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THE
DISCOVERY
OF THE
SCIENCE OF LANGUAGES.

VOL. I.

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LONDON :
Printed by A. SPOTTISWOODE,
New-Street-Square.

THE
DISCOVERY
Of the \bar{G}
SCIENCE OF LANGUAGES;

IN WHICH ARE SHOWN

THE REAL NATURE OF THE PARTS OF SPEECH;
THE MEANINGS WHICH* ALL WORDS CARRY IN THEMSELVES,
AS THEIR OWN DEFINITIONS;
AND THE ORIGIN OF WORDS, LETTERS, FIGURES, ETC.

BY MORGAN KAVANAGH.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS,
PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1844.

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P R E F A C E.

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THIS Work has, whilst going through the press, grown double in size; which circumstance, as so sudden and considerable an increase in its contents was not in the beginning anticipated, will account for its being several times referred to by its author, as a single volume. Hence, too, the reader, as he must be aware with what precipitation all productions of the mind, brought out in this way, are attended, cannot expect from this Work more than what is claimed for it—namely, that it contains, though put together hurriedly and without art, the clear and full communication of a discovery.

CONTENTS*

OF

THE FIRST VOLUME.

Philosophy of the human mind. Feeling of the public towards it. Title of this work. Quotations from Sir Charles Stoddart, Bacon, Horne Tooke's editor (Richard Taylor), and Lumsden, strengthened by observations from the author, tending to show the impossibility of great discoveries in philology.

What the author should do before attempting to prove the discovery of the science of languages. This he does, and a great deal more. What this is. Words carry in themselves their own meaning. Literal meaning of the names of the letters of the Greek alphabet to be given. Contents of the analysis of the English alphabet collectively considered, given. Advantages and difficulties attending the part of this discovery, by which the meaning of words may be found. Method proposed for communicating the discoveries of this work. We have been hitherto wholly unacquainted with the science of grammar. Proofs of this given. The difficulties alluded to in the opening of this work to be accounted for where the present discovery may be said to open. The great simplicity of this discovery. Peculiar order and style of this work

* This table of contents can be of service, as a means of reference, to such persons only as have read the work, of which, from its peculiar nature, no part can be understood without an intimate knowledge of all by which it is preceded. It should be also observed that, in order to bring the table within reasonable compass, it has been found necessary to leave unnoticed many observations and important discoveries.

accounted for. The author's resolution of frankly speaking his mind. End of what may be considered as an introduction to this work	- - - - -	Page 1—21
The substantive. Proof that this part of speech, as it is called, has not hitherto been known	- - - - -	21—24
Personal pronouns. Proof given that they are not, any more than substantives, what they have been taken for		24—40
The adjective. Proved that the greatest grammarians cannot at all account for this part of speech	- - - - -	40—58
Each of the six remaining parts of speech to be noticed in the proper place. Proofs given from the English language that this want of science is real and deplorable. The pronouns <i>mine, thine, ours, yours, his, hers, its, and theirs</i> , shown to be wholly unknown both as to meaning and grammar	- - - - -	58—71
Shown how a substantive in the possessive case is equally unknown. The English idiom vitiated in consequence of this ignorance	- - - - -	71—81
Origin of the possessive sign shown to be wholly unknown		81—87
Shown how the words called adjective pronouns cannot be accounted for by grammarians	- - - - -	87—94
Why the author has said this much of the principles of grammar	- - - - -	94, 95
View of the human mind. That taken by eminent philosophers inquired into, and found to be erroneous. The author's view of it	- - - - -	96—127
Words do not represent ideas. What sort of a language we should have if they did. What office words must fill with regard to the mind	- - - - -	127—131
How many parts of speech the author discovers there are. Shown what grammarians are likely to think of the great reduction made. All substances equally mental or ideal when spoken of	- - - - -	131—133
Proof that there are no such words as substantives or nouns		134, 135
Proof that all words called substantives are but names in the fourth degree of comparison. By this view are explained various difficulties already alluded to, and which no grammarians can account for	- - - - -	135—156
The author's pretensions	- - - - -	156—158

English noun in the possessive case accounted for. Discovery of the second possessive case. Its powerful meaning. The English idiom must be improved by a knowledge of it	Page 158—162
Discovery of the origin of the possessive sign. Various important observations. Advantages of this knowledge	162—171
Pronouns, supposed like nouns, but erroneously, to represent substances. They never represent nouns, as they have been supposed to do. Proof that they never stand for substances, nor can be, any more than nouns, the subject of propositions. Their real nature shown, and difficulties and locutions connected with them accounted for. The original form of <i>oh me!</i> and <i>ah me!</i> The nature of the ellipsis	171—187
The words <i>mine, thine, ours, yours, &c.</i> , of which both the meaning and grammatical properties have been hitherto unknown, accounted for	- - - 187—195
Adjective pronouns accounted for	- - - 195—200
Relative pronouns	- - - 200—208
Adverb, conjunction, and interjection	- - - 208—210
Prepositions, what they are, shown	- - - 210—218
Thus far the author pretends to have shown that there is but one part of speech	- - - 218, 219
The verb. Its importance. The part of speech which is known the least. Cause assigned. The word <i>to</i> wholly unknown. How is the word following <i>to</i> , supposed by the stoics to be the verb itself, to be accounted for? The verb following its nominative case? How is it to be accounted for? Why has the verb different endings? Who can account for <i>had</i> in “I have had a book,” or for <i>eu</i> in “J’ai eu un livre?”	
The participle past. The various accounts of the verb	219—237
The author’s account of the verb. Why it cannot be compared like the adjective. The verb is an adjective or name in the fourth degree. It does not represent an action. <i>To</i> and <i>do</i> . Shown how it does not represent an action, and how grammarians have been led to suppose that it does	237—250
The endings of English verbs discovered	- - - 250—259

- Why a verb agrees with its nominative case. The endings of French verbs discovered - - - Page 259—268
- The endings of French infinitives. To what the discovery of them leads - - - - - 268—273
- The author endeavours to account for the endings of Latin verbs. It is a difficult inquiry. The verb *to be*. How ignorant the learned have been of this word. Its primitive meaning discovered. Great importance of this discovery. Shown how it does not differ in meaning from the verb *to go*. How Latin verbs form their endings by means of *to go* or *to be* - - - - 273—292
- How men expressed themselves in the beginning of the world, when they had occasion to make use of the verb *to be*. Beauty and strength of their language. Poetry the most natural language. Why the ancients surpass the moderns in style and sentiment. What the learned have lost from their not having known the literal meaning of the times of a verb. Forceful instance given from Harris 292—298
- The nature of pronouns discovered. First indications of the way in which a plural number was in the beginning made, and how the meaning which words carry in themselves may be discovered. Further inquiries respecting the verb *to be*. The literal meaning of a past time. How articles fall behind the nouns they precede, and coalesce with them. The French past time *Je fus*, &c. accounted for. Here partly seen how the preterit of the verb *to have* does not imply possession. Meaning of the English word *time* (see note). Continuation of the forceful instance already given from Harris - - - - 298—316
- Inquiry into the nature of the imperfect tense of the verb *to be*, in both English and French. Important discovery. To what it leads - - - - 316—326
- The nature of a past participle in English and French . 326—347
- This knowledge of a past participle in French leads to a precious discovery. The ancient forms of Latin words discovered. Great antiquity of the form of French words. Ancient forms of words shown - - - 347—354
- How to find the etymology of words. Instances given: the meaning of *friend*, *mind*, *blind*, &c. shown. These ety-

mologies account for the growth of languages, and how men's words first became confounded -	Page 354—361
Latin pronouns. The endings of Latin nouns. Curious etymologies of many words. French datives -	361—376
Etymology of the English pronouns, <i>mine</i> , <i>thine</i> , <i>ours</i> , &c. Discovery of the origin of the plural sign <i>s</i> , &c.	376—382
French possessive pronouns. The meaning of <i>on</i> . How it happens that, with all people, this word meant <i>one</i> . Etymology of <i>sun</i> and <i>moon</i> with all people -	382—387
The French terminations <i>on</i> and <i>ien</i> , with the etymology of several words. The origin of the termination <i>ish</i> discovered. The etymology of the words, <i>Ireland</i> , <i>Scotland</i> , <i>Dublin</i> , with many other etymologies, and instances of the French termination <i>in</i> used as an article or pronoun	387—401

THE
DISCOVERY
OF THE
SCIENCE OF LANGUAGES.

OF all philosophy, that which inquires into the nature of the human mind is doubtless the most important; yet it is allowed by philosophers themselves, that this is the part of their science of which they happen to have the least certain knowledge. Thus Dr. Reid remarks, "The difficulty attending our inquiry into the powers of the mind serves to account for some events respecting this branch of philosophy which deserve to be mentioned. Whilst most branches of science have, either in ancient or in modern times, been highly cultivated, and brought to a considerable degree of perfection, this remains to this day in a very low state, and as it were in its infancy."* And a late French philosopher of repute expresses thus his wonder at our being still so ignorant of the laws of reasoning: "Quelle peut être la cause

* Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind, i. 98. *

d'une ignorance qui sembleroit si peu naturelle ? Comment se fait-il que l'art de raisonner se montre avec tant de perfection, dans les chefs-d'œuvre du génie et que la théorie de cet art soit encore si imparfaite ?" *

Notwithstanding these admissions, which prove the necessity of further inquiry, there is perhaps no pursuit after useful knowledge which the public of the present day feel less inclined to encourage, or put any faith in, than the one in question. But this indifference cannot arise from any real apathy or slight that men now entertain relative to a subject of so much real importance as that which tends to bring them better acquainted with their own minds; it rather proceeds from their hopelessness of ever receiving, through the medium of books, any further knowledge respecting this question than they have already; and which knowledge, notwithstanding the great merit of several of the men from whom it has been received, they find after all to be of a very dubious character.

From the conviction that I am not mistaken in my opinion respecting the feelings now generally entertained towards subjects relating to the mind, I should consider it a mere waste of words to allude to that part of my discovery, were it not in my power to prove its truth and importance by offering to the world *The Science of Lan-*

* Laromiguière, Leçons de Philosophie, tom. i. 14.

guages, which it has been my good fortune to discover through its means.

The title of this book, which wholly refers to this latter part of my discovery — as it must at first sight startle all who see it, from its being of a nature to call up a deal of doubt and misgiving — has cost me some serious thinking; so that I cannot persuade myself but that I now know its full force and extent, and need not be told what it implies. However, as some persons, notwithstanding the positiveness of this assertion, may on this head differ from me in opinion, and be desirous of offering an explanation of their own, I do here, in order to spare them this trouble, think it necessary to transcribe from a very high authority a passage which probably takes in all, or the most part of what they may have to say on this subject: — “The ancient grammarians who treated of the Greek and Roman languages, as well as those who in the middle ages cultivated the Arabic and its kindred dialects, and those whose disquisitions on Indian philology have been laid open to us by recent discoveries, all agree in founding the science of grammar on that of the mental operations. *Nothing but extreme vanity can lead us to suppose that all the great men, who have ever considered this subject before ourselves, have been involved in a more than Bæotian mist of ignorance; and that we alone can dispel the cloud by a single electric flash.* The more modest and rational student will confess with the amiable author of ‘Hermes.’ that ‘there is one truth

like the sun which has enlightened human intelligence through every age, and saved it from the darkness of both sophistry and error.' *It may be safely adopted as a general observation, that the man who tells you the whole world was ignorant of any particular subject until he arose to set them right, is himself* EGREGIOUSLY IN THE WRONG. The study of grammar indeed, like all other studies, is susceptible of gradual improvement; but if we admit that the ancients had a tolerable insight into the powers and operations of the human mind, we must acknowledge that they could not be entirely ignorant of the modes in which those powers and operations were manifested by language." *

The following passage from the same respectable authority, is still more positive:—“In grammar we have been told that a certain writer of recent date (Horne Tooke) dispelled, ‘by a single electric flash of genius,’ the obscurity which hung over the whole science. It is the duty of the encyclopædist to correct such errors in point of fact, and to expose such absurdity in point of opinion. In physical science there may be discoveries which go to alter much of our general reasoning on all subjects connected with those discoveries. Substances altogether unknown, organisations never before suspected to exist, may be rendered obvious by experiment. *But in the sciences which depend on a knowledge of the human mind, it is altogether*

* Sir Charles Stoddart. (See his Essay on Universal Grammar, Encyclopædia Metropolitana, i. 4.)

*weak and absurd to suppose that any such improvement can exist. By industry and attention we may perhaps be enabled to methodise some portions of every such science better, or even to correct, in some degree, their general arrangement; but we cannot possibly find in them any one topic which has not been admirably handled by some philosopher, ancient or modern; and as to the great leading systematic principles on which they respectively depend, these will generally be found to have been established from the highest antiquity.”**

The above passages are nowise weakened by the following, which is also from the same writer:—
 “It is far from our intention to assert, that universal grammar has been hitherto so successfully cultivated as to leave to future investigation no hope of improving this science. Its principles have certainly been nowhere laid down with that happy and lucid order, which has rendered Euclid’s elements, for above two thousand years, a text book in geometry. Much, however, has been done. *The ancient Greek and Latin writers have traced all the principal paths of the labyrinth*; elegant edifices have been raised in modern times by such writers as Scantius, Vossius, the writers of Port Royal, and the learned and amiable Harris.†”

And as I have derived no assistance whatever from books, or the etymology of words, in making this discovery, but have ever studied my own mind,

Encyclopædia Metropolitana, i. 60.

† Ibid. 12.

to which method I feel alone indebted, I beg to transcribe from other authorities one or two passages more, in order to anticipate the observations of such persons as suppose we can produce nothing by working upon the mind; and also of those who assert that all reasoning upon language must be vain, if not derived from a knowledge of the history of words: — “The wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby: *but if it work upon itself*, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of the thread and work, but of no substance or profit.” *

The above is strengthened by the following observation from Horne Tooke’s learned editor †: — “Reasonings on language, not deduced from the real history of words, are of about the same value as speculations in astronomy or chemistry unsupported by an acquaintance with the phenomena of nature.” ‡

The following observation, which is from a writer who appears to have seriously considered the subject of grammar, will be found favourable to all the foregoing opinions, and consequently severe on the title of this book. The *classification* to which he

* Bacon.

† Richard Taylor, F.S.A., F.L.S.

‡ Diversions of Purley, ed. 1840, Additional Notes, p. 53.

alludes, regards the parts of speech and their functions:—"Now it appears to me, that the principle which has given occasion to this *classification* is plainly founded on the *clearest logic*; nor can it ever, as a matter of necessity, lead to any absurdity whatever, though much absurdity has been very strangely imputed of late years to some of the deductions naturally arising out of it."*

To all those observations it may be added, that the science in question is not like astronomy or chemistry, which can be approached only by a select few; but that grammar, on account of the small portion of acquired knowledge considered necessary towards enabling every one to inquire into its principles, lies open, not only to men of superior minds and great learning, but to the scrutiny of the multitude; and that over the whole face of the civilised world it has thus lain since the earliest times.—Hence a discovery equalling in magnitude the one to which I lay claim, must appear to all, before examining its accompanying proofs, just about as probable as the discovery, in the neighbourhood of the British Channel, of some rich and extensive island that had, escaped till now the mariner's notice. Then am I either egregiously in error, or, through my humble means, one of the greatest and most important discoveries on record has been made.

* Lumsden's Persian Grammar, Introduction.

But before attempting to prove the discovery of the science of languages, I should show that men have hitherto had no such science, and that consequently it remains to be discovered. I should also give instances of the disadvantages we have been under for the want of such a science. In other words, I should, before taking the reader to that part of this work at which the discovery in question opens, show, in a manner admitting of no doubt, that the meaning attached to those words called the parts of speech cannot bear investigation when made to undergo in a proposition a logical analysis. And I should afterwards, in order to prove the bad effects of this evident want of science, give numerous instances of disagreement amongst eminent grammarians with regard to their definitions of the parts of speech, and show their total inability to account for certain words and phrases in familiar use. If I can succeed in proving this much in such a manner as to admit of no doubt, I shall have proved that we have hitherto had no such science as that called universal grammar; and that consequently, if there be such a science in existence, it remains to be discovered. If afterwards, from having taken a view of the human mind different from any other hitherto taken, and from having founded a rational principle in conformity with this view, I can offer such a definition of words as may bear the strictest investigation, and which all may understand; and if a child, by adhering to this principle, may be able to account

for words with all their changes and variations, and show them such as they must have been, not only ages before the Bible and the Iliad had been written, but even as they were at their very birth ; then it will, I dare hope, be admitted, that I shall not only have surmounted innumerable difficulties, but have discovered the real science of languages. Yet all this, and a great deal more, may be done by the application of the principle by which I am guided. Thus, not only may words be accounted for as to their present and past forms, but even the meaning which they do, unknown to us, carry in themselves as their own definitions, may be shown. For I have discovered that when men first made words, it was not by chance ; but that they reasoned just as they do at the present hour whenever they give a new name to any object : that is, each word was so made as to tell its own meaning ; so that men needed in this respect no explanation, any more than they do at present for such compound words as room-window, street-door, &c., which visibly carry in themselves their own definition. But I go still farther. When, by the application of my system, I shall have thus accounted for words in every way, from their present state to their very birth, I shall inquire into the nature of letters themselves, and account for their origin and formation. Thus I shall give the literal meaning of the names of the letters of the Greek alphabet, of which the learned have hitherto known nothing ; they having

been content to suppose that names of such length as Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, &c., had been given to these letters without any meaning having been attached to them by the wise men who composed and ranged them as they now stand.

This account of the Greek alphabet will lead to the elucidation of all others, provided the names of the letters have been preserved. That the reader may have in advance some notion of this manner of analysing words, and discovering their hidden meaning, I beg here to give, for the present, the contents of the analysis of the English alphabet *collectively* considered; that is, not as to what each letter means when read by itself, but as to what they all mean when read together in the following order:—

A B C D E F G H I (or J) K L M N O P Q

R S T U (or V) W X Y Z;

of which the literal meaning in modern English is—*This first book is had of the Jews; it opens the mind, and is good breeding and wisdom.* I shall show in the proper place how this meaning may be found in the above characters.

This part of my discovery will, I have no doubt, throw a great light on the religious and civil history of ancient times. In its application it sometimes offers serious difficulties; but to judge from the progress which I have myself already made in the use of it, it must, when before the public, become in a very short time thoroughly known. I intend towards the close of this work giving numerous instances

of this manner of analysing words, in order to discover their hidden meaning: but were I to offer them to the reader any sooner, it were to depart from the order I have chosen of communicating my discoveries; which is to give them in the manner they came to me, with the same train of thought and reasoning they called up prior to their being made. I prefer this method from its being the most natural and simple, and because I hope by it to be the more easily understood. For though my discoveries are mostly about as evident as any thing in Euclid, still, as they are new to the world, and require, previous to their being received as truths, the disagreeable admission that we have been hitherto in error; some art, besides downright logical persuasion, will be necessary towards bringing the mind friendly to them. The sole art I wish to employ towards their being thus well received, is to present them progressively and slowly to the reader; showing him how they rise out of one another, and thus putting him in the way of making them by himself long before he is brought to the place where they are made.

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That we have hitherto, though wholly unacquainted with the science of grammar, known from long observation many circumstances connected with it, I admit; but that we could, since languages have been in their infancy, trace those circumstances to their sources, I wholly deny. Thus that words often vary on account of number,

gender, person, case, and tense, has been observed by all grammarians, and rules have been made accordingly; but how these changes in the same word first occurred, or what they do now literally mean, we have never been told. Thus every body knows that the letter *s* is the sign of the plural number in English, and several other languages; but why it is an *s* any more than a *t* or a *u*, or how the simple idea of plurality was first named, nobody can imagine. In like manner every body knows that such endings as *are*, *ēre*, *ěre*, and *ire* are, in Latin, signs of what grammarians call the infinitive mood; but why these endings are employed for such a purpose, more than any others of three letters each, or what their meaning is, men are equally embarrassed to divine. Indeed it is the general opinion that these, and all similar difficulties, cannot be accounted for; the reason assigned by the most competent judges being, that we have as yet seen no language in its infancy, and so improving progressively to a settled state.*

Hence such knowledge as we have hitherto had of language, considered with regard to its science, is derived from observation only, and not from the application of a wise principle. Thus the shepherd, wholly ignorant of astronomy, knows very

* "We have as yet witnessed no people in the act of forming their language, and cannot therefore from experience demonstrate the simple elements from which a language begins, nor the additional organisation which it gradually receives." — Sharon Turner, *Hist. of the Anglo-Saxons*, i. 101.

well, from his having frequently remarked the circumstance, at what time the sun rises or sets, or in what quarter of the heavens this happens; and he may, in conformity with such observations, regulate his hours: but this is not to know astronomy. Yet as much, but not a particle more, have men deeply versed in the study of languages, hitherto known of the science of grammar.

I might, by requiring an explanation of the difficulties to which allusion has just been made, prove that we have hitherto had no such science as that of *grammār*; but though these are, when known, very simple, as we shall see later, yet we may for the present pass them by as entirely beyond the reach of any man's power to solve, to come to something far more plain and palpable — I mean the parts of speech as they are called; such as the noun, pronoun, adjective, &c. For the present I wish to go no farther than these three parts, as they are those about which grammarians have the least doubt and discussion; for ninety-nine grammarians in the hundred having, as they suppose, a very distinct idea of what these three parts of speech imply, can with difficulty believe any body else to be ignorant of their real nature. Yet I can easily prove, and in such a manner as to bring my reasoning within the reach of the dullest understanding, that of these three classes of words — which are by far the most simple of the nine — no philosopher, logician, or grammarian, no matter how learned or intelligent he is

allowed to be, can have known any thing correctly beyond what is derived from mere observation : which evident want of knowledge is by no means to be attributed to a want of capacity, but to our total want of the science of languages.

Therefore, previous to my showing what those parts of speech really are, and what has kept us till now in such ignorance of them, as well as of all the others, I mean to give, by referring to the English language, numerous and evident proofs of the evil effects produced by the want of such useful knowledge. In doing this, I shall have occasion to show, that neither as to meaning, nor as to grammar, can certain locutions and words, though in hourly use amongst us, be accounted for ; that is, while we allow ourselves to be guided by the principles of grammar as they have been hitherto known. Thus I shall be able to prove, that no grammarian or lexicographer can explain, either as to grammar, meaning, or etymology, any of the following familiar little words, *mine, thine, ours, yours, theirs, his, hers* ; nor, in these respects (meaning, grammar, and etymology), account for a substantive in the possessive case. Yet the pronouns *mine, thine, &c.* may be made in some way or other to refer to every word in the English language ; and the words which take the possessive sign (*'s*), are very numerous indeed.

Hence to be ignorant of the real meaning of such multitudes of words, and not to be able to account

grammatically or critically as to meaning, for any one sentence into which they enter, is a serious loss of scientific knowledge; not to mention the disagreeableness arising out of doubt and fruitless discussion, to which such real ignorance must frequently give rise, amongst such persons as prefer truth to error, or who seek to be critically acquainted with the principles of a language and the meaning of its words. I shall also have occasion to show that this want of grammatical science, generally considered, goes much farther; that it is the cause why no philosopher, logician, or grammarian can, without uttering as great an absurdity as that one and one make four, show the exact difference as to meaning between the terms of the most simple proposition; and that it often leads the most enlightened to adopt vicious locutions, to the great detriment of the English idiom, not only with regard to the pronouns *mine*, *thine*, *ours*, &c., and the use of nouns in the possessive case; but also as to other words and locutions frequently employed. And whilst proving those particular points, I shall have frequent occasion to show the disagreement of eminent grammarians among themselves respecting the most simple and familiar words; which disagreement could never happen, not only amongst learned men, but even amongst children, had the science of languages been hitherto known.

Until I come to the part at which this discovery

may be said to open, it would be premature to attempt accounting for any of the difficulties to which allusion will be made in this first part; and then the reader may often have occasion to wonder how any thing so uncommonly simple as this science appears to be could, on the first rude application made of it, lead to such a number of useful and important discoveries. This will, I know, go a great way with such minds as cannot judge of any mental operation unless by material truths, towards obtaining for this system the right of its being considered the real science of languages. But it has another quality—the one to which allusion has just been made—that ought to go still farther towards obtaining this title for it, and proving the purity of its origin—I mean its astonishing simplicity. From what little we know of the human mind, I cannot believe it capable, however perfect its powers of imagination, of inventing or even distantly conceiving any system so natural, so logical, and withal so easy to be understood, as the one now brought to light. These are qualities of so high an order, and so rarely to be met with even in the sublimest productions of genius, that it is difficult to believe the system through which they prevail so constantly, as they do through the one in question, to be any thing less than a pure science. Yet up to the present hour it has been as *utterly unknown* as the science of astronomy was at that remote period when our globe

was supposed to be stationary, and the sun to travel round it every day.*

My desire of being fully and easily understood by all classes of readers, may sometimes in the following pages lead me into minute details and repetitions of which I might not be otherwise guilty. This I am aware passes for a serious fault with certain persons of slight experience and knowledge as to the different powers of different capacities; for being perhaps themselves of quick apprehension, they fancy all others must be equally so. But they would be more indulgent had they ever remarked that many intelligent persons acquire knowledge with great difficulty, and that it is often necessary not only to tell them the same thing several times over, but even to present it under various forms,

* This period is farther back than two thousand years, since Pythagoras, who lived about 530 years before Christ, declared the sun to be stationary, and the earth alone to be in motion. But even fifty years earlier, Thales calculated eclipses with great accuracy. Surely, with so much knowledge, the world may be allowed, in those early times, to have known astronomy, notwithstanding the splendid discoveries that have been since made in this science. Yet the earliest opinions come down to us from the philosophers of antiquity, respecting the nature and power of words, prove that on this serious subject man's mind has undergone no change with the lapse of ages. Thus those words called substantives and verbs were allowed by Plato and Aristotle to be in a proposition what they are at the present hour. This must appear the more extraordinary when we remark that it is through the means of words we make all discoveries, and that without their use we might be now herding in rocks and caverns. And that our knowledge of words has not with time improved will appear still more extraordinary, when we bear in mind that it is to our want of being more critically acquainted with them, eminent writers have attributed the very slight progress that has been made in philosophy, which science philosophers themselves allow to be even yet in its very infancy.

in order to bring them fully acquainted with its contents. In the communication of any art or science, writers would do well to suppose their readers as entirely composed of the latter class. When they compose an idle fiction, of which the merit lies mostly in the style, they may — as their not being clearly understood is then of little or no consequence (nay, in our times it appears to be a merit) — follow if they think fit a different course.

And such persons as do not approve of the manner and order in which the parts of this work appear conjointly with the various reflections and proofs belonging to them, will please to bear in mind that I have promised to give my discovery, not perhaps as I ought to give it, nor as it is natural to suppose it might have been made by others, but just as I have happened to make it myself, with the same train of thought and reasoning — however imperfect this may be — to which it gave birth at the time. Were I to adopt a different method, I might, it is true, render this work less faulty and more acceptable to public taste, generally considered; but this were, after all — at least as far as the reasoning powers of one human mind are considered, of which I wish this work to be a faithful picture — a departure from both truth and nature.

This much may serve as an introduction to the following pages. The reader will by it perceive that I must be at least acquainted with the importance of the subject upon which I am about to enter, if not with its contents. And as I quote

no authority who admits the want of, or the possibility of making such a discovery as the science of languages, but do, on the contrary, endeavour to show that the united wisdom of all mankind, from the earliest times down to the present hour, tends to prove the impossibility of both the one and the other, he will feel convinced, that I must be either egregiously ignorant of the nature of the subject I attempt to treat, or that I have the most profound conviction of my discovery being real. For he will allow that though a man's vanity may often lead him to entertain a very strange opinion of himself, it can never, while he is outside the walls of a madhouse, render him so ridiculously extravagant as to induce him to believe that by far the most popular of all sciences, one which must have attracted the attention of all men who ever studied or taught a language, or who did in any way bestow a serious thought on the use of words, could have remained till now *utterly unknown* to all men except to himself. Such an opinion goes far beyond the reach of petty vanity, and can only proceed from an entirely mistaken view of the subject submitted to inquiry, or from the most positive conviction, such as mathematical demonstration affords, that it is not one's self, but all others that have been mistaken.

This, the reader may remark, is the second or third time that I have, whilst referring to the knowledge we have hitherto had of the science of grammar, made use of the words *utterly unknown*,

which I beg once for all to explain by declaring, that I do not believe there is to be found a single observation in any work existing, to prove that men have now or have ever had, since languages were in their infancy, the least scientific knowledge of so much as one word or one letter. Thus to take the two most simple instances I can think of, namely, the two first parts of speech, and the two first letters of the alphabet, I do mean to say that nobody living can show from any grammatical work ever published, so much as what a substantive or an adjective is, or in what the one differs from the other; and that, scientifically speaking, he must be equally ignorant of the letters A and B.

I am sorry that the resolution I have formed, of frankly speaking my mind throughout this work, obliges me to express myself as I do here and elsewhere with such an apparent want of modesty; but were I to adopt, with regard to this discovery and the knowledge we have hitherto had of the science of grammar, what is understood by a more becoming and humble tone, I should, by doing so, lose in truth what I might gain by affected modesty, since I should not only be speaking falsely, but be leading the reader into error by concealing from him my real opinion, which I should by no means do. And if while it be allowed, as I am sure it must, that though I do well to speak as I think, it be observed that this is not a reason why I should think as I do—that is, so presumptuously—I beg to reply, that if I had never *thought*

so, this discovery had never been attempted, and much less made; for notwithstanding what the world may say about the modesty of certain great men, I do in my heart believe that such modesty has been ever affected, and that it is wholly impossible that any thing great may be undertaken or achieved but where there is at bottom great presumption, which is, after all, nothing more than a consciousness of one's own strength.

THE SUBSTANTIVE.

PROOF THAT THIS PART OF SPEECH, AS IT IS CALLED, HAS NOT
HITHERTO BEEN KNOWN.

The accounts given of this word are various, though less so than of any other: but there is one circumstance connected with it that precludes the necessity of copying these different accounts; it is, that all philosophers, logicians, and grammarians concur, without a single exception, in making it represent both mental and corporeal substances, or, in other words, to stand for them. Thus, in this sentence: "The good man loves peace," the word *man* is allowed to stand for the corporeal substance bearing this name, since it is here said to be the subject or nominative case; and *peace* is in like manner allowed to stand for the mental substance so named, and is here said to be the object of the verb *loves*. In like manner if I say, "This boy is studious," or, "My brother is studious," every body

will admit that the two words, *boy* and *brother*, stand here for two substances; and they are, for this reason, said to be subjects or nominatives, like all words when in a similar manner situated with regard to verbs; that is, when appearing to be their agents. But if they follow a verb or a preposition, they are also considered as standing for substances, and they are hence, when in such a situation, said to be OBJECTS. The words called Substantives being thus made by all grammarians to stand for substances, it matters little how they disagree in their definitions of this part of speech. Let us now see how well this general notion of a substantive can bear examination. "This *boy* is my *brother*." Have we in this sentence two words standing for two substances? The grammarian says that we have, but common sense tells us that we have not, since there is but one individual presented to our notice. *Boy* and *brother* are said to be corporeal substances, that is, such substances as we may see or feel if we look at them or lay our hands upon them. Now if we endeavour to do so in the instance before us, how many substances are we likely to feel or to see? Every body will say only one. Then which is that one? is it boy or is it brother? Every body will again answer, it is as much the one as the other. Then do the words called substantives stand for substances, or is it only sometimes they do so? The reader will please to remark, that in the instances "this boy is studious," and "my brother is studious," the words *boy* and *brother* are preceded by the same

words — *this* and *my* — that precede them in the instance, *this boy is my brother*; hence it is difficult to conceive that these words can be, in those instances, different parts of speech. If they represent substances in one situation, it is clear that they must do so in the other. If we say this man is my *chief*, and this man is my *chief* friend, grammarians may, with some appearance of reason, say that the word *chief*, in both those places, does not belong to the same class of words, it being in the former situation what they call a substantive, and in the latter what they call an adjective. But the words *boy* and *brother* cannot be thus made to change their signification. However this may be, every body will assert that in “this boy is my brother,” *boy* is at least the subject or nominative case, which is to make it stand for substance. Then how are we to consider *brother*? has it here a different meaning from that which it bears in “*my brother is studious?*” if it has, this is very strange indeed; since it is evidently the same word, is preceded by the same word, and seems to mean exactly the same thing. Then are substantives the words they have been ever thought to be? that is, do they stand for substances in a proposition, or do they only do so sometimes? Let us take other examples: In “this building is very high,” the word *building* is allowed to be the subject of this proposition; and in “the church is very high,” *church* is in like manner allowed to be the subject. From this we perceive that both those words are made to stand

for substances. Then how are we to consider them in "this building is the church?" In this instance they appear to have precisely the same meaning they had before; yet they do not stand for two substances, for our senses tell us there is only one substance referred to, since there is only one object contemplated. And which is that one? is it building, or is it church? it is evidently as much the one as it is the other, and hence both words may change places without occasioning any alteration in the meaning of the sentence; as, "the church is this building," or "this building is the church," have exactly the same meaning.

Let us take other instances: "*will* is strong;" "*power* is strong." In both these instances *will* and *power* are allowed to be subjects, and to stand for two mental substances, or abstract ideas. Yet when we say "*will is power*," we perceive this to be impossible, for *will* cannot be itself and *power* also, any more than one thing can be itself and another thing also. Yet we say with great propriety *will is power*, and in the French language this expression has become a proverb — *vouloir est pouvoir* — just as *knowledge is power*, *gratitude is justice*, *honesty is policy*, &c. have become proverbs with us. To account for such propositions must have always seriously puzzled logicians. Locke referring to them says, "All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of sounds. For since no abstract idea can be the same with any

other but itself, when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term, it can signify no more but this, *that it may or ought to be called by that name, or that these two names signify the same idea.* Thus should any one say that parsimony is frugality, that gratitude is justice, that this or that action is or is not temperate ; however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem, yet when we come to press them, and examine nicely what they contain, we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms.”* We call the reader’s attention to the words in italics: they contain a great deal of error, simply because this great man had not the most distant conception of the real nature of a substantive ; yet what he here asserts is very logical, when we take into consideration what he understood a substantive to be. In the proposition *gratitude is justice, justice* does not exactly signify, as he supposes, the idea named gratitude ; for if this were the case, those two terms might in this instance be made to change places without any alteration occurring in the sense, agreeably to the observation I have already made in the instance “this building is the church ;” and I may add, agreeably also to an observation made by Locke himself when speaking elsewhere of the terms *body* and *matter*: his words are : “ If the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put

* Locke’s Essay concerning the Human Understanding, vol. iii. b. 4. c. 8. sect. Predication in Abstract.

for one another.”* . Hence *gratitude* and *justice* are not precisely the same, for we cannot say indifferently, “justice is gratitude,” and “gratitude is justice;” that is, without wholly changing the sense. In this short passage is also another instance of Locke’s inconsistency. He says, “If the ideas these two terms stood for.” Now terms can never stand for ideas; and this he would have known, had he clearly understood himself when he remarked, “To form a clear notion of truth, it is very necessary to consider truth of thought and truth of words distinctly one from another: but yet it is very difficult to treat of them asunder; because it is unavoidable in treating of mental propositions to make use of words; and then the instances of mental propositions cease immediately to be barely mental, and become verbal. For a mental proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas as they are in our minds, stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as they are put into words.”†

This is very true; and hence terms, which are only words, can never stand for ideas. Locke, from his not knowing the true cause of the wise and original truth here expressed, has derived no advantage from it. I shall have occasion to refer again to this passage.

But how are we to consider the proposition,

* Human Understanding, vol. ii. b. 3. c. 10. sect. Instance in Matter:

† Vol. iii. p. 2.

“Gratitude is justice?” It is clear that Locke can make nothing of it; yet it is neither specious (as he supposes) nor faulty: it is just as correct as “Knowledge is power,” which though very pure and logical, as we shall see hereafter, cannot be accounted for according to the principles of logic or grammar; that is to say, as these principles have been hitherto understood. As to the first proposition (parsimony is frugality) in the passage just quoted from Locke, there is so close an affinity between these two terms, *parsimony* and *frugality*, that were they alone referred to when he talks about two names signifying the same idea, there would be an appearance of truth in his assertion; but as the difference between *gratitude* and *justice* is immense, this observation will not at all apply to such terms. But what similarity is there to be found between *action* and *temperate* in the instance, “this or that action is or is not temperate?” or how can Locke call this a specious proposition? The truth is, to censure such a proposition is to reason very logically, when we believe, as every body does, that words stand for ideas. For if *action* represents one idea, and *temperate* another idea, and if no idea can be itself and another idea at the same time, it must appear very absurd to say that *gratitude* is justice, or that “this action is temperate;” just as absurd as to say, that this house is that house. But here we have alluded to an adjective (*temperate*) which we should not do yet. It is enough to let the reader see in advance

that the nature of this word is not known any more than that of the substantive. But elsewhere Locke denies altogether the propriety of forming propositions composed of two abstract names. Thus whilst considering abstract and concrete terms he says, "Each abstract idea being distinct, so that of any two, the one can never be the other, the mind will, by its intuitive knowledge, perceive their difference; and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can be affirmed one of another. This we see in the common use of language which permits not any two abstract words, or names of abstract ideas, to be affirmed one of another."* This reasoning is, as we have already remarked, very logical, when we consider that Locke knew nothing of the nature of a substantive, and that he wholly mistook its meaning.

Few men have, however, written more forcibly than he has done upon the evils arising in discussion out of an ignorance of the real meaning of words. He saw, with other great philosophers, that it is only by them we may ever expect to become intimate with the human mind. Horne Tooke, though he knew no more of a substantive than Locke did, makes a very wise remark, if not an original one, when he says, "The perfections of language not properly understood have been one of the chief causes of the imperfections of our philosophy. And, indeed, from numberless passages throughout his Essay, Mr. Locke seems to me to

* Human Understanding, vol. ii. b. 3. ch. 8.

have suspected something of this sort; and especially from what he hints in his last chapter, where, speaking of the doctrine of signs, he says, — ‘The consideration, then, of *ideas* and *words* as the great instrument of knowledge makes no despicable part of their contemplation who would take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And, perhaps, if they were *distinctly* weighed and *duly* considered, they would afford us *another sort of logick* and *critick* than we have hitherto been acquainted with.’” *

Dugald Stewart also observes, that a logical acquaintance with language is most essential towards guarding against errors in reasoning; and he very wisely adds: “The branch in particular to which the foregoing observations more immediately relate *must for ever remain in its infancy* till a most difficult and important desideratum in the history of the mind is supplied by an explanation of the gradual steps by which it acquires the use of the various classes of words which compose the language of a cultivated and enlightened people.” †

Now of the various classes of words here alluded to, that is, the parts of speech, nobody has hitherto known as much as one. Even the learned members of Port Royal knew no more than other great men the nature of a substantive, and this want of knowledge has greatly embarrassed them in their endeavours to account logically for the sacred

* Horne Tooke, edition 1840, p. 19.

† Elements of Philosophy, p. 214.

words, *This is my body*, that is, This bread is my body. It appears from the preface to the fifth edition of their Logic, that the ministers of those days had complained respecting the manner in which the proposition here alluded to was explained by the members of Port Royal. These learned men suppose that in *This is my body* there are two subjects; and as they do not pretend to determine whether those words are to be taken in a figurative sense or as a reality, the only difficulty they have to account for is, how one body can be itself, and another body AT THE SAME TIME. This they endeavour to explain, by supposing that there are two times meant, and that the meaning of the proposition is, "*this* which is bread in *this moment* is my body in *that other moment*." "*Ceci qui est du pain dans ce moment ici, est mon corps dans cet autre moment.*"* This is to take a great liberty with the text, in which there is no allusion made to different times, and for this there would have been no necessity if they knew what a substantive is. As this question must have drawn, when it was agitated, the attention of all France, on account of its religious importance, and the great celebrity of the parties engaged upon it, one would think it was a moment when men were likely to discover the nature of a substantive. Now when we decline, as we ought, the figurative or symbolical meaning of this proposition, and endeavour to explain only the apparent singularity it

* Logique, p. 192.

contains with regard to time, for in this all the embarrassment lies, it is not more difficult to account for "This is my body," or "This bread is my body," than it is to account for such a proposition as, "This book is my property," as all must admit when they see what a substantive really is.

Several distinguished logicians have endeavoured to account for two substantives, when one is in a proposition made the attribute of the other, by supposing that the attribute ought to be considered as an adjective, and the subject as a substantive. Thus Dumarsais, referring to observations he had previously made respecting substantive and adjective pronouns, adds, — "*Ces reflexions servent à décider si ces mots père, roi, et autres semblables, sont adjectifs ou substantifs. Louis XV. est roi; roi qualifie Louis XV.; donc roi est là adjectif.*" But Messieurs de Port Royal, though they adopt this opinion in their Grammar, do not refer to it in order to explain the proposition in question. We shall see, when we come to the adjective, that Condillac and Horne Tooke combat this opinion of such substantives being adjectives. But how does Condillac, whose penetration was so great, and whose grammar is, in the opinion of a very great grammarian, the best ever written*, account for a proposition in which one substantive is the attribute of another?

* La Grammaire de Condillac est sans contredit l'ouvrage le plus parfait qui existe en ce genre dans aucune langue. (See Thurot's translation of *Hermes*; *Discours Préliminaire*, page c.)

“Quand les deux termes d’une proposition ne sont pas identiques, il n’y a donc entre eux d’autre différence, si non que le substantif qui est l’attribut est toujours plus général que le substantif qui est le sujet.”*

Now in the instance, “This bread is my body,” the two terms, *bread* and *body*, are not identical; since we may not say indifferently, “My body is this bread;” yet *body* is not more general than *bread*, for both terms are limited to a definite sense by the words *this* and *my* by which they are preceded. Condillac as well as Locke admits that when the two terms of the proposition are identical, they may without occasioning any change in the sense of the proposition be made to change places with one another.† But when Condillac made this observation he was thinking of the proposition *Corneille est un poëte*‡, of which the latter term (poëte) happens to be indefinite, and the former definite. Had he known the real nature of a substantive he could have never fallen into this error. In the instance “knowledge is power,” the terms are not identical, for they cannot be used one for the other indifferently, and both are equally general.

But how does Harris, whose Hermes is allowed to be “the most beautiful and perfect example of analysis that has been exhibited since the days of

* Gram. Analyse de la Proposition, c. xii.

† See his Grammar, second part, chap. xxvi.

‡ See his Grammar, first part, chap. xii.

Aristotle," understand the terms of a proposition when composed of two substantives? Why he denies that substantives can be attributes; and Locke, as we have already seen, seems to be of the same opinion. But in the Greek language one substantive is frequently made the attribute of another, and Harris himself, giving an instance of a proposition, and thinking of one in Greek, quotes such a proposition.* But, chapter the third of the same book, he seems to recollect his notion of a substantive, which is, that it represents a substance and not a quality; and hence he asserts that substantives are not, and cannot by *their nature* be, attributes. The words he alludes to when making this assertion are, *air* and *beams*.† Yet if we are asked what is the thin fluid that surrounds our earth, and in which birds fly, may we not with propriety answer, "that fluid is air?" And if allusion be made to a very small portion of light, such as appears through a chink or a crevice, we may say, "that light is a ray or a beam." In which instances *air*, *ray*, and *beam*, have as much right to be considered attributes, as the word *happiness* has to be considered one in "pleasure is happiness." But Harris, like Locke, reasons wisely when he asserts that one substantive cannot be the attribute of another. One substantive is, however, and with great propriety, the attribute of another; but then a substantive is not what Locke

* See book ii. chap. 1., instance, "pleasure is happiness."

† *Attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made.*—HEERMES.

and Harris have supposed. Hence, when Condillac, and other great grammarians, are of opinion that substantives may be the attributes of other substantives, they forget what they understand by a substantive; and, though they are less in error than Locke and Harris, they are not so logical.

All this proves that hitherto the most eminent authorities have had a very imperfect notion of what a substantive really is, and that consequently they could never analyze, or give a critical account of, any proposition in which a substantive is the attribute.

PERSONAL PRONOUNS

appear, after substantives, to be those words about which there is the least discussion; and, as the general impression is that they are the exact substitutes of substantives, every body who believes he has a correct notion of the one class cannot entertain a doubt as to his knowledge of the other.

As the following account of the pronoun will be found to correspond with the idea which all grammarians entertain of this word, I see no necessity for quoting other authorities on this subject: "To avoid repeating the same words when the same objects were often presented in a discourse, it was found necessary to form words which might express the substances without repeating them. Hence the origin of pronouns; *i. e.* the representatives of nouns."*

* Encyclopædia Londinensis, p. 763.

Thus all logicians and grammarians concur in making them represent substances, just as they do with substantives. Hence in "I read," the word *I* is, we are told, the subject or nominative; and *he* in "he reads" is accounted for after a similar manner; which proves that personal pronouns are really made to stand for substances.

Now, this being admitted, how are we to find two substances in the proposition "I am he," which is, we are told by Harris, very good English?"*

Grammarians having classed the word *IT* among personal pronouns, make it also represent substance. Thus, if referring to a book, we say, "*it* is instructive;" the word *it* is allowed to be the subject of the proposition, just as the word *book*, if put in its place, would be. Now, this being also admitted, how are we to account for such a proposition as "*it is I*," or *it is he*, or *it is she*, which forms make also, we are told, very good English; whereas "*it is me*," "*it is him*," and "*it is her*," are allowed by all distinguished grammarians, with the exception of one (Dr. Priestley), to be very

* It is good sense, as well as good grammar, to say, in any language, "*I am he*."—*Hermes*, p. 75. It is Bishop Lowth, himself a distinguished grammarian, and perhaps the most elegant scholar of the age in which he lived, who bestows, whilst referring to the subject of grammar, on this celebrated work the following high eulogium, to the concluding part of which allusion has been already made:—"Those who enter more deeply into this subject will find it fully and accurately handled, with the greatest acuteness of investigation, perspicuity of explication, and elegance of method, in a treatise entitled '*Hermes*,' by James Harris, Esq., the most beautiful and perfect example of analysis that has been exhibited since the days of Aristotle."—*Lowth's Gram.*, preface, p. xiv.

vulgar and erroneous constructions. But where are we to find two substances in such a proposition as "I am he," or "it is I?" Every body will say that in "I am he," there being but one person, there cannot possibly be two substances; and a similar answer will be returned with respect to "it is I," and all such constructions.

Then do personal pronouns really stand for substances, as they appear to do, or is it only sometimes this happens? or are they only of the nature of adjectives? If we allow the latter, how does *he* in the phrase "I am he" qualify *I*? When we say "I am good," there is an appearance of reason in supposing that the word *good* qualifies *I*; but how can *he* qualify *I* in "I am he?" When we pronounce the word *I*, its gender, number, and person, are already known; and what has the word *he* to lend the word *I*, except its gender, number, and person, of which *I* happens to have no need? Besides, how can we allow *he* to qualify *I*? that is, how can we, without uttering a great absurdity, say that the first person is the third person? Now if the word *he*, in the instance before us, neither stands for substance nor qualifies, how are we to consider it? Than this no question can be more plain and simple, yet none more difficult. Indeed, no grammarian in the world can solve it by adhering to the principles of grammar, as they have been hitherto known. Then the three simple words "I am he" form a proposition, which were of itself enough to prove that the science of gram-

mar has not hitherto been known, since this proposition cannot, by any means in conformity with common sense, be accounted for. But how are we to decide between Dr. Priestley and other grammarians with respect to the propriety of saying "it is I," "it is he," "it is she," &c.? General practice decides in favour of Dr. Priestley, since in all classes of society we hear "it is me," "it is him," and "it is her," at least twenty times for the once we hear "it is I," "it is he," and "it is she." But we admit that the language spoken in books is mostly against him? In such a case it is for the science of grammar to settle the point. What does the science say in favour of those who maintain that we ought not to follow Dr. Priestley's advice? Why, that the verb *to be* should be followed by the same case as that which precedes it. But Dr. Priestley assigns no reason, unless the unpleasantness which he remarks in the sound may be accounted one. But when grammarians remarked that the verb *to be* has the same case after it as that which precedes it, they were thinking of substantives, the nature of which has been hitherto utterly unknown; and they were also then of opinion that pronouns do represent substantives, which is another gross blunder, as we shall have occasion to show a little farther on. Besides we do not see in the Latin language, which has authorized grammarians to recommend such a construction as *it is I*, &c., such an expression as "*hoc est ego*;" and this ought to have led them to look into this point

more minutely. Nor do we, as Dr. Priestley remarks, say in French "*c'est je*," "*c'est il*," &c., but we are obliged to say "*c'est moi*," "*c'est lui*," &c. This fact ought also to have taught Englishmen to look into this point more minutely; which had they done, they might have been led to a very important discovery, namely, the precise difference between nouns and pronouns.

But how are the French locutions *c'est moi*, *c'est toi*, *c'est lui*, &c. accounted for? After the same manner that we account for "it is I," "it is he," &c., the *moi*, *toi*, and *lui*, &c. being allowed in such situations to be subjects or nominatives. I have even heard the English language praised by learned French professors for the purity of its syntax in this respect; and I have heard them censure their own for its having bent to vicious custom so far as to have preferred the dative form to that of the nominative. Then it would appear there are also two subjects in *c'est moi*, &c., for it is evident that *ce* makes by itself what grammarians call a subject. Thus, in *c'est bon* or *c'est mauvais*, *ce* is allowed by all to be the subject of the verb *est*. And is it less if we say *c'est moi*? No, it is not: it is clearly as much in the one situation as it is in the other. Then how are we to account for *moi* in this proposition? We know that the most distinguished grammarians and logicians call such a word a substantive pronoun; that is to say, a pronoun filling the place of a substantive. Then we have here two substances according to grammar, though our reason

tells us we have but one.* How are we to get out of this difficulty? We are told that it is now the fashion in France to assert that there are here two subjects, but that one of them is only a subject *in appearance*, and that the other is a subject in reality. Now this is just as wise as to say, that of two figures in geometry the one is only a figure in appearance, but that the other is really a figure. Even Condillac appears equally embarrassed to account for this difficulty: his opinion is, “dans ces phrases (c’est vous, c’est nous, c’est moi), le sujet du verb est une idée *vague* que montre l’adjectif *ce*, et que la suite du discours determine.”* Now geometricians do not speak of squares or angles *vague*; and if such men as Condillac and Messieurs de Port Royal have been obliged to adopt such language with regard to grammar, it does not arise from the latter being an imperfect or vague science, but merely from such a science having been hitherto unknown. But Condillac regards the pronoun following the verb to be as a subject, since he continues thus: “si l’esprit se porte sur cette idée nous disons au singulier *c’est eux, c’est nous*, et nous disons au pluriel *ce sont eux* si l’esprit se porte sur le nom† qui suit le verbe.” But how does it happen, if *ce* be not the subject in such cases as *c’est moi, c’est nous*, &c., that the verb agrees with it, since we cannot say “*ce suis moi, ce sommes*

* Chap. xviii. 309. 2de partie.

† Sometimes Condillac calls the personal pronouns *noms des personnes*, which corresponds with the name of substantive pronouns given them by other grammarians.

nous," &c. ? And if, on the other hand, *ce* be here the real nominative, how are we to consider *moi* and *nous*? Are these words real substantive pronouns? that is, words representing substances, or are they only adjectives qualifying *ce*? If we are to consider them in the latter capacity, how do they qualify *ce*? This word is different from them in both number and person, so that, if they qualify it in this manner, we shall be obliged to say that *ce* is *at the same time* both singular and plural, and that it is also in the third and first person *at the same time*, which nobody in his senses can say. Then how can we, as the science of grammar at present stands, get out of this difficulty? How are we to analyze, so as not to shock common sense, this simple proposition "*c'est nous?*" Indeed, whilst adhering to any method or system hitherto known, it were just as easy to do so as to find the perpetual motion. I shall return presently to those two classes of words (nouns and pronouns) before showing what they really are; but were I to consider them no further than I have already done, enough has been said about them to convince every enlightened and impartial inquirer after truth, that they are not what they have been hitherto taken for.

THE ADJECTIVE.

This is a very interesting word, and a great deal of shrewd observation has been bestowed upon it

by the learned, with the praiseworthy intention of discovering its real nature, and showing in what, and exactly how far, it differs from two other parts of speech (the noun and the verb) to which it seems nearly allied. The result of all this inquiry and discussion has been fruitless; since nothing more is known than that the adjective is a word which qualifies another word, the substantive or noun. Grammarians derive it from the substantive; but they cannot agree as to the extent of its signification.

Is it equal to a substantive? Does it stand for substance or does it not? How does it happen that it is not made the subject of a proposition as the substantive is? How does it happen that it can be compared? If it be equal to the substantive, why have we such a word? If it be less, how much less is it? As it can be the attribute of a proposition as well as the verb, how does it happen that one of those two classes — adjectives and verbs — can be compared, and that the other cannot? When we say John is *laborious*, *laborious* is the attribute. When we say John *labours*, *labours* is the attribute. Then, where is the exact difference between *laborious* and *labours*? that is, who can tell us how it happens that the adjective has its three degrees of comparison, and that the verb, as will be subsequently seen, has none? These are questions which have never been answered, and, as far as the science of grammar has been hitherto known, which cannot be answered; yet a child may henceforth find them very trifling.

The various opinions and doubts of learned grammarians respecting the adjective must lead every judicious mind to the immediate and certain conclusion that its real nature has been hitherto wholly unknown. As Horne Tooke has, and with his usual shrewdness, written a great deal upon this word, we shall have often occasion to refer to the authorities whom he quotes, as favouring or contradicting his opinion on this subject.

"The question is," says R. Johnson, "whether the adjective be a noun or the name of a thing."

"Adjectives," says Lowth, "are very improperly called nouns, for they are not the names of things."

Scaliger pretends that they differ in form, and not in meaning, from substantives*; which implies that they are the names of things.

The opinion of the learned members de Port Royal tends also to make them be considered as meaning all which substantives do mean. "L'adjectif *candidus* signifie le *substantif*, tiré de l'adjectif, savoir, candor, la blancheur, et de plus la connotation d'un sujet dans lequel est cet abstrait."†

Dr. Wallis is also of opinion that the adjective is nothing more than the substantive used adjectively.

Harris, the author of *Hermes*‡, differs greatly from all those authorities, as he supposes that adjectives never denote substances, and that they are homogeneous with respect to verbs. His words are: "Grammarians have been led into the strange

* b. 4. c. 91.

† See their Gram. end of ch. viii. page 359.

‡ b. 1. ch. 10.

absurdity of ranging adjectives with nouns, and separating them from VERBS: though they are homogeneous with respect to verbs, as both sorts denote attributes, they are heterogeneous with respect to nouns, as never properly denoting substances.”* To which Horne Tooke boldly replies, “I maintain that the adjective is *equally* and altogether *as much* the name of a thing as the noun substantive, and so say I of all words whatever; for that is not a word which is not the name of a thing. Every word, being a sound significant, must be a sign; and, if a sign, the name of a thing. But a noun substantive is the name of a thing, and nothing more. And, indeed, so says Vossius: ‘Nec rectius substantivum definitur—quod aliquid per se significat. Nam omnis vox ex instituto significans, aliquid significat.’”† And again: “But if, indeed, adjectives were not the names of things, there could be no attribution by adjectives; for you cannot attribute nothing. How much more comprehensive would any term be by the attribution to it of nothing? Adjectives therefore, as well as substantives, must EQUALLY denote substances; and substance is attributed to substance by the adjective contrivance of language.”‡

And Sir Charles Stoddart, in the following passages, opposes thus Horne Tooke’s view of an adjective: “Mr. Tooke says he has confuted the account given of the adjective by Messieurs de

* Hermes.

† De Analog. lib. 1. c. 6.

‡ Taylor’s Horne Tooke, 634. ed. 1840.

Port Royal, who ‘make substance and accident’ the foundation of the difference between the substantive and adjective;’ but if so, he has confuted an account given not only by Messieurs de Port Royal, but by *every* grammarian who preceded them, from the time of Aristotle; and, whatever respect we may entertain for the abilities of Mr. Tooke (which in etymology were doubtless great), we must a little hesitate to think that he alone was right, and so many men of extensive reading, deep reflection, and sound judgment, were all wrong.”*

“It is necessary to come to some settled opinion, on a question so essential to the science of grammar, as whether there is any, and what distinction between substantives and adjectives: and on this point we trust we have satisfactorily vindicated the principle laid down by Aristotle, and adopted by all grammarians from his time to that of Mr. Tooke. The noun substantive, then, is the name of a conception or thought considered as possessing a substantial, that is, independent existence; the noun adjective is the name of a conception or thought considered as a quality or attribute of the former.”†

The three following respectable authorities differ not only from those we have already given, but even from one another:—“Le nom adjectif est celui qui ne signifie pas une chose, mais qui marque seulement qu’elle est.”‡

* Sir Charles Stoddart. *Encyc. Met.* p. 23.

† Ibid.

‡ L’Abbé Regnier.

“Les adjectifs sont des mots qui présentent à l'esprit des êtres indéterminés, désignés seulement par une *idée précise* qui peut s'adapter à plusieurs natures.” *

“C'est un nom qui exprime un *objet vague*, considéré comme revêtu de quelque qualité.” †

And in a passage quoted by Horne Tooke, Buonmattei asserts that the adjective by itself means *nothing* : — “Nel modo che l'accidente s'appoggia alla sustanza, l'aggiuntivo s'appoggia al sustantivo.” — “E comme l'accidente non può star nel orazione senza un sustantivo: e standovi, non vi starebbon à proposito; *perchè non significherebbon niente.*”

The author of the valuable article on grammar in the Edinburgh Encyclopædia ‡ opposes thus such an account of the adjective as the one given by the last-mentioned authority. “Some have asserted that the adjective by itself expresses no idea. This opinion has arisen from the circumstance that it supposes some other idea expressed by a different word. But this is in reality an addition to its meaning.” If this be true, the adjective must mean all which the substantive does mean, and something more besides; and this view of it coincides with Horne Tooke's opinion. But from what the same writer continues to observe, it would appear that the adjective and substantive express exactly the same idea: “*Every* idea expressed by a substantive may also be ex-

* Beauzée.

† Restaut.

‡ Henry Dewar, M. D., F. B. S. E.

pressed by an adjective, and *vice versâ*. The idea expressed by ‘*man*’ is also expressed by ‘*manly* ;’ and the idea expressed by the adjective ‘*good*’ is also expressed by the substantive ‘*goodness*.’” And a little farther on, he still says : “ *a Roman senator* and *a senator of Rome* mean exactly the same thing ; therefore the ideas contained in the word *Rome* are also contained in the word *Roman*.”*

This account of the adjective appears very plausible until closely examined. If, as the writer pretends, “ *every idea* expressed by a substantive may also be expressed by an adjective, and *vice versa*,” it must follow that the adjective and substantive may be used indifferently ; yet we cannot say “ *manly* is mortal,” instead of “ *man* is mortal ;” nor can we say “ *a man action*,” instead of “ *a manly action*.” Hence, between *man* and *manly* there is a wide difference ; nor is there less between *good* and *goodness*, since we may not say “ *John* is a goodness boy,” instead of “ *John* is a good boy.” But when this writer says that, “ *a Roman senator* and *a senator of Rome* mean exactly the same thing,” he is very right ; yet we are not hence to infer that *Rome* and *Roman* are alike, but that the two words *of Rome* are equal to the one word *Roman*. If we might, instead of “ *a senator of Rome*,” say “ *a senator Rome*,” then indeed the words *Rome* and *Roman* (that is, the

† Edinburgh Encyclopædia, 415.

substantive and adjective) would “express the same idea;” but, as this cannot be done, it is evident that there is between the substantive and adjective a very great difference, though what this is has never yet been shown.

Du Marsais, who is allowed by D’Alembert, and no French authority of repute does, I believe, contradict his judgment, to have won as a grammarian immortal fame*, says that the adjective is the substantive analyzed:—“L’adjectif ne fait qu’énoncer ou déclarer ce que l’on dit qu’est le substantif; en sorte que l’adjectif c’est le substantif analysé, c’est à dire, considéré comme étant de telle ou telle façon, comme ayant telle ou telle qualité. Ainsi l’adjectif ne

* And immediately after D’Alembert makes some observations on language, grammar, and grammarians, from which, on account of his great name and the deference paid in France to his opinions, I take the liberty of transcribing the following passage, though it is here out of place:—

“Un des plus grands efforts de l’esprit humain est d’avoir assujetti les langues à des règles; mais cet effort n’a été fait que peu à peu. Les langues formées d’abord sans principe ont été plus l’ouvrage du besoin que de la raison; et les philosophes, réduits à débrouiller ce chaos informe, se sont bornés à en diminuer, le plus qu’il était possible l’irrégularité, et à réparer de leur mieux ce que le peuple avait construit au hasard: car c’est aux philosophes à régler les langues, comme c’est aux bons écrivains à les fixer. La grammaire est donc l’ouvrage des philosophes; mais ceux qui en ont établi les règles, ont fait comme la plus part des inventeurs dans les sciences; ils n’ont donné que les résultats de leur travail, sans montrer l’esprit qui les avait guidés. Pour bien saisir cet esprit si précieux à connaître, il faut se remettre sur leurs traces; mais ce qui n’appartient qu’à des philosophes comme eux. L’étude et l’usage suffisent pour apprendre les règles, et un degré de conception ordinaire pour les appliquer; l’esprit philosophique seul peut remonter jusqu’aux principes sur lesquels les règles sont établies et distinguer le grammairien de génie du grammairien de mémoire.”—*D’Alembert, Éloge de Du Marsais*, p. 24.

doit pas marquer, par rapport au genre, au nombre, et au cas, des vues qui soient différentes de celles sous lesquelles l'esprit considère le substantif." *

He says again: "As every quality supposes the substance of which it is the quality, it is evident that every adjective supposes a substantive, for it is necessary to be, in order to be such:" "Comme toute qualité suppose la substance dont elle est qualité, il est évident que tout adjectif suppose un substantif; car il faut être pour être tel." † And again, speaking of substantives, he says: "Do they qualify? they are adjectives. Louis XV. is king: then king is here an adjective:" "Qualifient-ils? ils sont adjectifs. Louis XV. est roi: donc roi est là adjectif." This latter opinion is confirmed by Messieurs de Port Royal: "Il y a des noms qui passent pour substantifs en grammaire, qui sont de véritables adjectifs, comme roi, philosophe, médecin, puisqu'ils marquent une manière d'être ou mode dans un sujet: mais la raison pourquoi ils passent pour substantifs c'est, que comme ils ne conviennent qu'à un seul sujet, on sous-entends toujours cet unique sujet sans qu'il soit besoin de l'exprimer.‡

This opinion is opposed by two very high authorities, Horne Tooke and Condillac. The former expresses himself thus: "The same word is not sometimes an adjective and sometimes a substantive." The latter thus: "Parcequ'on peut re-

* Du Discours et de ses Parties, p. 127. Œuvres de Du Marsais, t. 1re.

† Tome, iii. 78.

‡ Logique de Port Royal, p. 131.

garder ces noms (roi, philosophe, poëte) comme modifiant des substantifs sous-entendus, il y a des grammairiens qui les mettent parmi les adjectifs ; cela est libre : je remarquerai seulement que, si tout nom qui modifie est un adjectif, on ne trouvera plus de substantifs que parmi les noms propres.” *

As Condillac is of all writers perhaps the most clear, his account of the adjective ought to come in here : but that it may be still more easily understood, it will not be amiss to give first his definition of the substantive. When a writer of such penetration could not discern the exact difference between the words called adjectives and substantives, the wonder to be felt at this discovery having not been hitherto made must become greatly less :

“ Des noms substantifs. Les qualités que nous démelons dans les objets paraissent se réunir hors de nous sur chacun d’eux ; et nous ne pouvons en apercevoir quelques unes, qu’aussitôt nous ne soyons portés à imaginer quelque chose qui est dessous, et qui leur sert de soutien. En conséquence nous donnons à ce quelque chose le nom de substance, de *stare sub*, être dessous.

“ Quand on a voulu pénétrer plus avant dans la nature de ce qu’on appelle substance, on n’a saisi que des fantômes. Nous nous bornerons à la signification du mot, persuadés que ceux qui ont nommé la substance n’ont prétendu désigner qu’un

soutien des qualités, soutien qu'ils auraient nommé autrement, s'ils avaient pu l'appercevoir en lui-même tel qu'il est. Les philosophes qui sont venus ensuite ont cru voir ce quelque chose que nous nous représentons, et ils n'en ont rien vu.”

His account of the adjective is fully as clear : —

“ Des adjectifs : Homme, vertu, sont deux substantifs dont les idées existent dans notre esprit, chacune séparément. Celui-là est le soutien d'un certain nombre de qualités, celui-ci est le soutien d'un autre nombre, et ils ne se modifient point.

“ Mais si je dis *homme vertueux*, cette forme du discours fait aussitôt évanouir l'un des deux soutiens, et elle réunit dans le substantif *homme* toutes les qualités comprises dans le substantif *vertu*.

“ En comparant ces mots, vertueux et vertu, vous concevez donc en quoi ces adjectifs diffèrent des substantifs. C'est que les substantifs expriment tout à-la-fois certaines qualités et le soutien sur lequel nous les réunissons : les adjectifs, au contraire, n'expriment que certaines qualités, et nous avons besoin de les joindre à des substantifs, pour trouver le soutien que ces qualités doivent modifier.” †

This account of the adjective comes nearer to that of Horne Tooke's than at first sight appears. ‡ If the adjective *virtuous* transmits to the

* Gram. de Condillac, 2de partie. † Chap. 2. ‡ See page 43.

substantive *man*, as the writer pretends, ALL the qualities belonging to the substantive virtue, it is clear that the adjective is equal, wholly equal, to the substantive. I wonder how Horne Tooke has allowed this definition of Condillac's to escape his notice, as it appears to coincide in every way with his own. But I have an objection to make to both Condillac's and Horne Tooke's account of an adjective. If the adjective which is derived from the substantive be, as Horne Tooke pretends, *as much as* the substantive itself, that is, if it can transmit, as Condillac asserts, all the qualities which the substantive has, how does it happen that we can say *more virtuous*, and *most virtuous*? Thus in "A is virtuous, B is more virtuous, C is the most virtuous," how does it happen, if A has ALL the qualities belonging to the substantive virtue, that B and C have still more than A? This is about as easy to conceive as that A should have to himself a whole house, and B and C have still more of the said house than A. But what difference does Horne Tooke find between his account of an adjective and that given by Messieurs de Port Royal? They also admit, in other parts of their works besides the part to which I have already referred, that the adjective means all that the substantive does mean, except that its signification is a *confused one*, which they assign as the sole reason of its not standing by itself like the substantive.

"Le mot de *blanc, candidum*, signifie directe-

ment, mais *confusément*, le sujet ; et indirectement, quoique distinctement, *la blancheur*."

" La signification distincte de *rouge* est *la rougeur* ; mais il la signifie en marquant *confusément* le sujet de cette rougeur, d'où il vient qu'il ne subsiste point seul dans le discours parcequ'on y doit exprimer ou sous-entendre le mot qui signifie ce sujet." †

Now, as a word understood is to be always considered in grammar as a word expressed, if we take away the *confused signification* referred to in the above two separate accounts given of the adjective, it will be difficult to perceive any difference between them and the one given by Horne Tooke. Hence the observation already made respecting B and C being more virtuous than A, who is, however, allowed to possess ALL virtue, will apply here with equal propriety ; that is to say, if *blanc* and *rouge* be equal to *blancheur* and *rougeur*, how does it happen that we can say *plus blanc*, *plus rouge*, and that we cannot say *plus blancheur*, and *plus rougeur* ? or, in other words, how does it happen, if *blanc* and *rouge* possess all that *blancheur* and *rougeur* possess, we still seek to make them possess more by saying *plus blanc*, *plus rouge* ?

Then, if substantives stand for substances, it is clear, unless those latter authorities be in error, that adjectives stand for substances also ; and that substances can consequently, in point of degree, be

* Logique de Port Royal, 131. † Gram. de Port Royal, p. 274.

compared, since adjectives are compared. Yet Aristotle and Scantius think otherwise, and Harris and Sir Charles Stoddart appear to be of the same opinion, as the following passage, which is taken from the powerful treatise on universal grammar to which I have been already so often indebted, leads me to suppose.

“ Substantives cannot be compared, as such, in point of degree ; for that would be to suppose that the nature of substantial existence was variable ; and that one existing thing was more truly existing than another, which is absurd.” “ A mountain,” says Harris, “ cannot be said more to be or to exist than a mole-hill ; but the more and less must be sought for in their quantities. In like manner, when we refer many individuals to one species, the lion A cannot be more called a lion than the lion B. But if more any thing, he is more fierce, more speedy, or exceeding in some such attribute. So again, in referring many species to one genus, a crocodile is not more an animal than a lizard is, nor a tiger more than a cat ; but, if any thing, he is more bulky, more strong, &c. ; the excess, as before, being derived from their attributes. So true is that saying of the acute Stagirite, ‘ Substance is not susceptible of more or less.’ Scantius, referring to this passage of Aristotle, observes, that we may hence infer that comparatives cannot be drawn from nouns substantive. Hence, adds he, they are deceived who reckon the words *senex*, *juvenes*, *ado-*

lescens, infans, &c., substantives; for they are altogether adjectives. Nor is it to be objected that Plautus has made from Pœnus Pœnior, for he does not there mean to express the substantial existence of the Carthaginian, but his cunning, as if he had said *Callidior*; for the Carthaginians were reputed to be a cunning people. So the writer who used the word Neronior, from Nero, meant only to signify an excess of cruelty.”*

According to those latter opinions, the adjective differs widely from the substantive, and is not allowed to stand in any way for substance. Horne Tooke; from asserting that it implies *as much as* the substantive, has been led to the conclusion, “that adjectives, though convenient abbreviations, are not necessary to language; and are therefore not to be ranked (by him) amongst the parts of speech.† And to prove that a language may very well do without adjectives, he refers to the Mohegans, who, it appears, have no such class of words in their language as that which we call adjectives.

As the contents of the following passage have given rise to some doubt and discussion amongst philosophical inquirers, I give it in full:—

“Doctor Jonathan Edwards, D. D., pastor of a church in New Haven, in ‘Observations on the Language of the MUHHEKANEW Indians, communicated to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, published at the request of the Society, and printed

* Enc. Met. p. 36.

† P. 634.

by Josiah Meigs, 1788,' gives us the following account:— ' When I was but six years of age, my father removed with his family to Stockbridge, which at that time was inhabited by Indians almost solely. The Indians being the nearest neighbours, I constantly associated with them; their boys were my daily schoolmates and play-fellows. Out of my father's house, I seldom heard any language spoken beside the Indian. By these means I acquired the knowledge of that language, and a great facility in speaking it: it became more familiar to me than my mother-tongue. I knew the names of some things in Indian which I did not know in English: even all my thoughts ran in Indian; and though the true pronunciation of the language is extremely difficult to all but themselves, they acknowledged that I had acquired it perfectly, which, as they said, had never been acquired by any Anglo-American.'

" After this he proceeds:— ' The language which is now the subject of observation is that of the Muhhekanew, or Stockbridge Indians. They, as well as the tribe at NEW LONDON, are by the Anglo-Americans called Mohegans. This language is spoken by all the Indians throughout New England. Every tribe, as that of Stockbridge, of Farmington, of New London, &c., has a different dialect; but the language is radically the same. Mr. Elliot's translation of the Bible is in a particular dialect of this language. This language

appears to be much more extensive than any other language in North America. The language of the Delawares in Pennsylvania; of the Penobscots, bordering on Nova Scotia; of the Indians of St. Francis, in Canada; of the Shawanese, on the Ohio; and of the Chippewaus, at the westward of Lake Huron, are all radically the same with the Mohegan. The same is said of the language of the Ottowans, Nanticooks, Munsees, Menomonees, Messisaugas, Saukies, Ottagaumies, Killistinoes, Nipegons, Algonkins, Winnebagoes, &c. That the languages of the several tribes in New England, of the Delawares, and of Mr. Elliot's Bible, are radically the same with the Mohegan, I assert from my own knowledge.'

"Having thus given an account of himself, and of his knowledge of the language, he proceeds (in p. 10.) to inform us that 'The Mohegans have no adjectives in all their language. Although it may at first seem not only singular and curious, but impossible, that a language should exist without adjectives, yet it is an indubitable fact.'"*

Sir Charles Stoddart, alluding to the opinion by which this passage is preceded, and to the passage itself, observes, "From what has been already said, we may perceive the absurdity of asserting that adjectives, 'though convenient abbreviations, are not necessary to language;' and still more, 'that the Mohegans have no adjectives in their language;' for though this latter fact is vouched by

* H. Tooke, 647.

Dr. Jonathan Edwards, D.D., pastor of a church in New Haven, and communicated (by their request) to the Connecticut Society of Arts and Sciences, and published by Josiah Meigs, yet it amounts to nothing else but that the Mohegans cannot distinguish subject from predicate, or substance from quality; and if so, they must be utterly destitute of the faculty of reason, which we suppose neither Dr. Edwards, nor Mr. Meigs, nor Mr. Tooke intend to assert." *

Now, if a language may after all do very well without any of those words called adjectives, and if the Mohegans have no such words in their language, what are we to conclude from such wonder, curiosity, and downright incredulity being expressed at the circumstance? Why, nothing else but that the science of languages has been hitherto so utterly unknown, that the most competent judges in matters of philology have a very imperfect notion of what an adjective is. But it may be observed that, if the Mohegans have no adjectives in their language, and if a language may, as I seem to insinuate, do very well without them, Horne Tooke at least may be allowed to have known the nature of this word: yet it is not so; for had he known what an adjective really is, he might have easily convinced the world of the truth of his knowledge, and have thus corrected the erroneous notions which had prevailed before his time respecting this word, and which have not been modified in the least for the better since his opinions (that

* Encyc. Met. 36.

have been always looked up to with that respect which genius claims) have been widely circulated.

Out of the nine parts of speech, I have thus far alluded to three only ; and, although I have dwelt upon them very lightly, more than enough has been shown to satisfy every enlightened and impartial mind that of the real nature of those three parts, which are by far the most simple and material of the nine, nothing has been hitherto correctly known. *For the present*, I do not consider it necessary to go any farther in order to convince the reader that of the six remaining parts (each of which shall be noticed in the proper place), upon which so much metaphysical learning has been wasted to no purpose, no more is known than there is of the substantive, pronoun, and adjective. Thus, though Horne Tooke has bestowed upon the verb more serious thought than perhaps any other writer that ever lived, yet the more he dwelt upon it, the less disposed he felt to attempt defining its nature. At the end of his long account of this important word, he seems to hold out a promise of giving a definition of it at some future period ; but he has gone to his grave without being able to do so. It appears, however, that he had this subject before him for upwards of thirty years.

To convince Englishmen how far this want of science is real and deplorable, let me here subjoin a few plain facts respecting their own language of which they are not aware.

Almost every hour of our lives, and often several times in an hour, we have occasion to employ one or more of these few familiar household words—mine, thine, ours, yours, his, hers, its, and theirs—and yet we do not know what they mean, nor does any lexicographer living, or that ever wrote, know what they mean; nor can any grammarian living, or that ever wrote, tell to what class of words they belong, or how they are, grammatically considered, to be accounted for in a sentence. Webster, the best lexicographer and grammarian America has to boast of, and of whom his country has reason to be proud, has done for those words what Horne Tooke has done for the verb,—he has shown that we know neither their precise meaning, nor their grammatical properties. But how has he done this? By his incessant yet fruitless endeavours to account in either way for them. He alludes to them frequently in his philosophical grammar, but still more so in his valuable dictionary, upon which he has bestowed twenty-seven years of hard labour; yet the utmost benefit to be derived from his acute observations amounts to this,—that of the real nature of those words nothing is known, nor can be known after the closest investigation, if in our inquiry we allow ourselves to be guided by the science of languages as it now stands.

When we say “this book is *mine*,” the word *mine* seems to mean *belonging to me*; and this is the meaning assigned it by Johnson and all other

lexicographers, and a meaning analogous to this is given to all the other words of the same class, as: THINE, belonging to thee; OURS, belonging to us; YOURS, belonging to you; HIS, 'belonging to him; HERS, belonging to her; THEIRS, belonging to them.

So that no difference, *as to meaning*, is made between the above class of pronouns and the one called adjective pronouns, *my, thy, our, your, their, his, her, its*; since lexicographers tell us that these words also mean "belonging to me," "belonging to thee," &c. But they have remarked that those of the first class never precede nouns, whereas those of the second class always do. Hence we do not say, "this is mine book," but, "this book is mine;" nor, "this book is my," but, "this is my book."

This remark made by grammarians with respect to the place which those two classes of words respectively hold, has nothing whatever to do with their meaning, nor does it prove a nearer approach to a knowledge of the science of grammar, than it proves an acquaintance with anatomy to know that a man's head is at one extremity of his body, and his feet at the other.

I was saying that in the instance "this book is mine," the word *mine* seems to mean "belonging to me;" but when we put it in another situation, as "this book *of* mine is better than yours," which is very good English, we perceive that *mine*, though it is still the same word, can have no such meaning, since we may not say "this book of belonging to me is better than yours;" and thus it ever is when

the word *of* precedes any of those pronouns, a circumstance which frequently happens. We may also remark that whenever any of those pronouns appears to be the subject of a proposition, or the object of a verb or a preposition, the meaning assigned them cannot bear investigation. Thus, if referring to my book I say, "mine is or is not instructive;" or, "give me mine;" or, "that passage is in mine;" and if, in these instances, we insert the words "belonging to me" instead of the word *mine*, we shall have "belonging to me is or is not instructive;" "give me belonging to me;" "that passage is in belonging to me." Hence we are immediately led to suppose that these words have a substantive meaning, and that *mine* probably means, besides "belonging to me," the thing or the things referred to. But this we soon discover is an erroneous supposition; for in such an instance as "this house of mine is better than yours," we cannot insert in the place of the word *mine*, the words "belonging to me," and also the word *house*, as this would make the singular construction "this house of the house belonging to me is better than yours." Hence grammarians know not whether to consider these words as adjective or as substantive pronouns, since they are equally embarrassed to account for them in either situation.

It is very easy to perceive that there is a great difference as to meaning between these two classes of pronouns, *my*, *thy*, *our*, &c., and *mine*, *thine*, *ours*, &c., though in what this difference precisely

consists we have never been told; and grammarians are, as I have just remarked, equally embarrassed to account for them grammatically. They assert that *of* is already a sign of the possessive case, and they admit (Webster excepted) that the words *mine*, *thine*, &c., do already imply possession; so that in “this book of mine is better than yours” we have an instance, and such a one frequently occurs, of a double possessive, although the idea of possession is single, which Webster calls a manifest solecism; that is, if we allow *mine* to be already a possessive case, or a word in any way implying possession. All grammarians (Webster again excepted) suppose that those pronouns have the nouns to which they belong understood. Lowth, referring to them, observes, “all these are used when the noun they belong to is understood.” Johnson says that they are used when the substantive goes *before*; but by this he means when it is understood, which is proved by his manner of accounting for the word *yours*: “Yours is used when the substantive goes before, or is understood, as, this book is *yours*.”

Cobbett is also of the same opinion, as the following observation proves:—“Mine, thine, theirs, yours, hers, his, &c., stand frequently by themselves, but then the noun is understood: this is hers, that is to say, her property, her hat, or whatever else.”*

Murray’s Grammar, which is a compilation of

* Cobb. Gram. Let. xvii. 188.

many respectable authorities, admits also that the nouns to which those pronouns refer are understood: — “When they are separated from the noun by a verb, or when the noun is *understood*, all of them, except *his*, vary their terminations.”*

But Webster remarks, “If it should be said that a noun is understood, I reply that this cannot be true in regard to the grammatical construction; for, supply the noun for which the word is a substitute, and the pronoun must be changed into an adjective. Thus, ‘Yours of the 26th of October I have received’ becomes *your letter*,” &c.†

Grammarians are equally puzzled as to the place those pronouns should occupy with regard to the other parts of speech. Dr. Johnson, who allows substantives in English to have a genitive case, denies one to pronouns; and puts *mine*, *thine*, &c., and *my*, *thy*, &c., in the same class. In this he is consistent with himself, as he allows both classes to be alike in meaning. In the following passage, in which he censures Dr. Wallis for his considering the possessive case of our nouns to be an adjective, he seems to wonder how Dr. Lowth can allow *mine* and *thine* to be genitive cases:—

“The learned and sàgacious Wallis, to whom every English grammarian owes a tribute of reverence, calls this modification of the noun (the possessive case) an adjective possessive — I think, with no more propriety than he might have applied

* Gram. p. 62.

† See his Gram. preceding his Dictionary.

the same to the genitive in *equitum decus*, *Trojæ oris*, or any other Latin genitive. Dr. Lowth, on the other part, supposes the possessive pronouns *mine* and *thine* to be genitive cases.”*

Sir Charles Stoddart is also opposed to Lowth: — “Lowth considers the word *mine* as the possessive of *I*; but the English substantive *MINE*, if substantive it be, answers to the Latin *meus*, which is certainly an adjective.”†

By Sir Charles Stoddart’s saying “*if substantive it be*,” it is clear that he is not sure what it is. When he asserts that it answers to the Latin *meus*, he is greatly mistaken; which he might have easily perceived, had he examined *mine* when preceded by *of*; as in this instance from Shakspeare: —

“———— Rude am I in my speech,”
 “For since these arms *of mine* had seven years’ pith,
 ————— they have used
 Their dearest action in the tented field.”

Ben Jonson expresses also his doubts as to whether those pronouns ought to be regarded as genitives, since he remarks that they follow nouns, “AS IT WERE *in the genitive case*.”‡

When mathematicians refer to lines, triangles, and squares, they have no doubts like these; there is no probability of their mistaking one figure for another. And why is it so with the mathematics and not with grammar? It arises from the elements of the former science being known, and from

* See his Gram. preceding his Dictionary.

† Met. Encey. 44.

‡ B. Jonson, vol. vii. p. 275.

those of the latter having been hitherto unknown. It does not arise from the one science being more exact than the other, for all sciences are equally exact, but from the one being better known than the other; hence the *inexactness* belongs wholly to our minds.

Dr. Priestley, that acute observer, argues, I think, in a very loose manner on this subject. His object is to prove the propriety of using such a form as that called the double possessive case of substantives; as, “a discovery *of* Sir Isaac Newton’s:” and he remarks, “That this double genitive is sufficiently agreeable to the analogy of the English language, is evident from the usual conjunction of the pronoun possessive with the preposition *of*, both of which have the force of a genitive,—‘This exactness *of* his.’* In reality, this double genitive may be resolved into two; for, this is a book of my friend’s, is the same as this is one of the books of my friend.”†

Here he asserts that the conjunction of the pronoun possessive with the preposition *of* has the force of a genitive, that is, not of a double possessive or double genitive, but of a single one; yet he maintains that the double possessive case of a noun is a pure construction, from its corresponding with a similar form belonging to pronouns. Hence the conjunction of a possessive pronoun with the preposition *of* must be also a

* Tristram Shandy, vol. i. p. 12.

† Gram. 72.

double possessive, or there is no such case as a double possessive belonging to nouns. But why does Dr. Priestley say that a pronoun possessive preceded by *of* (which is also allowed to be a sign of the possessive case) has only the force of a genitive? Because he felt, like Webster, that two signs of possession, when single possession is referred to, must be a “manifest solecism.” But if the double possessive case of nouns can be accounted for by grammarians, of course the double possessive case of pronouns can be accounted for also, allowing both constructions to be similar. We shall have occasion to show, a little farther on, that learned grammarians are not more fortunate with the one form than they are with the other.

As Webster plainly saw how difficult it is to account for the pronouns *mine*, *thine*, &c., and as he has bestowed much thought upon them, I sub-join here, from his learned dictionary and grammar, the following observations, which are, notwithstanding their merit, very erroneous, as the reader will acknowledge when he comes to our discovery.

“HERS: This house is *hers*; that is, this is the house of her. But perhaps [perhaps] it would be more correct to consider *HERS* as a substitute for the noun and the adjective in the nominative case. Of the two houses *HERS* is the best; that is, *her house* is the best.” Here *HERS* can mean neither the house of her nor her house; since if we say this house of hers is very commodious, and put in place of the word *hers* in this instance *the house of her*, or

her house, we shall have, “this house of the house of her,” &c., and “this house of her house,” &c., which nobody can say.

“OURS, which is primarily the possessive case of *our*, is never used as an adjective, but as a substitute for the adjective and the substantive to which it belongs. Your house is on a plain; *ours* is on a hill. This is good English; but certainly *ours* must be the nominative case to *is*, or it has none.* Their organs are better disposed than *ours* for receiving grateful impressions from sensible objects. Here *ours* stands in the place of *our organs*, and cannot, in conformity with any rule of construction, be in the possessive case.” †

“THEIRS, is used as a substitute for the adjective and the noun to which it refers, and in this case it may be the nominative to a verb. Our land is the most extensive; but *theirs* is the best cultivated. Here *theirs* stands as the representative of *their land*, and is the nominative to *is*.‡

‘ Nothing but the name of zeal appears
Twixt our best actions and the worst of *theirs*.’

In this use *theirs* is not the possessive, for then there would be a double possessive.” §

“That *mine*, *thine*, *his*, *hers*, *yours*, and *theirs*, do not constitute a possessive case is demonstrable,

* This is a great mistake, as we shall see hereafter.

† Here are two great mistakes.

‡ It is never used in this sense, nor can it ever be a nominative case.

§ He is still in error.

for they are constantly used as the nominatives to verbs, and as the objectives after verbs and prepositions, as in the following passages: — ‘In referring our ideas to those of other men *ours* may be false.’ ‘It is for no other reason but that *his* agrees not with our ideas.’ ‘You may imagine what kind of faith *theirs* was.’ ‘He ran headlong into his own ruin whilst he endeavoured to precipitate *ours*.’ ‘The reason is, that his subject is generally things; *theirs*, on the contrary, is persons.’ ‘*Yours* of the 26th Oct. I have received, as I have always done *yours*, with no little satisfaction.’ ‘Therefore leave your forests of beasts for *ours* of brutes called men.’ ‘The omission of repetitions is but one and the easiest part of *yours* and of my design.’” .

Immediately after those passages, which are taken from some of the best writers in the English language, he continues thus: — “It is needless to multiply proofs. We observe these pretended *possessives* uniformly used as nominatives or objectives. To say that in those passages *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, and *minè*, form a possessive case is to make the possessive form the office of a nominative case. to verbs, and an objective after ~~v~~erbs and prepositions, — a manifest solecism. If it should be said that a noun is understood, I reply, that this cannot be true in regard to the grammatical construction, for, supply the noun for which the word is a substitute, and the pronoun must be changed into an adjective. ‘*Yours* of the 26th Oct.’ becomes *your*

letter. ‘He endeavoured to precipitate *ours*,’ becomes *our ruin*. This shows that these words are real substitutes, like the word *others* where it stands for *other men* or *things*.”

Now it is as evident that those words imply possession as that one and one make two; but Webster, from perceiving that they cannot, in conformity with the science of grammar, as *it is known*, be accounted for, if this meaning be allowed them, has been driven to the hard necessity of boldly asserting that they have no such meaning. Hence, when we say *this house is mine*, we are not to suppose that the house does in any manner belong to the individual *me*. What he asserts is fully as bad.

We have already remarked that Dr. Johnson makes no difference between the two classes of words, *mine*, *thine*, &c., and *my*, *thy*, &c., either as to meaning or as to the rank they should hold in grammar. This extraordinary circumstance of supposing both those classes to be similar in meaning has led Todd, Johnson’s learned editor, to make a very just remark, which, though ‘unwittingly applied, is the severest censure that can be bestowed on Johnson himself, and all the learned English lexicographers and cyclopædists that have written on grammar. “There seems, indeed, to have been no necessity for the added *s*; *our*, *your*, &c., including in themselves the idea of property or possession.”*

* Todd’s Johnson, p. 110.

This is, indeed, a very just remark ; for if *our* means belonging to us, and *your*, belonging to you, and if *ours* and *yours* have still the same meaning, where is the necessity of writing them differently? But as our ears do not allow us to say, this book is *our*, we say *ours*, knowing no more why we do so, than if the English tongue were some ancient dialect now nearly forgotten. In Latin we can say *meus* liber and *hic liber est meus* ; and why is it so ? because *meus* has in both places the same meaning ; it is the same word. But *my* and *mine* are not the same word, neither in sound, form, nor meaning ; and it is a sad proof of our real ignorance of the science of language not to be able to point out in what they exactly differ from each other, both as to meaning and grammar. It may be thought that *mine*, *thine*, &c., are the same as *le mien*, *le tien*, &c., in French ; but it is not so : *le mien*, *le tien*, &c., can never be preceded by another possessive sign, no more than *meus* and *tuus* can in Latin ; for we cannot say, as we do in English, *ce livre de mien*, or *ce livre du mien*, but we must say, *ce livre est le mien*, or *ce livre est à moi*.

I had forgotten to allude to Richardson's great dictionary, but he is not more fortunate than Johnson, Webster, and Todd are ; nor do the learned writers on grammar in the "Encyclopædia Britannica" and "Rees's Cyclopædia" throw the least light on those extraordinary little words. Now, when we observe that they can, though very few, be made to refer to every noun in the English lan-

guage, the disadvantage, for both native and foreigner, at not being able to find their exact meaning, or account for them grammatically, is, it must be allowed, very considerable; and this must be often seriously felt by both professor and student, whether, on the one hand, analytical investigation be attempted, or, on the other, close inquiry made. But where difficulties are passed over, and no critical explanation required, of course the words *mine, thine, ours, &c.*, will not offer any difficulty. Thus Cobbett, alluding to them, says: "No difficulty can arise in the use of these words."*

Let us now consider a substantive in the possessive case, and see if grammarians know anything about it as to meaning, etymology, or grammar. When we say, "this book is John's," we seem to know very well the meaning of the word John's, and that we may write it down "belonging to John;" for it is good English to say, "this book is belonging to John." But if we say "this book of John's is better than mine," the word John's can no longer mean "belonging to John," as it is not good English to say, "this book of belonging to John," &c. This construction, which is called the double possessive, is thus accounted for by Bishop Lowth:—"Both the sign and the preposition seem [seem] sometimes to be used: as, a soldier of the king's; but here are really two possessives; for it means one of the soldiers of the king."†

* Eng. Gram. Let. xvii. 188.

† Gram. 43.

Dr. Priestley says also that “this double genitive may be resolved into two; for, this is a book of my friend’s, is the same as, ‘this is one of the books of my friend.’” *

Hence, in our instance, “This book of John’s is better than mine,” we are to suppose that John owns several books, which is taking a very great liberty with the text, as he may be the proprietor of only the single book referred to. But whether he own only this one book, or several books, the language is equally correct. The double possessive belonging to pronouns is precisely the same as this double possessive belonging to nouns. Grammarians judging by their ears—for in this case they have no other guide—allow it is very good English to say, “this house of his or of hers is better than mine;” and so must they, for the same reason, allow that it is very good English to say, “this house of John’s or of Mary’s is better than mine.” And when we do express ourselves so, is it fair to suppose, in order to account in some way or other for this double possessive, that the meaning is, “this house of John’s houses, or of Mary’s houses, is better than mine?” Yet it is only in this erroneous manner that grammarians have hitherto been able to account for this singular construction. But this mode is evidently so illogical that many respectable authorities oppose it. And how do they account for this double possessive? Why, they cannot in any way account for it;

* Gram. 72.

i. e. neither grammatically nor as to meaning, and still much less as to etymology. And from not reflecting that language is a heavenly gift, and that a handful of the rudest savages do, unknown to themselves, display, in the happy arrangement of their words, more logical wisdom and acute discernment than the most learned philosophers that ever lived do in their works, they accuse that mysterious power which pervades all things, and do not suspect that they are wholly ignorant of a science which, if known, might make them change their presumptuous censure for humility and admiration. According to those grammarians, this double possessive, which is of the greatest antiquity, and than which no form of expression can be more logical and pure, is a corrupt locution, and ought to be banished out of the language. When learned philosophers and logicians are so profoundly ignorant of the nature of words, as to know neither their real meaning nor the place they should hold in grammar, we cannot expect such books as have been compiled from their works to betray less ignorance. And when we recollect that those compilations are considered in schools and colleges as infallible guides, the evil they produce towards corrupting a language, and keeping future generations in ignorance of its elements, is incalculable. On looking over some of those English grammars intended for the use of the French nation, I find in one of them a passage full of the harshest invectives against the use of the double possessive. It is in

the author's opinion, notwithstanding his admission that there is perhaps in the English language no form of expression more frequently heard, an illogical, vicious, and false construction; and that consequently Sutcliffe, a modern grammarian, rejects it altogether. These are his words:—

“ Peut-être n'y a-t-il aucune façon de parler qui soit *plus employée en Anglais* que celle qu'on appelle le double possessif, et cependant rien ne saurait être *plus contraire à la logique*. Aussi un grammairien moderne (Sutcliffe) rejette-t-il tout-à-fait cette construction? Néanmoins, en raison de son fréquent usage, il nous a paru nécessaire d'en parler, tout en avertissant l'élève de ce qu'elle a de *vicieux*.

“ Voici ce que Sutcliffe dit à ce sujet: une des difficultés qu'offre l'emploi du possessif provient de ce que l'on ne fait pas toujours la distinction entre l'idée de possession simple et celle de possession double que renferme la phrase. Ainsi, quand on dit, *there are very noble tragedies which have been written on the other plan, as Tamerlane, Ulysses, with most of Mr. Dryden's**, la phrase est correcte, parceque l'idée de possession est double; mais il arrive souvent que des auteurs se servent d'un double genitif pour exprimer une idée de possession simple; Lowth a commis cette erreur. Il donne pour exemple, *a soldier of the king's*, et dit que cette phrase equivaut à, *one of the king's soldiers*; mais si l'on supplée l'ellipse,

* Spectator, No. 40.

la phrase sera, a soldier of the king's soldiers; ce qui est répéter deux fois l'idée de soldat sans aucune utilité.

" Priestley, dans sa grammaire, a employé six pages entières à expliquer l'emploi du double possessif pour exprimer une idée simple. Il dit que dans quelques cas, on se sert du possessif et de la préposition, mais que le sens est différent. Ainsi, dit-il, *this picture of my friend* veut dire, ce portrait de mon ami; tandis que *this picture of my friend's* signifie, ce tableau appartenant à mon ami. Cela est vrai, d'après l'usage; mais, d'après la logique, rien n'est plus *faux*.

" Pour montrer combien cette façon de parler est vicieuse, supposons que l'on veuille dire, one of the king's servants: en employant l'idiotisme que nous critiquons, on dira, a servant of the king's; et la phrase, si l'on supplée l'ellipse, deviendra, a servant of the king's servants, c'est à dire, non le serviteur du roi, mais le serviteur des serviteurs du roi.*

" M. Sadler prétend que le possessif dans les phrases comme la suivante, *that tongue of yours*,

* This is a very wise remark for the present, that is, in the total absence of all grammatical science; for, if "a servant of the king's" means, as all grammarians must allow that it does, according to their manner of supplying the ellipsis, *a servant of the king's servants*, it is evident that the servant does not belong to the king, and that the meaning is the reverse of what is intended. Then, in order to know if this be correct, we have to find out if "a servant of the king's" does *really* mean "a servant of the king's servants." But where are we to look for information on this point? Not amongst grammarians; for the best of them cannot show in what an adjective differs from a substantive; then much less can they show the nature of a noun in the possessive case, the latter being far more difficult; and hence, such a locution as "a servant of the king's," though in hourly use, has never yet been known either grammatically or as to meaning.

&c., ne se rapporte qu'à la personne indiquée par le pronom, et n'a aucun rapport avec la chose possédée. Nous sommes fâchés de ne pouvoir admettre cette décision, d'abord, parcequ'elle ne nous explique pas le rôle que joue dans la phrase une préposition sans régime*, ensuite, parcequ'elle ne s'applique qu'au seul cas où le mot au possessif est un pronom, attendu que si le mot au possessif est un nom, il doit toujours être suivi d'un nom de chose possédée, soit exprimé soit sous-entendu. Crombie, Murray, et Lennie, à l'exemple de Lowth, affirment que l'on peut employer un double possessif pour exprimer une idée simple; et, de tous les auteurs de grammaires à l'usage des Français, aucun, à l'exception de M. Sadler, n'a abordé cette difficulté. L'usage, aujourd'hui, paraît avoir complètement décidé contre la logique: nous avons cru devoir faire nos réserves.† ”

Thus we perceive that both at home and abroad the English language must suffer seriously from

“ * M. Sadler ne veut pas sans doute faire entendre que le mot *yours* est le régime de la préposition, car s'il y a quelque règle fixe en Anglais, c'est certainement celle qui veut que le régime d'une préposition soit à l'objectif. Je sais que Webster prétend que dans ces sortes de phrases la préposition régit le nom ou le pronom au possessif, et c'est la seule manière d'expliquer grammaticalement l'emploi du possessif *double* pour exprimer une idée simple de propriété; mais je crois que jusqu'ici il est le seul de cette opinion: encore, cette explication ne saurait s'appliquer à l'exemple que donne Sutcliffe, *with most of Mr. Dryden's*, où la préposition a pour régime le mot *tragedies* sous-entendu. Il y a donc, de quelque manière qu'on explique l'idiotisme en question, un double emploi d'une même forme pour exprimer deux idées distinctes.”

† Grammaire complète de la Langue Anglaise par F. Churchill, Professeur d'Anglais au Collège Royale Henri IV. à Paris. Ouvrage autorisé par le Conseil Royal de l'Instruction Publique. 1842.

the science of grammar being thus wholly unknown. Besides the censure bestowed on this double possessive by the English grammarian Sutcliffe in England, and the English Professor of a French College, do we not find in the English Grammar adopted by all the respectable scholastic institutions throughout Great Britain and America the following concluding observation on this same difficulty: — “But after all that can be said for this double genitive, some grammarians think that it would be better to avoid THE USE OF IT ALTOGETHER, and to give the sentiment another form of expression.”*

Now, if we are to avoid the use of it altogether, how are we to express ourselves? Why, instead of saying “a soldier of the king’s,” we are to say “a soldier of the king;” for this is a sentence which grammarians think they can account for. But if it be correct to say “a soldier of the king,” it must be equally correct to say “a soldier of him;” and if we admit “a soldier of him,” we ought also to admit “a soldier of me.” These also are expressions which grammarians think they can, according to their limited notions of the science of grammar, account for, and so they find them very logical; yet our ears tell us that they are detestable; and a little farther on (that is, when we come to our discovery) our reason will justify our ears.

Now we have never seen an English grammar that does not sanction this mode of forming our

* Murray’s Grammar, 174.

possessive case. They all admit that the preposition *of* is just the same as the *s* and the apostrophe. When we employ a noun which we hear but seldom, this advice can deceive us. Thus, "a house of the governor" seems to pass off very well; but if we take a noun heard more frequently than the noun *governor*, our ears are offended, as, "the house of my *father*;" and if we employ a pronoun instead of *father*, our ears are still more offended, as, "the house of him." This arises from our hearing such a pronoun, perhaps, a hundred times for the once we hear *father*, since it is employed, not only for this one word *father*, but for every other noun in the English language of the same person, gender, and number. And if we choose a pronoun still more frequently heard than *him* (which is *me*, inasmuch as it stands for both masculine and feminine nouns, whilst *him* stands for nouns masculine only), our ears are still more offended: indeed, I have never heard any one but a foreigner say "the house of me;" yet it is fully as bad to say "the house of the governor."

But how does it happen that grammarians do not reject the use of the double possessive, when it belongs to a pronoun? Because our ears, from hearing the pronoun so often, cannot be imposed upon so readily. Though we may be misled to say "this house of the king," or "of the governor," instead of "this house of the king's," or "of the governor's," we cannot be so easily induced to say "this house of him," or, "this house of me;" yet

the one is just as logical as the other, that is, just as bad. Hence grammarians take care to tell us that the double possessive may be avoided in a grave style; that is, when we use words out of frequent use, and of which our ears cannot so easily judge. Thus, Dr. Priestley remarks, "We say, it is a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton, though it would not have been more improper, only *more familiar*, to say, a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton's."* The words *more familiar* here imply neither more nor less than *better English*. Besides, those two forms have quite opposite meanings; it is only the latter (the genuine English possessive) which implies possession; the former does not mean that Sir Isaac Newton is the author of a discovery, but that a discovery is made of him, and this we know is not intended to be meant. Grammarians, from not knowing how to account for this double possessive, have been led to employ the form recommended above; and thus, from its being approved of in one situation, it became approved of in *all* others, to the great detriment of the genuine English idiom. Every English grammarian will tell you it is just as good to say "give me the book of my brother," as "give me my brother's book;" or, "give me that book of my brother," as "give me that book of my brother's:" yet, "give me the book of my brother," and "give me that book of my brother," are very faulty constructions, and wholly foreign to the English idiom; whereas,

* Gram. 72.

“give me my brother’s book,” and “give me that book of my brother’s,”^{*} are genuine. We even find in Cobbett, a writer as well acquainted with our idiom as Swift himself, the following observation:—
 “But observe, this change” (he alludes to the possessive case) “is not absolutely necessary. We may ALWAYS do without it if we please; for, *the hat of Richard* is the same as *Richard’s hat*.”^{*}
 Now, we are sure that when Cobbett found himself in the midst of his family, he never did, any more than any other Englishman, make use of such an expression as “give me the hat of Richard,” or “give me that hat of Richard;” but he must have invariably said “give me Richard’s hat,” and “give me that hat of Richard’s.”

Thus I have shown the total incapacity of grammarians to account for this double possessive case of nouns, just as I have shown their total incapacity to account for the same construction when belonging to pronouns; nor can they, in either instance, give the exact meaning of a noun or a pronoun. Indeed, no matter how we place any of the pronouns *mine*, *thine*, *ours*, *yours*, &c., their exact meaning cannot be shown by any grammarian or lexicographer that ever wrote; and the exact meaning of a noun when forming the double possessive is just as little known. The English idiom, for our want of such knowledge, is often vitiated when we have occasion to use nouns; and if the

^{*} French Gram. Let. vi. p. 74.

learned have not been equally fortunate in their evil work when pronouns are employed, we may thank our ears, and not our knowledge of grammar, for it. Hence it appears that not only those pronouns to which allusion has been so often made are unknown, but even all English nouns that can take the possessive form. And when I say unknown, I understand by this, that we are not only wholly ignorant of these words grammatically considered, but that we do not know even their meaning. This is an immense privation of useful knowledge, yet this is not all; we shall see when we come to the present discovery, that not only those pronouns and nouns in the possessive case are unknown, but also others in familiar use.

And who can tell us the origin of the possessive sign ('s)? The spots on the sun's disk can be accounted for, with as much appearance of truth as this little mystery. Various are the conjectures formed respecting it. For a long time the learned supposed it to be a contraction of the pronoun *his*, and that "John's book" is no other than "John his book." But, on observing that we cannot say "Mary his book," though we say "Mary's book," nor "the men his books," though we say "the men's books," this opinion respecting its derivation was rejected. The learned have since begun to suppose that it is derived from the Saxon genitive *es*. But on looking over the declensions of nouns in the Saxon language, I perceive that this genitive of theirs belongs to

nouns masculine only. I even remark that nouns masculine have not *always* such a termination for their genitive; whilst our genitive is the same, always the same, for both masculine and feminine nouns. Now, though I can easily conceive why men should reject the masculine word *his* as that from which our genitive is formed, since the latter is the same for both masculine and feminine, I cannot so easily account for their supposing, nay asserting, that it is derived from the Saxon termination *es*, since this is also masculine. Indeed no one can account for such inconsistency, unless it may be supposed to come from the vulgar opinion that things brought from afar are always to be preferred to those we find at home.

Addison supposes the English genitive to be derived from *his*; thus, in No. 135. of the Spectator, after alluding to the verbal termination *ed*, he says, “I think we may add to the foregoing observations the change which has happened in our language by the abbreviation of several words that are terminated in *eth*, by substituting an *s* in the room of the last syllable, as in drowns, walks, arrives, and innumerable other words, which in the pronunciation of our forefathers were drowneth, walketh, arriveth.* I might here observe that the same single letter on many occasions does the office of a whole word, and represents the *his* and

* Addison is here in error, as I shall have occasion to show when I apply my system to the discovery of all those endings of English verbs.

her of our forefathers." Upon which Bishop Lowth remarks: "The latter instance might have shown him how groundless this notion is; for it is not easy to conceive how the letter *s*, added to a feminine noun, should represent the word *her*, any more than it should the word *their*, added to a plural noun; as the *children's* bread. But the direct derivation of this case from the Saxon genitive case is sufficient of itself to decide this matter." *

But the "learned and sagacious Wallis," as Dr. Johnson justly qualifies him, must have determined many in rejecting Addison's opinion. He is very positive on this point:—"Qui autem arbitrantur illud *s* loco vocis *his*, adjunctum esse (priori scilicet parti per Aphaeresin abscissâ), ideoque apostrophî notam semper vel pingendam esse vel saltem subintelligendam, *omnino errant*. Quamvis enim non negem quin apostrophî nota commodè nonnunquam affigi possit, ut ipsius literæ *s* usus distinctiùs, ubi opus est, percipiatur; tamen semper fieri debere, aut etiam ideò fieri quia vocem *his* innuat, *omnino nego*. Adjungitur enim et femininarum nominibus propriis, et substantivis pluralibus, ubi vox *his* sine solæcismo locum habere non potest." †

Dr. Johnson gives his opinion thus:—"These genitives are always written with a mark of elision, *master's*, *scholar's*, according to an opinion long received, that the 's is a contraction of his, as the

* Gram. 42.

† See his Gram. p. 80. ed. 1664.

soldier's valour for the soldier his valour; but this cannot be the true original, because 's is put to female nouns: woman's beauty, the virgin's delicacy, haughty Juno's unrelenting hate; and collective nouns, as women's passions, the rabble's insolence, the multitude's folly. In all these cases it is apparent that *his* cannot be understood. We say also, '*the foundation's strength, the diamond's lustre, the winter's severity*;' but in these cases *his* may be understood, *he* and *his* having formerly been applied to neuters in the place now supplied by *it* and *its*. This termination of the noun *seems* to constitute a real genitive, indicating possession. It is derived to us from those who declined *smid*, a smith; genitive *smides*, of a smith; plural *smides* or *smidis*, smiths; and so on in two other of their seven declensions.

"It is a further confirmation of this opinion, that in the old poets both the genitive and plural were longer by a syllable than the original word: *kneitis* for knights in Chaucer; *leavis* for leaves in Spenser."*

In his dictionary, accounting for the word *his*, he also says, "It is sometimes used as a sign of the genitive; as, the man his ground for the man's ground. It is now rarely thus used, as its use proceeded probably from a false opinion that the *s* formative of the genitive was *his* contracted."

We shall see, when we come to the proper place for showing it, how far this opinion was false.

* See his Gram.

Dr. Priestley says, "The apostrophe denotes the omission of an [i] which was formerly inserted, and made an addition of a syllable to the word. Pope and some of his contemporaries, to avoid a harshness in the pronunciation of some genitives, wrote the word *his* at the end of the word; as Statius *his Thebais*, Socrates *his fetters* (Spectator), imagining the *'s* to be a contraction for that pronoun. But analogy easily overturns that supposition; for *Venus his beauty*, or *men his wit*, were absurd." *

"In our mother-tongue nouns were varied to form cases, somewhat as in Latin. This declension of nouns has entirely ceased, except in the genitive or possessive case, in which an apostrophe before *s* has been substituted for the regular Saxon termination *er* (*es*)."

Dr. Ash in his *Institutes* considers our use of the apostrophe before the *s* to be a corrupt custom, and he is of opinion that it ought to be discontinued. "Formerly," says he, "there were notes used to distinguish the ablative case singular of Latin nouns of the first declension, and the genitive of the fourth, which are now laid aside by correct writers; and I cannot but think that some time or other this will be the fate of the apostrophe in the genitive case." He is also of opinion that "this case undoubtedly came from the Saxon, &c., and that as to the apostrophe, it was seldom used to distinguish the genitive case till about the beginning of the present century (the eighteenth), and

* Gram. 68.

† Webster.

then seems to have been introduced by mistake. At that time the genitive case was supposed to have had its original from a contraction; as *John's book* for *John his book*; but that notion has been sufficiently exploded; and therefore the use of the apostrophe, especially in those instances where the pronunciation requires an additional syllable, is, I presume, *quite indefensible*.”*

Grammarians and lexicographers, in general, concur in this opinion of our genitive being derived from the same case in the Saxon tongue. However the learned author of the article Grammar in the “*Encyclopædia Britannica*” supposes that it may probably be derived from *his*; whilst the no less able and learned writer who treats the same subject in Rees’s *Cyclopædia* boldly asserts:—“The possessive case in our tongue is an evident abbreviation of the third declension in Latin, Father is house, Father’s house, the apostrophe above supplying the place of the excluded vowel.”

Foreigners who never fail inquiring into the original of our genitive, and why we make use of an apostrophe, and have always the object possessed following this case, are often surprised at our total incapacity to satisfy them respecting a construction of which the use is for them a very great difficulty, but which would, of course, be greatly diminished were its real nature and grammatical properties known.

But are the most enlightened foreigners capable

* Pages 29, 30, &c.

of satisfying us respecting any of the real difficulties of their language? Have ever any of the learned members of the French Academy told us why they say, *c'est moi, c'est toi, c'est lui*, any more than *c'est je, c'est tu, c'est il*? Yet there is a profound logical reason for it. Or do they know why their participles past sometimes vary, and at other times do not? A library might be filled with all the works written on this single difficulty in French grammar, but the cause of this variation in the same word is utterly unknown; yet, like every other *apparent* difficulty in grammar, it is extremely clear and simple. Or can Frenchmen trace to their original sources any of the terminations of their verbs? or do they even know whence come their infinitives in *oir*, as *voir, pouvoir, devoir*, &c.? No, they do not; no more than the learned Romans knew the original of the terminations of their nouns, adjectives, verbs, &c.; yet all this is uncommonly simple. But let us return to the English language.

We have shown how imperfect our knowledge of its possessive nouns and pronouns is; we had previously shown how imperfect it also is with respect to nouns, adjectives, and personal pronouns; and this latter imperfection applies not only to the English language, but to all the languages ever spoken. We have now to consider those words known by the general name of ADJECTIVE PRONOUNS, such as, *this, that, these, those, some, other, any, each, every, one, all, such*, &c. The great difficulty

to be solved with regard to these words, is to know whether they are to be considered as adjectives or pronouns; and on this point, as the science of grammar stands, grammarians have only conjectures to offer. When these words precede their nouns, as, this book, that house, some book, the other house, &c., all grammarians concur in naming them adjective pronouns. But when they are not followed by their nouns, grammarians cannot agree as to how they should be considered; because no reason sufficiently logical to gain general assent can be assigned. Now the difference as to meaning between those words when viewed as adjectives, and as pronouns, is very considerable. Indeed it is precisely the same as that which we perceive between the words good and goodness, or bad and badness; that is to say, there is exactly the same difference between them as that which we remark between the words called adjectives and those called substantives. This difference every body will admit is very palpable; hence, nothing can show more forcibly our total want of the science of languages than the impossibility our learned grammarians find themselves in to settle this point to the satisfaction of all; it is, however, when known, simplicity itself. Lowth, referring to those pronouns, says*, “Though they may sometimes *seem* to stand by themselves, yet they have *always* some substantive belonging to them, either expressed or understood.”

* Page 51.

If they have always some substantive belonging to them, *expressed* or *understood*, they are always adjectives, and cannot possibly be pronouns; but how are we to know with certainty that when they have not their substantives expressed they are understood? If pointing to three books, we say, "Put up those two, and give me the other," are we to understand that after the word *other*, the word *book* is understood? And for what reason are we led to understand this? Do logicians, metaphysicians, or grammarians know any thing of the ellipsis? We should like to see what rules they have laid down respecting its use, and on what wise principle these rules are based, *if there be any*, for we have sought for them in vain. We know that all grammarians admit that in this instance of the three books the word *book* is understood; but why do they admit this? Simply because it does not offend their ears to say, "Give me the other book;" and this is a sorry reason. Now, supposing we were to say, still alluding to those three books, "Give me that one, and put up the *others*," are we to understand that after the word *others* the word *books* is understood? Every grammarian will now answer *No*, still consulting his ear, because he cannot bring himself to say *the others books*.

Sir Charles Stoddart, referring to those words, says, that he "cannot admit them to be adjectives when they stand by themselves, or as Lowth rather singularly expresses it, *seem to stand by themselves*. It is true that in such cases they often have some

substantive belonging to them, either *expressed* or *understood*, but this only proves that they are pronouns."* It proves quite the contrary. If the noun be *expressed*, they cannot possibly occupy its place, and consequently are not *pro*-nouns; and if it be *understood*, it is the same in analysis as if it were expressed. The author of *Hermes*, alluding to those words, says, "It must be confessed, indeed, that all these words do not always *appear* as pronouns. When they stand by themselves, and *represent* some noun, (as when we say, *this* is virtue, or give me *that*,) then are they pronouns. But when they are associated to some noun, (as when we say, *this* habit is virtue; or, *that* man defrauded me,) then as they supply not the place of a noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall *rather* into the species of definitives or articles."†

The writer in Rees's *Cyclopædia* says, "Mr. Tooke has the merit of being the first to show that in all circumstances *THAT* retains one and the same character." Now Horne Tooke allows a *subauditur* after the word *that*, when it stands alone, from which we are to conclude that the writer in the *Cyclopædia* allows one also. It is difficult to know, from the above passage, whether Harris is or is not of the same opinion. If we may judge from Lowth and Sir Charles Stoddart, who suppose a noun to be understood after adjective pronouns, they did not suppose Harris to think otherwise, as from the great deference they show to

* Ency. Met.

† Page 72.

all his opinions, it is scarcely possible they would have differed from him in this particular.

Now had Horne Tooke, in his celebrated account of the word **THAT**, fully and logically explained its real character "in all circumstances," we should know with certainty whether it has or has not a noun understood after it, when not followed by one in such situations as, "give me that and take this," and "put up the other," &c. ; and this would have led to an important discovery—the real nature of all those words called adjective pronouns. If we now descend from those high authorities to school books, what shall we find? Nothing but doubt and conjectures; and the sad and convincing proof that nothing is known. Thus in Murray's popular compilation, we find the following observations on the subject before us:—

"It is the opinion of some respectable grammarians, that the words *this, that, any, some, such, his, their, our, &c.*, are pronouns when they are used separately from the nouns to which they relate*; but that, when they are joined to those nouns, they are not to be considered as belonging to this species of words; because, in this association they rather ascertain a substantive than supply the place of one. They assert that, in the phrases, 'give me *that*,' '*this* is John's,' and '*such* were *some* of you,' the words in italics are pronouns; but that in the following phrases they are not pro-

* *Their* and *our* should never be used separately from the nouns to which they relate.

nouns: ‘*this* book is instructive,’ ‘*some* boys are ingenious,’ ‘*my* health is declining,’ ‘*our* hearts are deceitful,’ &c. OTHER grammarians think that none of ~~these~~ forms of speech can properly be called pronouns; as the genuine pronoun stands by itself, without the aid of a noun expressed or understood. *They are of opinion*, that in the expressions, ‘give me that,’ ‘this is John’s,’ &c., the noun is *always* understood, and must be supplied in the mind of the reader: as, ‘give me that book;’ ‘this book is John’s;’ and ‘*such* persons were *some* persons amongst you.’ ” *

Children eight or nine years old will, some short time hence, be filled with astonishment, when told that there was a time when the most eminent professors could not tell, with any appearance of certainty, how the words *this*, *that*, *any*, *some*, *such*, *his*, *their*, *our*, &c., were to be classed and considered. This story will fill them with astonishment, because the principle that directs how these little words are to be accounted for can be as easily understood by a child eight or nine years old, as by a Locke or a Newton, since it requires no greater power of the understanding to be clearly felt and admitted, than that by which we can conceive that a part of an apple is less than a whole one.

I have, till now, forbore to allude to the article, because, from its offering no distinct image to the mind, its real nature is difficult to conceive. When languages were in their infancy, all words must

* Murray’s Gram.

have had a visible meaning, we might say a palpable one. What was then our definite article *the*? This is Horne Tooke's account of it: "*The*, our article as it is called, is the imperative of the verb (Anglo-Saxon) *Dean*; which may very well supply the place of the Anglo-Saxon article *re*, which is the imperative of *reon*, *videre*: for it answers the same purpose in discourse to say, *see man*, or, *take man*. For instance —

‘THE man that hath not music in himself
Is fit for treasons,’ &c.

TAKE man (or SEE man); TAKEN man hath not music, &c., SAID man or TAKEN man is fit for treasons, &c.

“This analysed method of speech must, I know, seem strange and awkward to you at first mention; but try it repeatedly as I have done FOR YEARS; apply the meaning frequently on every occasion where *the* and *that* are used in the language, and I fear not your conviction.”*

Sir Charles Stoddart does not contradict this account of the English article *the*; he only observes that were it made out more clearly than it really is, it would throw but little light on its “true grammatical force.”†

Thus, Horne Tooke has taken *for years* this little word *the* for the imperative of a Saxon verb meaning to *see*. All this is very erroneous and far-fetched, as we shall see in the proper place, for its original is to be found much nearer home. Besides,

* Horne Tooke, p. 345.

† See Enc. Met. 68.

it throws no light upon a singular circumstance connected with the article *the* as it is called ; which is, that this word, although having no sign of the plural number about it, must, however, when preceding an adjective not followed by a substantive, have always words in the plural number corresponding with it. As, “the *rich are* unhappy, and so *are the poor.*” All the English grammars ever published say, that this singularity arises from such adjectives having plural nouns understood after them ; so that the example given above means, the rich *men* are unhappy, and so are the poor *men*. But besides that this construction is contrary to the English idiom, as the article should not, in such a case, be expressed, we can see no reason why a plural noun should be understood any more than one in the singular number. It is even clear that if a singular noun were understood the construction would be correct ; as, “the rich man is unhappy, and so is the poor man.” But it is evident, though this makes good English, and the other form is faulty, that a singular noun cannot be understood, since, as we have already seen, adjectives used substantively have always words in the plural number corresponding with them, and it is very just that it should be so, as the reader will allow when he sees the original of THE.

This much I have thought it necessary to say respecting the principles of grammar, that it may be seen in what state I have found this science.

So might I continue through all the nine parts of speech; but each one shall be critically examined in its proper place. For the present, enough has been seen to leave no doubt on any impartial and enlightened mind, that nothing whatever indicating a knowledge of the science of languages has been hitherto known; and if we except some vague hints from a few eminent philosophers, men do not even appear to have suspected that they were in want of such a science, and that its discovery remains to be made. Hence, were this work to stop here, it would do more for grammar than any other of the same kind that has yet appeared, since it clearly proves what no other work treating the same subject does prove, namely, that of grammar beyond what is acquired by mere observation we know nothing, not even so much as what a substantive, an adjective, or a pronoun is. And as the consciousness of our ignorance of any art or science is most essential towards our becoming acquainted with it, so this proof of our real and total ignorance of the science of grammar is a great advance towards our discovering what it is. For myself, this much at least I can say, that when I had gone thus far into this inquiry, and felt assured that of the science of grammar I knew nothing, and that in this respect nobody else was any wiser than myself, I thought that even this, were I to go no farther, was a great and important discovery; and thus I was encouraged to continue my research, and I soon began to have a foreboding of what was to follow.

I have now to submit to the reader the view I have taken of the human mind, to the end that he may thoroughly understand the system by which I have been guided; and should this view not coincide in every way with his own, I beg to remind him of the promise I have made, which is not to tell him how I *ought* to have made this discovery, but *how I happened to make it*.

As my sole object is for the present to communicate to the public the science of languages, there will be no necessity for noticing here any other part of the entire opinion I may have formed of the powers of the mind, than as much as *may* serve to show, in a plain and concise manner, the discovery which has been made by adhering to this opinion. Nor is there any necessity for calling the reader's attention to the great question upon which he and I now enter. Every body who knows any thing must be aware, that an inquiry into the nature of the human mind has been considered by eminent philosophers as the most important of all inquiries; and it is not without reason that it has been so considered, since it is solely to the mind that man is indebted for all his knowledge and power.

THE MIND.

Lexicographers allow this word to have several significations; but in the view now to be taken of it, I have to notice only one of them, and hence I say, it means *that intellectual power by which we think and move*. Whilst thus considering MIND, there are two questions (on which a great deal depends, as we shall see hereafter) to be solved. The first question may stand thus: Is the mind a being separate from the body? And the second thus: Is the mind a material or an immaterial substance? In other words—Is it body or soul? Before I presume to offer my own opinion on both these points, it will not be out of place to set down here, that the reader may the more easily judge for himself, what others have already decided respecting them.

Dr. Johnson, a man well acquainted with words, and the different meanings assigned them by eminent writers, defines MIND, whilst considering it as I now do, “the intelligent power.” By the following words, which are taken from the example he gives under this meaning, it is easy to perceive that he believes the *mind* to be *immaterial*:—“A part or particle of the soul, whereby it doth understand, not depending upon matter, nor needing any organ, free from passion coming from without, and apt to be dissevered as eternal from that which is

mortal.”* And this opinion is still confirmed by the following example which he gives from Dryden: —

“ I thought th’ *eternal* mind
Had made us masters.”

Locke, also, whose Essay on the Human Understanding is nothing more, as Horne Tooke somewhere observes, than an essay on words, says, whilst referring to this intelligent, this thinking power, “ The soul is agreed on all hands to be that in us which thinks.”†

Dr. Johnson, who defines SPIRIT to be an immaterial substance, an intellectual being, gives under this meaning from Locke and Watts the two following examples, from which it is clear that he makes no difference, no more than Locke and Watts do, between mind and spirit: —

“ Spirit is a substance wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, do subsist.”‡

“ If we seclude space, there will remain in the world but matter and *mind*, or body and *spirit*.”§

Locke says also||, “ Our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body by willing or thought.”

There is a clever essay on the human mind in “ The Spectator¶, from which I take the following passage: — “ It is impossible to attend to such

* Raleigh.

† See his letter to the Bishop of Worcester in his Essay on the Human Understanding, vol. ii. p. 332.

‡ Locke. § Watts’s Logic. || Vol. ii. p. 23. ¶ No. 554.

instances as these* without being raised into a contemplation on the wonderful nature of an human mind, which is capable of such progressions in knowledge, and can contain such a variety of ideas, without perplexity or confusion. How reasonable is it from hence to infer its divine original! And whilst we find unthinking matter endued with a natural power to last for ever, unless annihilated by Omnipotence, how absurd would it be to imagine that a being † so much superior to it should not have the same privilege.”

In the same paper *soul* is several times taken for *mind*.

Dugald Stewart is also very positive with regard to the immateriality of the mind, as we may perceive from the following passage : —

“ The notions we annex to the words MATTER and MIND, as is well remarked by Dr. Reid ‡, are merely relative. If I am asked what I mean by matter? I can only explain myself by saying, it is that which is extended, figured, coloured, moveable, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold;—that is, I can define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities, which the constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something which is extended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with respect to Mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence,

* The writer refers to Boyle, Sir Isaac Newton, and Leonardo da Vinci.

† The mind.

‡ Essay on the Active Powers of Man, pp. 8, 9.

but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition; operations which imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every man, too, is impressed with an irresistible conviction that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions belong to one and the same being; to that being which he calls *himself*; a being which he is led, by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something *distinct from his body*, and not as liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs." *

A little farther on the same writer observes:—

"Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of that principle which feels, and thinks, and wills, by saying that it is a material substance, or that it is the result of material organisation, we impose on ourselves by words; forgetting that matter as well as mind is known to us by its qualities and attributes alone, and that we are totally ignorant of the essence of either." †

Bacon also considers the mind as the soul, and as distinct from the body:—"Quantum ad doctrinam de fœdere, sive de communi vinculo animæ et corporis: Ea in duas partes tribui possit. Quemadmodum enim inter fœderatos intercedunt, et mutua rerum suarum communicatio et mutua officia; sic fœdus istud animæ et corporis duabus similiter rebus continetur: Nimirum ut describatur; quo modo hæ duo (*anima* scil. et *corpus*) se

* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 3.

† Page 5.

invicem detegant, et quo modo invicem in se agant ; notitia sive indicatione et impressione."*

French philosophers of great repute do also consider the mind as immaterial, and wholly distinct from the body. Thus Descartes, the glory of France, and who is allowed to have examined this question more minutely than anybody else, expresses himself on this subject in the following precise and positive manner: " Pour ce que je sais que toutes les choses que je conçois clairement et distinctement peuvent être produites par Dieu telles que je les conçois, il suffit que je puisse concevoir clairement et distinctement une chose sans une autre pour être certain que l'une est distincte ou différente de l'autre, parce qu'elles peuvent être mises séparément, au moins par la toute puissance de Dieu ; et il n'importe par quelle puissance cette séparation se fasse pour être obligé à les juger différentes ; et partant, de cela même que je connais avec certitude que j'existe, et que cependant je ne remarque point qu'il appartienne nécessairement aucune autre chose à ma nature ou à mon essence, si non que je suis une chose qui pense, je conclus fort bien que mon essence consiste en cela seul, que je suis une chose qui pense, ou une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser. Et quoique peut-être, ou plutôt certainement, comme je le dirai tantôt, j'aie un corps auquel je suis très-étroitement conjoint ; néanmoins, pour ce que d'un côté j'ai une clair et distincte

* De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, lib. iv. c. 1.

idée de moi-même en tant que je suis seulement une chose qui pense et non étendue, et que d'un autre j'ai une idée distincte du corps en tant qu'il est seulement une chose étendue et qui ne pense point, il est certain que *moi*, c'est à dire mon *ame*, par laquelle je suis ce que je suis, est entièrement et véritablement distincte de mon corps, et qu'elle peut être ou exister sans lui." *

Alluding elsewhere to this power of *thinking* and *doubting*, which he discovered in himself, Descartes also observes: " Je connus delà que j'étais une substance dont toute l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser, et qui, pour être n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, ni *ne depend d'aucune chose matérielle*." †

Another great man also observes: " Je puis bien concevoir un homme sans mains, sans pieds; je le conceverais même sans tête, si l'expérience ne m'apprenait que c'est par là qu'il pense. C'est donc la pensée qui fait l'être de l'homme, et sans quoi on ne peut le concevoir. Qu'est-ce qui sent du plaisir en nous? est-ce la main? est-ce le bras? est-ce la chair? est-ce le sang? On verra qu'il faut que ce soit quelque chose d'IMMATÉRIELLE." ‡

The opinion entertained by Malebranche respecting the nature of the mind, is in conformity with all the preceding authorities: " L'esprit de l'homme n'étant point matériel ou étendu, est sans doute une substance simple, indivisible, et sans aucune composition de parties." §

* Meditation sixième, 106. ed. de Jules Simon, 1842.

† Discours sur la Méthode, même ed. p. 20.

‡ Pensées de Pascal.

§ De la Recherche de la Vérité, tom. i. p. 4.

Condillac, in his *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances humaines*, is so far from considering the mind to be different from the soul, that instead of saying *les opérations de l'esprit*, which he might have said with great propriety, he has *les opérations de l'âme**, by which he understands both mind and soul. He does not allow the mind to be even the most subtile part of the body, and he consequently wholly rejects such an opinion: "Le péché originel a rendu l'âme si dépendante du corps, que bien des philosophes ont confondu ces deux substances. Ils ont cru que la première n'est que ce qu'il y a dans le corps de plus délié, de plus subtil, et de plus capable de mouvement: mais cette opinion est une suite du peu de soin qu'ils ont eu de raisonner d'après des idées exactes." †

Laromiguière, Condillac's distinguished follower and rival, has also the following words in his philosophy:—

"On me permettra sans doute de supposer, conformément à la croyance des peuples, et à celle des plus grands philosophes, que nous avons une *âme* distincte du corps." ‡

This philosopher, as well as Descartes, Pascal, Malebranche, and Condillac, considers this thinking power to be the same as the soul. Hence by *âme*,

* Witness the title he gives to the first part of his "*Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances humaines*;" it is in these words:—"*Des matériaux de nos connaissances, et particulièrement des opérations de l'âme.*"

† *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances humaines*, p. 20

‡ Page 63.

in the instance here given, he understands *esprit* or *mind*, as well as our immortal being. Thus, elsewhere he says, “On ne voit pas comment l’âme et le corps se modifient reciproquement, cependant le fait reste ; toutes le fois que le corps reçoit quelque impression l’âme éprouve une sensation ; et lorsque l’âme prend une détermination, le corps l’exécute.”* Hence it is evident that he makes no difference between the mind and the soul.

M. Cousin seems to adopt Plato’s opinion, and to consider the mind as the Divinity itself: “Qu’est-ce que Dieu ? Je vous l’ai dit, c’est la pensée en soi, la pensée absolue avec ses momens fondamentaux, la raison éternelle, substance et cause des vérités que l’homme aperçoit.”† And again: “Leibnitz a dit : ‘Il y a de l’être dans toute proposition ;’ or une proposition n’est qu’une pensée exprimée, et dans toute proposition il y a de l’être, parce que il y a de l’être dans toute pensée ; or l’idée de l’être à son plus bas degré implique une idée, plus ou moins claire mais réelle, de l’être en soi, c’est à dire, de Dieu.”‡

Thus we have seen that the greatest philosophers of modern times suppose that power by which we move and think to be the same as our immortal being. The ancients also, whether supposing the mind, like Plato, to be an emanation of the divinity, or, like Aristotle, to be composed of the same matter as the heavens ; or whether they express their hopes or their doubts upon the pro-

* Page 251.

† Cours de l’Histoire de la Philosophie, vol. i. 6me leçon, p 12.

‡ Page 21.

bability of a future state, refer to the mind or soul during life, as to a being wholly different from the body: —

“ Ignoratur enim quæ sit natura animai,
Nata sit ; an, contra, nascentibus insinuetur :
Et simul intereat nobiscum morte dirempta ;
An tenebras Orci visat, vastasque lacunas,
An pecudes alias divinitus insinuet se.” LUCRETIVS.

They were even so strongly impressed with the belief of the mind's being separate from the body, that its form and place of rest in it have given rise to numerous conjectures. Hence Cicero remarks: —
“ Qua facie quidem sit animus, aut ubi habitet, ne quærendum quidem est.”

But however the ancients may differ among themselves in other respects concerning the mind or the soul, few of them could dissent from Cicero's definition of it when he says : “ Animus est qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui prævidet, et moderatur, et movet, id corpus cui præpositus est.”

Nor do the opinions respecting the nature of the mind, which I have given above from Descartes, Pascal, Malebranche, Locke, &c. contradict in the least this of Cicero's ; and as he has minutely examined what the greatest men of antiquity have thought on this subject*, it may be safely inferred that his notion of this active power, by which we think and move, does not, whilst it belongs to the body, differ from theirs. In like manner, as the moderns use soul or spirit for the mind, ancient

* See his Tusculan questions.

philosophers employ *spiritus*. Thus Locke, justifying his use of the word *spirit* in the same sense, observes in one of his letters to the Bishop of Worcester that Virgil and Cicero, who of all the Romans understood philosophy and Latin best, employ *spiritus* in the same manner, which corresponds with these words already quoted from him: "The soul is agreed on all hands to be that in us which thinks."

Ancient philosophers have also supposed the mind (that is, the most eminent amongst them) to be of a substance very different from the body; such as air, ether, fire, or light, in short, to be the same as the soul, which, for the most part, they seemed to believe as material, though not of a gross substance, or such as might be handled, but as composed of a very subtile matter.

Such are the opinions that have mostly prevailed in ancient and modern times respecting the human mind.

Now, if philosophers had considered the mind as a material, and not as an immaterial, substance, would there be, in such a consideration of it, any thing immoral or irreligious? or would it imply that the soul must be also material? In such an opinion there would be nothing that might be said to offend morality or religion, nor could it hence be inferred, as we shall see presently, that the soul is material; unless, however, men were to assert, as they have ever done, that *soul* and *mind* had the same meaning. Then have philosophers raised them-

selves to the height of this great question when they considered the mind to be equal to their immortal being? This thinking power is, to be sure, a noble piece of workmanship; the greatest on earth, since it is the greatest power in man. But have philosophers seen the immortal soul, and minutely inquired into its powers and perfections, to entitle them to judge of it so readily as they do, when they presumptuously assert their mind is exactly the same thing? How have they presumed to limit the power of the Creator of all things, by thus allowing it to be inferred that, because the mind is astonishingly great, he cannot create any thing greater? Have they forgotten that it is after all, notwithstanding its many splendid endowments, perishable and corrupt? Like the body, it is subject to infirmity; nor is it in old age, any more than the leg or the arm, what it is in the prime of life. An immoderate use of certain liquors or medicines can injure it just as it does the body; yet this is the substance which philosophers consider as immaterial, and as the immortal soul. Indeed, this is to think and to reason not only illogically and erroneously, but grossly; I might even say, were ignorance a proof of sin, that this were sinful reasoning. Do men, when they declare the mind to be *immaterial*, ever bestow a thought on the meaning of this word. How can matter injure that which is *immaterial*? How is it possible that a few grains of a certain medicine can wholly derange the mind, if the latter be of a

nature which no matter can touch? and this is what we do understand by an immaterial or spiritual substance: it is something of which the qualities are not tangible, and that are wholly beyond the reach and power of matter. In short, it is a spirit, for this cannot be handled, as our Saviour tells us: —

“ And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit. And he said unto them, Why are ye troubled? and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have.” *

As it cannot be denied that the mind may be made to suffer from matter, philosophers, as long as they consider the mind to be immaterial, make matter act upon immateriality, than which, according to themselves, nothing can be more absurd. Thus Laromiguière, rejecting the opinion of those philosophers who allow the mind to act upon the body, and the body upon the mind, observes: “ Le corps étant une substance étendue et l’âme une substance inétendue, conçoit-on l’action physique de l’une sur l’autre? *Tangere enim aut tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res*, a dit Lucrèce; une chose ne peut toucher ou être touchée qu’autant qu’elle est corps, qu’autant qu’elle a des parties. L’âme ne

* St. Luke, xxiv. 36.

saurait donc recevoir le contact du corps ; et l'influx physique est impossible." *

Then during life the body has no soul, that is, its mind which may be seriously affected by matter, is not its soul. No philosopher could be more convinced of the immateriality of the mind, and of its being something entirely distinct from the body, than the author here quoted.

As the liability of the mind to infirmity and error cannot be denied, philosophers do but degrade the soul by supposing it and the mind to be one ; and this error of theirs is so much the more lamentable, as it must have hitherto tended to keep us from acquiring a knowledge of the mind. But how, it may be asked, are we to account for its extraordinary powers, if we do not suppose it to be the soul ? Matter, it will be remarked, cannot think, nor has it the power of voluntary motion. By this word matter, when thus employed, men understand inanimate substance ; but they ought to remark that animals do think, and move ; so that if thinking and free motion be what entitles the mind to the right of being considered as the soul, a dog, a fox, or a monkey, may be also said to have a soul ; for these are animals that move and think, and that often show a great deal of activity and shrewdness in doing so. If I wish to raise my arm, and that agreeably to my wish it rises, my mind then acts, it is true, since it is by its will my arm has been put in motion ; and if a dog

* Leçons de Philosophie, 2nde partie, p. 249.

wishes to get into a room of which the door is only partly closed, will he not push it before him and enter? And does not his intelligence then act, as mine does when I raise my arm, or when I open a door with my hand? I need not here allude to the numerous proofs that might be given of the natural and acquired knowledge of many animals — they are known to every body. In Lord Brougham's "Dissertations on Subjects of Science connected with Natural Theology" are several curious anecdotes proving the wonderful acuteness of animal intelligence, and leaving it beyond all doubt that it differs from human intelligence only in degree.

But how, it will be asked, are we to account for the motion given to my arm? Just as we account for that of any other substance. If we see a hoop rolling, we know that some other body has given it this motion. If we see a needle move, we also know that it must have received its motion from some other body having the power (either from its own motion at the time, or from its quality of attraction, such as we witness in the loadstone,) of giving motion to a needle. Motion indicates the power of moving, and power without substance cannot be.* And as my arm does not move when I wish to move it, but agreeably to my mind; hence my mind has a power, and as power without substance is inconceivable, hence my mind must be a sub-

* "I agree with Sir Isaac Newton, that power without substance is inconceivable." — Dr. REID.

stance; by which I mean something within me so situated as to be connected with all those parts of my body, to which I may, independent of every thing else, give motion. And after the same manner that any substance may be deprived of its means of giving motion to another substance, so the mind may be deprived of the power of giving motion to the hand. Thus, if I fasten one end of a string to a ball, and hold the other end, I may, though at a considerable distance from the ball, put it in motion by pulling the string; but if when I am about to do so, a person take firm hold of any other part of the string, or press it strongly against the ground, or cut it in two, it will not be in my power, by pulling the string, to give motion to the ball. In like manner, if the nerves which connect my hand with my mind, that is, which go from my hand to the brain (for this I take to be the mind), be firmly held or pressed upon by some strong body, or if they be cut asunder, my mind will in vain try to give motion to my hand. But if the nerves which connect my hand with my brain recover their strength, my mind may immediately give motion to my hand, just as a link between any two material substances may, if in a proper state for the purpose, allow the one to act upon the other. Now, if the mind were immaterial, this could not be, for it would not then need the assistance of any thing material to give it power; nor can it be conceived how matter may be linked with immateriality, with that which is not tangible. It were just as reason-

able to suppose that a spirit may be handled, notwithstanding our notion of it, which is, that this cannot possibly happen. If the mind be immaterial, I willingly admit that it may be the soul, though of this I can give no proof; and that hence the mind and soul are two names for the same immaterial substance. Now it is wholly impossible that any single thing which bears two names may be injured under one of those two names, and not under the other. Thus, if we allow London to have been the capital of England in the year 1666, we cannot say that London was almost destroyed by fire in the year 1666, without also admitting that the capital of England was nearly destroyed by fire in the same year; since by London and the capital of England we mean one and the same thing.

Hence if my mind be injured from having taken a certain portion of a certain drug, it must follow that my soul, if it be the same as my mind, is injured also; since it is wholly impossible that any thing having two names can escape injury if it suffers under either of them. A man may be a good poet and a bad historian; but we cannot censure him in the latter capacity, without making the individual named the good poet receive also our censure, since the good poet and the bad historian make the same individual. Then if the mind be the same as the soul, the one cannot possibly suffer without the other suffering also; so that if any body were, through inadvertency, to take so much of a pernicious drug as to impair his

mind, we should, whilst considering the mind to be the soul, believe his soul to be equally impaired, since philosophers assert that the soul and the mind are one and the same being: then as no sensible or charitable person can for a moment believe, that because the mind is injured the soul must be injured also, it follows, that no sensible or charitable person can, after a moment's reflection, believe the mind to be the soul. If hitherto this has been believed, it has arisen from philosophers having been misled by erroneous principles. Then the mind is a material substance, and is endued, like other material substances, with qualities peculiar to itself. It is the brain; and the power of thinking and giving motion to the different parts of the body which belong to this substance may be called mind, but very improperly the soul, from which it differs widely, and of which by experience we can know nothing in this world.

By this view of the mind, it is not made less great and intelligent than it really is; but the soul is raised above it; since the moment we admit the mind and the soul to be different substances, the one material, and the other immaterial, the latter must, on account of its imperishable nature, be supposed infinitely superior to the former; and hence our idea of the Divinity is exalted, since we thus conceive him, notwithstanding our high opinion of the human mind, as having created another being (the soul) infinitely greater.

Philosophers have supposed that, by allowing the

mind to be material, they were compelled to take a similar view of the soul; and this reasoning is logical and consistent, since they have considered the mind and the soul as the same substance; but if they allow them to be different substances, their opinion of the one cannot in the least affect the other. Thus Descartes somewhere says, that to believe the mind to be immaterial, must induce men to believe in the immortality of the soul. But as the mind is not supposed to be immaterial, but from its having the power of feeling which is denied to a body, it must hence follow that animals are immortal also, since it is clear that they can feel as well as we do. Hence Descartes and his followers have been obliged to suppose that animals are only a species of automatons, and that they neither feel nor think. "The body," says Du Marsais, "cannot feel; it is only the soul that feels. Hence comes the opinion of the Cartesians, who have imagined that animals are but mere automatons, like Vaucanson's flute-player and duck; for, they remark, if animals feel they must have a soul, and so be capable of doing what is right and wrong, and consequently be deserving of reward and punishment, whence it would follow, they continue to observe, that the soul of animals must be immortal."*

Many persons will doubtless say it was very absurd in Descartes and his followers to suppose that animals are mere automatons; and to assert that they neither feel nor think. But it is not for this reason

* *Logique de Du Marsais*, p. 51.

they should be considered absurd ; for it is just that when they believe feeling to be that which distinguishes the soul from the body, that they should deny the power of feeling to animals, or else allow them to have a soul ; hence the Cartesians are only absurd when they suppose the mind, or the power of feeling, to be the same as the soul. I can see only one means by which Descartes might escape the absurdity of which he and his followers are guilty from the view they have taken of the mind, and this were to be guilty of another absurdity ; namely, to suppose that animals also have souls, and that, consequently, they are entitled to reward and punishment in a future state.

That a very religious and enlightened man has been led to adopt this means, in order to hold up to the opinion formed of the mind, must appear pretty clear from a perusal of the following passage : “ Ce que se passe dans les bêtes est connu de Dieu, dont la puissance infinie peut avoir fait des âmes de différentes ordres, dont les unes seront immortelles, et les autres mortelles : les unes connaîtront le bien et le mal, et les autres n’en auront aucune connaissance. Il y a différents ordres dans les anges ; il y a différents degrés de lumière parmi les âmes ; et ne convient-on pas que les imbéciles, et les insensés, et même les enfants jusqu’à un certain âge, sont incapables de bien et de mal ? ” *

But how are we to reconcile the singular reasoning of those philosophers who define the mind to

* Logique de Du Marsais, p. 52.

be that power within us by which we think and move, and who maintain that it must for this reason be the same as the soul, if, whilst admitting that animals also are endued with the power of thinking and moving, they deny that they have souls? To suppose them to be only automaton, or that they have an immortal being, will, though these opinions are extremely ridiculous, be found, on examination, far more logical than this contradictory mode of reasoning, which allows animals, at one and the same time, to have and not to have the same thing; for if the power of thinking and spontaneous motion be what constitutes the mind, animals, since it is evident that they are so endowed, must have a mind; and if the mind is the same as the soul, it follows that they must have a soul also, or words have no meaning.

In order to show how far animals have a mind, let us here transcribe from Locke a few of those qualities that do constitute a mind, and see if animals are in any way entitled to them. I beg to call the reader's attention to the words in italics.

Locke observes, "that *perception* is the first operation of all our *intellectual faculties*, and the inlet of all *knowledge* in our *minds*."* A little further on he observes†, "The next *faculty of the mind*, whereby it makes a further progress towards *knowledge*, is that which I call *retention*, or the keeping of those simple *ideas* which from *sensation* or *reflection* it hath received."

* Vol. i. p. 136. † Chap. *retention*, section *contemplation*.

He next alludes to memory, or the power of reviving ideas in the mind, and says, “Memory in an *intellectual creature* is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless; and we in our *thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge*, could not proceed beyond present objects were it not for the assistance of our memories.”

In order to prove the importance of *memory* he adds, “It is reported of that prodigy of parts, Monsieur Pascal, that, till the decay of his health had impaired his *memory*, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or *thought*, in any part of his rational age. This is a privilege so little known to most men that it seems almost incredible,” &c.

At the bottom of the same page is a section, entitled “*Brutes have memory*,” and the words following it are, “This faculty of laying up and retaining the *ideas* that are brought into the *mind* several other animals seem to have to a great degree as well as man; for, to pass by other instances, birds learning of tunes, and the endeavours one may observe in them to hit the notes right, put it past doubt with me that they have *perception* and *retain* ideas in their *memories*, and use them for patterns; for it seems to me impossible that they should endeavour to conform their voices to notes, as it is plain they do, of which they had no ideas.” And thus he continues to assure us that birds must be very intelligent creatures, since they possess that faculty which Monsieur

Pascal had in such a wonderful degree, and without which all other faculties would be useless. If the reader will cast his eye over the passages just quoted from Locke, he will perceive, from the words in italics, a part of what must exist in any being possessed of memory. Thus we see *perception, intellectual faculties, knowledge, mind, retention, contemplation, reflection, ideas, &c.*

Then the only difference, as to mind, between men and animals, is that the former are superior to the latter; and hence the human mind cannot be immaterial nor immortal; that is to say, it cannot be the same as the soul, if we allow the latter to be both immaterial and immortal, or either.

But why do philosophers suppose the mind to be the same as the soul? From observing that inanimate matter has no such power, it being incapable of thought or spontaneous motion. Thus, though Locke admits that he has not demonstratively proved the mind to be immaterial, yet he presumes that as THINKING demonstrates God to be immaterial, it "will prove it in the highest degree probable that the thinking substance in us is immaterial." * Then it must follow that the thinking substance in a bird is also immaterial, since it has received this thinking substance from God. Indeed, it seems presuming a little too much to suppose that God, because he is an immaterial substance, must have made our minds immaterial also; that is, of his own divine essence. It would be more rational and more becoming in mortals to suppose

* Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, vol. ii. p. 332.

that, whilst in this corrupt world, however superior the human mind may be when compared to the intelligent powers of all other animals, it must be of a substance greatly inferior to the Divine nature, or to the nature of that immortal being, the soul, which is to live for ever in his presence.

The difference between matter and immateriality appears to me so great, that though I have a very faint notion of the latter, I cannot conceive how two substances so opposite could abide together. Hence, though an immaterial being were to visit our earth, it seems to me that he could not do so without becoming for the time of his stay material, any more than a human being if he had the power of visiting the sun could do so without first changing his nature. Then am I led to suppose that were immateriality to enter for a moment into any mortal being, death would immediately follow. I do also believe that man's nature could not endure the least portion of that bliss or woe belonging to an immaterial being when in a happy or an unhappy state, without his dying at the instant.

This power of thinking and spontaneous motion belonging to the mind is not more incomprehensible than the power of attraction which we witness in the loadstone. And if it be observed "that we cannot conceive how matter can think," and that consequently it is the soul which thinks, and not the body, this kind of reasoning, as Locke himself justly observes, "brings down God's infinite power to the size of our capacities;" for can there be any

reasoning more absurd than to suppose that the Creator of all things cannot give to matter the power of thinking, just as he gives to the loadstone the power of attraction, simply because we cannot conceive how this may be ?

From this observation of Locke's respecting the possibility of the mind being material, he appears opposed to his own words when he also says, "This thinking substance [God], which has been from eternity, I have proved to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, thinking substance, has put into us a thinking substance, which, whether it be a material or immaterial substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our ideas; though from them it may be proved, that it is to *the highest degree probable that it is IMMATERIAL.*" *

But, as Locke positively asserts in the following passage, that the soul, though immortal, is material, he ought not, if he were consistent with himself, to talk of the mind as being probably to the highest degree immaterial, since he also says, "The soul is agreed on all hands to be that in us which thinks." "To what I have said in my book to show that all the great ends of religion and morality are secure barely by the immortality of the soul, without a necessary supposition that the soul is immaterial, I crave leave to add, that immortality *may and shall* be annexed to that *which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor immortal*, as the Apostle expressly declares in these words:

* Vol. ii. p. 334.

‘For this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.’ ” *

Now, if the soul be “in its own nature neither immaterial nor immortal,” it follows, if there be no middle state, that it must be both material and mortal. And this, it would appear, Locke endeavours still farther to prove, when, after having examined what Virgil and Cicero allow to be understood on this subject from their use of the word *spiritus*, he adds, “Nor was it the heathen world alone that had this notion of *spirit*—the most enlightened of all the ancient people of God, Solomon himself, speaks after the same manner: ‘That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts, even one thing befalleth them; as one dieth, so dieth the other, yea, they have all one spirit.’ ”

Hence we are led to conclude, that man’s mind or spirit, whilst on earth, is, like all things here below, material, and that its immateriality and immortality do not begin till death, when the human mind becomes a soul; and respecting the divine nature of which we cannot, it is reasonable to suppose, have, whilst in our present state of ignorance, but a very faint idea; so that to assert that our mind is the same as our soul is the extreme of human vanity and presumption; to say nothing of the confined views and erroneous conclusions of such reasoning. Hence Locke, speaking here as he does of the soul, is opposed to himself when he asserts that the mind is, to the highest degree of probability, im-

* Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, vol. ii. p. 332.

material. He is also opposed to himself, when he says*, “Our idea of soul, as an *immaterial spirit*, is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body by willing or thought.” It must also produce a bad effect on some persons, to allow them to believe that the soul is no better than the mind, and that the latter is immaterial, or the same as the soul. Thus the celebrated Arnauld, one of Descartes’s warmest and most enlightened admirers, observes, “Ce qui augmente cette difficulté est, que cette vertu de penser semble être attachée aux organes corporels, puisque dans les enfants elle paraît assoupie, et dans les fous tout-à-fait éteinte et perdue, ce que ces personnes impies et meurtrières des âmes nous objectent principalement.”†

Having thus shown the mind to be a material substance, endued with the power of thinking, and acting in consequence of this power, by means of the nerves on most parts of the body, I have now, as it receives impressions by the same means, to show how when doing so it differs from other substances.

If we read the most minute and perfect description which can be given of any object, and if we look at the object itself afterwards, we shall not see it as we did in the description. If we read even a hundred such descriptions, and look at the object itself afterwards, the result will be still the same—always some slight difference. We may also re-

* Vol. ii. p. 23.

† Œuvres de Descartes, p. 201. ed. Simon.

mark, that if we look at any agreeable or disagreeable object a hundred different times in the same day, our pleasure or pain will be no two times precisely the same. We may also remark, that though we read the same description of any object a great many times, even at very short intervals, we shall never see it twice in precisely the same manner. Hence it is that we often read the same tale or repeat the same verses a great many times, and find each time some pleasure; and hence it is that the bird sings all its life the same song. From this we may conclude that the brain has, in its power of receiving impressions, wonderful variety, and that perhaps no living creature ever receives, in the whole course of its being, the same impressions twice.

Now, do words, by which men endeavour to communicate their mental impressions to one another, vary according to those impressions? If we refer in our lives a hundred different times to a mountain, does its name vary each time according to the hundred different impressions we must have received of it each time we utter the word mountain? Every body will say that this word will have in the English tongue, each time, the same form and the same meaning. Yet every body who pays any attention to the various workings of his own mind must remark, that his notions of the same thing often vary, though the thing itself may not appear to undergo any change, any more than its name or the signification given of it in diction-

aries does. Thus every body may remark that the words liberty, love, pity, courage, &c., do not affect our minds equally throughout life, yet they bear the same forms, and they have the same meaning attached to them this year which they had last year. From this we may conclude that words are not the same as our ideas, nor do they represent them in any way; and that they do no more than name them. Thus John may be called John all his life, and Mary called Mary. Were it otherwise, we should have as many names for the same object as we receive various impressions of it, so that we should most likely never hear the same word twice in the course of our lives, as no two persons, so variously the mind receives impressions, can ever see the same thing in precisely the same manner, no more than any single person can ever see the same thing twice in the same manner.

When I had gone thus far in my inquiry into the nature of the human mind, and had, from adhering to the above conclusions, made the discovery which follows, I felt assured that the brain must, in order to have such wonderful variety in its power of receiving impressions through means of the senses, *be ever in motion*, and for the space of two or three days I was led to believe myself the sole author of this great discovery. This belief arose from my having never remembered any observation respecting the brain, that might tend to bring me better acquainted with its nature than

I have hitherto been. I had often heard of the circulation of the blood, but had never supposed that the brain must be consequently in motion. From this it is reasonable to suppose, that had the nature of the human mind been known previously to Harvey's time, it would have led not only to the discovery of the science of grammar, but also to that of the circulation of the blood.

Then we are to consider the brain, — of which thinking is the inherent quality, just as malleability is a quality belonging to gold, — as a substance that is, perhaps, of all others (but of this I have no certainty) the most susceptible of impressions; and which impressions, while it exists, it must ever receive, whether the being to whom it belongs be awake or asleep, so that life without thinking is utterly impossible. This we can the more easily conceive, if we reflect that thinking is during life the inherent quality of the brain, and that it is as reasonable to suppose the latter can exist without thinking, as it is to suppose that gold can be pure gold, and yet not have those qualities which prove it to be such. Besides, whilst we have any of our senses, which are the inlets to the brain, the latter must in its motions ever vary according to what they do in any manner come in contact with. We may be inattentive to the effect of many of those impressions, or we may wholly forget it, on account of its slight importance, the moment after it is produced; but the brain must be alive to all, and change in its motions accordingly. Hence we

sometimes think intently, and at other times do not seem to think at all; but the truth is, we ever think, though often so feebly and indistinctly as to be scarcely conscious of our doing so, or to forget it entirely the next moment.

Locke, though he admits that whilst awake the soul ever thinks, is strongly opposed to the opinion (yet it is entertained by Descartes and others), that we do think whilst asleep. "I grant," he says, "that the soul in a waking man is never without thought, because it is the condition of being awake; but whether sleeping without dreaming be not an affection of the whole man, mind as well as body, may be worth a waking man's consideration; it being hard to conceive that any thing should think and not be conscious of it."* Yet that persons do frequently think in their sleep, and have no recollection of it, there cannot be the least doubt, since they have been frequently overheard by others when speaking in their sleep. Besides, do not persons frequently walk about in their sleep, and do many other reasonable actions, of which they have no recollection the next day? But it is not from these facts that I conclude a man must, even in his sleep, ever think; but from the certainty that thinking is as much an inherent quality of the mind as malleability is of gold, and that nothing but death, or a total privation of all his senses, which must be the same as death, can

* Vol. i. b. ii. p. 88.

for the space of one minute wholly deprive him of it.

Hitherto all philosophers have supposed that language has been given to man to *represent* his ideas (as we shall show presently); and this is perhaps the most fatal error ever committed, since to it may be attributed not only the slight progress that has been hitherto made in the science of philosophy, but it must have also seriously contributed towards retarding our advancement in all arts and sciences.

Now, on inquiring into the possibility of such a language as might be a picture of our thoughts — that is, the representative of our ideas — I have, after long and minutely examining what we understand by immateriality, and how inconceivable it is that it should receive impressions from that which is material, acquired the certain conviction that no such language could possibly exist, except in a region wholly unconnected with matter, and of which the inhabitants were necessarily all soul and no body. And as the motions of the mind must, notwithstanding their endless variety, be of the strictest regularity, it follows that such a language, from its ever corresponding with them — that is, representing every modulation — could not, on account of such unison, fail producing perfect harmony; so that were it possible for us to overhear two beings conversing in such a divine language, it would not be in our power to discern the least difference between the sounds of their voices

and exquisite music. It is almost needless to observe, that, as every word of such a language would show the soul without disguise (it would not otherwise represent our thoughts), the beings employing it could not (even if so inclined) be deceitful, since it were impossible for them to conceal their deceit.

Now as the Creator of all things could have easily given us such a language, and a being and an element corresponding with it, by which means sin were impossible, it follows, since he has not done so, that we are to consider our stay on earth as only a state of probation previous to our becoming the inhabitants of that pure region, wherein, but no where else, may words be safely said to represent ideas.

But some persons may ask with surprise, as if they were themselves guiltless of such an error, if philosophers have really considered discourse as the representative of thought. But they have ever done so, and have even gone much farther, since they have taken discourse for thought itself; or, which is a still grosser blunder, they have taken words for things. Thus, when the learned members of Port Royal could not account for the proposition, "This is my body," it arose from their having taken, as every body else has done, words for things. And when Locke could not explain such a proposition as "gratitude is justice," it arose from his having taken words for ideas, as every body else has hitherto done; which the reader will see

presently. Then let nobody say hereafter he has never fallen into either of the errors here alluded to, when accounting for words in a proposition. Nobody has escaped them: not Aristotle himself, with all his shrewdness and penetration; nor even the divine Plato, as Sir Charles Stoddart clearly shows in the following passage:—

“Had Mr. Tooke been as well acquainted with the writings of Plato as he was with those of the old English and Saxon authors, which he studied with such meritorious industry, he would have hardly fallen into this error*; for he would have perceived that speech received its forms from the mind; he would have acknowledged with that great philosopher that ‘*thought and speech are the same*; only the internal and silent discourse of the mind with herself is called by us *Διδνοια*, thought, or cogitation; but the effusion of the mind, through the lips, in articulate sound, is called *Λόγος*, or rational speech.’ It is therefore the mind that shapes the sentence into its principal parts and accessories: it is the mind which distributes alike the principal and the accessory parts into divisions, according as they are necessary to its own distinguishable operations.” †

A passage has been already quoted from Locke, and a promise made at the time of referring to it again. That passage concludes thus: “A mental

* That because a word was once a noun it always remained so.

† Enc. Met. 19.

proposition being nothing but a bare consideration of the ideas as they are in our minds stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as they are put into words." This is a very true observation, and it were enough to show that words can *never, never* represent ideas; since it is by words propositions are made, and since no proposition is in words what it is in the mind. Locke should have looked into this grand idea, and followed it up; but it would appear from numerous passages in his Essay, that he never perceived its importance, or if he did, that he immediately afterwards forgot it. Then—though Plato thought otherwise—words are not our ideas, nor do they even represent them; since if that were so, we should most probably, as I have already remarked, never hear the same word twice in our lives, as we never have perhaps—so variously the mind receives impressions—exactly the same idea twice in our lives.

Yet words must fill an important office with regard to the mind, and it must be one of these three offices, for I can discover no more. They are the same as our ideas, or they are their representatives, or merely their names. Now having already examined of these three offices the former two, and having found that words cannot possibly fill either of them, it follows—since this alone remains—that they must fill the third office, that is to say, *name our ideas*; and as all words must in some way or other do this, though neither more nor less, it fol-

lows that all words must in some way or other be names, and neither more nor less.

Then the nine or ten classes into which words have been hitherto, for the most part, divided, I reduce to one.

What grammarians are likely to think of so great a reduction before witnessing to what it has already led, we may easily imagine from the following observation coming from so high an authority:—

“ Mr. Tooke, to be consistent, should not have said that there are two sorts of words which are necessary for the communication of our thoughts, viz. nouns and verbs; but that there is *one sort*; which would have been saying, in effect, *there is no such science as grammar in the world.*” *

Nor is the following remark, which defends Horne Tooke's view of language, more favourable:—
“ That nouns and verbs are the most essential and primitive words of language, and that all others have been formed from them, are universal facts, which, after reading the ‘Diversions of Purley’ (by Horne Tooke), and tracing, in other languages, the application of the principles there maintained, *no enlightened philologist will now deny.*” †

But Condillac's opinion of what a system ought to be, favours the view I have taken of the science of grammar:—“ *Le système est d'autant plus parfait, que les principes sont en plus petit nombre:*

* Sir Charles Stoddart, Enc. Met. p. 4.

† History of the Anglo-Saxons by Sharon Turner, vol. ii. p. 420.

il est même à souhaiter qu'on les réduise à un seul." *

By the term *NAME* I mean what names or qualifies an idea, or that does, in any manner whatever, point it out; and this every word does, but no more. I should, perhaps, be more easily understood by readers in general were I to call all words adjectives instead of names, since adjectives are alone considered as qualifying words. But between the two terms I make no difference; so that the reader who does not always understand me when I employ the term *name*, may, if he thinks proper, change it for the term adjective. I shall, of course, when referring to words, be frequently obliged, in order to be understood, to use the ordinary grammatical terms, such as substantive or noun, pronoun, verb, &c.

How it happens that all the classes into which words have been hitherto divided make but one class I shall endeavour to show, by considering each class separately and in its proper place, taking first into consideration the four following classes, and in the order in which I do here set them down: the substantive or noun, the adjective, the pronoun, and the article. And here it may not be amiss to state, that I understand by substance not only things corporeal, such as man, house, garden, &c., but also such as are said to belong solely to the mind, and are called by grammarians ideal,

* *Traité des Systèmes*, p. 1.

intellectual, or mental substances ; such as love, virtue, pride, &c.

But the truth is, all substances become, when spoken of, equally mental or ideal. Thus, if I point to a mountain and speak of it, it is not of the one before me that I speak, but of the one within ; and this is so far from being an exact picture of the mountain, that nobody else (so variously the mind receives impressions) could see it in exactly the same manner ; nor could I myself see it so a second time. Hence this object, though in nature corporeal, becomes, when spoken of, as much an ideal substance, as love, fear, hope, &c. And this accounts for substances of the mind having, in a proposition, the same value as corporeal substances — a singularity in grammar not till now to be accounted for. This reasoning coincides with the view I have taken of the mind, and proves that words are neither the same as our ideas, nor their representatives ; nor the same as things, nor their representatives. Indeed, if words had such power, there would be no necessity of travelling to visit those scenes which others describe ; and we should, besides, have effusions of the mind emanating from vulgar capacities, which would be found infinitely superior in nature and beauty to any thing that Homer or Virgil ever *wrote*, but not to what they have *imagined*.

NOUNS OR SUBSTANTIVES.

*Proof that there are no such words as substantives or nouns ; that is to say, words standing for substances or representing substances in any manner.**

This BUILDING is the CHURCH. We have in this short sentence two of those words called nouns or substantives, that is (as it has been supposed), words standing for substance. Now, our senses tell us that we cannot have here two substances or things, since there is but one object presented to our notice, though we have two names, BUILDING and CHURCH. But to have two names is not always to have two persons or things, for one person or thing may have several names. Yet if between those two objects, BUILDING and CHURCH, we have but one thing or substance, to which of the two names may we say it belongs? Are we to consider it as belonging to BUILDING, or are we to consider it as belonging to CHURCH? Every body in his senses will answer that it belongs to the one as much as it does to the other, and I answer so too; for if we make those two words change places, we cannot by doing so make them in any way change their meaning; if they be substantives in one situ-

* Though important discoveries in grammar may here be said to begin, and so increase as I advance; yet I shall be obliged to leave many of them unnoticed until I have done with the verb, as it is only from a thorough knowledge of this word that they can be clearly shown.

ation, they must be substantives in the other: this BUILDING is the CHURCH, and the CHURCH is this BUILDING, have precisely the same meaning. The word BUILDING is neither more nor less in the one situation than it is in the other; nor does the word CHURCH vary any more than the word BUILDING. Thus as each of those two words, separately considered, has fully as much right as the other to be called a substantive, and as both *cannot* be substantives, since we know there is but one substance or thing referred to, it follows that neither of them can possibly be substantives. To assert the contrary, were as logical as to say that two things can be but one thing, and yet two things at the same time. Or it were as just to maintain that the house No. 20., which we see standing on one side of a street, is itself and also the house No. 40., which we see on the opposite side of the same street. Hence there can be no such words as substantives, that is to say, words which stand for substances, or represent substances in any manner.

Proof that all words called substantives are but names in the fourth degree of comparison; that is to say, in a degree above the one commonly called the superlative.

When we say "THIS BUILDING IS THE CHURCH," we must have already engraven upon our minds some image or other of the substance of which we have just spoken, and the words BUILDING

and CHURCH are but significant sounds naming that image, and thus enabling others to become acquainted with its nature, just as the words *good* and *bad*, which all allow to be qualifying words, make us acquainted with the nature of the things to which they refer. Hence building and church are in this place, as they are every where else, two names or qualifying words determining the nature of the single substance referred to, thus: [The substance named] this building is [named] the church ; which is the same as, [The substance qualified] this building is [qualified] the church. This shows that the subject of the sentence is neither the word building nor the word church, for *no word can be the subject of a proposition*, but that the substance referred to is the subject, of which *this building*, by merely naming it, shows the nature as far as a name can do, whilst it also determines its gender, number, person, and case. The final term, *the church*, is another name or qualifying word serving to bring us still more acquainted with the nature of the substance in question, just as one of those words called adjectives, and which all grammarians allow to be qualifying words, might do if put in its place ; as for instance : This building is sacred, that is, [the substance named or qualified] this building is [named or qualified] *sacred*. But if we account for such a sentence as, *this building is the church*, by saying, as grammarians have ever said, that the word *building* is the subject of the verb, we do not take this word for what it really

is, that is, a name, but for a substance, or which is fully as bad, for the representative of a substance. And as there is as much reason for considering the word *church* as the representative of a substance also, it follows that we must have, according to this system, two substances, which we know cannot possibly be. Hence the propriety of taking these two words, *building* and *church*, for what they really are — two names or qualifying words belonging to the one substance.

Now this circumstance being clearly felt and admitted, nothing remains but to find out the exact difference between those qualifying names and those other words called adjectives, of which the property also is, as all allow, to qualify. The exact difference between these two classes of words has not hitherto been known, as we have already shown by numerous instances from the most learned grammarians.

Yet when it is found that, though hitherto ever divided, they make after all but one class, in what they differ from one another may be easily discovered. If we take a common adjective, such as *great*, and put it through all its variations, thus, *great*, *greater*, *greatest*, and inquire what place the new adjective *greatness* ought to occupy with regard to those three forms, we perceive at a glance that it must either precede or follow them. For it cannot come after *great*, since the next in order to this form is undoubtedly *greater*; nor can it follow *greater*, since the next in order to this form is *greatest*; hence it must either stand first of all, thus, *great-*

ness, great, greater, greatest; or last of all, thus, *great, greater, greatest, greatness*. It is evident that the latter order is the true one, since we begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest; and there can be no doubt that *greatness* implies more than *great*, since if we say God is great, we do not qualify him so highly as when we say "God is greatness itself." Then the instant we discover that *greatness* is more than *great* we discover that it must be also more than *greatest*, after which we are obliged to put it, since it cannot possibly occupy any other place. Then we perceive that those words hitherto called adjectives have four degrees, and are thus compared: great, greater, greatest, greatness; good, better, best, goodness; bad, worse, worst, badness; virtuous, more virtuous, most virtuous, virtue. Then the fourth degree names the whole substance, and the three degrees by which it is preceded are consequently less than the whole. Hence we discover that an adjective in the positive degree is less than a substantive, that it is even its least part, since the positive is the lowest, and the fourth degree (that is, the substantive) is the highest. When names, or, if the reader prefers the term, adjectives in the fourth degree, happen to have positive degrees belonging to them, as goodness has good, and badness bad, they may be always compared as above; but when they have no positive degree, they may be still compared. For since we know that the positive degree is the least of the four, we need only take a part of any name, and

compare it upwards till we come to the name itself, in order to have the four degrees. Thus, the names *building* and *church*, which qualify a whole substance, have in the English language no adjectives in the positive degree; but *partly a building*, and *partly a church*, may supply the place of their positives. And then they may be compared thus: A is partly a building, B is more of a building, C is the most of a building, D is a building; A is partly a church, B is more of a church, C is the most of a church, D is a church. That is, the structure A is partly a building, the structure B is more of a building, the structure C is the most of a building, but the structure D is a building. The building A is partly a church, the building B is more of a church, the building C is the most of a church, but the building D is a church. Comparisons formed thus, A is good, B is better, C is best, but D is goodness itself, require some explanation. It may be asked how is it possible if D be goodness itself, that A, B, and C, can have any portions of goodness. In such comparisons there is ever an ellipsis, and the meaning is: D is a part of goodness itself; that is, a part equal to himself in magnitude, so that he is wholly good or all good. Then the parts of goodness possessed by A, B, and C, are less than D's part. Thus if we suppose D's part to be equal to 1, A cannot have more than $\frac{1}{4}$, nor B more than $\frac{1}{2}$, nor C more than $\frac{3}{4}$. And as the parts A, B, and C, make when added together more than D's part, hence it cannot be out

of his part that they have taken their parts, but they must have taken them from ALL GOODNESS. Then the meaning is, A is good, — that is, A has a certain part of all goodness; B is better, — that is, B has a certain part of all goodness, but more than A has; C is the best,—that is, C has a certain part of all goodness, but more than either of the two preceding parts; D is goodness itself, — that is, D has a certain part of all goodness; it is a part equal to himself in magnitude, and consequently it is more than any of the three preceding parts. Then A's part is equal to one, B's is equal to two, C's is equal to three, and D's is equal to four. Or we may say, one quarter of A is good, one half of B is good, the three quarters of C are good, but the four quarters of D are good.

The exact value of each degree may perhaps be made still more intelligible by such a comparison as this: There are, we suppose, four spoons, each spoon weighing an ounce. The spoon A is gilt,—that is, it has in its composition some gold; the spoon B is more gilt, — that is, it has in its composition more gold than A has; the spoon C is the most gilt,—that is, of the three spoons, A, B, and C, C has in its composition the most gold; the spoon D is gold, that is, it is an ounce of gold; it has all the gold that it is possible for it to have, since each of the four spoons weighs only an ounce. Now, if we allow the spoons A, B, and C, to have portions of an ounce, ascending progressively, so that D, by following the same order, may have a whole ounce,

we ought to allow to A a quarter of an ounce, to B half an ounce, and to C three quarters of an ounce. Hence the positive degree is equal to a quarter of a certain part, the comparative to one half, the superlative to three quarters, and the fourth degree to the whole part. Then when we say, "this ring is gold," the meaning is, "this ring is a part of gold," that is, a part out of all gold, but which part is equal in magnitude to the ring itself. Thus though the difference between "this ring is gilt" and "this ring is gold," is very far from being infinite, yet the difference between *gilt* and *gold* is infinite, since *gilt* means only a slight part of a part of *gold*, whereas *gold* means *all gold*, unless it has some word before it to show that only a certain part of all gold is meant; as when we say, *my gold*, *your gold*, *this gold*, *that gold*, &c. This will serve to show the immense difference between an adjective and a substantive when the latter is taken in its widest sense; and by it we may also see how erroneous those conjectures and opinions of the learned have hitherto ever been with regard to this difference. Though I have shown that an adjective in the positive degree is, when progressively considered with regard to the fourth degree, equal to a quarter of this fourth degree, yet it may be more or less than a quarter of the fourth degree. Thus the spoon A may have in its composition half an ounce of gold, the spoon B a little more, and the spoon C still more than either, and the spoon D a whole ounce; and yet the comparisons will stand

as before: gilt, more gilt, most gilt, gold. Thus we see that it is only when each degree has what it ought to have, if progressively considered, that A has one quarter, B two quarters, C three quarters, and D four quarters. The fourth degree may be always distinguished from any of the other degrees by its naming a whole substance, and taking before it the words *a part of*, as *a part of* the building, a part of goodness, a part of gold, &c. We may also remark, that as it takes in all, it cannot possibly have any word understood after it; hence every ellipsis regarding a name or an adjective in the fourth degree must ever precede, but *never follow it*.

We may now proceed to account for those difficulties already referred to respecting the substantive and adjective. It will be necessary to observe, that as I do at present explain only these two classes of words, I am not, until I come to consider them, to notice any of the other parts of speech. I need only state here, that such words as are connected with the adjective or substantive, so as to name with the adjective or substantive but a single idea, are to be considered as if making with the adjective or substantive but one word. Thus the two words *this* and *the* in “*this* building is *the* church,” are to be considered (each separately) as making with the words to which they are joined but one word; since *this building* names but one idea, and *the church* but one idea also. Of course, *this* and *the* will be explained hereafter.

I have already accounted for “this building is the

church," and have shown that it means — the substance named *this building* is also named *the church*. As both the words *building* and *church* are here rendered definite by the words *this* and *the*, and as the one is not more than the other, this proposition makes a perfect definition, and we may consequently say "the church is this building," as well as "this building is the church," without changing the sense of the proposition. But if one of those terms (*building* and *church*) was definite and the other indefinite, this change could not happen without either an alteration in the sense, or the employing of a form not in use; as, "this building is a church," instead of which we do not say, "a church is this building." In like manner, though both terms be definite, if one be more than the other, they cannot change places without changing the sense; as, "this book is my property," of which the meaning is, this book is *a part of* my property, that is, *of all my property*: from which it is clear that *property* means more than *book*, since I do not intend to say that all my property is confined to a single book. Then instead of "this book is my property," we cannot, without entirely changing the sense, say, "my property is this book;" which would imply that my whole fortune was limited to a single book. Hence we may safely infer, that whenever the two terms in a proposition are definite and of equal amount, that is, when the one is not a part of the other, they belong to a definition, and may change places without occasioning any alteration in the sense. But if they

cannot be made to change places without altering the sense, then they are not definite, or if definite, they are not of equal value; in which case, the words *a part of* may, without changing the sense, come between both terms, provided that the latter term be in the fourth degree.

"This boy is my brother;" that is, [the substance named] *this boy is* [named] *my brother*.

This proposition is accounted for after the same manner we account for "this building is the church." Both terms are made definite by the words *this* and *my*, and the one does not imply more than the other, since we do not mean to say, "this boy is a part of my brother." Hence we may say indifferently, this boy is my brother, or my brother is this boy.

Will is power; knowledge is power; honesty is policy; gratitude is justice.

In these and all similar propositions, we cannot change the terms without entirely changing the sense. Thus, "knowledge is power," is not the same as, "power is knowledge," hence the meaning is, knowledge is a part of power, that is, knowledge is composed as it were of a part of all power, just as a ring is composed of a part of all gold; and as a ring which is all gold has a part of gold equal to itself in magnitude, in like manner knowledge is supposed to have here a part of all power equal to itself in magnitude, so that "knowledge is power," and "knowledge is all-powerful," ought to have exactly the same meaning. But though we know

that this part of power is supposed to be equal to knowledge, or, at least, that it is as much as knowledge can possibly have; since we are not told what particular part of all power that is, it is consequently an indefinite portion, one uncertain part of power out of all power, and the terms knowledge and power cannot, for this reason, change places without altering the sense. But if we allow this part of power to be a certain part of all power—let us suppose the third part—then the terms knowledge and power may, without changing the sense, change places; as “knowledge is the third part of power;” between which and “the third part of power is knowledge,” there is no difference as to meaning. But if we understand—as philosophers have hitherto done when they have considered such propositions as those we are now examining, specious propositions, and wholly void of meaning—that power in “knowledge is power” means *all power*, we shall be greatly in error; and of this we may easily convince ourselves by putting power through its four degrees, thus: A is powerful, B is more powerful, C is the most powerful, but D is power itself; that is, a part of power itself. Now if D had here all power instead of a single part of all power, A, B, and C, could not possibly have any; yet they are allowed to have some.

It is useless to explain those other propositions, “will is power,” “gratitude is justice,” “honesty is policy,” &c., since they, and all similar propositions, are to be accounted for like “knowledge is

power." Nor is it necessary to observe that here, as in "this building is the church," there is only one substance referred to, though there be two names, the sense being " [the substance named] knowledge is [named] power."

We have now to explain the memorable proposition, "This is my body," which has given rise to so much discussion. The reader who has followed us thus far with attention must by this time be convinced, that every one of those words hitherto called substantives is, in truth, only an adjective in the fourth degree. Now, if we say, "This is a book," the meaning is, the substance named or designed by the word *this*, is named or qualified *a book*; just as if we were to say, whilst showing a book, "*This is instructive*," which also means the substance designed or named by the word *this*, is named or qualified *instructive*. In like manner, when we say, "This is my body," the meaning is, the substance designed by the word *this*, is named or qualified *my body*; that is, the one substance has two names, the two words *my body* qualifying here the substance referred to, just as the adjectives sacred, divine, or holy, might do, if we were to say, "This is sacred, or divine, or holy." This we could the more easily understand, if we had a single word equalling in import the two words *my body*. But we are to consider both these words as making but one word, since they do no more than name or qualify a single idea, namely, the body of our Saviour. Why they are here

made to qualify the substance *bread*, is because our Saviour attributed to the bread such a power. And it is as if he were to say, This substance named bread, I also name *my body*; that is, because I grant it the power, or the virtue, or the qualities which my body has, I name it *my body*. One substance may have several names; but it is utterly impossible that the same substance can be itself and another substance at the same time: it were just as wise to say, that truth can be itself and falsehood at the same time. But, as we have just observed, one substance may have several names, and, consequently, several qualities designed by those several names; thus the bread blessed by our Saviour, besides being called bread, may be also called "divine food," or "sacred food," or, as our Saviour has chosen to call it, "my body." We have now to consider the extent of this qualifying term, *my body*. Its meaning is, my whole body, or, which is the same thing, the whole body belonging to me; and for this reason, that every name or adjective in the fourth degree means always the whole of the substance referred to, and never less. Then, as our Saviour says, when handling a portion of the sacred bread, "This is my whole body," it is evident that the usual ellipsis occurs here, and that the meaning is, this is of my body, that is, this is a part of my body. We may easily make this clear to every understanding, in the following manner:—If all a man possesses on earth be worth a thousand pounds, he may say,

“My property is a thousand pounds;” by which we perceive, that *my property* means all the property belonging to me, and not a part of all the property belonging to me. Now, if this same man were to refer to a single article of all his property, namely, a book, and to say, “This book is *my property*,” nobody could understand that his whole property was comprised in a single book: hence the meaning is, “This book is a part of my property.” And this explains why we may not say indifferently, “This book is my property,” and, “My property is this book;” but we may say indifferently, “My property is a thousand pounds,” and, “A thousand pounds are my property;” understanding, as we do, a thousand pounds to compose the whole property of the individual in question. Nor can we suppose our Saviour would say indifferently, whilst referring to a single portion of the sacred bread, “This is my body,” and “My body is this.” Hence we are to suppose his whole body more than a single portion, and that, consequently, there is the ordinary ellipsis, this is [a part of] my body, which does not in the slightest degree differ from “This is my body;” that is, whilst referring to any substance less in bulk than his body. Hence the literal meaning of the sacred words “This is my body,” is, this portion of bread is *a part of my body*; so that the five words, *a part of my body*, are to be considered as one qualifying term, expressing the quality of the single portion of bread referred to; just as if we were to say [The substance named]

this portion of bread is [named] a part of my body. And if the two terms of this proposition, in its latter form, cannot with propriety change places, it does not proceed from the one being more than the other, but from the one being definite and the other indefinite. Messieurs de Port Royal have been greatly embarrassed to account for the different times which they thought should be in this proposition; for, though they granted our Saviour the power of considering bread as his flesh and blood, they could not conceive how the same thing could be itself and another thing *at the same time*; and in order to explain this singularity, as it may well be called, they were obliged to suppose that there were in reality two times meant, to which our Saviour does not allude. But, unless my memory greatly deceives me, other eminent theologians have, in their comments on this proposition, fallen into a similar error. Now, had men hitherto known that those words called substantives never stand for substances, and that they do but qualify them, no mistake of the kind could have been committed, not even by children, and much less by perhaps the most learned body of men that have ever written. When Messieurs de Port Royal suppose that there are here two subjects, and say that “des sujets confus équivalens à deux sujets,” this arises from their supposing that words represent things. Hence, with the exception of the divine virtue granted to the bread, the proposition, “This is my body,” is not more difficult to be accounted for

than if, referring to a book, we say, "This is my property."

Thus I have shown what a substantive is, and what an adjective is, and in what they differ from one another. We see that those two classes make but one class, and that it would be just as wise to say that substantives and adjectives make two separate parts of speech, as to assert that the positive, comparative, and superlative degrees make three different parts of speech ; for these three degrees differ as much from one another as they do from the fourth. We now know why substantives cannot be compared ; we see that it arises from these words being already in the highest degree of comparison, and that they qualify the whole substance referred to.* We also see why adjectives are compared ; we know that it arises from their naming less than the whole, and that this makes the sole difference between them and substantives. Hence Aristotle, and all succeeding philosophers who have endeavoured to show why substantives are not compared, have been greatly in error when they supposed that it arises from their representing substances, and that it is only adjectives that qualify. We can also now account for a language being without adjectives : we know that it does not

* Sometimes substantives appear to be compared, but they never are. Thus in *more pride*, *more gold*, &c., the word *more* refers to *of*, here understood before *pride* and *gold* ; and the word *of*—which is yet to be accounted for, as it belongs to the class of words called prepositions—refers to the words *pride* and *gold*, and shows that less than the whole is meant.

arise from a people that speak such a language being so void of natural intelligence as not to be able to “distinguish subject from predicate, or substance from quality;” nor are we likely to accuse such a people, as an enlightened authority* has done, of being “utterly destitute of the faculty of reason,” because they have not such words as those that have been hitherto called adjectives. For as we know that those words are only fractional parts of a whole name, the Mohigans need only diminish their nouns, no matter how, in order to make adjectives of them; as, some of goodness, a little goodness, a part of goodness, &c. And they may increase such parts by saying, much of goodness, more of goodness, &c. And they may compare in the fourth degree, as we often do; as, our chief is goodness, our chief is wisdom, &c. Or their language may have augmentatives and diminutives; that is, words differing as widely from one another as *hill* differs from *hillock* with us. Any of those modes of comparing would make it appear that they have no adjectives; but they cannot be without them, since these are the only words which they have, or that any language has — names and adjectives being the same.

We may also now correct an erroneous opinion entertained respecting the comparing of certain adjectives. Thus Harris says, “As there are some attributives which admit of comparison, so there are others which admit of none. Such, for

* Sir Charles Stoddart.

example, are those which denote that quality of bodies arising from their figure; as, when we say, a circular table, a quadrangular court, a conical piece of metal, &c. The reason is, that a million of things, all participating the same figure, participate it equally if they participate it at all. To say, therefore, that while A and B are both quadrangular, A is more quadrangular than B, is absurd.* Now, there is the same difference between circular, quadrangular, and conical, and circle, quadrangle, and cone, that there is between any other adjective in the positive and fourth degree; thus, circular differs as widely from circle as *great* differs from *greatness*. A great many figures may be circular, without being a circle, just as a great many men may be great without being greatness itself. But if we are to understand by circular, a circle, then Harris's observation is very correct; but as circular does not, like circle, name the subject of a proposition, for we cannot say "circular is a figure in geometry," it is evident that circular cannot be taken for circle, and that it must be less than the circle. Hence circular, and all such adjectives, may be compared; and we may say that A is more circular than B—that is, A is nearer being a circle than B is; but it has not all the qualities of the circle, for if it had, we should then call it *a circle*, and not a circular figure. It is just as correct to say circular, more circular, most circular, as it is to say round, rounder, roundest. These

* Hermes, p. 200.

observations are equally applicable to quadrangular and conical.

I have no objection to make to what Harris gravely asserts, when he says, that "a million of things, all participating *the same figure*, participate it *equally* if they participate it at all." For this appears just as wise as to say, a million of men^{*} being of the same age, must be of the same age, if they be of the same age at all. Amongst a million of things having the *same figure*, and a million of men being of the *same age*, certainly we cannot say that they differ in figure or in age; but if this were a reason for such attributives having no degrees of comparison, we might conclude that no adjectives can be compared, since all adjectives may be so employed.

Philosophical grammarians could not have fallen into such errors respecting the degrees of comparison, had they known the difference as to meaning between a substantive and an adjective. But were such errors to remain only amongst the learned, the evil thence arising would not be considerable; but when they find their way into books intended for the instruction of youth, they become very serious. At the bottom of page 163. of Murray's popular Grammar, I read these words: "The phrases *more perfect*, and *most perfect*, are improper; because *perfection* admits of no degrees of comparison. We may say nearer or nearest to perfection, or more or less imperfect." From this observation it is clear that the writer supposes

perfect and *perfection* to have exactly the same meaning; for when he says that *perfection* admits of no degrees of comparison, and that we may say nearer or nearest to perfection, his observation is very correct, that is, as to the word *perfection*. But he forgets that the phrases he finds fault with are *more perfect* and *most perfect*, and not *more perfection* and *most perfection*. Horne Tooke, when he asserts that the adjective is altogether as much as the substantive, appears to be almost the only grammarian who entertains such an opinion; but it will be found, when we examine them closely, that all grammarians, whatever they may say to the contrary, do not think otherwise. The word *perfect* differs as much from *perfection* as *good* differs from *goodness*, or *great* from *greatness*; and hence we may compare it in the same manner: A is perfect, B is more perfect, C is the most perfect, but D is perfection itself. And in like manner may circular be compared: A is circular, B is more circular, C is the most circular, but D is a circle.

Nor will young poets or writers of too warm an imagination be any longer under the necessity of employing double superlatives in order to qualify higher than ordinary men. Thus the lover, willing to place his mistress at the expense of grammar a degree above all other ladies in the world, will not be obliged to offend her ears with an epithet so harsh and so foreign to the English idiom as the *most loveliest*; for he will know that *lovely* has a fourth degree, and so he may tell her that she is

loveliness itself; which is not only the most correct, but even the most natural and forcible language he can employ. This accounts for the strength of such propositions as, God is greatness, knowledge is power, man is frailty, gratitude is justice, &c.; which forms, notwithstanding their great antiquity, for they must have been the first used in a language, have hitherto been never accurately understood; on which account they have been censured by Locke.

Now also we can explain propositions which could not hitherto be explained, and a proposition can be understood as it ought to be, which till now was not possible, because no philosopher, nor logician, nor grammarian, knew the exact meaning of the terms he employed, having always considered words as if they represented the mind, or stood for things or ideas, which they *never, never* do. Nor are great grammarians likely to speak henceforth about *confused significations*, as Messieurs de Port Royal and others have been obliged to do, in order to explain some way or other what no human ingenuity could account for in the total absence of the science of languages. Indeed nobody could understand what is meant by the following words, not even Messieurs de Port Royal themselves:—
“Les adjectifs ont donc essentiellement deux significations; l’une *distincte*, qui est celle du mode ou manière; l’autre *confuse*, qui est celle du sujet; mais quoique la signification du mode soit *plus distincte*, elle est pourtant *indirecte*; et au contraire

celle du sujet, quoique *confuse*, est *directe*. Le mot de *blanc*, *candidum*, signifie *directement*, mais *confusement*, le sujet; et *indirectement*, quoique *distinctement*, la blancheur." *

Thus I flatter myself that I have already, by the application of my system, for ever settled the question to which Sir Charles Stoddart alludes when he says, "It is necessary to come to some settled opinion on a question so essential to the science of grammar, as whether there is any and what distinction between substantives and adjectives." †

I think I may also claim, as my lawful due, what is denied to Horne Tooke by the same enlightened authority in the following passage:—

"Mr. Tooke says he has 'confuted the account given of the adjective by Messieurs de Port Royal,' who 'make substance and accident the foundation of the difference between substantive and adjective;' but if so, he has confuted an account given not only by Messieurs de Port Royal, but by every grammarian who preceded them from the time of Aristotle; and whatever respect we may entertain for the abilities of Mr. Tooke (which in etymology were doubtless great), we must a little hesitate to think that he alone was right, and so many men of extensive reading, deep reflection, and sound judgment, were all wrong." ‡

* Logique de Port Royal, p. 131.

† Enc. Met. 23.

‡ Ibid.

And this honour I can claim not only as to the class of words named adjectives, but also as to those named nouns, since the latter were no more known than the former. Indeed, it were utterly impossible to have a thorough knowledge of the one class without having a thorough knowledge of the other; or to be ignorant of the one without being ignorant of the other; since it is now as evident as any thing in Euclid that these two pretended classes make but one class. But that the reader may the more easily admit this, I refer him to what the highest authorities have written on this part of grammar. Their confused and conflicting accounts, and the impossibility to analyse, without shocking common sense, the most simple propositions, whilst adhering to their definitions of the noun and the adjective, will soon convince him on which side truth lies. But what may do this more forcibly than any thing else, is perhaps the astonishing simplicity of the adjective and its four degrees; as, great, greater, greatest, greatness; in which we have these two pretended separate parts of speech reduced to one, and rendered so clear to every understanding, that a child may now show their meaning, even to a fractional part; of which the greatest philosophers of ancient and modern times had no idea. The explanation which is now to follow of the other difficulties and obscurities to which allusion has been already made, will render the nature of the substantive and adjective still more intelligible; or, to speak more correctly, will render

the *name* more intelligible; for we must not forget that these two classes of words are henceforth to be considered as making but one, with its four degrees of comparison.

Let us now account for an English noun in the possessive case. I have already shown that such a word cannot be explained either as to grammar, meaning, or form. This book is John's, that is, [the substance named] this book is [named] John's. Thus we see that there is but one substance qualified by two names. We have seen how we may know when a name is in the fourth degree; if it can take before it the words *a part of*, we may be certain that it is in this fourth degree; as, a part of the building, a part of goodness, &c.; and we know that as such a word takes in *all* that is referred to, it cannot have any thing understood after it; hence, as I have already remarked, when there is an ellipsis connected with a name in the fourth degree, it must *ever* precede but *never* follow it.

This book is John's. Here it is clear that we may say, this book is [a part of] John's, that is, of *all John's*; and this shows us that John's is in the fourth degree, since it takes before it the words *a part of*, and that consequently, like all words in the fourth degree, it can have no word understood after it. This leads us to two very important discoveries: we see the meaning of all nouns in the possessive case when thus situated. Thus *John's* means here *all John's*, that is, *all things belonging to John*, and not *John's book*, as it has been ever

supposed. Hence, whatever precedes such a noun can never be more than a part of it, just as knowledge is a part of power in "knowledge is power," and as "*this book* is a part of my property," in "this book is my property." But we discover something greater than all this; we perceive that the English language has, what nobody ever suspected, two possessive cases belonging to its nouns, just as it has belonging to its pronouns. Hence when we say, "this book is John's," and "this is John's book," the word *John's* differs in these two situations as widely from itself, as *mine* differs from *my*, but neither more nor less. In the former, the word *John's* means *all John's*, that is, *all things* in any way belonging to John; and in the latter, it merely means *belonging to John*. Though these two cases are written alike, the one can never be mistaken for the other. This is the only rule to be observed: if the thing possessed does not follow the possessive case, it is *never, never understood*; and then this case is similar to the pronouns, mine, thine, ours, yours, &c.; but when the thing possessed follows the possessive case, then the latter is always similar to the class of pronouns called adjective pronouns, such as, my, thy, our, your, &c.

But our discovery does not stop here. We can now account for what has hitherto puzzled all grammarians, namely, the double possessive. This book of John's means, this book of all John's; that is, this book forming a part of all John's, of all things belonging to John. Hence there is no double

possessive, since the *of* refers to *all things*; and we moreover discover that an instance cannot be found in the English language of this possessive case without the *of* being either expressed or understood before it. This arises from its extensive meaning, which takes in not only all things corporeal, but also all things ideal; and these can never be all considered at once, so that the *of* which indicates that only a part can be meant, is ever employed, being expressed or understood. This also shows why this case can never name the subject of a proposition, nor the object of a verb, since it were utterly impossible that all things corporeal and ideal belonging to a person could be at once considered.

And how rich and full the meaning of this new possessive ! What an image it brings before the mind, compared to the wretched meaning our ignorance of this noble science has hitherto taught us to allow it to have ! This book is John's, means, we have been told, this book is John's book. How frivolous, how poor, compared to, "this book is a part of all things corporeal and ideal belonging to John." How useless this repetition of the same word book ! and how incorrect ! since if John possessed only one book, and that we said, "this book of John's is better than mine," we were immediately stopt, as we cannot say, this book of John's book is better than mine. But now we know that this book of John's, &c., means, "this book is a part of all John's," &c., and we need not call this form —

so congenial to the English tongue — an “ illogical, corrupt, and vicious construction;” nor need we say that it ought to be driven out of the language. Nor are we to employ in its stead, as all grammarians have done, such a form as, “ this book of John,” which is not English; for if it be, then we ought to say, “ this book of him,” and “ this book of me,” which, our ears tell us, cannot be said, this latter construction being chiefly intended for inanimate things, as the back of the chair, the foot of the table. Hence, from our not knowing that nouns as well as pronouns, have two possessive cases, the English tongue has, in this respect, been already considerably vitiated, since we continually meet with such expressions — and our ears are now grown familiar with them — as “ a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton,” which all grammarians allow to be very pure, but which, I am convinced, is very faulty, and that we ought to say, “ a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton’s,” just as we say, “ a discovery of *his*,” and “ a discovery of *mine*,” instead of “ a discovery of *him*,” and “ a discovery of *me*,” the meaning in these instances being very different.

And how wise it is that we should have for nouns as well as for pronouns these two possessive cases! How just and logical it is, that the same precise difference as to meaning which we perceive between “ this book is *hers*,” and “ this is *her* book,” should also exist, when instead of *hers* and *her* we employ a noun; as, “ this book is *Mary’s*,” and “ this is *Mary’s* book.” And for this happy contrivance we

are not indebted to man's wisdom, but to that mysterious power which has given us the use of words, and has taught us, unknown to ourselves, how to arrange them in the most logical manner. Without the friendly aid of science, how short-sighted we are, not to have discovered this case sooner, since it is so very simple and natural, and it is so just that we should have it! This were almost enough to prove, when we consider how widely English is studied over the world, that man, in a civilized state, has perhaps of all animals the least portion of natural penetration.

But the advantages to be derived from our knowledge of this second possessive case do not stop here. Let us now show whence comes the possessive sign, that is, the *s* and the apostrophe. This little mystery has hitherto baffled the penetration of the most clear-sighted; and though, when I reflect that such men as Ben Jonson, Dr. Wallis, Addison, Bishop Lowth, Dr. Priestley, Dr. Johnson, and Horne Tooke, with many other eminent men besides, could make nothing of it, I do feel certain emotions stir within me; yet it is so uncommonly simple *when known*, that I am ashamed at not having discovered it sooner, and that I have not done so without assistance, that is, without the light of the science by which I am guided.

We know that a noun in the possessive case, not followed by another noun, has then no noun understood after it, since it is an adjective in the fourth degree; then, "this book is John's" is contracted

from “this book is John his;” and “this book is Mary’s” is contracted from “this book is Mary hers;” and “this book is the men’s or the women’s” is contracted from “this book is the men theirs, or the women theirs.” This we may render more plain by showing between crotchets the letters suppressed, thus:—

This book is John [hi]’s.

This book is Mary [her]’s.

These books are the men [their]’s.

These books are the women [their]’s.

Thus we may perceive, that the apostrophe which precedes the *s* when a noun is in the possessive case indicates the omission of the letters suppressed, just as it indicates the omission of the four letters *woul* in *would*, when, instead of “I would rather,” we say, “I’d rather,” which is the contraction of *would rather*, and not, as many have been erroneously led to suppose, of *I had rather*; for which corrupt locution we are indebted to this false opinion respecting the original form of *I’d*.

What has kept the learned till now in ignorance of this possessive sign, was the constant belief that after a noun in the possessive case there was ever another noun understood. In this belief they have been all, without a single exception, of Hørne Tooke’s opinion. But this distinguished philologist asserts, that not only a possessive case, but that all nouns in their oblique cases have nouns understood after them. These are his words:—“No substantive, in any of its oblique cases, can stand alone

any more than the adjective. And this latter circumstance might perhaps incline Wallis to call our genitive an adjective; for MAN'S cannot stand alone any more than HUMAN."*

Into what a gross error Horne Tooke has been led in this instance, from his knowing nothing of a substantive and its four degrees! To say that a noun in the possessive case has ever another noun understood after it, is certainly a serious error; but to say that all nouns in their oblique cases have ever other nouns understood after them, or, in his own words, "that they cannot stand alone, any more than an adjective," is an error far greater.* But the most enlightened minds, in the total absence of all science, must ever thus commit themselves; and of this truth the following passage from Sir Charles Stoddart offers an additional proof:— "Dr. Wallis, in his valuable English Grammar, first published in 1653, treats the genitive *man's* as an adjective. He says, 'Adjectivum possessivum fit à quovis substantivo (sive singulari, sive plurali) addito s, ut, man's nature, the nature of man, natura humana vel hominis; men's nature, the nature of men, natura humana vel hominum.' But no other grammarian has adopted this notion; and the principle on which it rests would equally go to prove that all the oblique cases of substantives, in all languages, should be considered as adjectives. For Mr. Tooke has JUSTLY remarked that these cases cannot stand alone; although he has not noticed

* Diversions of Purley, p. 634. ed. 1840.

that this is owing to the complexity of the sentence in which they are used.”*

But what has more than all contributed to keep grammarians from discovering the existence of this second possessive case, was their having always taken words for both thoughts and things; which are, perhaps, when we consider how glaring they are, and to what they have led, two of the most palpable and serious blunders ever committed by man. Those two possessive cases belonging to nouns, do not differ from one another in form as *mine* differs from *my*, or as *hers* differs from *her*; because the sign (*'s*) is too short to be made shorter. This also happens with respect to *his*, which, for the same reason, never varies. Thus we say, “this book is *his*,” and “this is *his* book;” but *hers* varies, on account of its having a letter more: thus we say, “this book is *hers*,” and “this is *her* book.” Hence it follows, when we supposed that after *Mary's*, in “this book is *Mary's*,” there was still the word *book* understood, we fell into as gross an error as if we had said that after *hers*, in “this book is *hers*,” the word *book* was also understood, since “this book is *Mary's* book” is as bad as “this book is *hers* book;” yet this we have ever done.

Now, although the difference as to meaning between these two sentences, “this book is *John's*,” and “this is *John's* book,” appears very slight, yet the difference between the words *John's* in both

* Enc. Met. 22.

places is very great, since in the former it means *all things belonging to John*, and in the latter only, *belonging to John*, it being in one of those situations in the fourth, and in the other, only in the positive degree; in short, there is precisely the same difference between them which we may remark between the words *good* and *goodness*. Hence, when Dr. Wallis asserted that a possessive case was only an adjective, he meant an adjective in the positive degree, as he had, like all other grammarians, supposed there was a noun understood after it; so that he was never right but when the possessive case preceded a noun. There is, however, I think, great merit in his remark, and had it been minutely examined and dwelt upon, as every thing emanating from so great a man ought always to be, it might have led to the discovery of the second possessive case in English, and to the real meaning of a genitive case in Latin, and why the latter can never be the subject of a proposition. And hence Englishmen might also discover the meaning and grammatical properties (neither of which have they ever known) of their household words, mine, thine, ours, yours, theirs, his, and hers, though they have occasion to employ them almost every hour of their lives, and, as I have already said, frequently many times in an hour — “but of this anon.” Dr. Johnson makes, as the reader may remember, the following observation on Dr. Wallis’s opinion respecting the possessive case being an adjective. “The learned and sagacious Wallis, to whom every English grammarian owes a tribute of reverence,

calls this modification of the noun an adjective possessive; I think with no more propriety than he might have applied the same to the genitive in *equitum decus*, *Trojæ oris*, or any other Latin genitive." Had Dr. Johnson remarked, that a genitive in Latin is frequently converted into an adjective, as *bonitas Dei* may become *bonitas divina*, he would have seen more merit in Dr. Wallis's observation than he has. Hence the sole difference in Latin between an adjective and a genitive is, that one is in the positive degree, and the other in the fourth. Thus *Petri* in *liber Petri* has not the poor meaning which has been always given it, that is, *of Peter*, but *all things of Peter*, so that if we make an adjective of *Petri*, it will be precisely the same as Peter's with us, when placed before an object. A genitive case in Latin can never be the subject of a proposition, no more than it can in English; and for the same reason, namely, that all the various things which may or may not belong to an object cannot possibly be referred to at the same moment. And hence, of all those things there can be never more than a part meant. Thus, *liber Petri*, means the book forming a part of all things, corporeal and ideal, belonging to Peter. Hence grammarians have been greatly mistaken, when they supposed that a genitive case is not a real adjective; since it does, even according to their imperfect notion of an adjective, all which they allowed this part of speech to do. When we say, "this book is *Peter's*," we qualify the substance *book*, as clearly as if we

were to say, "this book is instructive." Du Marsais, who is, perhaps, of all grammarians, the one that has come nearest to the present discovery, has, with regard to a genitive case, fallen into the usual error: —

"Un nom est adjectif quand il qualifie un nom substantif. Or qualifier un nom substantif ce n'est pas seulement dire qu'il est *rouge* ou *bleu*, *grand* ou *petit*, c'est en fixer l'étendue, la valeur, l'acception, étendre cette acception ou la restreindre; en sorte pourtant que toujours l'adjectif et le substantif pris ensemble ne présentent qu'un même objet à l'esprit. Au lieu que si je dis *liber Petri*, *Petri* fixe à la vérité l'étendue de la signification de *liber*; mais ces deux mots présentent à l'esprit deux objets différents, dont l'un n'est pas l'autre. Au contraire, quand je dis 'le beau livre' il n'y a là qu'un objet réel, mais dont j'énonce qu'il est beau. Ainsi tout mot qui fixe l'acception du substantif, qui en étend, ou qui en restreint la valeur et qui ne présente que le même objet à l'esprit, est un véritable adjectif." *

Here Du Marsais says, that the adjective and substantive taken together, must present to the mind but a single object. Thus he remarks, that as in *le beau livre*, there is but one object presented to the mind, we are to conclude that this contains an instance of a real adjective. Now, in *liber Petri* there are not, any more than in *le beau livre*, two objects, although this eminent authority pretends

* (Œuvres de Du Marsais, tome iii. p. 82.

that there are. Yet, if we ask for *Peter's book*, nobody understands that we ask for more than one object, that is to say, that we ask for Peter and his book also. Hence *Petri* does but qualify *liber*, just as *beau* does in *le beau livre*. It is the more singular that grammarians have not hitherto discovered the nature of a genitive case, since they well knew that a genitive in Latin is frequently converted into an adjective. Dr. Wallis, it is true, was very near making this discovery; much nearer than Ben Jonson, who, though he saw there was something singular in the manner of employing an English possessive, could not account for this singularity. He merely alludes to it thus:—

“ His, their, and theirs, have also a strange use; that is to say, being possessives they serve instead of primitives:—

“ ‘ And shortly so forth this thing went,
That my will was his will's instrument; ’

which in Latin were a solecism: for there we should not say, *suæ voluntatis*, but *voluntatis ipsius*.” *

Ben Jonson would not have found this use of *his* in the least singular, had he known that the word *will's*, which it precedes, is here an adjective, and that it qualifies the substance named instrument, just as the word good or bad, or any other adjective, might do. And it is not to the use of *his*, *their*, and *theirs*, he should have here alluded as to something singular; but to the noun in the pos-

* Ben Jonson's Works, vol. vii. p. 274.

sessive case. Then every body should know, and writers in particular, that there are two kinds of adjectives, and that, as to meaning, there is no difference between such expressions as, *a hero's action*, and *an heroic action*.

We have now only this observation to make, that when a possessive case in English (in the fourth degree) appears to be a nominative or an objective case, it has always understood before it, but never following it, the real nominative or objective. In order to understand this more clearly, we must remember that *of* is ever expressed or understood before such a possessive case; so that the pretended double possessive ever exists when a possessive is not followed by an object. Thus, if speaking of two books, we say, "John's pleases me very much, but I like Peter's better," the meaning is, that *of* John's pleases me very much, but I like that *of* Peter's better. But we must on no account supply the ellipsis by saying, "John's book pleases me very much, but I like Peter's book better;" in which situations the two words, John's and Peter's, become adjectives in the positive degree. It is this erroneous manner of supplying the ellipsis which has kept Englishmen, till the present hour, in total ignorance of one of these two cases; and this has led also, as we have shown, to a great deal of idle discussion, uncertainty, and many wrong opinions respecting the purity of the English idiom; without considering that neither as to grammar, meaning, or form, has a noun in the possessive case been hitherto known. I have already shown

some of the erroneous opinions entertained respecting a possessive case in English, to which I again refer the reader desirous of becoming more intimately acquainted with this difficulty.

I have now by the further application of my system, which is, that every word names a whole substance, or a part of a whole substance, and that no word represents an idea or a substance, to inquire into the nature of those words called pronouns, show what in all languages they really are, and disperse the cloud under which they have hitherto lain. I shall first consider those called personal pronouns.

PRONOUNS have been ever like nouns taken for substances, or the representatives of substances. Thus if we say, "I am indisposed," every logician and grammarian will assert that the pronoun *I* is in this proposition the subject; yet this is taking the word *I* for a substance, or the representative of a substance. And when it is asserted, as it has been ever done, that *he* is the subject in the proposition, "*he* is learned who is wise," this word also is considered as a substance, or as the representative of a substance; yet pronouns are not to be considered as substances nor as their representatives, as we shall see presently.

They have been also made to represent nouns; but this they never do, as we may show even here. Thus if we say, "the governor is in the country," and "the magistrate is in the country," and that we wish to supply the place of both governor and

magistrate by their proper pronouns, we shall be obliged to employ *HE* in both places. Yet if pronouns represented nouns, this could never be. Hence if we say, "the governor is the magistrate," and make a pronoun occupy the place of governor and magistrate, we shall have, instead of the governor is the magistrate, *he* is *he*, which we could not have if pronouns represented nouns; for then the word *he* would here differ from itself, in order to correspond with the different words *governor* and *magistrate*; and if the word *he* did thus differ, then indeed we might say that pronouns represent substantives or nouns. Hence they do but fill the places of nouns, and this is not to represent them. It were as just to maintain that a man who occupies in a theatre the place which some other man had before him, must represent that other man; such as to have his trade or profession, or his good or bad qualities. How it happens that pronouns do not, like nouns, show the nature of the substances to which they refer, we shall see when we come to the verb, but not sooner.

This error of supposing that pronouns represent nouns has, in the English language, done a great deal of harm. Thus grammarians, from their having found that it is very correct to say, "I am the man," and "it is the woman," imagined it must be equally correct to say, "I am *he*," and "it is *she*;" and for this reason they have censured, as very erroneous, such expressions, as, I am *him*, it is *her*, I am *her*, it is *me*, it is *him*, it is *them*, &c., asserting that in these, and all similar instances, the

final pronoun* should be a nominative case, and that we should say, I am he, it is she, I am she; it is I, it is he, it is they, &c.; which proves that they have considered pronouns as the real representatives of substantives.

Proof that Pronouns do not stand for Substances, and that, consequently, they cannot, any more than Nouns, be the Subject of Propositions.

“I am he.” In this instance if *I* represents substance, and if *he* represents substance, it is evident that we have two substances, or, in other words, two persons, which we know to be impossible, as the two words *I* and *he* indicate, in this place, but a single individual. Thus if we ask, “who wrote that letter?” and receive for answer, “*I* am *he*,” we do not from such an answer understand that two persons wrote the letter, or that more than one person wrote it. Now as the word *I* represents substance as well as the word *he*, and *he* as well as *I*; or let us rather say, as one of these two words has as much right to represent substance as the other has, it follows that if one of them represents it, both must do so; and as it is impossible that both can in this instance represent substance, since we should then have two substances or persons, whilst we know there is but one, it follows that neither of them can represent substance. Hence the meaning is [The substance named] *I* am [named] *he*. Thus the word *I* serves to show the number

and person of the substance referred to, here the singular number and first person, with which the word *am* agrees accordingly. The word *he* is also made to qualify or name the same substance, though with what propriety this is done we shall see presently.

Harris, the author of *Hermes*, "which work is," in Lowth's opinion, as we have already seen, "the most beautiful and perfect example of analysis that has been exhibited since the days of Aristotle," assures us, "It is good sense, as well as good grammar, to say in any language I AM HE." There was also a time, as has been already hinted, when it argued good sense, as well as a sound knowledge of astronomy, to suppose that the sun went round the earth every day; but this is an opinion which nobody entertains any longer, as the learned have since proved it to be erroneous. Now as we have been up to the present hour about as far advanced in the science of grammar as we were in astronomy at that distant period, when the sun was supposed to travel round the earth every day, it is not improbable but many of our present notions of the latter science may, some short time hence, undergo as great a change as our early notions of astronomy have done.

I have proved by a plain investigation of the proposition *I am he*, that pronouns cannot possibly represent substances, and that they do but name them. I have now by a further examination of the same proposition to prove that the second term

in all those propositions, I am he, I am she, it is I, it is we, it is you, it is he, it is she, and it is they, should not be a nominative, but a case corresponding with a dative in Latin.

“I am he.” Here the name *I* determines a substance, showing it to be the first person singular number; but it shows not its nature as a substantive does. The word *he* is of the same kind; that is, it can bring us acquainted with the person, number, and gender of the substance to which allusion is made, but it cannot go any further. Now the instant the word *I* is pronounced in the example before us, we must be already acquainted with the gender, number, and person of the substance in question. Thus if a man speak, we know his person, gender, and number, as soon as we hear the word *I*; if the word *he* follows, as I am he, we are not in these respects better informed. The same observation will apply if a woman speak, and that the *I* be followed by *she*; as, I am she. And if the word *he* be allowed to give us—what we do not need—further information on those points, it cannot do so without contradiction. Thus *I* tells us that the substance is in the *first* person, and the word *he* tells us that it is in the *third*; hence the word *he* cannot possibly qualify, *in this manner*, the substance already qualified by *I*.

Then if a pronoun qualifying a substance already qualified, as in the instance before us, cannot do so over again, by indicating its gender, number, or person, how, we ask, is it to qualify? We have

already seen, in the instance "the governor is the magistrate," that it cannot qualify, by expressing the nature of a substance, since this proposition becomes "he is he." This leads me to inquire further and minutely into the nature of a pronoun, in consequence of which I discover that it can never fill but two offices, which are, to determine a substance without expressing its nature, by showing its gender, number, person, and case, and to show to whom or to what a substance belongs, without in any way expressing its nature; as, "*he* lends John *his* book." In this instance, the two words *he* and *his* fill the two offices just alluded to, but do no more. It is just, as the word *he* does not express the nature of the substance it determines, that the word *his* (formed from it) should not do so. Now, the word *virtuous* is formed from *virtue*, just as *his* is formed from *he*; but as the substantive *virtue* expresses the nature of the substance it names, so does the word *virtuous* show that the substance to which it is made to refer, partakes of the nature of the substance it names. Thus *virtuous*, in "a virtuous woman," shows that the substance named *woman* partakes of the nature of the substance named *virtue*; but *his*, in "his book," does not show that the substance named *book* partakes in any manner of the nature of the substance named *he*, it merely indicates to whom the book belongs.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that, when either of these two offices belonging to a pronoun is

already filled, no matter how it is done, we must not make a pronoun fill the same office over again. Hence we must not say, "he is he," nor, "that book *belonging to him* is *his*." It is for this reason we never say, "the man is he," "the woman is she;" but, "he is the man," "she is the woman." For the instant the words *man* and *woman* are expressed, we know all that *he* and *she* tell us afterwards; but when we begin with the words *he* and *she* we do not know—as pronouns express not the nature of substances—all we know afterwards, when we come to the substantives *man* and *woman*, as these are words which express the nature of substances. Thus, when we say, "he is," "she is," we may add the *king*, the *queen*, as well as the *man*, the *woman*; as, "he is the *king*," or, "he is the *man*;" "she is the *queen*," or, "she is the *woman*." But this necessary distinction could not exist if pronouns were made the second terms of propositions. Thus, in "the king is *he*," and "the beggar is *he*," the word *he* does not indicate the difference between *king* and *beggar*.

Now as in "I am he," the concluding pronoun is made to fill an office already occupied by the pronoun *I*, and as this cannot possibly be, it follows that if *he* be preserved, it should be made to serve in its other capacity, that of expressing possession, which it does not in the present instance do, since the word *he* never implies possession. This leads me to inquire into the different forms of a pronoun, both when it merely names a substance,

and shows to whom or to what a substance belongs. In the former situation it has, in English, but two forms, which grammarians call nominative and objective cases. Thus *I* is allowed to be the nominative, and *me* the objective case singular; and *we* and *us* the nominative and objective cases of the first person plural. But it has generally for both numbers three different ways of expressing possession. Thus we say in the first person singular, "this book is *mine*," or, "this is *my* book," or, "this book is *belonging to me*;" and in the plural, "this book is *ours*," or, "this is *our* book," or, "this book is *belonging to us*." This last form is perhaps the most ancient, though, on account of its length, it is seldom used. But in the French language, as it has been abridged to two words, *à moi*, *à nous*, that is, *to me*, *to us*, it is in great use. We have also an instance in our language of this possessive, in which it is contracted even to one word; as in "wo is me!" which is no other than wo is [belonging to] me; that is [the substance qualified or named] wo is [qualified or named] belonging to me; in which case the three words *belonging to me* are to be considered as one qualifying word, just as if we were to put in their place the word *mine*, and say, "wo is mine." Now, "wo is me!" is a locution which, from its being expressive of a powerful natural feeling, has happily, throughout all time, withstood our ignorance, and the sway of false artificial rules, under which other locutions have sunk, and so it has remained with us in its primitive purity. We have

been corrupted so far as to believe that such expressions as, "it is I," "it is he," "it is she," "I am he," "I am she," &c. make good sense and good English; but nobody has dared to tell us that we should say, "wo is I," because the genuine language of grief listens not to rules: yet it is fully as bad to say, "it is I;" and hence we should say, "*it is me*," which implies, *it is the person to me*, that is, *the person belonging to me*; in other words, *it is my person*: the word *person* being here the name of the substance indicated by the word *it*, when we say, "*it is me*." Then the literal order is as follows: [the substance or person named] *it* is [named the substance or person belonging to] *me*. This we can still more easily conceive, if we inquire into the meaning of our words when we say, "who is there?" It is easy to perceive that they mean "what is," or "who is the person there?" Then if we question in this literal form, and receive an answer equally literal, ought not this answer to be, "it is my person," or, which is the same, "it is the person belonging to me," contracted to "it is me," just as "wo is belonging to me" has been contracted to "wo is me!" This contraction must be of the greatest antiquity; for the word *person* always occurring in such expressions as "it is the person to me," "it is the person to him," "it is the person to her," &c. could be easily understood when omitted, as it was ever the same word. But when other things were possessed, this ellipsis could not so easily happen, on account of their variety.

Thus, when a man possessed a house or a horse, he could not say, "it is me," this form being reserved for his own person; hence he was obliged either to point to the object, and say, "it is to me," which is the construction of "it is belonging to me," or he was obliged to name the object, and say, "it is the house or the horse to me." Thus from our great love of contraction, "wo is a thing belonging to me" has been contracted at first to "wo is to me," and then to "wo is me!"

After the same manner we may account for the French locutions, *c'est moi, c'est toi, c'est lui, &c.*; which imply *c'est la personne à moi: c'est la personne à toi; c'est la personne à lui.* Hence it is evident that *moi, toi, lui, &c.* are not, when thus situated, as all French grammarians have ever supposed, subjects or nominative cases, but are genuine datives. The old rule which says that the verb *to be* must have the same case following it as that which precedes it, is thus preserved, since the word *person* which follows *is*, corresponds with the word *it* in English, and *ce* in French, by being a nominative.

This opinion, that the pronoun should in instances similar to those before us have, when following the verb *to be*, the nominative form, arises from the learned having ever taken pronouns for the representatives of nouns, which is a very serious mistake, as it must have been the cause of a great many errors. But grammarians are not by the view I take of the pronoun, deprived of their nominative in the propositions, "it is me," "*c'est moi,*" &c., since I say that they mean, "it is the person to me,"

“*c’est la personne à moi.*” To French grammarians I give, on the contrary, a nominative; since their pronouns *moi, toi, lui, &c.* are not nominatives or subjects, for the reason that they never precede verbs, like *je, tu, il, &c.*

Here it may not be amiss to state that the exact meaning of, “it is me,” &c. is, “it is a part of all things belonging to me,” instead of which I have said, “it is the person belonging to me,” because this word *person* is the name of the thing that is out of all things here alluded to.

When in French the verb *to be* following *ce* is in the plural number, we are to consider *ce* as a contraction of *ces*; thus, *ce sont eux* is no other than *ces sont eux*, that is, “les substances *ces* sont à eux;” in other words, “les personnes *ces* sont à eux.” “*Ces sont leurs personnes.*”

Thus, as Frenchmen have ever considered the pronoun following the verb *to be* as a subject or nominative case, they may thank their language, which is, perhaps, of all others the least susceptible of innovation, and not their superior knowledge of grammar, if they have not fallen into the error into which Englishmen have fallen; and that they do not now say, *c’est je, c’est tu, c’est il, &c.*, instead of *c’est moi, c’est toi, c’est lui, &c.*

I ask pardon of such readers as do clearly understand and acknowledge the truth of what I have thus far stated respecting the pronoun, if I seek to render in another manner such propositions as, it is me, it is him, it is her, &c., still more intelli-

gible. If we suppose that Englishmen had formed the strange resolution of using no longer the pronoun *it* in instances similar to those just given, namely, it is me, it is him, it is her, &c., and that they had determined to employ a noun instead of this pronoun *it*, what is the noun they would be likely to choose for this purpose? Every body, after a moment's reflection, must be convinced that it is the word *person*. Then we should, if we put the usual question, "who is there?" receive for answer, "the person is me," instead of "it is me." Hence as to meaning there is not between "it is me" and "the person is me" the least difference. Thus *person* is in this instance exactly what *wo* is in "wo is me!" then, as nobody can think of saying "wo is I," nobody should say "the person is I," instead of "the person is me;" and this being granted, why should any body think of saying "*it* is I," since this word *it* occupies the place of *person*? Certainly if it be correct to say, "it is I," it must be equally correct to say, "*the person is I*;" and if this be allowed, we must also allow "*wo is I*," which nobody can allow.

I pass by several other observations that I might still make respecting the locutions just noticed, to show the original form of "ah me!" and "oh me!" to the discovery of which I have been led from thinking on the proposition "wo is me." They are to be thus accounted for:—

Ah wo is a thing belonging to me!

Ah wo is belonging to me!

Ah wo is to me!

Ah wo is me!

Ah wo's me!

Ah's me! *

Ah me!

Thus we see that ah me! is the contraction of "ah wo is a thing belonging to me!" Oh me! is derived in a similar manner from, oh joy is a thing belonging to me! and it may be thus traced:—

Oh joy is a thing belonging to me!

Oh joy is belonging to me!

Oh joy is to me!

Oh joy is me!

Oh joy's me!

Oh me!

Desirous to know how grammarians may have accounted for ah me! and oh me! I find in Murray's compilation the following remark:—"The interjections O! oh! and ah! require the objective case of a pronoun in the first person after them; as, O me! oh me! ah me! but the nominative case in the second person; as, 'O thou persecutor!' 'Oh ye hypocrites!'"†

From this observation it would appear that grammarians, from their not knowing the original forms of "oh me" and "ah me," have been led to suppose that interjections govern cases; and what is still more strange, that the same interjection governs different cases.

* It appears that "ah's me!" is still used: "His spirit has fled, said Deerslayer, in a suppressed melancholy voice. Ah's me!" COOPER.

† Page 153.

As the locutions “it is I,” “it is he,” “it is she,” &c., are, when compared to the correct forms, harsh and unnatural, notwithstanding their being recommended as genuine by all grammarians except one, it is seriously to be regretted—as the English language has in this respect been materially injured—that Dr. Priestley’s recommendation of the forms “it is me,” “it is him,” “it is her,” &c., has not been attended to. But beyond the disagreeableness he perceived in the sound, his opinion is wholly unsupported by any logical reason. These are his observations: “All grammarians say that the nominative cases of pronouns ought to follow the verb substantive as well as precede it; yet many familiar forms of speech, and the example of some of our best writers, would lead us to make a contrary rule; or, at least, would leave us at liberty to adopt which we liked best. *Are these the houses you were speaking of? Yes, they are them. Who is there? It is me; it is him, &c. It is not me you are in love with.*—Addison. *It cannot be me.*—Swift. *To that which once was thee.*—Prior. *There is but one man that she can have, and that is me.*—Clarissa.

“When the word *if* begins a sentence it seems pretty clear that no person, whose attention to artificial rules did not put a sensible restraint upon his language, would ever use the nominative case after the verb *to be*: who would not say, *if it be me*, rather than *if it be I*?

“The verb *become* is a verb neuter as well as the verb *to be*; and I think no person who reads the

following sentence will question the propriety of the use of the oblique case after it : — *By imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments ; we enter, as it were, into his body, and become in some measure him ; and from thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them.*”*

Dr. Priestley’s delicate ear having also told him that in the English language a nominative pronoun should never close the sense by having its verb understood ; that is, that we should never make use of such expressions, as “you know that better than I,” “as well as I,” “you are as tall as I,” &c., although we are told to do so by Lowth and all other grammarians, has, in his endeavours to correct a locution so foreign to our idiom, recommended such a form as, “you know that better than me,” which really implies (and this is not meant), you know that better than you do me. Hence in this case, and all similar ones, the verb (erroneously allowed to be understood) should be expressed, and we ought to say, “you know that better than I do,” and not, you know that better than I, or better than me. Of this I am convinced from my having discovered through the application of my system the real nature of the ellipsis, which, from its not having been hitherto known, has led grammarians and writers in general into very gross errors.. This is the only rule to be observed respecting it:—

Whenever the sense is complete (and by this I

* Smith’s Moral Sentiments, p. 2. Dr. Priestley’s Grammar, p. 104.

mean when the addition of another word or of other words does not make us understand the sense better), there is after the word or the words, at which the sense is complete, *nothing understood*. This arises from every word at which the sense is complete, having the substance qualified going before it, so that there is no necessity for our repeating it over again; our doing so may even lead to serious errors. Now, this being a wise and plain principle, why should we, by perverting our language, try to make exceptions to it? When we say, "you know that better than I," the sense should stop with our words, and not be carried on; for this is an unwise principle, and it may in some instances prove a dangerous one; since one person may understand one thing and another person understand another. Hence the ellipsis which occurs frequently in all languages must (that is, when it exists) precede the final word at which the sense is complete, but *never follow it*. Now, as the mind perceives that the sense is not complete in "you know that better than I," we must express what we mean, and say, "you know that better than I do;" beyond which word *do* there is nothing understood, as we shall see when we come to those words hitherto called verbs. But if in such a proposition as "you are taller than I," we say there is still something understood after the final word, how are we to know what that something is? We are told it is the word *am**; but every body is free to say as this word *am* is not already in the sentence, that it has no more

right to be understood than the word *thought* or *supposed*, or any other word in the language which may happen to make sense. But this is a rule of man's contrivance: the superior wisdom by which we are taught the use of words and, unknown to ourselves, their proper arrangement, has ordered it otherwise.

This observation respecting the ellipsis will, I have no doubt, apply to every language, and may lead to the detection of a multitude of errors. If it be remarked that hitherto very eminent men have spoken otherwise of the manner of employing this figure, I reply that it is not my poor wisdom which opposes those eminent men, but the impenetrable wisdom that watches over all things emanating from itself, the order of words as well as the order of the stars; I do no more than tell what I see, just as a man who looks into the moon through a telescope does, whilst enumerating to somebody behind him the wonders presented to his view.

Let us now account for those familiar little words of which both the exact meaning, and the grammatical properties have been hitherto unknown. I allude to *mine*, *thine*, *ours*, *yours*, *his*, *hers*, and *theirs*. Indeed, I may say that I have already explained them in the discovery of the second possessive case, since they belong to the same class, and are all in the fourth degree. This book is mine, means [thē substance named] this book is [named] mine.

Thus we perceive that, like all other words, they

name or qualify; but as they belong to those words called *pronouns*, they do not show the nature of the words which they name or qualify.

Thus, in the instance before us, *mine* expresses neither the nature of the possessor nor of the thing possessed. As they are all in the fourth degree, they of course imply *all mine, all thine, all ours, &c.*, hence, when we perceive that, "this book is all mine," means that all our property is confined to a book, we know that the usual ellipsis (*a part of*) must be supplied; as, "this book is (a part of all) mine," that is, [the substance named] this book is [named] a part of all mine.

Thus we see that the several words, *a part of all mine*, are to be considered as one qualifying word, just as the word *instructive*, if put in the place of those several words, might be considered. Now, as those powerful little words can never take a limiting word before them, such as, *the, this, that, a, one, these, those, &c.*, it follows that no instance of their use can be found in which they do not mean, all mine, all thine*, &c. And as things corporeal and things ideal may be referred to them with equal propriety, it follows that their exact meaning is, "all things corporeal and ideal belonging to me, to thee, to us, to you," &c. Hence, on account of this vast meaning, there is

* Of course the reader will not confound two of these words with *my* and *thy*, as mine age, thine iniquities, &c. This ancient use of *mine* and *thine* instead of *my* and *thy* is now very properly become obsolete; but Dr. Johnson, from his not knowing the meaning of *mine* and *thine* thought otherwise.

never more than *a part of* it considered, and they must consequently ever have understood before them, if not expressed, the word *of*, besides some word or words implying *a part*, such as, *this, that, these, those, &c.*, as, mine is better than yours; that is, this or that of mine is better than this or that of yours. It is also on account of this extensive meaning that they can never come next the substance which is the subject or the object in a proposition. Then there is not in their use what grammarians have supposed a double possessive, since the *of*, which is ever expressed or understood before them, relates to *all things*. Hence these words, as well as the second possessive case of substantives, are compound words, that is, they have in themselves the meaning of those other words called adjective pronouns, *my, thy, our, &c.*, of which the meaning is, *belonging to me, to thee, &c.*; and they have besides this meaning, *all things*. Thus also *John's*, in "this book is *John's*," means *belonging to John*, and also *all things*; whilst *John's*, in "*John's* book," means only, *belonging to John*. How uncommonly simple and natural this wise arrangement is. It is really astonishing how any thing so easy to be conceived could not be found out without the application of a system. There is no necessity for continuing our observations on these words: almost all that has been said respecting the second case of substantives will apply to them. As to the class of words, *my, thy, our, &c.*, there is, for the present, no

remark to make: they have been properly classed by grammarians with adjectives, for they only differ from them in not expressing the nature of substances; hence they cannot be compared, and they are ever to be considered as making but one word with that which they precede: "give me my book," that is, give me the substance named *my book*: the reason for this is, that there is but *one substance* referred to. I transcribe, for the reader's further perusal, those passages from Webster in which are to be found the pronouns *mine*, *thine*, &c., and which he could not explain. I supply, between crotchets, the ellipsis, of which he had no suspicion.

"In referring our ideas to those of other men called by the same name, [those of] *ours* may be false." "It is for no other reason but that [this idea of] *his* agrees not with our ideas." "You may imagine what kind of faith [this faith of] *theirs* was." "He ran headlong into his own, whilst he endeavoured to precipitate [that of] *ours*." "The reason is, that his subject is generally things; [that of] *theirs*, on the contrary, is persons." [A letter of] "*yours* of the 26th of October I have received, as I have always done [one of] *yours* with no little satisfaction." "Therefore leave your forest of beasts for [this of] *ours* of brutes, called men." "Having good works enough of your own besides, to insure [this immortality of] *yours* and their immortality." "The omission [of this design] of *yours*, and of my design." "My sword and [that of] *yours* are kin."

These extracts are from Bacon, Locke, Bolingbroke, Campbell, Wycherley, Shakspeare, &c.

Thus from knowing that the class of pronouns, *mine, thine, ours, &c.* have ever preceding them, expressed or understood, the word *of*, how very easy it is to account for them in a proposition; especially when we bear in mind that they always mean *all things belonging to me, to thee, to us, &c.* Every body will now see that *hers* in "this house is hers" cannot mean, as Webster pretends, *of her*, nor *her* house, since, as I have already shown, this account cannot bear investigation. A child will see that "this house is hers" must be for "this house is *of* hers," that is, a part of hers; in other words, that it is one thing out of all the things belonging to her. And how easily a child may also correct the following errors committed by the same clever philologist: "OURS, which is primarily the possessive case of *our*, is never used as an adjective, but as a substitute for the adjective and the substantive to which it belongs. 'Your house is on a plain; *ours* is on a hill.' This is good English; but certainly *ours* must be the nominative case to *is*, or it has none."

Now as *ours* is an adjective in the fourth degree, and as it consequently means "all things belonging to us," and not only all things corporeal, but all things ideal, the house must form only one part out of all things thus possessed; hence it is easy to conceive and to recollect that it must ever have before it, expressed or understood, the word *of*, in order to show

that only a part of all is meant, it being wholly impossible that such a multitude of things could at once name the subject or the object of a proposition; and when we insert *of* in this instance, “your house is on a plain, of *ours* is on a hill,” it is very easy to find out what is still understood before *of ours*, especially when we bear in mind that it must be ever the part (out of all things) referred to. Then “your house is on a plain, *ours* is on a hill,” becomes, “your house is on a plain, *that of* ours is on a hill;” by which we see that *ours* is not, as Webster supposes, the nominative case; and that, consequently, *ours* does imply possession. We also see that *ours* cannot in this place, nor any where else, be used as a substitute for the adjective and the substantive, that is, for *our house*; since if we allow this to be, *that house of ours* will become *that house of our house*. Webster’s account of **THEIRS**, which is equally erroneous, may be corrected after the same manner:—

“**THEIRS** is used as a substitute for the adjective and the noun to which it refers [it never is], and in this case it may be the nominative to a verb [no, never]. Our land is the most extensive; but *theirs* is the best cultivated. Here *theirs* stands as the representative of *their land* [it does not], and is the nominative to *is*. [It is never a nominative.]

‘Nothing but the name of zeal appears,
 ‘Twixt our best actions and the worst of *theirs*.’

In this use *theirs* is not the possessive, for then

there would be a double possessive." It is, on the contrary, the possessive, and there is no double possessive; since the meaning is, "nothing but the name of zeal appears 'twixt our best actions and those which are the worst *of theirs*;" that is, "*the worst of all the actions which are theirs*;" this form being still the contraction of "*the worst of all the actions WHICH ARE OF THEIRS*;" that is, "*which are of all the things belonging to them*;" in other words, "*which make a part of all the things belonging to them*."

In like manner the word *own*, when not followed by the name of an object, has never been understood by any grammarian or lexicographer. Thus, in "this book is my *own*," the learned have always supposed that the word *book* is still understood, and that it is for "this *book* is my own *book*;" but as the word *own* may here take the words *a part of* before it, so as to be solely affected by these words, it is evidently in the fourth degree, and it cannot for this reason have any thing understood after it. Hence the exact meaning of *own*, in such a situation, is *all things* or *all property*; so that MY OWN means *all things* or *all property* belonging to me; OUR OWN, *all things* or *all property* belonging to us; and so on with all the others; as, *your own*, *thy own*, *his own*, *her own*, and *their own*. Then *this book is my own* means *this book is a part of my own*; that is, it is a part of all things belonging to me. But if we allow the word *book* to be understood in this instance, we should also allow it to be understood in such an instance as, "I like this

book of my own better than yours," which would make "I like this book of my own book better than yours." Thus we see how necessary it is to bear in mind that every adjective or name in the fourth degree takes in ALL of whatever is referred to; and that for this reason, it can never have another word understood after it. *My own, our own, your own, &c.*, when they precede names, as *my own book, our own book, &c.*, are in the positive or first degree, and simply mean *belonging to me, belonging to us, &c.*; hence the sole difference between *my book* and *my own book* is, that the latter is more emphatical than the former.

With the exception of proper names and words ever used in a limited sense, there is not perhaps a single substantive in any language in the world that has been hitherto correctly understood, simply because we have had no knowledge of this fourth degree. Thus if we look into all the dictionaries in the English language we shall not find one of them that can tell us the meaning of the word *property* in such a situation as "this book is my property;" for all lexicographers suppose that in such an instance *property* is in apposition to the word *book*, and that consequently it means here *a single thing*, which is not true, since it is for ALL *property*; and hence the meaning is, "this book is a part of ALL my property;" that is, of all the things belonging to me.

ADJECTIVE PRONOUNS;

That is, such words as *this*, *that*, *these*, *those*, *some*, *other*, *any*, *one*, *all*, *every*, *either*, &c.

I refer the reader to the different opinions (already quoted) of eminent grammarians respecting the nature of those words, of which, we may recollect, nothing with certainty was stated, all being doubt and conjecture.

We have already seen that a noun in the possessive case when not followed by the thing possessed, and when followed by the thing possessed, differs as widely from itself as the word *good* differs from *goodness*; or as the word *my* differs from *mine*. Thus is it also with adjective pronouns. When they precede words, as, *this* book, *that* book, they may be said to be in the same degree with the words *my* and *good*; and when they do not precede words, as, "give me *this*," "give me *that*;" they are like the words *mine* and *goodness*; that is, they are in the fourth degree, and have not nouns then understood after them, as grammarians have been ever led to suppose. It is the want of a different form in these words, which are too short to be made still shorter, that has hitherto led every body to believe that they have the nouns which they already sufficiently determine understood. And as our ears could not in such cases, for the want of a different form in these words, serve as a true

guide to the right understanding of them, our ignorance of their real nature has remained securely with us. Thus if we say, pointing to three books, "put up two, and give me the *other*," we are led to suppose that this word *other* has still the word book understood after it, simply because the word *other* wants that variety of form which other words, such as, *mine*, *ours*, *hers*, &c., have; these latter words being written when in the positive degree, *my*, *our*, *her*. Hence the word *other* is always written alike, whether it precedes a word like *my*, or stands by itself like *mine*. But supposing we were to say, pointing to three books, "give me one and put up the others," no Englishman will suppose that the word *others* has here the word books understood after it; simply because his ears will not allow him to say, "put up the *others* books," instead of "put up the other books." Yet it is fully as bad to suppose the word *book* to be understood after the word *other* in the instance "put up two, and give me the *other*," the only difference between *other* and *others*, in these instances, being a difference in number. In like manner, if pointing to two books we say, "give me *hers*, and take away *his*," our ears are not offended if we express the word book after *his*; yet we know that this word *his* can have nothing understood after it, no more than the word *hers* would have, if put in its place, from which word it differs only in gender. And if our ears are offended at saying *hers* book, and they are not offended when we say *his* book, it arises from our ears not

being accustomed to hear a word expressed after this word *hers*, as it ever takes another form in such a case; but the word *his* wanting this double form, and being for this reason always written alike, whether following or preceding a word, we may be led to suppose, when it has not a noun expressed after it, that it must be understood, which is not the case; for it is then an adjective in the fourth degree, and this we know can have nothing understood after it. These observations will apply to the adjective pronouns of all languages. Thus in French, if I say, pointing to a book, “*donnez-moi le mien*,” no Frenchman will be led into such an error as to suppose that the word *mien* has here the word *livre* understood after it; because his ears will not allow him to supply such an ellipsis.* But if I say in French, pointing to a

* When I say “no Frenchman,” I mean of course one who knows little or nothing of grammar; for the French grammarian may very well commit the error here alluded to; and for this reason—that anciently *mien*, *tien*, &c. went before words as *mon*, *ton*, &c. do now. But this is a sorry reason; for *mien*, *tien*, &c. are no longer thus used; nor would it be proper to use them so now, since *mon*, *ton*, &c. have in this respect wholly usurped their place. Words, like men, change in grade; and we should consider them just in the same manner. The soldier who has been only a corporal in the beginning is no longer called by this name, if he happens to become a captain, because his power has increased, and he is no longer what he has been. But it is to be regretted that learned grammarians have not hitherto, when compiling their works, consulted the opinion of the multitude. This opinion is wisdom—wisdom slowly formed, for it is the work of ages; and hence it may be, in most cases, safely relied upon. Even the greatest philosophers might from the same source have drawn a great deal of sound instruction. They have filled libraries with their works on the *soul* and the *mind*, without even knowing what these words mean; and they have consequently in their philosophy committed such gross

single book, *donnez-moi l'autre*, every Frenchman will immediately say that the word *livre* is now understood after *autre*; because it does not offend his ear to say, *l'autre livre*. Yet the word *livre* is here no more understood after the word *autre* than it is after the word *mien* in *donnez-moi le mien*. Hence *autre* is like *other* in English, it is one time in the positive, and at another time in the fourth degree; but from its wanting different forms to correspond with these different degrees, it is ever written alike; and it is only from its situation with regard to other words that its degree may be known. We must not forget to bear in mind, that adjective pronouns may, when in the fourth degree, take, like all other names in the fourth degree, the words

errors in the use of these words as even one ignorant peasant out of a thousand could not have committed. Who is the Frenchman, I should like to know, except a philosopher, or some one who has a smattering knowledge of it, that can say, *les opérations de l'âme* instead of *les opérations de l'esprit*, yet Condillac, the most enlightened man of his age, has committed this gross blunder. In this respect, he is, however, consistent with himself, as he believed the mind and the soul to be one and the same thing. But as the multitude would have told him they were different words, and could not be confounded, this lesson might have led him to discover what he never suspected, that they were also different things. Dr. Reid does not say, "the powers of the soul," instead of the powers of the mind; as in the English language *mind* and *soul* cannot in such an instance, not even by a philosopher, be used indifferently, because the wisdom of the multitude could not suffer such an error. And from this fact Dr. Reid ought to have learned, that as these are different words, they are also the names of different things. Had Dr. Reid said, "the powers of the soul," instead of the powers of the mind, (and which he might have said without offending any body's understanding, if *soul* and *mind* meant the same thing,) his error would not be greater than that committed by Condillac when he says, *les opérations de l'âme*, instead of *les opérations de l'esprit*.

a part of before them ; as, give me a part of *this*, a part of *that*, &c., by which means we may always distinguish a name in the fourth degree from one in the positive.

Another instance will suffice to render such words clear to all : “ Have you taken the money ? Yes, I have taken all.” “ Have you taken the books ? Yes, I have taken all.” After the word *all* in both these places, we are not to understand the words *money* and *books*. Yet there is an ellipsis ; but as the word *all* is here an adjective in the fourth degree, since it may take before it the words *a part of*, the ellipsis must, when it does in such a case exist, ever precede, and never follow, such an adjective. Therefore the ellipsis in both places is, “ I have taken [of it] all — I have taken [of them] all.” And this accounts for the words *it* and *them*, when we say, I have taken *it* all, I have taken *them* all — the word *of* understood before both these words being omitted. Hitherto, the words *it* and *them*, in such cases, have been supposed objectives of the verb preceding them, and not of the preposition *of* understood. Now, if we wish to know whether any one of those words has or has not a double form — that is, one for the positive and one for the fourth degree — we need only put it before a noun and make it stand alone, in order to find what we seek. Thus, from perceiving that we may say, “ this is *my* book,” and that we cannot say, “ this book is *my*,” but must say, “ this book is mine,” it is clear that this word *my* has two forms,

one for the positive and one for the fourth degree. But as we say, “give me *this* book,” and, “give me *this*,” it is evident that the word *this*, which is here in the positive and fourth degree, has not a double form for these two degrees, simply because this word is too short to become still shorter. Harris was of opinion, that when adjective pronouns stand alone, they are real pronouns; and that they are otherwise adjectives. But as he could show no principle to support this just opinion, his warmest admirers have differed from him in it, and others have differed from them again, so that nothing like certainty has remained, because the science that could at once have removed all discussion and doubt was wholly unknown. It is perhaps still in the reader’s recollection, that I observed, when first speaking of these adjective pronouns, how little children would, some short time hence, be surprised when told that formerly great grammarians could not, with the least appearance of certainty, tell how such words as, *this*, *that*, *some*, *other*, &c. were to be classed and considered. From what the reader has just seen, he will, I dare hope, admit the propriety of this observation.

RELATIVE PRONOUNS.

The words called relative pronouns, that is, *who*, *whose*, *whom*, *which*, *that*, and *what*, are also names, since, like all the words hitherto accounted for,

they serve to determine substances, though they do not, any more than those other words called pronouns, show their nature.

In this instance, "John who reads much thinks little;" the substance named by *John* is also named by *who*, so that it is as if we were to say, "John (the said John reads much) thinks little." And as we may here, if we account for these words, *the said John*, say, the substance named *the said John*, in like manner may we account for *who*, by saying, the substance named *who*. The whole sentence may then be explained thus: "The substance named John — the same substance (being named who) reads much — thinks little."

Whom does not differ from *who* but in case, and as both words ever name a whole substance, they are ever in the fourth degree. We may also remark, that they may take before them the words *a part of*, so as to be solely affected by these words. Thus we may say, "a part of whom;" and if we do not say, "a part of who," it is not because *who* implies less than whom, but because *whom* is the form preferred to *who* after verbs and prepositions. The word *whose* differs from both *who* and *whom*, by being sometimes in the positive degree. This happens every time it precedes a noun, as, "the man whose *friend* I am," &c.

But when *whose* is not connected with a noun, as, "that author, a work of whose I could never read, is, however, very popular," it is in the fourth degree, since it may take before it the words

a part of, so as to be solely affected by them. From these remarks I am led to discover how *who*, *whose*, and *whom*, have been formed.

These are three compound words. *Who* is composed of *ou* (an ancient word for interrogation) and *he*; so that from *ou he* has been formed *who*; and *whose* is no other than a contraction of *who his*; and *whom* is a contraction of *who him*. These pronouns, though in the beginning thus composed of masculine words, are now, for the want of a change in their form, of both genders. When first made they must have been interrogatives only.

The relative in Latin is formed after the same manner. *Que* must have been at first a word implying interrogation; and to it were added the pronouns *is*, *ea*, *id*. Thus, *quis* is a contraction of *que is*; *quæ* of *que ea*; and *quid* of *que id*. The genitive *cujus* is also formed from *que ejus*; for in sound *cue* and *que* are the same; so that *cujus* might as well be written *qujus*. The dative *cui* is in like manner a contraction of *que ei*, and it might as well be written *qui* as *cui*, but the latter has been preferred for the sake of distinction, *qui* being used in another sense. And between *quis* and *qui* there is no difference as to meaning. *Quis* is the original form, and when the Latins began to use it otherwise than interrogatively, the *s* was dropped merely for distinction. In like manner in English we should make a change in the word *who*, in order to show when interrogation was not meant, if this word were sufficiently long to allow such a change.

The accusative in Latin is after the same manner formed from *que eum*, *que eam*, *que id*; these being contracted to *quem*, *quam*, *quid*. The ablative *quo*, *quâ*, *quo*, is also a contraction of *que eo*, *que ea*, *que eo*. At the present hour *que* is used in French, as it must have been anciently in Latin; that is, as a word of interrogation. But if the primitive forms of words be taken as proofs of the antiquity of languages, both Greek and Latin will often appear of modern date compared to the French. The truth is, there is not a language in Europe (and perhaps not in the whole world) a day older than another. Here the reader will doubtless feel inclined to shake his head, in order to signify his dissent; but I entreat him to wait a little longer. I have not yet accounted for the terminations of Latin nouns, pronouns, verbs, &c.

We may now very easily discover what the article *the* is; this word, which the most celebrated philologist of modern times has, for years, treated as the imperative of a Saxon word, implying to see. As *the* cannot stand by itself, since if we point to a book, we cannot say give me *the*, but must say give me it, or give me that, or give me the book; hence, this word is in the positive degree, and by finding its fourth degree we may discover its real source. When we say, give me it, or give me that, the word *it* or *that* might, as to meaning, be very well its fourth degree. But the word *it* is too remote in form from *the* to allow the latter to be formed from the former. And the

word *that*, as it is already both in the positive and fourth degree, cannot be the original of *the*. Besides, neither of these words, were we to receive them as the fourth degree of the word *the*, would throw any light on the singularity already referred to respecting the meaning of *the*, when it precedes an adjective: as, “*the poor* are unhappy, and so are *the rich*,” in which case *the* is ever treated as a plural word, though it has no plural sign. This latter observation must lead many readers to discover immediately whence comes *the*. In the instance before us nobody can doubt of “the poor,” and “the rich,” being contractions of *they poor*, *they rich*, which are again contracted from “they who are poor,” “they who are rich;” the contraction being made thus: the(y who are) poor, the(y who are) rich.

Thus far we perceive that *the* instead of meaning *see*, or of being derived from a Saxon word meaning *to see*, is no other than the positive of *they*. But we discover that it is equally the positive of *them*; thus, in “God will punish *the wicked* and reward *the good*,” *the wicked* and *the good* are contractions of *them wicked* and *them good*; as, God will punish the(m who are) wicked and reward the(m who are) good. It is in this manner the word called the definite article has been formed. It was at first employed before plural nouns only, its place before singular nouns being then supplied by *it*, *that*, or *this*. But as soon as its primitive meaning began to be forgotten, it was used indif-

ferently before singular and plural nouns. From this we learn that an article is only the positive degree of a pronoun, and that there is just the same difference between *the* and *they* as there is between *my* and *mine*, or as there is between *good* and *goodness*; then it is one of those words called pronouns; and it has no more right to be considered as a part of speech separate from them, than *good* has to be considered as belonging to a part of speech differing from *goodness*.

On looking into the oldest book I have by me for something to confirm the truth of this opinion respecting the article, I find in the very first page all the confirmation I desire:—"Et sachies que notres sires fist maint biel miracle pour *li* (that is, *pour lui*)—et sachiez *li* renommée, (that is, *la renommée*,) de cel saint home ala tant que elle vint à l'apostoile de Romme Innocent."*

Here *li* preceded by *pour* means *him*; and the same word followed by *renommée* means *the*, proof that the article is no other than the pronoun. But why have we not in English articles formed from *he*, *him*, *she*, and *it*, as well as we have from *they* and *them*? simply because these words are too short to become shorter: were they two or three letters longer we should have had articles formed from them all; that is, we should have had pronouns in the positive degree formed from them all. For we must not forget that there are no such words as articles, nor even as pronouns, all words being

* Geoffroy de Ville-Hardoin.

NAMES determining in some way or other a substance; that is, simply pointing it out as the pronouns do, or naming or qualifying it, as the words called nouns and adjectives do.

The indefinite article *a* or *an*, as it is called, is also a pronoun; that is, the positive degree of the word *one*, which was anciently written *ain*, *an*, *on*, &c. All this will be made very clear by a knowledge of the verb.

Grammarians have in all times remarked that the difference between the article and the pronoun is very slight; but they could not in their total ignorance of the science of grammar prove to the satisfaction of all that the pronoun and the article make but one part of speech. Perhaps the best observation that has been ever made on this subject is in Harris's *Hermes*; it is this:—

“That there is indeed a near relation between pronouns and articles the old grammarians have all acknowledged, and some words it has been *doubtful* to which class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this: the genuine pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the power of a noun, and supplying its place; the genuine article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to something else, requiring a noun for its support, as much as attributives or adjectives* ;” that is, as much as all adjectives in the positive degree.

It is the old Greek grammarians to whom Harris here alludes; but the best Greek scholar, or at least

* *Hermes*, p. 72.

one of the best of our own times, is not more advanced as to the precise difference between an article and a pronoun than the old grammarians, as the following observation will prove (he is speaking of the article):—"ὁ, ἡ, τό signifie quelques fois *celui, celle*. ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ καὶ ὁ τοῦ φίλου, mon père et celui de mon ami; LE mot πατήρ est sous-entendu avec le second ὁ." *

* 'O is here a genuine pronoun; that is, a word in the fourth degree, and by no means in the positive; that is, it is by no means an article, as this eminent grammarian supposes; for no word in the fourth degree, no matter in what language, can have a word understood after it. This goes also to prove that the article and pronoun as they have been called, make but one, and that they differ only in degree; and if this is to be regarded as making a separate part of speech, then *good* and *better* should make two parts of speech, which few, I think, will allow. We may also remark, that the truth of the observation just quoted from Harris, namely, that "the genuine article never stands alone," is thus confirmed. Hence ὁ is not in the above instance an article (a word in the positive degree), but a pronoun (a word in the fourth degree). When it precedes a word, as ὁ πατήρ, it is quite another thing; for then it is what grammarians understand by an article (a word in the positive degree).

This much will, *for the present*, suffice to show what the article is. I have not yet alluded to

nouns and pronouns in Latin ; nor can I properly do so until I come to the verb ; they are, besides, too full of matter and interest, and the discoveries connected with them are too numerous, to allow me to speak of them sooner.

Having thus far shown that the article, noun, pronoun, and adjective make but one part of speech, if I can also show that the verb and the preposition belong to the same class, this will be to prove that six parts of speech make but one. As to the three remaining parts, (the adverb, the conjunction, and the interjection,) two of them (the adverb and the conjunction) are already allowed, and very justly, to belong to these six parts, they being either composed of several of them added together, or, when not compound words, they being the same as some of the six parts, singly considered. Thus the adverbs *indeed* and *peradventure*, are allowed to be formed of prepositions and substantives connected, that is, of the words *in*, *deed*, *per*, and *adventure*. In like manner, all those which end in *ly*, as, prudently, wisely, &c., are allowed to be the same as, *with prudence*, *with wisdom*, &c., so that these also have the meaning of prepositions and nouns.* And such adverbs as *much*, *little*, *now*, *then*, *here*,

* It is thought that this termination *ly* was anciently *lic* (the Saxon word for like), so that wisely would mean wise-like, but this is a mistake, as we shall see. There is a material difference as to meaning between godly and godlike, yet this could not be if *ly* and *like* were equal. It may also be remarked that *secondly*, *thirdly*, &c. do not mean second-like, third-like.

there, yes, no, &c., which grammarians call adverbs of *quantity, time, place, affirmation, negation, &c.*, are all belonging to the class of words called nouns, since they name certain ideas as clearly as the words *abundance, scantiness, day, hour, place, consent, and denial*, do. Those also which are called adverbs of number, such as, *once, twice, &c.*, are compound words, meaning one time, two times, &c. Their etymology will be found in the proper place.

Conjunctions belong also to the six parts of speech named above, and often stand for whole sentences. Thus, *notwithstanding* is composed of the three words *not, with, and standing*; *because*, of the two words *be, and cause*, which might very well be *by cause*; *moreover*, of the two words *more, and over*. *And* implies *in addition*; and the conjunction *for* means *the reason being*. From which instances it is evident that the conjunction does not, any more than the adverb, make a distinct part of speech, but that it is a compound of several others. By that part of my system — and to which we are not yet come — that shows how words contain their own definitions, the etymology of adverbs and conjunctions, like that of all other words, will of course be discovered.

Interjections, since they clearly indicate the emotions of the mind, do evidently belong to the class of words called adjectives or names. Thus, *oh! ah! alas! fie! pish! hollo! hark! &c.*, are

other words for *wonderful, pitiful, grievous, shameful, slight, contempt, attention, &c.*

Hence it is evident, that having already accounted for four parts of speech, (the article, the noun, the pronoun, and the adjective,) and proved them to make but one, I have now to consider only two — the verb and the preposition — since the adverb, conjunction, and interjection, visibly belong to the others, as we have just seen. As the preposition is far less important than the verb, I prefer accounting for it first, that the latter word may have afterwards our whole and undivided attention, as a critical knowledge of it is of the greatest importance. I beg, however, to observe, that to the information which I have thus far given of words, as well as to that which I am now about to give of the preposition, considerable addition will be made by an acquaintance with the verb.

PREPOSITIONS.

Prepositions are allowed by all grammarians to have the power of connecting words with one another, and of showing the relation between them. But how they happen to fill such an office any more than the other parts of speech, or in what they differ from these other parts in meaning — grammatically considered — we are not told. Indeed; with the exception of Horne Tooke, who says they are all substantives, the account given of them by other grammarians must lead every thinking

mind to consider them as the least significant of all words. Sir Charles Stoddart's notice of them is as follows: "Some of the Greek grammarians, considering that prepositions connected words, as conjunctions did sentences, ranked both the preposition and conjunction under the common head of *Συνδεσμος*, or the connective; and the Stoics, adding this circumstance to the ordinary position of the preposition in a sentence, called this part of speech *Συνδεσμος Προθετικος*. Another accidental peculiarity of most of the words which were used as prepositions, in Greek and Latin, as well as in some modern languages, was that their original and peculiar meaning had, in process of time, become obscure; and from hence some persons were led to think that these words had no signification of their own. The learned Harris gives the following definition: 'A preposition is a part of speech devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite two words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite of themselves.' Campanella also says of the preposition, '*Per se non significant;*' and Hoogeveen says, '*Per se posita et solitaria nihil significat.*' Under the same impression, the Port Royal grammarians say, '*On a eu recours, dans toutes les langues, à une autre invention, qui a été d'inventer de petits mots pour être mis avant les noms, ce qui les a fait appeller des prépositions.*' And M. de Brosses says, '*Je n'ai pas trouvé qu'il fut possible d'assigner la cause de leur origine; tellement que j'en crois la formation purement arbi-*

traire.' Now in all this there ~~was~~ certainly much inaccuracy of reasoning.

"It is not surprising that Mr. Tooke should ridicule these post-positive prepositions, and non-significant words which communicate signification to other words; but, unfortunately, he only substitutes worse errors of his own, when he asserts that prepositions are always names of real objects, and do not show different operations of the mind.

"The real character and office of the preposition have been stated with a nearer approach to accuracy by Bishop Wilkins and Vossius; but neither of them seems to have given a full and satisfactory definition of this part of speech. Wilkins says, 'Prepositions are such particles whose proper office is to join integral with integral on the same side of the copula, signifying some respect of cause, place, time, or other circumstance, either positively or privately.' Vossius says, '*Præpositio* est vox per quam adjungitur *verbo* nomen, locum, tempus, aut causam significans, seu positivè, seu privativè.'

"It suited Wilkins's scheme of universal grammar to call the preposition a *particle*; but however appropriate this may be to a theoretical view of language, such as never did, and, probably, never will exist, it does not suit our view of those philosophical principles on which the actual use of speech among men depends. On the other hand, as Wilkins includes under the term *integral* both the noun and the verb, he is in this respect more accurate than Vossius, for the preposition does not

merely join a noun to a verb, but sometimes to another noun.

“ We therefore, with that diffidence which becomes all persons who endeavour in any degree to clear the path of science, shall propose the following definition: — A preposition is a word employed in a complex sentence to express the relation in which a substantive stands to a verb or to another substantive.” *

Such is the imperfect and confused idea grammarians have of the words called prepositions; I find, however, on applying my system to them, that they are all names or adjectives in the positive degree: the words *good* and *bad* do not fill this office more clearly. It is really astonishing how any thing so easy to be conceived could till now remain hidden from all.

The words called adjectives have, as every body may remark, their meaning sometimes carried on to the names of other substances than those which they qualify. Thus in “ John is *good*, and he studies assiduously,” the meaning of the word *good* is not carried on to any thing following. But when we say, “ John is *good* to the poor,” its meaning is carried on to “ the poor.” Now if Englishmen had formed the resolution of never using an adjective of which the sense was not carried on as in the instance before us, and if the word by which it was thus carried on was to be always *the same word*, that is, the word *to*, as we see it in “ John is

* Enc. Met. p. 124.

good *to* the poor," what might be the result of such an arrangement? The result would be that we should, after a very short time, wholly suppress this connecting word *to*, and express ourselves in such a manner as "John is good the poor." This ellipsis would occur from our continually repeating the same word in the same place, and its suppression would not occasion the least ambiguity. Hence we should not have such words as those which have been hitherto called adjectives; that is, if grammarians were consistent with themselves; for adjectives would then fill the office which prepositions are allowed to fill by Bishop Lowth and all other grammarians; that is to say, they would serve to connect words with one another, and to show the relation between them.

Then what are prepositions? They are such adjectives as are ALWAYS carried on to something else, and it is only in this particular circumstance of being carried on, that they do differ from other adjectives. Thus when we say in English, "John is *near* me," "is *nigh* me," or, "is *opposite* me;" the words *near*, *nigh*, and *opposite*, do really belong to the class of words called prepositions, since the connecting word *to*, *of*, or *concerning*, is suppressed. They, moreover, not only mark the relation between the words *John* and *me*, but they name a quality belonging to the substance John, as clearly as the words called adjectives do. And it is not only such words as *near*, *nigh*, *opposite*, (which may be called new prepositions, inasmuch as they are still classed with the

words called adjectives,) that may be compared, but *all* prepositions. Thus *with*, *at*, *for*, *against*, *on*, &c., are allowed by all to be genuine prepositions; and yet these words may be compared like other adjectives. Thus we may say, that A is *with* B, or *more with* C, or *the most with* D, or *wholly with* E. We may also say, A is *at home*, B is *more at home*, C is *the most at home*, but D is *wholly at home*. And if we say, A is *friendly* to me, B is *more friendly* to me, C is *the most friendly* to me, but D is a *friend* to me, does the word *friendly* express attachment, or is it compared more clearly than the word *for*, when we say, “A is *for* me, B is *more for* me, C is *the most for* me, but D is *wholly for* me. And if we compare with the word *opposed*, as A is *opposed* to me, *more opposed* to me, *most opposed* to me, *wholly opposed* to me, do we express a different sentiment, if, instead of the adjective *opposed*, we make use of the preposition *against*, as, A is *against* me, *more against* me, *the most against* me, he is *wholly against* me? And as one book may be more on a table than another book, may we not compare with this word *on* as well as with any other adjective? “The book A is *on* the table, the book B is *more on* the table, the book C is *the most on* the table, but the book D is *wholly on* the table.” This is enough to show that prepositions, as they have been called, are only adjectives, and that they qualify as clearly as those other words called adjectives do. If they are not, like other adjectives of one syllable, compared by the finals *er* and *est*, this

arises from the preposition and the word or words with which it is connected making as it were but one qualifying term. Thus, in John is *at home*, both the word *at* and the word *home* are to be considered as one word qualifying the substance named John; and it is as if we were to say, John is *domiciled*. In like manner, when we say, John is *in foreign parts*, the words *in foreign parts* are to be considered as making but one qualifying word; just as the word *abroad* is considered when put in their place. And if prepositions be adjectives, and yet do not vary like the adjectives of many languages, on account of gender and number, it is also because they make as it were but one word with the word or words by which they are followed, and which word or words have already, for the most part, gender and number, so that there is no necessity for a variation taking place on this account in the preposition.

Thus we perceive that prepositions are not words devoid of signification; nor are they, as Horne Tooke pretends, substantives (that is, adjectives or names in the fourth or highest degree); for if this were the case, they could not be compared higher. We may also remark, that when prepositions are compared separately from the words they precede, their fourth degree can be easily conceived, though no such form may exist in the language. Thus the fourth degree of *with* may be said to be *conjunction* or *connection*; as *with*, *more with*, *most with*, *conjunction itself*, or *connection itself*. And the fourth

degree of *against* may be said to be *enmity* or *opposition*; as, *against*, *more against*, *most against*, *enmity* itself, or *opposition* itself.

We can render this still more clear, when we recollect, that the word which carries the sense of these adjectives (hitherto called prepositions) on to other words, is ever understood, and that it implies *concerning*. Thus, "John is *with* me," is as if we were to say, "John is *connected concerning* me;" that is, as to me, with regard to me. Then the above comparisons may be formed thus:—A is *with* or *connected* (concerning) me; B is *more with* or *more connected* (concerning) me; C is *the most with* or *the most connected* (concerning) me; but D is *wholly with* or is *connection itself* (concerning) me. A is *against*, or *opposed* (concerning) me; B is *more against*, or *opposed* (concerning) me; C is *the most against*, or *opposed* (concerning) me; but D is *wholly against*, or is *wholly opposed*, or is *opposition itself* (concerning) me. And as the words to which the part of speech commonly called the adjective refers, may be always easily distinguished in a sentence, so may those qualified by prepositions be likewise easily distinguished. Thus, the word *for* qualifies the pretended pronoun *he* in "he is *for* me;" that is, *he* is *for* (concerning) me; in other words, "he is *friendly* (concerning) me. And in "he *speaks for* me," it qualifies *speaks*; the sense being, his *speech is for* me, that is, it is *friendly* (concerning) me.

Then prepositions are evidently significant words, and are adjectives in the positive degree, not differing from other adjectives, but by their having their meaning ever carried on by a word understood (such as *to*, *of*, or *concerning*) to other words than those they serve to qualify.

Thus far I have shown that there is but one part of speech, since all the words of which I have given any account fill the same office; that is, they name or indicate an idea. That the noun, the adjective, the pronoun, the article, and the preposition do this, nobody who has the power of divesting his mind of erroneous opinions can have the least doubt; because the view I have taken of these words is in itself so uncommonly simple, and it has besides led to so many important discoveries (without considering those which I have yet to make), that it must be rather difficult for any unprejudiced mind to believe such a view a wrong one. With regard to what I have said of the adverb and the conjunction, I can, for the present, claim no merit, because it has been often remarked, that these words are compounds; but I can claim the merit of having shown the nature of the words of which the adverb and conjunction are compounded. What have we been the wiser for having hitherto known that certain words were composed of substantives and adjectives, or of prepositions and substantives, since of none of these words, separately considered, we knew the real nature? We have been in the

situation of such persons as find in a dictionary the meaning of words of which they know nothing, given in other words of which they are equally ignorant. What is any man the wiser for being told that *rex* in Latin is *roi* in French, if he knows not the meaning of either *roi* or *rex*?

As the reader must, from what he has seen, have now the conviction, that the real nature of a substantive and an adjective has been hitherto unknown, it cannot but amuse him to look back to the various opinions I have quoted respecting the latter word, when he recollects that all those opinions are meant to show the exact difference between the substantive and the adjective; as if the learned, whilst treating of the one, had a precise knowledge of the other. Thus is it also with regard to the verb, upon which I now enter.

THE VERB.

This word is allowed to be the most important of the nine parts of speech, inasmuch as no sentence can be formed without it. Hence the philosophical and learned grammarians, of all times and of all languages, have bestowed on this word more than ordinary attention; yet, notwithstanding its importance, and the minute explanations given of it, it is undoubtedly the part of speech which is known the least. This real ignorance of so important a word arises from the impossibility the learned have hitherto been in, to account for the many difficult circumstances

connected with it, such as its number, person, tense, &c. Thus nobody has ever told us, so as to bring home conviction to every understanding, even the meaning of the little word *to*, by which English verbs, when said to be in the infinitive mood, are preceded; as in the instance, "I like *to* play;" in which case the meaning of this word is for the most learned as obscure and as difficult to seize, as it appears clear and intelligible in such a situation as, "This book is belonging *to* me."

It is extraordinary that a word so familiarly used cannot be accounted for when thus preceding verbs; learned men have, however, done all that lay in their power to explain it; but their opinions are too forced and far-fetched to be received except by the learned themselves. Horne Tooke, who is a great favourite with grammarians, speaks thus of this word: "The preposition *to* [in Dutch written *toe* and *tot*, a little nearer to the original,] is the Gothic substantive *tawi* or *taughts*, *i. e.* act, effect, result, consummation; which Gothic substantive is indeed no other than the past participle *tawid* or *tawids* of the verb *taujan*, *agere*: and what is done is *terminated*, *ended*, *finished*. In the Teutonic this verb is written *tuan* or *tuon*, whence the modern German *thun*, and its preposition varying like its verb *tu*. In the Anglo-Saxon the verb is *teogan*, and the preposition *to*. After this derivation it will not appear in the least mysterious or wonderful that we should in a peculiar manner in English prefix this same word *to* to the infinitive

of our verbs; for the verbs in English not being distinguished, as in other languages, by a peculiar termination, and it being sometimes impossible to distinguish them by their *place*, when the old termination of the Anglo-Saxon verbs was dropped, this word *to*, that is, *act*, became necessary to be prefixed, in order to distinguish them from nouns and invest them with the verbal character; for there is no difference between the noun *love* and the verb *to love* but what must be comprised in the prefix *to*. The infinitive therefore appears plainly to be what the Stoics called it,—the verb itself.” *

Hence Tooke and his followers have been led to suppose that *to* before the infinitive is the same as *do*, and that *to love* implies *do love*, or *make love*. Upon which the learned author on Grammar, in Rees’s Cyclopædia, remarks: “Mr. Tooke has been followed and supported by all subsequent grammarians in the above incorrect and inconclusive reasoning. The form, says Dr. Crombie †, of the infinitive *to love* is doubtless the same as *do love*; thus denoting the simple energy of the emotion signified by the noun; *d* and *t* being kindred letters.”

Even Todd, who is no follower of Horne Tooke, does not object to his account of *to*, since, in his edition of Johnson, he quotes it ‡ for the benefit of his readers.

But what says the learned writer in Rees’s Cy-

* Horne Tooke, vol. i. p. 350.

† p. 83

‡ See p. 111.

clopædia respecting *to*? These are his words: "Its use (that is of *to*) is to be ascertained from its etymology. In Arabic [here the learned writer quotes a word which I cannot decipher] is a verb which signifies motion; hence, in Celtic, *atto* (*et*) became a preposition denoting an end or the point to which motion tended. In passing to Persia it dropped the initial vowel, and in the form of *tau* it denotes in Persian the interval in which motion reaches its object, or that object itself, and thus became the parent of our *to*, which it perfectly resembles in sound and sense. *To* then denotes that point of time or place to which motion or action tends, and in which it terminates."

This account of *to* before infinitives I have read several times over; but as I do not yet understand its meaning, I can only refute such an account, which I shall do in the proper place, by showing what this *to* really is. As to Horne Tooke's opinion, it is, though erroneous, very intelligible, and its error may be easily shown. If *to love* be the same as *do love*, how are we to explain *to* when placed before *do* itself, as in "I like *to do* that?" which must become "I like *do do* that;" or how are we to explain it in "I like *to play*," if we suppose it to be the same as *do*, and if we allow *do* to be the same as *make*, or *agere*, which we cannot avoid if we allow it to have any meaning at all? But one of Horne Tooke's admirers will doubtless say, that "I like *do play*," or "I like *make play*," is comprehensible; but then the *to*, which may with great propriety precede this

do or make, as “I like *to* do play, or “I like *to* make play,” must be accounted for, which will oblige us to have *do* twice, and to say, “I like *do do* play,” or “I like make make play.” Horne Tooke “has been followed and supported” in this account of *to* “by all subsequent grammarians,” because nobody has hitherto known what a verb is. All grammarians have remarked the similarity as to form between this word and the part of speech called a substantive, and many of them have consequently asserted that the verb must be the same as the substantive, with this slight difference, that the one represents action, passion, &c., and the other a substance merely; which is in other words to say, that the verb is a substantive, and that it is not by any means a substantive, since few things can differ more widely than mere substance, and action, passion, &c.

But this *to* before English verbs is not more difficult to account for than a corresponding word in other languages. Thus *à* in the French locution *c'est à dire*, seems to have no meaning at all, and hence to differ widely from itself when preceding nouns, as in *ce livre est à Jean, est à moi*. These instances serve also to show how erroneous it is to suppose that *to* in English must, when preceding verbs, be the same as *do*; since if this were true, it might be said that *à*, when in a similar situation in French, must be the same as the French word *faire*, which nobody can say, since these two words do not happen to have that accidental resemblance—

and which has misled English philologists—to be found between *to* and *do*.

Then how are we to account for these words following *to*, supposed by the Stoics to be the verb itself, as, I like to *do*, to *be*, to *have*, to *sleep*? It is not possible to explain these words, so that they may with *to* make sense; that is, it has not hitherto been possible to do so. And how are we to explain the verb following its nominative case, as, “I love”? Is its meaning different from that which it bears in the infinitive mood? Is it more or less? And how much more or how much less is it? Who can answer these questions? And why have we different endings according to the different persons; as, thou lovest, he loves, or loveth? And how does it happen that these endings belong generally to all verbs? And what do they mean? And how have tenses been formed? Or what in English is the meaning of the word *had* in these two situations, “I have *had* a book,” “I *had* a book”? Have we the same word in both places? Does it mean possession in “I have *had*,” as well as in “I *had*”? If it means possession in the former situation, what does *have* mean? Every body will say that *I have* implies possession in the present time, and that *I had* does the same for the past, and that *had* must consequently imply possession in “I have *had*.” According to this explanation, which I believe is the only one that can be given by grammarians, we shall have possession twice in “I *have had* a book;” yet we do not mean to say that we have the book

now: our meaning is, as every body perceives, that we had the book some time ago. Then why have we here two words implying possession? and why is there one of them in the present, and the other in the past? Every close inquirer must find this circumstance very extraordinary; and the longer he continues to examine it, the more extraordinary he will still find it. How is it that the same time is present and past? Does not this appear very faulty? If any body says that he finds it very clear and logical, that man must be able to explain this difficulty, or he does not understand our question, or he does not speak as he thinks. Men may suppose that this is what we call an idiom, and so lay the fault on the language; for, by this word *idiom*, we often understand a locution so void of reason as not to be accounted for. But we happen to find a similar idiom in other languages: we believe there must be few modern languages without it. Then how are we to account for it in French? “*J’ai eu un livre*,” also means *I have had a book*. But *j’ai eu* cannot be explained in French any more than in English*: and libraries might be filled with all the works written in French on the *participe passé*; yet Frenchmen are, at the hour we write this, as far from understanding its nature, as they are from finding the quadrature of the circle. France has, however, besides

* *Eu* is here what Frenchmen call a participle past, and it frequently varies its form; as, *le livre que j’ai eu*, *les livres que j’ai eus*, *la plume que j’ai eue*, *les plumes que j’ai eues*.

her other learned bodies, an academy composed of forty of the most distinguished literary Frenchmen to be found, whose principal occupation, as academicians, is to account for the difficulties of their language, and to lay down rules respecting its use. Du Marsais is allowed by Condillac to have given a very satisfactory account of a participle past. Let us therefore quote a short passage from this eminent logician and grammarian, and see what light he throws on this most critical point.

“ Quand un officier dit, j’ai habillé mon regiment, mes troupes, *habillé* est un *nom abstrait* pris dans un *sens actif* ; au lieu que quand il dit, les troupes que j’ai habillées, *habillées* est un pur adjectif participe, qui est dit dans le même sens que *paratus* dans la phrase : *misit copias quas habebat paratas*.” *

Hence we learn that this word *clothed* in English, is regarded in French, when in one situation, as an *abstract noun taken in an active sense*, and in another situation as “ a pure adjective.” In short, *clothed* in “ I have *clothed* my troops,” and *clothed* in “ the troops I have *clothed*,” are considered as two words very different from one another ; so different as to belong to two opposite parts of speech ; we might say as to belong to three, since it is considered in one place as both a verb and a substantive, — Du Marsais’s words being, “ an abstract noun taken in an active sense.” Then, according to this, we are to consider the word *eu* in *j’ai eu une plume*,

* Cæsar.

and in *la plume que j'ai eue*, as words belonging to separate classes, that is, as an abstract noun taken in an active sense, and as a mere adjective. Now what does the reader think? Is this word *clothed* to be considered as having meanings so opposite? Is it at one and the same time, both a substantive and an active verb, and at another time a pure adjective? If it is to be so considered in French, so ought we to consider it in English. But can any body tell how it happens that this word called the participle has here in one situation gender and number, and in the other it has neither? All the French grammarians that ever wrote seem to know very well how this happens; yet they are, to use an expression of their own, *a hundred leagues from it*. And can any body tell us how it happens that the word *clothed* with us never undergoes any variation on account of gender and number, whilst in French it varies thus: *habillé, habillée, habillés, habillées*; and in Latin it varies in its endings much more: as, *tus, ti, to, tum, te, ta, tæ, tam, torum, tarum, tis, tos, tas*, several of which endings, without changing in form, are made by grammarians to change their signification very considerably. This is a question of the greatest difficulty as the science of grammar at present stands; and it is also one of the greatest importance, since he who can answer it must be also able to tell us how it happens that nouns and adjectives, though they refer to things that in nature have no gender, vary in certain languages on account of gender. And

this useful knowledge may be acquired by merely understanding either of these two little words, *had* in English and *eu* in French. How extraordinary it will appear in future times to little children, when told that the world was nearly six thousand years old before men had discovered the meaning of two words so frequently employed as *had* and *eu*; and that this happened even in instances as familiar as “I have had a book,” and “I had a book,” “*j’ai eu un livre*,” and “*j’eus un livre*.” As some Englishmen will believe with difficulty that they do not clearly understand the little word *had*, I consider it necessary to let them see in a still plainer manner than I have already done, that the meaning of this word is wholly unknown. Every intelligent Englishman, whose understanding is not wholly perverted by the false notions of grammar which we have hitherto had, will readily admit — and he will be right in doing so — that *had* in “I had a book,” and *had* in “I have had a book,” have precisely the same meaning. Now if we ask any body the meaning of *have* in “I have a book,” he will admit that it is synonymous with *possess*, and that the whole sentence implies, “I *possess* a book.” He will also, for the same reason, admit that *had* in “I had a book,” means *possessed*, and that instead of this sentence we may say, “I *possessed* a book.” So far this account of *have* and *had*, that is, *possess* and *possessed*, seems very correct. But let us now give to both these words the meanings here assigned them in such a

proposition as “ I have had a book,” and we shall have “ I possess possessed a book,” than which nothing can be more absurd. Yet, as I have already stated, *had* in “ I had a book” does not differ in any manner whatever from *had* in “ I have *had* a book;” hence it is evident that, up to the present hour, not only the meaning of this little word *had* in English, but also that of all those other words called past participles in other languages as well as in English, has been utterly unknown. Such is the state in which I find the science of grammar.

Let nobody, then, say that he understands a verb, or that he understands a participle past, and can show the cause why the latter varies in one situation, and does not in another. Every child knows that *habillées* in *les troupes que j’ai habillées*, and *paratas* in *misit copias quas habebat PARATAS*, must be written as they are; but this knowledge is acquired by mere observation; and, after the same manner, persons the most ignorant of astronomy, may tell in what quarter of the heavens the sun rises and sets. But enlightened Frenchmen find their participle uncommonly difficult; and learned philosophical grammarians, and writers in general, do frequently contradict one another in their rules and use of this important word. Even Condillac, the shrewdest observer of his age, declares that he *dares* not answer for what he has said on this subject: his words are: “ Je n’oserais pas vous répondre de l’exactitude des règles que je viens de

proposer sur les participes du passé." And let nobody suppose that the slightest progress has been made in the science of grammar since Condillac's time. Indeed, when we look into what has appeared since his days in France on this important question, we are inclined to believe that men have rather gone backwards than advanced. Thus it were not difficult to point out several indications of truth in Messieurs de Port Royal, Du Marsais, Beauzée and Condillac, which have never been attended to by later grammarians; they do not even appear to have understood them. And with us, has the slightest advancement in grammar been made since Dr. Wallis's time? This distinguished man went a great way towards discovering that the English language has two possessive cases belonging to its nouns, when he said that a substantive in the possessive case is an adjective. Johnson, Horne Tooke, Sir Charles Stoddart, and others, have merely alluded to this original idea, without following it up, as they ought to have done, when coming from such a mind. If we except this single trait of penetration, Dr. Priestley's remarks upon the vicious locutions "it is I," "it is he," &c., Horne Tooke's endeavours to explain the nature of an adjective, a verb, &c., and Webster's fruitless inquiry into the pronouns *mine*, *thine*, *ours*, &c. I am not aware of the existence of as much as one thought in any modern work on grammar deserving of notice.

Were I to transcribe here only a slight part of

the various accounts given of the verb by learned grammarians, I should by so doing swell this book to an enormous size, without affording any additional instruction. It is surely enough to refer the reader, curious of such things, to a few of the higher authorities in philology, by whom he will be again referred to others, such as *Hermes*, *Messieurs de Port Royal*, and *Horne Tooke*. “*The Diversions of Purley*” contains such reflections on the verb, as may be said to be the result of a man’s whole life ; yet, to the wonder of all, its distinguished author declines a definition of this important word.

I have observed respecting the noun and pronoun, that, though grammarians are very far from being unanimous in their definitions of these two words, they all concur in making them represent substances so clearly, as to take them for the subjects of propositions. Thus is it also with the verb, which all grammarians, logicians, and philosophers, from believing it to be what they call the attribute of a proposition, take for action, passion, or existence, or for their representatives ; which are blunders only equal in magnitude to that of taking words for thoughts and things, or for their representatives.

In order to prove that such is the opinion all persons have of a verb, we need only ask any body who has ever studied grammar, what he understands by the word *beats*, in the proposition *A beats B*, and he will confess that this word represents the action done by *A*, the subject. Thus a late

philosopher observes: — “In all languages we find active verbs which denote some *action* or *operation*; and it is a fundamental rule, in the grammar of all languages, that such a verb supposes a person; that is, in other words, that every *action* must have an agent.” *

I have already given an opinion from this philosopher, which is also Sir Isaac Newton’s,* namely, that action without substance is inconceivable; and this opinion, had he seriously dwelt upon it, might have shown him that *a word*, which is not a substance, cannot possibly do what nothing but substance can do, and that, consequently, there is in no language in the world such a thing as a verb; that is to say, a word doing an action, or, which is the same thing, a word representing an action.

Lest the reader may suppose I forget, or do not know, that Plato, Aristotle, with all other philosophers, both ancient and modern, have ever entertained a different opinion of the verb, I beg to let him see, by one or two passages from Sir Charles Stoddart, that I am fully aware how differently I think on this subject from all who have gone before me.

“In whatever way we assert any thing, the assertion is a declaring of some truth, real or supposed; it is a propounding, or showing forth the existence, or, in the language of logicians, it is enunciating a proposition. This is not done by a

* Dr. Reid’s *Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind*, vol. i. p. 67.

peculiar word, as, for instance, the word *be*, but by the form of the word ; for the word *be*, in some of its forms, as, *to be*, and *being*, is a simple conception, and so are the words *love*, *hate*, *walk*, *sing*, and, indeed, all others which may be used as verbs. Mr. Tooke, therefore, was very accurate, as far as regards words, in saying, that the verb was ‘a noun and something more ;’ but when, toward the end of his book, he came to consider what that something more was, he found himself entirely at a loss, and was forced to break off abruptly ; since the just solution of the difficulty, as we conceive, would have overturned the whole system, which he had laboured, throughout two ponderous volumes, to erect ; it would have shown the mind of man to be an active intelligence, not only in forming conceptions, but in uttering, declaring, propounding, asserting them to be truths.*

“ Now that principle, in whatever terms it is clothed, is, that the noun and the verb are the primary parts of speech ; and that without them neither can a truth be enunciated nor a passion be expressed, in combination with its object. This principle is the most ancient. It boasts the support of the greatest of philosophers ; of him whom, for many ages, even Christianity recognised by the title of ‘ the divine,’ as approaching the nearest of all heathens to the divine light of the Gospel. PLATO, in his Dialogue called the Sophist, having most profoundly and unanswerably argued on the

* Encyclopædia Metropolitana, p. 10.

nature of truth, thus speaks of language:— ‘ We have in language two kinds of manifestation respecting existence, the one called nouns, the other verbs. We call the manifestation of action a verb; but that sign of speech which is imposed on the agent himself a noun. Therefore, of nouns alone, uttered in any order, no sentence (or rational speech) can be composed, neither can it be composed of verbs without nouns: thus, *goes, ruins, sleeps*, and such other words as signify action, even though should all be repeated in succession, would not make up a sentence. And again, if any one should say, *lion, stag, horse*, or should repeat the names of all the things which do the actions before mentioned, still no sentence would be made up by all this enumeration; for neither in the one way nor in the other do the words spoken manifest any real action or inaction, or declare that any thing exists, or does not exist, until the verbs are mixed with the nouns. Then at length the very first interweaving of them together makes a sentence, however short: thus, if any one should say, ‘*man learns*,’ you would pronounce at once that it was a sentence, though as short a one as possible; for then at last something is declared which either exists or has been done, or is doing or will be done; and the speaker does not merely name things, but limits and marks out their existence, by interweaving verbs with nouns; and then at last we say he discourses, and does not merely recite words.’

“The only great name that for nearly 2000 years was ever brought into competition with Plato’s was that of his scholar Aristotle; but Aristotle also, as we have already seen, agreed with Plato, in stating the noun and the verb as the two primary parts of speech, and, indeed, the only ones necessary to be considered in the formation of a simple sentence. In other parts of his work, looking at the composition of language in a more general point of view, he enumerated three parts, viz. the noun, the verb, and the connective; and finally, in his Treatise on Poetry *, he enumerates two parts of speech as significant, viz. the article and conjunction.

“The doctrine that the noun and the verb are the primary parts of speech is incontestable. Apollonius the grammarian calls them the most animated; and all grammarians concede to them at least the superiority over all the other parts of speech, in whatever manner they choose to account for their preference.” †

Thus these great authorities make the noun and the verb differ widely from each other; the former being regarded as an agent, or as the representative of an agent, and the latter as an action, or as the representative of an action. But to say, as Plato does, that the word called the verb cannot make up a sentence by itself, is a mistake; that is, when we consider those words hitherto called verbs to be nothing more than verbs; for in *amo*, *amas*, *amat*,

* c. xx.

† Enc. Met. p. 16.

amamus, amatis, amant, each word makes by itself a perfect sentence, and needs not the assistance of any other word for completing the sense. But were it otherwise, this would be no proof that the words called nouns and verbs make different parts of speech; for what *one* single thing of the same kind may not do, *two* may. Thus one man may not be able to raise a certain weight by himself, which with another man's assistance he may be very well able to raise.

The following passage, which is from Harris, goes also to prove that the noun and the verb have been considered by the greatest philosophers as very different words. This learned grammarian endeavours also to show why Plato and Aristotle adopted at one time but these two parts of speech.

“ Plato, in his *Sophist*, mentions only two — the noun and the verb; Aristotle mentions no more where he treats of propositions. Not that these acute philosophers were ignorant of the other parts, but they spoke with reference to *logic* or *dialectic*, considering the essence of speech contained in these, *because these alone combined make a perfect assertive sentence, which none of the rest without them are able to effect.** Hence, therefore, Aristotle in his *Treatise on Poetry* (where he was to lay down the elements of a more variegated speech) adds the article and conjunction to the noun and verb, and

* By the words in italics the reader may perceive that Harris has like Plato fallen into the error just noticed; namely, that without a noun and a verb combined no sentence can be formed.

so adopts the same parts with those established in this treatise. To Aristotle's authority (if indeed better can be required) may be added that also of the elder Stoics." *

The reader who has followed me with attention thus far, must by this time know how I mean to account for the verb, and that I am to consider it, just as I do every other word; that is, as the name of a whole substance, or the part of a whole substance. Now as whole substances cannot be compared, it is evident that *love* in *I love*, must be the name of a whole substance, since we may not say, "I more love." If we put the word *more* after the verb, it will not affect the verb, but the word it precedes; as I love more constantly, more truly, &c. And of this we may convince ourselves still more clearly by remarking, that, when on such occasions, *more* is not expressed but by its corresponding termination *er*, it is not the verb which ever takes this termination. Thus, instead of "I rise earlier than John," we may not say, "I *riser* early than John."

Hence it is that the words *more* and *most*, which precede adjectives and adverbs, do not precede verbs, since we may not say, "John more labours," or "most labours," instead of "John labours more," or "John labours most." Yet if verbs were com-

* Hermes, b. i. c. iii. p. 34. For this we have the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, De Struct. Orat. sect. ii., whom Quintilian follows, Inst. l. i. c. 4. Diogenes Laertius and Priscian make them always to have admitted five parts.

pared by *more* or *most*, they might be preceded by these words. It may be also remarked, that if we add the terminations *er* and *est* (which are in forming comparisons equal to *more* and *most*) to the end of verbs, they can give no idea of comparison. Thus I *camer*, or I *camest*, or I *ran-er*, or I *ran-est*, can give no idea whatever of I *came more* and I *came most*, or of I *ran more* and I *ran most*. Yet if we add the terminations *er* and *est* to other words which never receive them, but which are otherwise compared, the effect will be as great — that is, the idea of comparison will be as clearly and as fully felt — as if the usual forms of comparison were employed. Thus every body understands as well what is meant by *gooder* and *goodest*, and by *wiselier* and *wiseliest*, when we say John is the *gooder* or the *goodest*, or John speaks *wiselier* or the *wiseliest*, as when we employ the correct forms *better*, *best*, *more wisely*, *most wisely*. This arises from adjectives and adverbs being words which are really compared, whereas verbs never are. It may be also remarked, that in such an instance as “John studies more constantly than his brother,” the word *more* cannot be said to compare both the word it follows and the one it precedes — namely, *studies* and *constantly*; but that it refers wholly to the latter. Then this being allowed, how are we in this instance to compare the word *studies* if we wish to do so? Every body will admit that an additional comparison cannot in this instance be possibly made. Hence it is evident that since the word *studies* is not in this

place already compared, it could be compared if it had degrees of comparison; and this proves that when comparisons come next a verb, they do not refer to it, but to some other word or words expressed or understood.

Now when a word cannot be compared, it must be in the fourth or highest degree; that is, it must belong to the class of words commonly called nouns or substantives. This explains why in the English language almost all its nouns may be used as verbs. Thus, *love, labour, work, walk, water, dust, &c.* may become, in the infinitive mood, *to love, to labour, to work, to walk, to water, to dust, &c.*

Learned grammarians have remarked that the verb does resemble the adjective; but to tell why it cannot be compared like the adjective, has been wholly beyond their power. Sir Charles Stoddart's observations on this point are such as a man is obliged to make when he knows not what to think or to say, for there is not a particle of reason in them. But it is fair that I should, by a quotation of them, allow the reader to judge for himself.

“It is not easy to conceive any form of the verb which in itself would express the degrees of comparison; and the reason PROBABLY is, that though the mere qualities of substance may be simply *intensive*, yet actions are intensive in various modes, as well as in various degrees. Of different substances, concerning which whiteness can be predicated, some may be more and some less white; but of different beings, concerning which the act

of walking may be predicated, all equally walk, though one walks more, another less; one faster, another slower, &c.; and so of mental action, several persons love, but one loves more warmly, another more violently, another more purely, so that there is not in actions, as there is in qualities, a simple scale of elevation and depression; and consequently the mere comparison of more and less would not answer all the purposes of language, as applied to the verb, though it does as applied to the adjective. For this reason, participles when they are compared lose their participial power; for *sapientior* and *potentior* do not express acts, but habits, or fixed qualities, and therefore answer to the English adjective wiser and more powerful.*

How much more easy it is to account for a verb not being compared, by observing that it is *ever* in the highest degree of comparison, and that it cannot, *for this simple reason*, be made any higher or lower. Why it is in this degree more than any other, we shall see presently.

Now this much being clearly understood, namely, that a verb is one of those words called substantives; that is, a name in the fourth degree, and that it does not by any means represent an action, it will not be difficult to show the exact literal meaning of such a word. Hence "I love," must mean either "I am of love," or "I have of love;" as, "I am of love for my father," or, "I have of love for my father." And as here the meaning

* Enc. Met. p. 64.

seems equal, we have only to find out to which of the two forms custom has given the preference, and this will lead us to a very important discovery; namely, to the origin and meaning of the verbal terminations in English, and consequently to those of every other language. But let every thing be given as it came; that is, in the same order, and hence let the word *to*, of which the meaning has been hitherto unknown, when preceding verbs, be accounted for.

Grammarians, from having been always satisfied that they understood this word *to* in such a situation as “this book is belonging to me,” “belonging to him,” &c., could not suppose that it was the same *to* which went before verbs, since in the latter situation nobody, except one or two philosophical grammarians and their followers, could imagine what it means; yet their account of it is, after all, but imagining. The only proof we need offer that this word *to* was supposed in these two different situations to make different words, is, that the learned have endeavoured, when it precedes verbs, to explain it by the word *do*. But in such a situation as “this book is belonging *to* me” the learned could never suppose it means *do*; as nobody can say, “this book is belonging *do* me.” Now, between the word *to* when preceding a noun or a pronoun, as, “this book is belonging to John, to me,” &c., and *to* when going before verbs in the infinitive mood, there is not the least difference as to meaning; and if learned grammarians have

wholly misunderstood this word in the latter situation, this arose from their knowing nothing whatever of the word called the verb, and from their ever believing that it represents an action. Hence, had I no other proof to offer, that hitherto the nature of the verb has been utterly unknown, this single circumstance were of itself sufficient. Now, when we supply what is understood in the proposition, “ I wish to love,” that is, “ I [have a] wish [belonging] to love,” what difference do we find between *to* in this instance, and *to* in “ this book is belonging *to* John?” Every body will admit that there is none ; because we now see the verb in its true light, that is, as a word which does not by any means represent action ; and that between it and those other words called nouns, there is not, in this respect, a shade of difference ; hence it were more correct to say, that it was the meaning of the verb, and not of this little word *to*, of which grammarians have been hitherto entirely ignorant. Now also we see that *à* in French, when preceding a verb, does not at all differ from itself in meaning when in a similar situation with regard to a noun or a pronoun. Thus, as *c'est à moi* means *c'est appartenant à moi*, (it is to me, it is belonging to me,) so must the literal meaning of *c'est à dire*, be *c'est appartenant à dire* ; that is, *it is to say, it is belonging to say*.

Thus, though we are now only entering upon the verb, we begin already to perceive how this word, when properly seen, loses that appearance of repre-

senting action, which has ever made the learned suppose it to differ widely from the substantive.

Thus in the sentence "I wish to love," we may perceive how the words *wish* and *love* lose their verbal appearance, if we merely supply the ellipsis in this imperfect manner: "I a wish to love." Here the word *wish* is no longer taken for a verb, and even the word *love* begins, in consequence of this change in the word *wish*, to lose also its verbal appearance; but when we put before it the single word *belonging*, as, "I a wish belonging to love," we see this word in its true meaning; and though the ellipsis of the whole sentence is not by the addition of these two words (*a* and *belonging*) completely filled up, yet we see enough to understand all, and to find, without an effort, the other word *have* still understood, as, "I have a wish belonging to love;" which sentence does not, as to meaning, differ in the slightest degree from "I wish to love;" this latter form being only a contraction of the other.

But many of those words called verbs, *from their being ever used in one situation only* — that is, from their being ever used as those words called verbs are used — may, at first sight, appear as not belonging to the class of words called nouns, since the word *to* does not seem to have the same meaning before them which it has when placed before a noun.

But if all those words called verbs were in English like the verb *love*, that is, if the same word had always the same form in the infinitive which

it has when belonging to the class of words called substantives, it might not be very difficult to make Englishmen believe that a verb and a substantive are the same word. But it may, to quote one instance out of many, be remarked, that though we can say *I have love*, we cannot possibly say *I have see*; and that consequently the words *love* and *see* do not belong to the same class. But all who reason so, are led by their ears, and not by their understanding. It would be now very improper to employ the word *see* as if it belonged to the class of words called substantives; because the English language *happens* to have, in this case, two words for expressing the same idea, *according to its two different situations*, and not from any difference in the sense, for there is none. But the English language is not so rich with respect to the word *love*, which is written and pronounced alike in whatever situation we employ it. Yet whether we say "I have love," or that we contract this form and say *I love*, our meaning is precisely the same; hence the words called verbs and substantives express the same idea; but from this idea being put in different situations, and for no other reason whatever, the word naming it has in most languages taken different forms, according to those different situations.

Now our ears, by which we have been hitherto solely guided, have not allowed us to remark the circumstance here alluded to. Thus, when we say "*I begin* my letter," we can with difficulty believe that the word *begin* belongs to the class of words

called substantives; because our ears do not allow us to say "I am at the begin of my letter," which arises from our never thus employing the word *begin*, as the English language has other forms for this word when used so, such as *beginning* and *commencement*. But if, instead of I *end* my letter, we say, I am at the end of my letter, our ears are not offended, simply because we are accustomed to hear this word *end* so employed, and this arises from its primitive use not having yet been lost from our adopting of other words of a similar meaning. Hence it is just as logical to say, "I am at the begin of my letter," as it is to say, "I am at the end of my letter;" though it were now very improper to adopt the form "I am at the begin of my letter," as the English language has for the name *begin*, when in such a situation, other forms (*beginning* and *commencement*); but if we had not those other forms, it would not be in the least improper to say, "I am at the begin of my letter," nor could our ears be then in the least offended at hearing such a locution. Thus also, nobody can say "the orator's *speak*," instead of the "orator's *speech*;" yet *speak* and *speech* were anciently the same word, and were both pronounced *speak*, the *ch* having in the beginning such a sound as *k* has at present; and then men said, with great ease and propriety, "you *speak*," and "your *speak*," just as we say now, "you *talk*," and "your *talk*." But the word *talk* in the latter instance may with time become as obsolete as the word *speak*, when in

a similar situation, has already become; for the words *discourse*, *conversation*, &c. may wholly usurp its place: but it will not on this account belong less to the words called substantives, except that it will be very improper to employ it any longer in such a situation. Thus, in the French language, nobody can now employ the word *descendre*, as one of the words called nouns; yet in the thirteenth century, and probably much later, it was so employed, as the following passage will prove: “Et quant les gens qui estoient avecques moi, virent les meschiefs que les Sarrazins faisoient aux Almans au *descendre* et qu’ilz les poursuyvoient tous jours, ilz commencirent a effroier et a avoir paeurs.”*

Nor can any body think now of employing *parole* as a verb, yet Geoffroy de Ville-Hardoin has employed it as such:—“Plusieurs preudommes dont li livres ne parole plus.”† Yet the English word for *parole* has not yet grown obsolete, as we still hear such expressions as, “to word a letter,” “to word a speech,” &c.; and Addison, in an instance quoted by Johnson, thus employs it, as, “The apology for the king is the same, but worded with greater deference to that great prince.”

Nor is there at present, in the French language, any difference as to form between *pouvoir* the verb, and *pouvoir* the substantive. Then why do we not employ *power* in English both as a verb and substantive? Simply because we have the word *can*

* Mem. de Joinville, vol. ii. p. 113. ed. de Londres, 1785.

† See his Memoirs, p. 36. latest Paris edition.

(which expresses the same idea) for that situation, in a sentence which we allow the words called verbs to have. And why do we not employ *can* as a substantive? Because we have the word *power* for such a situation. But *will* has not yet been made obsolete by the words *desire*, *inclination*, or *wish*; since we may say, "I have the *will* to do that," or, "I will do that;" and, in like manner, if we had not the word *can*, we should say, with great propriety and ease, "I power do that," just as we now say, "I can do that." All this proves that between the words called verbs and substantives there is not, as to meaning, the least difference; and the separate forms which they frequently take to mark their different situations must be very slight in those languages which retain much of their primitive simplicity. Thus almost all the nouns of the English language may be converted into verbs; and if we could find a language wholly in its infancy, and no parts of it taken from any other language, we should not find the least difference, either as to sense or form, between its substantives and its verbs; indeed, such a language could have none of those words called verbs. Nor is it natural to suppose, that a rude people would seek different modes of expressing the same idea, if they found one to answer their purpose. Those different modes do not come till after a great length of time; that is to say, when a language abounds with words, and men begin to use abbreviated forms, and, instead of such a sentence as "I have of love for

John," they say, "I love John;" in both of which forms the meaning is precisely the same, though the one contains just twice as many words as the other. This latter example (I love John) may also serve to show and correct another gross error into which grammarians fell, when they supposed that there are such words as active or transitive verbs; by which they understand such verbs as take no preposition between them and the names of the objects they are supposed to act upon. Thus in the instance "I love John," *love* is said to be an active or transitive verb, because we do not say, "I love to John," or "I love for John." But *speak*, in "I speak to John," is called a neuter or intransitive verb, because we cannot say, "I speak John." Now the only difference between *love* and *speak*, in the instances here given, is this: *love* has its preposition understood, *speak* its preposition expressed; and such, as to meaning, is the sole difference between verbs active and neuter, or transitive and intransitive, and not only in English, but in all the languages in the world. How slightly men have ever looked into these matters, to suppose that such things as words can be active, and even that some can be more active than others! This is certainly one of the grossest blunders that man has ever committed, and it must some short time hence excite general astonishment, and not only amongst philosophers but amongst children. Thus we learn, that in such a sentence as, "I speak to John," the meaning is, "my speak or speech is

to John," that is, it is belonging to John, addressed to him, and to nobody else; and hence it may happen that a verb which is said to be transitive in one language may not be transitive in another; for the reason that some nations express themselves in fewer words than others. Thus the Spaniards still use the words *love* and *hate* as though they were intransitive verbs; since they say, "*love to thy neighbour, and hate to thy enemy*," instead of "*love thy neighbour, and hate thy enemy*."* And in French we may not say, as we do in English, "I asked John to lend me a book," but we are obliged to say, "I asked to John to lend me a book" (*Je demandai à Jean de me prêter un livre*). But do we not even hear in the same language the same word used transitively and intransitively? Thus in English some persons say, "I *approve* his conduct," and others, "I *approve of* his conduct," which arises not from some words being more active than others, for no words can be active, but from some persons wishing to express themselves in fewer words than others.

Thus the word called the verb, from being frequently used in this abbreviated manner, began while languages were yet very young, to appear another word than what it really is, and so it

* "*Habeis oído que fué dicho, Amarás á tu proximo, y aborreceras á tu enemigo. Mas yo os digo, Amad á vuestros enemigos*," &c. — S. Mathéo, v. 43, &c.

"Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, &c. — St. Matthew, v. 43, &c.

received a different name, although its primitive meaning never varied. What has most of all contributed to keep men in such ignorance of this word, is the variety of forms it has been made to undergo on account of person, number, and tense. But these circumstances, when clearly accounted for, will, it is hoped, settle all future doubt and discussion respecting the nature of verbs; and this important task I have now to accomplish.

In order to make this account as clear as possible, and not to perplex the reader's attention by different objects at the same time, I shall not, till I have accounted for verbal terminations in general, consider, in a particular manner, the verbs *to be* and *to have*.

I have already said that *I love* must mean either "I am of love," or "I have of love," which are still contractions of "I am a part of love," and "I have a part of love." But as the words *a part of* are in such a case never expressed, but implied, we are to suppose them as not coming under our notice, and that, consequently, *I love* is to be considered as a contraction of "I am love," or "I have love."

The endings of the three persons singular of the indicative mood, present tense, do not at first sight appear to be formed from either the verb *to be* or the verb *to have* and the principal verb. Thus *love*, *lovest*, *loves*, resemble neither *am love*, *art love*, *is love*, nor, *have love*, *hast love*, *has love*. Though this circumstance was at first disheartening, I soon

saw, from a closer examination of the view I had thus taken of the verb, that I could not in this instance be in error. Hence, from persevering in this application of my system, I was here led to a certain discovery, which I cannot but think an important one, inasmuch as it has opened the way to a great many others, as will be subsequently seen. It is simply this:—When two words come frequently together, as *am love* or *have love*, the first, after some time, falls behind the second. Thus, if Englishmen were now to adopt for the superlative of *good*, *the most good* instead of *the best*, we should soon, on account of the frequent use made of this word *good*, and our love of contraction, find ourselves saying, the *goodmost*. Hence the two words *most up* have become *upmost*; and in like manner the two words *most out* have become *outmost*, this compound having been since contracted to *utmost*. For the same reason *am* and *have*, if in the beginning made to precede English verbs, would, after a short time, be put after them; so that *am love* would become *love-am*, and *have love*, *love-have*. Then let us set down here in full the present and past tenses of the verbs *to be* and *to have*, in order to find out from which of them the endings of English verbs are derived.

And let us begin with the verb —

TO BE.

I love am	We love are.
Thou love art	You love are.
He love is	They love are.
I love was	We love were.
Thou love wast or wert	You love were.
He love was	They love were.

Now if the verb *to be* had served to form the terminations of an English verb, the first person singular of the present time should end with an *m*, and we should say, “I lovem” instead of “I love.” From the strong sound of the *r* in *art*, we should also have in the second person singular not only a *t*, but an *rt*; so that instead of thou *lovest*, we should say, “thou lov’rt.” The *s* in *is* might very well be the *s* in the third person singular *loves*; but the three persons plural would, if formed from *are*, end all with an *r*, though not with an *e*, as this letter is silent in *are*. This examination of the present time were sufficient to prove that English verbs have not taken their endings from the verb *to be*; but of this we may be still more convinced when we look at the past time, which generally ends with *ed*, whilst in this time the inflections of the verb *to be* are for the singular *was*, *wast*, or *wert*, *was*, and for the plural, *were*, *were*, *were*, among which we see no *d* or *ed*. Now, if after the same manner we examine the verb *to have* conjointly with another verb, we shall find that it has, on the contrary, formed the endings of English verbs,

which we may perceive the more easily by setting down an instance, thus:—

TO HAVE.		
PRESENT TIME.		
I love have		I love.
Thou love hast		Thou lovest.
He love has or hath	ed	He loves or loveth.
We love have		We love.
You love have	Con	You love.
They love have		They love.
PAST TIME.		
I love had		I loved.
Thou love hadst		Thou lovedst.
He love had		He loved.
We love had		We loved.
You love had	Con	You loved.
They love had		They loved.

By this we see that *love hast* has been shortened to *lovest*; *love has*, to *loves*; *love hath* to *loveth*; *love had* to *loved*; and *love hadst* to *lovedst*. The *ha* has been omitted throughout; as, love [ha]st; love [ha]s; love [ha]th; love [ha]d; love [ha]dst.

On account of the feeble sound of *ve* in *have*, no trace of it has remained in *I love have*, *we love have*, *you love have*, and *they love have*, which are all contracted to *love*.

Many verbs of the past time that should end with *ed* have, from a corrupt pronouncing of them, been contracted in their endings to a single *t*, such as *sleep*, *weep*, &c., which ought to be *sleeped*, *wepted*, and not *slept*, *wept*, &c. It may be said, that such words ought rather to be written *sleepd*,

weepd, as there is no *e* in *had*; but this is a mistake; for the sound of *d* is *ed*, and we shall see hereafter that two consonants should never coalesce, but ought ever have a vowel between them.

Those verbs which have not formed their past time from *had*, are irregular, such as, *come, came, come; sing, sang, sung; speak, spoke, spoken, &c.*

The future in English is not formed by the juncture of the verb *have* and another verb, but by the words *shall* and *will*, which are to be considered as principal verbs, with this exception, that these words, from the frequent use we make of them, have not preserved so much of the verb *have* as other words. Thus we do not say, "he wills come," nor "he shalls come," the *s* having by frequent use been wholly omitted. But the *t* in *wilt* and *shalt*, and the *d* in *would* and *should* (which come from the *t* in *hast* and the *d* in *had*), have on account of their stronger sound remained. The reader is doubtless aware that formerly *will* and *shall* were written also *woul* and *shoul*, just as they are still heard in certain parts of England; and it was when they were so written that they happened to coalesce with *had*, and so from *woul had* and *shoul had* have come by contraction *would* and *should*. *Woul* meant then what *will* does at present; that is, inclination, desire, wish, &c., and *shoul* meant what *shall* did in Chaucer's time; that is, debt, duty, obligation*, &c., and which meaning

* *Shall* is originally I *owe*, or I *ought*. In Chaucer, the *faith* I shall to God, means the *faith* I *owe* to God." — Dr. JOHNSON.

The reader must by this time know that *owe* is another word for

it still has. Then *woul had* meant *had the will* or *desire*, and *shoul had* meant *had the debt* or *obligation*, &c. Hence grammarians, though wholly ignorant of how *would* and *should* have been formed, were very right when they remarked that these words were the past of *will* and *shall*. Then *will* and *shall* and the verb *have* are to be accounted for just as *love* and *have* have been already accounted for; as,

WILL.

PRESENT TIME

I will have	Contracted	I will.
Thou wilt hast		Thou wilt.
He will has		He will.
We will have		We will.
You will have		You will.
They will have		They will.

PAST TIME.

I woul* had	Contracted	I would.
Thou woul hadst		Thou wouldst.
He woul had		He would.
We woul had		We would.
You woul had		You would.
They woul had		They would.

SHALL.

PRESENT TIME.

I shall have	Contracted	I shall.
Thou shall hast		Thou shalt.
He shall has		He shall.
We shall have		We shall.
You shall have		You shall.
They shall have		They shall.

debt, there being in reality no class of words distinct from name called *verbs*.

* Instead of *will*.

PAST TIME.		
I shoul * had	Con- ed to	I should.
Thou shoul hadst		Thou shouldst.
He shoul had		He should.
We shoul had		We should.
You shoul had		You should.
They shoul had		They should.

Can and *could* are to be accounted for after the same manner. Because instances of *could* can be found in which this word is written without an *l*, Sir Charles Stoddart is of opinion, that it ought not to be written as it is. But according to this reasoning *would* and *should* ought to have no *l*, because they also were at one time simply *wou* and *shou*, as we shall see when showing how words may be often traced up to a single letter. Then *can* and *coul* are two words in the present time, meaning *power*, and they bear signs of their connection with *have*, just as *will* and *shall* (or *woul* and *shoul*) do.

CAN.		
PRESENT TIME.		
I can have	Con- ed	I can.
Thou can hast		Thou canst.
He can has		He can.
We can have		We can.
You can have		You can.
They can have		They can.
PAST TIME.		
I coul † had	Con- ed	I could.
Thou coul hadst		Thou couldst.
He coul had		He could.
We coul had		We could.
You coul had		You could.
They coul had		They could.

* Instead of *shall*.

† Instead of *can*.

May and *might*, which are, like *can* and *could*, other words for *power*, are also to be explained like these latter words; except that to *might* is assigned a past signification, although it is no more in a past time than any of those words called nouns are. But had not this or some other means been adopted for making a past time for *may*, great confusion might arise by uniting this word with *had*, as this would make *mayed*, a word not to be distinguished in sound from *made* or *maid*. Even the verb *be* is, in its ancient form, made to coalesce with the verb *have*, for thou *beest* is no other than thou *be hast*; and *bes* and *beeth*, as it was also at one time written in the third person singular, is from *be has* and *be hath*. But for this verb in its other form (*am, art, is, &c.*) I cannot yet account: the most important of all my discoveries is connected with it.

Hence we see that when those words called auxiliaries precede those words called principal verbs, as *I will love, I shall love, I would love, I should love, &c.*, they are to be accounted for thus: *I will love, i. e. I the will have belonging to love; I will love*, being already a contraction of *I will to love; I shall love*, that is, *I shall to love; I obligation to love*, that is, *I have the obligation belonging to love; I would love, i. e. I had the will (woul) to love, belonging to love; I should love, I had the shoul (obligation) to love*, that is, *belonging to love, &c.* Every body knows that the future is also formed thus: “*I have to love*,” which is no other than a con-

traction of *I shall have to love*, that is, *I obligation have belonging to love*, which is shown above.

We may now account for

THE INFINITIVE MOOD.

- | | |
|-------------------|------------|
| 1. To love. | 3. Loving. |
| 2. To have loved. | 4. Loved. |

1. *To love* [the thing] *to love*; that is, *the thing belonging to love, the passion belonging to love*; as, *to love is natural*; that is, *the passion belonging to love is natural*.

2. *To have love had*, contracted to *to have loved*.

3. *Loving*; that is, *love having*, contracted to *loving*.

4. *Loved*; that is, *love had*, contracted to *loved*.

Thus far I have shown that the endings of verbs in English are formed by means of the word *have* in its various forms.

We see that *I love* means *I have love*; in which instance we have three names in the fourth degree — I, HAVE, LOVE; and they are as clearly in apposition to one another, as the two names Paul and Apostle are in apposition in “Paul the Apostle.” The name *I* is defined or limited, as it is the name of one particular person out of all persons; but *have* (which is another word for possession) and *love* are not limited; and hence they have understood before them the words *a part of*, so that *I have love* literally means *I a part of possession, a part of love*; and this we may clearly understand when we set down in one word the exact meaning of *a part of possession*, which word is *a possessor*;

and this will make *I* a possessor of a part of love ; that is, I (am) a possessor of a part of love.

Now, when in like manner we reduce the several words *part of love* to one word, which is *lover*, since this implies *one part* or *one being* out of all love, we shall find that “ I a part of possession, a part of love,” will become “ I a possessor, a lover ;” that is, the substance named *I* is named Δ POSSESSOR, and is also named *a lover* ; implying, that if the substance named *I* is named *a possessor*, it bears this name in the capacity of *a lover* ; and that in this instance, it is only as being such, it is called *a possessor*. This analysis leads to the discovery of what could not be otherwise known, namely, why a verb agrees with its nominative case : we see it arises from this word (the verb) being a noun or a name standing in apposition to another name (the nominative case), as clearly as the word *Apostle* stands in apposition to the word *Paul*, when we say “ *Paul the Apostle*.” Than this nothing can be more rational and evident, yet nothing could hitherto be more unknown. As a child seven or eight years old, and even much younger, can tell why we ought not to say “ *Paul the Apostles*,” since it must know that one person cannot possibly be several persons, so such a child can now easily understand why a verb should agree with its subject or nominative case.

FRENCH VERBS.

Just as English verbs have been accounted for, so may those of the French language; for though the hand of time has leant heavily on these words, enough of their primitive state remains, to show that they are all composed of *nouns* and the verb *to have*. In order to make this clear—but like every thing else for which I have hitherto accounted, it will become much clearer as this discovery advances—let us set down here the present and two past times of *avoir*.

PRESENT TIME.

J'ai.	Nous avons.
Tu as.	Vous avez.
Il a.	Ils ont.

1. PAST TIME.

J'eus.*	Nous eumes.
Tu eus.	Vous eutes.
Il eut.	Ils eurent.

2. PAST TIME.

J'avais.†	Nous avions.
Tu avais.	Vous aviez.
Il avait.	Ils avaient.

* This was the first past time the French ever had, and hence it is here contrary to general practice made to precede *j'avais*.

† *Ais* in this time is now preferred to *ois*. This orthography was first introduced by Voltaire; till a few years ago it was opposed by the French Academy, and had the meaning of this syllable (*ois*) been known, it would have been opposed still. As I do not give my discoveries but as they came to me, the meaning of *ois* cannot yet be shown.

The three times of the verb *aimer*, corresponding with those three times of the verb *avoir*, are:—

PRESENT TIME.

J'aime.	Nous aimons.
Tu aimes.	Vous aimez.
Il aime.	Ils aiment.

1. PAST TIME.

J'aimai.	Nous aimames.
Tu aimas	Vous aimates.
Il aima.	Ils aimèrent.

2. PAST TIME.

J'aimais.	Nous aimions.
Tu aimais.	Vous aimiez.
Il aimait.	Ils aimaient.

If we omit the ending of the infinitive (*er*), for which I cannot yet account, we shall have *aim*; and if to this we add the present of *avoir*, that is, *ai*, *as*, *a*; *avons*, *avez*, *ont*, we shall have for the present of *aimer*, not what we have above, but —

J'aim ai.	Nous aim avons.
Tu aim as.	Vous aim avez.
Il aim a.	Ils aim ont.

And such was the first present time for this verb *aimer* and all similar verbs, which the French language ever had; with this difference, however, that the verb *avoir* preceded *aim* in the beginning, thus:

J'ai aim.	Nous avons aim.
Tu as aim.	Vous avez aim.
Il a aim.	Ils ont aim.

And the variations of *avoir* having thus continued for some considerable length of time to

precede *aim*, fell afterwards behind it, as we see them above in the first instance. But in order to form a past time, Frenchmen made, unknown to themselves, certain changes in this ancient present time. Thus, from *aimai*, *aimas*, and *aima*, they took the variations of *avoir*, (*ai*, *as*, *a*,) so that *aim* alone remained, to which the letter *e* was joined, merely to allow the *m* to have the same sound as before; and the *s* of *as* was also preserved, thus indicating that *aimes* had previously been *aimas*. Though thus diminished, this word did not lose its right of marking a present time, and such is the original of *j'aime*, *tu aimes*, *il aime*; whilst of *aimai*, *aimas*, *aima*, has been made the three persons singular of that past time which French grammarians call their *prétérit défini*. But the three persons plural of the present (*aimavons*, *aimavez*, *aimont*,) have not been thus converted into a past time, and we have them still in almost their primitive purity. Thus *aimons* and *aimiez* are the contractions of *aimavons*, and *aimavez*, the syllable *av* being in both words left out, thus: *aim*[*av*]ons, *aim*[*av*]ez. From the third person plural of *avoir* (*ont*) not having this syllable *av*, it must, in the beginning, have been added in its primitive state to *aim*, and men must for some time have said, in the third person plural of *aimer*, and all such verbs, *ils aimont*, instead of *ils aiment*. But as the first person plural (*aimons*) must have been pronounced in a similar manner—that is, when Frenchmen discontinued pronouncing final consonants—they

soon saw a necessity for distinguishing the one from the other, which they did by forgetting to pronounce the *o* in *aimont*, allowing an *e* to take its place, that the *m* might not change its sound; for if we insert no *e* and write *aimnt*, the syllable *aim* must be pronounced as it is in the French word *faim*, which is very different from *aim* in *aimont*.

We have already seen that the three persons singular of the *prétérit défini* are formed by means of the present time singular of *avoir*; and notwithstanding the disfigured form which the three persons plural of the same time now bear, it is not difficult to discover that they are vitiated contractions of *aim* and the three persons plural of *avoir*, (*eumes, eutes, eurent,*) as *aimames, aimates, aimèrent*, which, to be regular, ought to be *aïmeumes, aimeutes, aimeurent*; and in like manner the three persons singular of this tense ought to be, (instead of *j'aimai, tu aimas, il aima,*) *j'aïmeus, tu aimeus, il aimeut*; but at the time the *prétérit défini* received the form which it now bears, the three persons singular, *j'eus, tu eus, il eut*, could have scarcely existed as they do at present, and which the reader will admit when he knows what these words originally were. Hence it is possible that without the artifice here employed, Frenchmen could not have a *prétérit défini* in the singular, and that they would have been obliged to make use of the present tense for this purpose, just as they are obliged to do with verbs of the second conjugation, of which the three persons singular of the present

are the same as the three persons singular of the *prétérit défini*. Thus *je punis, tu punis, il punit*, means either I punish, thou punishest, he punishes, or I punished, thou punishedst, he punished. In English, also, many instances occur of a verb bearing the same form in a present and past time; as, I bid, I cut, I cast, I put, &c.

The past time in French, commonly called the imperfect, that is, *aimais, aimais, aimait, aimions, aimiez, aimaient*, is formed by the addition of the same tense of *avoir* to *aim*, thus:—

J'aim [av]ais.	Nous aim [av]ions.
Tu aim [av]ais.	Vous aim [av]iez.
Il aim [av]ait.	Ils aim [av]aient.

The future in French is simply the present of *avoir* added to the infinitive (*aimer*), as —

J'aimer ai.	Nous aimer [av]ons.
Tu aimer as.	Vous aimer [av]ez.
Il aimer a.	Ils aimer ont.

In the beginning *avoir* went before *aimer*, and men said,—

J'ai (à) aimer.	Nous avons (à) aimer.
Tu as (à) aimer.	Vous avez (à) aimer.
Il a (à) aimer.	Ils ont (à) aimer.

Nor is there, at the present hour, the least difference as to meaning between *j'ai à aimer* and *j'aimerai*.

The future of the verb *avoir* itself is to be accounted for after the same manner. Every body knows that *avoir* has, till a very late period, been written *auoir*, that is, the *u* instead of the *v*. Then *aur* in *j'aurai, tu auras, &c.* is only the

contraction of *avoir*, one single letter (the *o*) being omitted, and for a very good reason, namely, that *au* by which it was preceded bears a similar sound. Hence, to see the future of *avoir* in its original state, we need only set it down thus:—

J'aur ai.	Nous aur [av]ons.
Tu aur as.	Vous aur [av]ez.
Il aur a.	Ils aur ont.

We must not forget that prior to the time when the future of *avoir* was thus formed, its present tense preceded the infinitive *avoir* or *aur*, just as *j'ai à aimer* must have existed previous to *j'aimerai*. Hence, the future of *avoir* then was,—

J'ai à avoir.	Nous avons à avoir.
Tu as à avoir.	Vous avez à avoir.
Il a à avoir.	Ils ont à avoir.

The reader may remember that between *will* and *would*, *shall* and *should*, the sole difference is a difference of time, the present and the past; and that these two times of these words are formed by means of the present and past of the verb *to have*, namely, *have* and *had*. Thus, “I will love,” means “I the will have to love;” and “I would love,” “I the will (woul) had to love.” Even so is it with regard to the two times in French, which correspond with those two times in English. The future, as we have just seen, is the present of the verb *to have* and the infinitive, and so is the form of the verb called by French grammarians the *conditional*, made by the addition of the past time *avais* to the infinitive, as we may thus see:—

J'aimer [av]ais.	Nous aimer [av]ions.
Tu aimer [av]ais.	Vous aimer [av]iez.
Il aimer [av]ait.	Ils aimer [av]aient.

There are two times belonging to the subjunctive, yet to be accounted for; they correspond with the present and *prétérit défini* of the indicative, which we have already seen, and they begin thus: *que j'aime*, &c., and *que j'aimasse*, &c., the same times of the verb *avoir* are:—

Que j'aie.	Que nous ayons.
Que tu aies.	Que vous ayez.
Qu'il ait.	Qu'ils aient.
Que j'eusse.	Que nous eussions.
Que tu eusses.	Que vous eussiez.
Qu'il eût.	Qu'ils eussent.

Let us now set down in full the two times of *aimer* alluded to above, which ought to have been formed by means of those two times of *avoir*:—

Que j'aime.	Que nous aimions.
Que tu aimes.	Que vous aimiez.
Qu'il aime.	Qu'ils aiment.
Que j'aimasse.	Que nous aimassions.
Que tu amasses.	Que vous aimassiez.
Qu'il aimât.	Qu'il aimassent.

As the present of the indicative has been deprived of *ai*, *as*, *a*, in like manner the singular of the present of the subjunctive is deprived of *aie*, *aies*, *ait*; but it is not so with the plural, which is thus formed:—

Que nous aim [a]yons.
Que vous aim [a]yez.
Qu'ils aim [ai]ent.

It is also easy to see that this second tense of the subjunctive is formed from the juncture of *aim* and *eusse*, which has become *aimasse*, the *eu* being shortened to an *a* thus:—

Que *j'aimeusse* (*aimasse*).

Que tu *aimeusses* (*aimasses*).

Qu'il *aim eût* (*aimât*).

Que nous *aim eussions* (*aimassions*).

Que vous *aim eussiez* (*aimassiez*).

Qu'ils *aim eussent* (*aimassent*).

Before I say any thing of the infinitive of *aimer*, its participle present *aimant*, and its participle past *aimé*, it will be also necessary to show the corresponding forms of *avoir*:—

avoir,

ayant,

eu.

Now the final *er* in *aimer* is to *aim* what the final *ir* is to *avo*, but this I do not yet explain. As to *aimant*, it is the contraction of *aim[ay]ant*, and the *é* in *aimé* is another form for *eu*, and it has precisely the same meaning; and hence the sole difference between *aimé* and *aimeu* is in the form; and the sole difference between a participle of the second conjugation in *i*, as *puni* and *puneu*, if the latter could be used, is in the form. For the participles of *tenir*, *rendre*, *recevoir*, &c., which are all in *u*, as *tenu*, *rendu*, *reçu*—what are they? nothing more than *eu*; and until very lately they have been written *teneu*, *rendeü*, *reçeü*, as every body knows; and it is a grave mistake not to write them so still. Hence the French Academy would act wisely by restoring

this orthography, from which the French nation would have never deviated had they known that this *eu* at the end of verbs, as in *reçeu, teneu, &c.*, is in truth the participle past of *avoir*. But though I show that the participle past in French is either literally this *eu*, or another form for it, this is not telling the meaning of this *eu* itself, which, though so frequently used, is in this respect utterly unknown; but I cannot yet explain to the reader what it means, as it is first necessary to bring him acquainted with something else.

Though I do not yet account for French infinitives in *er*, and *ir*, and *re*; as, *aimer, punir, rendre*, I may, however, in this place remark, that those in *oir*, such as *voir, recevoir, devoir, &c.*, and those in *ôtre* or *âtre*, such as *paraître, connaître, naître, &c.*, do not come direct from the Latin, as all French philologists have hitherto believed; but they are formed by means of the infinitives *avoir* and *être*. Thus *voir, recevoir, devoir*, are not from *videre, recipere, and debere*, but from *vu avoir, reçu avoir, and dû avoir*, contracted to *voir, recevoir, devoir*. Hence *voir* literally means *avoir la vu*; *recevoir, avoir la réception, or le reçu, and devoir, avoir le dû, or la dette*. Nor shall we find, if we examine them nicely, any difference as to meaning, between *avoir la vue d'une chose* and *voir une chose* (admitting that the pure locution *avoir la vue d'une chose* might exist in French), and *avoir le reçu or la réception d'une chose, and recevoir une chose*; and *avoir le dû, or la dette d'une chose, and devoir une chose*.

And this opinion is confirmed by Dr. Reid thus : — “ Although the operations of the mind are most properly and naturally, and indeed most commonly in all vulgar languages expressed by active verbs, there is another way of expressing them less common, but equally well understood. To think of a thing, and to have a thought of it ; to believe a thing, and to have a belief of it ; to see a thing, and to have a sight of it ; to conceive a thing, and to have a conception, notion, or idea of it, are phrases perfectly synonymous.” *

This just remark of Dr. Reid's might have shown him that there are really no such words as those to which he here refers, namely, verbs active ; for if “ to have the belief of a thing ” be exactly the same as “ to believe a thing,” we are led to suspect that as both these forms could not have existed when languages were in their infancy, the one must be only a contraction of the other. Hence men first said “ to have belief,” and this form, from frequent repetition, became *belief have* ; and then these two words were soon contracted to one, namely, *believe*. If we examine the French language for this word *believe* (*croire*) we shall find that it was formed in exactly the same manner. Men first said *avoir cru*, then *avoir* fell behind, making *cru avoir* ; and then these two words coalesced, making *croire*, which, had Frenchmen known, they would no more write *croire* as they do, that is, with an *e* after the final *r*, than they would put an *e* after the

* *Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind*, vol. i. p. 225.

same letter in *avoir*, since the *oir* in *croire* is no other than the *oir* in *avoir*. Hitherto the learned have supposed that this word came direct from *credere*, in Latin; and hence the error they have committed by allowing it to bear its present form is pardonable. But now that its original form is clearly shown, the French Academy would act wisely by correcting its vicious orthography, and writing it *croir*, as they do *devoir*, *savoir*, &c.

Dr. Johnson is so far from suspecting *believe* to be formed from *belief have*, that he derives *belief* from *believe*; thus supposing that the verb must have existed before the noun; and the word *believe* itself he derives, on the authority of others, from the Saxon word *gelyfan*.

Thus we may perceive, that from knowing the etymology of French verbs in *oir*, we discover also that of a great many English verbs similar in termination to *believe*, such as *grieve*, *relieve*, *reprieve*, &c., which have been formed from the juncture of *grief*, *relief*, *reprief*, and the word *have* coming after them, thus: grie[f ha]ve, relie[f ha]ve, reprie[f ha]ve.

This completely confirms the view I have hitherto taken — both as to meaning and etymology — of English and French verbs; which is, that they are only contractions of *nouns* and the verb *to have*.

Paraître, *connaître*, *naître*, and all such verbs, were originally the word *être* (the being or the thing) added to the other parts — and it first preceded them — of these words, which then meant *apparence*, *connaissance*, and *naissance*. Hence *para-*

ître, *connaître*, and *naître*, literally mean, *la chose apparence*, *la chose connaissance*, *la chose naissance*; and they do not, as all French philologists pretend, come direct from *parere*, *cognoscere*, and *nasci*; but that the root of these words is the same, there can be no doubt. Thus, *voir*, and *videre*, begin both with a *v*; but we are not hence to infer that the three letters following the *v* in the French word *voir*, are derived from the five letters following the *v* in the Latin word *videre*; all we are to infer is this, that when European languages were in their infancy, there was but one word for *voir* and *videre*. Of course philologists can now have no notion of what word this was; but we shall see it in the proper place.

Such persons as have all their lives considered past participles as words very different from those called nouns, will find it very difficult (unless they possess the rare power of divesting themselves of erroneous opinions) to believe *connu*, *paru*, &c., as belonging to the class of words called nouns. Yet nearly a century ago, Du Marsais, though he had but a faint knowledge of what participles past are, thought that they must be nouns. But why did he think so? from his remarking that they followed, in French, the verb *to have*, as *honte*, *peur*, *envie*, &c. do.* Condillac, and several other grammarians, have since alluded to the same circumstance; but their opinions, as they were unsupported by solid principles, have produced no

* See his *Observations on Verbs*, tome troisieme, p. 220.

effect. Du Marsais himself supposed, that when men make use of a participle past instead of a noun, it is by imitation and abuse; these are his own words: — “ On dit cette ville a deux lieues de tour; cet ouvrage a des défauts; les passions ont leur usage; il a de l'esprit; il a de la vertu; et en suite *par imitation et par abus*, IL A AIMÉ, IL A LU *, ” &c.

But if it is neither by imitation nor abuse that men express themselves so; and this I could make very evident at the present moment if the time for telling what a participle past is, were come.

But the reader must now have a distinct notion of what a verb is: he must perceive that it is not a word which represents an action, any more than the word called a noun does; and that thus far its endings in both English and French appear to be the *verb* to have, in its various forms. In the English language this has been minutely shown, and also in French in all verbs of the first conjugation. But is it otherwise in French when we consider verbs of the other conjugations? not in the least. All their endings are to be accounted for by referring to the verb *avoir*. Thus, in *je reçois*, the meaning is, j'ai le reçu, or the reception, the *ois*, in *reçois*, being another form for *ai* (have); and when we see the letter *a* in its primitive state, we shall find the difference between *ai* and *ois*, to be uncommonly slight. But in the plural *reçevons* (which is no other than *reçu*

* Tome cinquieme, p. 80.

avons contracted) we see the verb *avoir* more openly. It is true that *avoir* is sometimes, as we have seen in *j'aime, tu aimes, il aime*, entirely suppressed; but this is only for the purpose of distinguishing one tense from another, as we have fully proved; and besides, as the verb *avoir* had in such cases been formerly expressed, we are still to consider it as understood. We have, however, seen that several of the infinitives have *être*, as well as others have *avoir*, for their endings, as, *connaître, recevoir, &c.*

Let us now, by adhering to the same system, endeavour to account for the endings of Latin verbs. *Are* is the termination of the infinitive of the first conjugation, as, *amare, rogare, putare, &c.* And what we ask is the meaning of this *are*, which belongs to such a multitude of words? It has, since the earliest times, been pronounced by all the learned men the world has seen, and it is natural to suppose that it must, through the course of their lives, have attracted their attention a great many times, for man is naturally inquisitive; but, at the hour I write this, the learned have about as clear a notion of *are*, in *amare*, and in all other verbs, as they have of the most hidden thing in nature. And what have we hitherto known of the meaning of the ending *ere* belonging to the infinitives of such verbs as *monere, tenere, docere, &c.*? Just as much as we have hitherto known of the ending *are*, but no more. And of the ending *ere*, such as we find it in *legere, scribere, cognoscere, &c.*, what have

we known? The same. And of *ire*, such as we find it in *audire*, *munire*, *punire*? &c. still the same; that is, nothing at all.

Now, when we set down the present tense of the indicative of *amare*, thus:—

<i>Amo</i>	<i>Amamus.</i>
<i>Amas</i>	<i>Amatis.</i>
<i>Amat</i>	<i>Amant.</i>

and compare its endings with *are* in *amare*, we perceive a great dissimilarity; thus in *amo*, *amas*, *amat*, we have an *o*, an *s*, and a *t*, and nothing like them in *are*, their supposed root. Hence we are led to look elsewhere for these three letters; and of course to examine the variations of *esse* and *habere* in the same tense, and see if their endings might have served to form those of *amare*. But the inflections of *esse* in the present of the indicative are *sum*, *es*, *est*; *sumus*, *estis*, *sunt*; and from the first inspection of these words, it is easy to perceive that they have not gone to make the endings of *amo*, *amas*, *amat*, *amamus*, *amatis*, *amant*; since were it so, the first person *amo* should end with an *m* instead of an *o*, in order to correspond with *sum*, of which the final letter is an *m*. Then we are led to examine *habere*; and with some confidence, since it is from the same verb that English and French verbs have formed their endings. But we see at once from the length of *habere*, that it could not possibly have lent Latin verbs their endings; thus *amo* cannot be a contraction of *amhabeo*; the *b* would have remained, it being of a sound not to be so easily omitted; and if such an omission

were, as an extraordinary circumstance, to happen in the first person singular, it could not possibly happen in all the others. Yet all verbs have in their meaning, as I have already shown, either the verb to *be*, or the verb to *have*: hence we cannot look elsewhere for the original of verbal endings. I acknowledge that when I had gone thus far in my discovery, and felt convinced that neither *esse* nor *habere* could have given Latin verbs their terminations, I was, for a moment, both surprised and disheartened; and hence I was led to examine over again, with the closest attention, the account I have given of the endings of English and French verbs; but detecting nothing that might induce me to believe I had taken a wrong view of them, I began to examine more minutely than I had hitherto done the verb to *be*. And this inquiry has led me to the most important of all my discoveries; since it not only showed me the original of the endings of the Latin verbs, but also those of the several declensions of Latin nouns, adjectives, pronouns, participles, &c., with their several cases, genders, numbers, &c. And this knowledge will not only apply to the Latin language, but of course to all the languages in the world. From this I have been also led to discover the real nature of a pronoun, and how words have been made in the beginning of time, and how they have increased from a single letter, or at most from two, to all which they have at present: by which means we may see the state of languages at different periods of the world, even such as they

must have been ages before the building of the tower of Babel; which knowledge will, it is presumed, throw great light on the ancient history of the world, since men must, in the composition of words, have ever made allusion to things already known, such as might serve to explain the words they made. Thus is it even in our own times, and thus has it ever been. I intend towards the end of this work to give numerous instances of how words were at first formed, and the various forms they bore at different times; so that no doubt may remain on any man's mind, either as to the truth of this, the most important part of my discovery, or as to the advantages which may, from our following it up, arise from it.

To account for the verb TO BE has ever seriously puzzled the learned. "Dr. Smith," says the author of the clever article on grammar (p. 420.) in the Edinburgh Encyclopædia, "infers from the generality of the character of this verb, that it must have been the result of much thought, and could have been formed only after refinement in metaphysical science had made considerable advancement."

And Condillac is of opinion that in the beginning men did not clearly understand the meaning of the proposition *I am*, since this were to suppose them endued with a sagacity which even our philosophers do not always possess. And to this he adds, "Mais enfin cette proposition a toujours la même signification, soit qu'on en fasse l'analyse ou qu'on ne la fasse pas; et d'une bouche à l'autre elle ne diffère que par ce qu'elle offre aux uns

des idées distinctes, tandis qu'aux autres elle n'offre qu'une masse confuse d'idées. Sans doute dans l'origine des langues cette proposition n'offroit aussi qu'une *masse confuse* dans laquelle on distinguoit peu d'idées; et il a fallu bien des observations avant que les hommes qui la prononçoient pussent comprendre eux mêmes tout ce qu'ils disoient. Ils parloient comme nous parlons souvent, et nous leur ressemblons plus qu'on ne le pense."*

That we do not now always understand words when we use them, there can be no doubt; because, though words have a wise meaning, as it is not ourselves who have composed them and given them this wise meaning, we do frequently misunderstand them. But I cannot conceive how any body who makes by himself a significant word, can be ignorant of what it means. He who first made the word *ear-ring*, even though he were an idiot, must have clearly understood what is meant by this word, just as the cunning artisan who, by profoundly thinking on what he was about, first contrived to make a watch, must have well understood his own workmanship. Whatever we do by our own serious reflection, if it be not always the best done, is however clearly understood. Hence when men first made the proposition *I am*, they had of these words a distinct idea, one far more distinct than any philosopher now has; and for this reason, that it was themselves who made these words, and gave them their meaning. Let us now see if we

* Grammaire, chap. viii. première partie.

have this meaning still. When we say, "the man *is no more*," what do we understand by these words? Every body will say that they imply "the man *is dead*;" that is, every body who has heard several times this poetical form will so understand them. But there may be persons who, though they understand very well what is meant by "the man *is dead*," do not understand what is meant by "the man *is no more*." Thus there are doubtless a great many children who know very well what is meant by *is dead*, and do not know what is meant by *is no more*, as employed in the instance in question. Yet every body who knows any thing will admit that the word *is* has, in this instance, its primitive meaning, and that it implies *existence*; so that "the man *is no more*" means "the man exists no more." Then if this be the first meaning this word ever had, the rudest savage, and the simplest child, must have clearly understood what it meant, while languages were yet in their infancy; and if they do no longer, while it is so employed, understand it so clearly, this can only happen from our having no longer its primitive meaning. Then how are we to recover this primitive meaning, which must have been lost since a great many ages? By imagining ourselves to be in the midst of a savage people whose language is in its very infancy. But we are not to carry with us Condillac's opinion, namely, that men when in such a state do not clearly understand their own words; that is, the words made by themselves, and to which they alone have given a meaning; but we are, on the contrary, to believe

that they do clearly understand their own words; and not only this, but that when men are in such a state, every word they utter is palpably significant. Then can we possibly suppose that we could find in their language a word so void of meaning as the word *is*, in the instance “the man *is* no more?” Are we not rather inclined to believe that with such a people the word for existence would be one most clear in meaning, and necessarily indicating life? And when we reflect seriously as to what kind of a word this ought to be, are we not immediately led to suppose that it must be one of motion; that is, implying motion, such as *going*, *moving*, *stirring*, &c.; and that they, instead of saying, “our chief *is* no more,” would say, “our chief *goes* no more,” or “*stirs* or *moves* no more?”

And if we told such a people that with us the word *is* has no such meaning in this instance, they would, it is natural to suppose, feel greatly surprised, and ask us what it does mean. It is only then by our endeavouring to explain it, we should perceive that we have a very confused notion of it. And if we endeavoured to make ourselves more intelligible, by employing in the place of *is* the word *lives*, we should of course be asked, what this word *lives* means; and if we were to inquire into the meaning of every word in their language, in order to find the one by which it could be properly translated, we should perceive no separate word for it, since for *going* and *living* they would have but one word. And so must it have been in all languages

while they were yet in their infancy; but in no language could this have long continued, as men must have soon found it necessary to make some change in this word, in order to show when it meant motion expressive of existence, and that which indicates passing from place to place. But as words in common use lose with great difficulty their primitive meaning, so *going* and *living*, or, in other words, *going* and *being*, must be still frequently confounded in all languages. There is, on this subject, a very clever article in the French Encyclopædia, in which the writer expresses his wonder how two words (*être* and *aller*) so dissimilar in meaning as he supposes them to be, could have ever become synonymous. For in French as well as in English, these two words are frequently confounded; as, *je fus vous voir*, instead of *j'allai vous voir*; that is, "I have been to see you," for, "I went to see you;" and, "*comment cela va-t-il?*" equal in English to "how goes it?" in both of which instances the words *va* and *goes* are evidently for existence or being. But the learned, from not being aware that to *go* and to *be* were anciently the same word, have frequently censured this use of the one for the other. Thus Voltaire, as it is observed in the article in the French Encyclopædia to which I have just alluded, finds this a fault in Corneille, though it is one into which he has fallen himself, as it has been shown in a work well known to French grammarians, entitled, "*Journal de la Langue Française*:"—

"Les temps passés du verbe *être* : je fus, j'ai été,

&c., sont ils synonymes de ceux du verbe *aller*? réponse : tous les faiseurs de grammaires, l'Abbé Regnier lui-même, que je ne confond pas avec eux, prétendent qu'on dit, *un tel est allé à Rome*, pour faire entendre qu'il en est de retour.

“ Le verbe *aller*, et le verbe *être*, dans aucun cas n'ont et ne peuvent avoir de synonyme. *Aller* emporte une idée de tendance; *être*, une idée de station. Or il implique que deux idées aussi différentes puissent être rendues par les mêmes expressions.

“ M. Voltaire dans ses remarques sur *Pompée*, tragédie de Corneille, condamne l'emploi du verbe *être*, pour celui du verbe *aller*, Acte i. scène 3.

“ ‘ Il fut jusqu'à Rome implorer le sénat.’

“ ‘ *Il fut implorer;*’ c'était, dit-il, une licence qu'on prenait autrefois. Il y a même encore plusieurs personnes qui disent *je fus le voir, je fus lui parler*; mais c'est une faute, par la raison qu'on va parler, qu'on va voir; on n'est parler, on n'est pas voir. Il faut dire j'allai le voir, j'allai lui parler; il alla l'implorer.’

“ Cependant Voltaire dans une épître à M. Fakner à la tête de sa *Zaïre* : —

“ ‘ Votre Oflds et sa devancière
S'en furent avec le concours
De votre république entière,
Sous un grand poêle de velours
Dans votre église pour toujours
Loger de superbe manière.’

“ Ne pourrait-on pas lui retorquer l'argument

qu'il fait contre Corneille? On va loger et on n'est pas loger dans une église."

The writer adds, that had Voltaire "*approfondi par une étude sérieuse une langue qu'il parlait si bien,*" he would not have confounded, as he has done, two contradictory ideas, "*être et aller, le mouvement et le repos.*" *

This article goes strongly to prove the great tendency there is to confound, even in writing, the verbs *to be*, and *to go*; from his not knowing that they are, in truth, the same word, the writer finds it very illogical to employ one of these words for the other; but he is obliged to admit that *all grammarians*, even l'Abbé Regnier, do so. And Voltaire himself, though he could not approve of such a liberty, has not been able to avoid it. But he remarks in his disapprobation of it, that it was "*une licence qu'on prenait autrefois,*" and that it is even used still by several persons, "*il y à même encore plusieurs personnes qui disent, je fus le voir, je fus lui parler.*" All this shows how inclined we are to confound *to go*, and *to be*. And when Byron says, —

"Who would not brave the battle-fire — the wreck —
To *move* the monarch of her peopled deck?"

we have another instance, and a happy one, of motion and existence being used indifferently; for between *to move*, and *to be*, in this couplet, there is not the least difference, as the meaning is, —

"Who would not brave the battle-fire — the wreck —
To *be* the monarch of her peopled deck?"

* Journal de la Langue Française, vol. i. p. 42.

that is, to exist, or live, the monarch of her peopled deck.

The opinion of the French Academy on this use of *to be* and *to go*, is as follows : — “ Etre, dans les temps ou ce verbe prend l’auxiliaire avoir, est quelquefois synonyme d’aller. On dit *j’ai été à Rome*, pour dire qu’on y est allé, et qu’on en est revenu ; et, il est allé à Rome, pour marquer, qu’il n’en est pas encore de retour. On dit aussi dans la conversation, *j’aurais été*, ou *je serais allé* vous voir. Je fus ou j’allai hier à l’opéra.”*

A living authority, from his having no suspicion that *to be*, and *to go*, could have ever been the same, thus incautiously censures the Academy and others, for the view they have taken of these words : — “ Suivant quelques grammariens lexicographes, et l’Académie elle-même, les prétérits du verbe *être* s’emploient souvent, du moins dans le style familier, pour ceux d’aller : — ‘ J’ai été, je fus chez vous.’ Il serait beaucoup plus régulier de ne jamais confondre ainsi deux verbes, dont l’un *de sa nature* signifie *mouvement*, et l’autre *repos*, puisqu’il ne renferme proprement en lui, que l’idée de l’existence.”†

But a stronger proof than any already given that *to be*, and *to go*, must have been originally the same word, is, that the ancient word in Greek for *I go*, was *ἐω*, and the ancient word for *I am* or *I be* was also *ἐω* (eo). And *eom* in Saxon (I am), and

* Dictionnaire de l’Académie.

† Dictionnaire par Napoléon Landais.

eam in Latin (the subjunctive of *eo*), as well as *am* in modern English, are almost alike in form as in meaning; not to mention the similarity between *beo*, in Saxon (I be), and *ibo*, in Latin (I shall go). That these four languages had in the beginning but one and the same word for *to be*, and *to go*, there can be no doubt.

It may also be remarked, that all the Latin verbs ending in *ire*, as *sagire*, to be wise, have visibly *ire* (to go) for their termination, just as the French verbs *connaître*, *paraître*, &c., have *être*, so that *ire*, and *être*, are here alike. But when we recollect that there is not, as I have clearly shown, the least difference between a substantive and a verb, what difference can we find between the Latin word *sagire* and the French word *sagesse*? And what is this *esse*, with which the French word ends, but the Latin for *to be*? The whole was at first *esse sage*, and afterwards the *esse* fell behind, so that the two words became one — *sagesse*, instead of *sage-esse* — which proves that *esse* and *ire*, that is, *to be*, and *to go*, were, in the beginning, the same word.

All this appears so evident and so simple, that the reader may well ask, with surprise, if the learned have hitherto had no knowledge of it. Nothing of this has, however, been known. The greatest lexicographers have not even suspected that *sagesse* was for *sage-esse* (*sage-être*), so short-sighted is man without the light of science; then much less did they suspect that for *to be*, and *to go*,

there was, whilst languages were yet in their infancy, but one word. The learned, from their not knowing that *sagesse* is for *sage-esse*, must have lost discovering the etymology of a vast number of words in all languages. Thus, all the French words ending in *esse*, as, *caresse*, *finesse*, *paresse*, &c., have never been accounted for; and, in like manner the etymology of all English words ending in *ess* and *ness*, as, *caress*, *happiness*, &c., has been unknown. But here the reader, as he has not yet seen how we are to discover in words their own definitions, may say, that though he can admit *caress* and *caresse* to be for *cara* or *carus esse* (to be dear), and *finesse* to be for *fin-esse* (*être fin*), he cannot so readily allow *paresse* and *happiness* to be accounted for after a similar manner, since *paresse* must hence become *par-esse*, and *happiness*, *happin-esse*, which words *par* and *happin* here offer no meaning. But a little farther on, he will know that *par* here signifies *on the ground*; so that *par-esse* literally means *on the ground to be*, that is, to be lying down, or doing nothing. He will also see, that the termination *ness* has not the ridiculous meaning assigned it by the learned, namely, “the top or the foot of a hill” (I forget which), but that it literally means *the being* (*en-esse*), so that *happiness* was first *en-esse-happy*, (the being happy, the thing happy,) after which, *en-esse* became contracted to *ness*, and so fell behind happy, making *happiness*.

Here, not to perplex the reader's and my own

mind, by the considering of too many things at once, I am really obliged to turn my view from the many important discoveries that rush upon me, all emanating out of this little word *be*, or *go* (no matter which we call it), in order merely to show how verbs in Latin have, from this single word, formed their endings.

The Latin of *to go*, is *ire*, and the present of the indicative of this verb is —

eo	imus
is	itis
it	eunt

Thus, as the word in Latin for *to love* is *amare*, it can be no other than a contraction of *ama ire*, there being but one letter omitted — *ama[i]re*. I shall, farther on, inquire more minutely into this infinitive, and even from this discovery still make others; but this present view of it will suffice to show the reader, to a certain degree, the literal meaning of *amare*. In order to understand this more easily, he has only to remember the explanation I have given of such French verbs as *connaître*, *paraître*, &c., where *être* has precisely the same meaning that *ire* has in *amare*; and this will let him see that *amare* means *the thing love*. If he will for the present find it difficult to conceive how two words apparently so different as *thing* and *go*, can name the same idea, this arises from his not having yet divested his mind of the erroneous opinion, that a verb is an action; but it is very difficult for any body to get rid, all at once, of

early impressions, no matter how evidently false they may be.

These observations will apply equally to the infinitives of the second, third, and fourth conjugations; they being all contractions of *mone-ire*, *lege-ire*, and *audi-ire*.

Hence the present of the indicative of *amare* is, throughout, a contraction of the name *ama*, and the same tense of *ire*, as we may thus see:—

am[ac]o	} contracted to	{	amo.
ama[i]s			amas.
ama[i]t			amat.
ama[i]mus	} contracted to	{	amamus.
ama[i]tis			amatis.
ama[eu]nt			amant.

After the same manner have been formed the endings of the other conjugations: *mone eo* is the original of *moneo*; *lege eo*, of *lego*; and *audi eo*, of *audio*.

The imperfect or past time of *ire*, is —

ibam	ibamus.
ibas	ibatis.
ibat	ibant.

And from this tense and *ama* having coalesced, the imperfect of *amare* has been formed; as —

ama[i]bam	} contracted to	{	amabam.
ama[i]bas			amabas.
ama[i]bat			amabat.
ama[i]bamus	} contracted to	{	amabamus.
ama[i]batis			amabatis.
ama[i]bant			amabant.

Thus also is formed the same time of the other conjugations: *monebam*, *legebam*, and *audiebam*, being the contractions of *mone ibam*, *lege ibam*, *audi ibam*.

The perfect of *ire*, is —

ivi,	ivimus,
ivisti,	ivistis,
ivit,	iverunt vel ivere ;

which has thus coalesced with *ama*, (and so formed the perfect of *amare* : —

ama[i]vi	} contracted to	{	amavi.
ama[i]visti			amavisti.
ama[i]vit			amavit.
ama[i]vimus	} contracted to	{	amavimus.
ama[i]vistis			amavistis.
ama[i]verunt vel			amaverunt vel
ama[i]vere			amavere.

The perfect tenses ending in *ui* instead of *vi*, as *monui*, are to be considered as though they ended in *vi*; or, if the reader pleases, those ending in *vi* are to be considered as ending in *ui*. The truth is, the sole difference between *vi* and *ui* is a difference of pronunciation. Thus, when sounding *u*, if we close the lips much more than we usually do, we shall produce the sound of *v*; and it is after this manner that the letter *v* was first formed. Then *ivi* was in the beginning *iui*, and so became afterwards *ivi*, merely from some persons closing their lips much more than others when sounding the *u*. Hence it is that we find, in old authors, the *u* and the *v* ever confounded; that in dictionaries they

are still classed together, and that in the alphabet no letter comes between them; hence also it is, that, when in this latter situation, the *u* is made to precede the *v*.

The perfect tenses ending in *i* (as *legi*), instead of *ui* or *vi*, are also to be considered as bearing the latter form (*ui* or *vi*), since *legi* is only a contraction of *legui*, the *u* being suppressed that the *g* might preserve the sound that it bears when followed by *i* in all the other variations of this verb; such as in *legis*, *legit*, *legimus*, &c.

The preterpluperfect tense of *eo* is *iveram*, *iveras*, &c., and consequently *amaveram* is the contraction of *ama iveram*; as, *amaveras* is of *ama iveras*.

The future of *eo* is *ibo*, and of *amo* the future is *amabo*, this being a contraction of *ama ibo*. *Monebo* is formed in a similar manner, it being a contraction of *mone ibo*. *Legam* and *audiam*, the future tenses of the third and fourth conjugations, are not formed by the juncture of the future *ibo* with the radical part of these words, but by the juncture of the subjunctive of *eo*, that is, *eam* (and which is in reality another future), with *lege* and *audi*, making when contracted *legam*, *audiam*. As to the imperative of the four conjugations, it is the root of the verb itself; as, *ama*, *mone*, *lege*, *audi*, the imperative of *eo* (*i*) being understood before each of them, thus: — *i ama*, *i mone*, *i lege*, *i audi*; then *i ama* literally means *GO love*, that is, *BE love*; and the other form of the imperative, that is, *amato*, *moneto*, &c. is the contraction of *amaito*, *moneito*, &c. The

subjunctive of the first conjugation, that is, *amem*, *ames*, *amet*, &c. is not formed by means of the present subjunctive of *eo*, that is, *eam*, *eas*, *eat*, &c., but by means of the more ancient form of *eam*, *eas*, *eat*, &c., namely, *em*, *es*, *et*, *emus*, *etis*, *ent*, which must have also existed, as we shall see when tracing words to their earliest state. Then *amem*, *ames*, *amet*, &c. are the contractions of *ama em*, *ama es*, *ama et*, &c. This ancient form of the subjunctive has been on this occasion chosen, in order to make a difference between this and the same time of the indicative. But, as in the other conjugations, those two tenses are already sufficiently distinct from each other, the form of *eo* in the present-tense of the subjunctive now in use, has been adopted to form the same times of these three conjugations. Thus *moneam*, *legam*, and *audiam*, are contracted from *mone eam*, *lege eam*, *audi eam*.

The endings of the imperfect of the subjunctive of the four conjugations are, in like manner, formed from the same time of *eo*. Thus *amarem*, *monerem*, *legerem*, and *audirem*, are contracted from *ama irem*, *mone irem*, *lege irem*, *audi irem*. Thus, too, are we to account for the other forms, *amaverim*, *monuerim*, &c., *amavissem*, *monuisssem*, &c., *amavero*, *monuero*, &c.; it is ever corresponding forms of *eo*, that are, with slight contractions, added to the names in question.

We have already seen that *amare* is formed from the present of the infinitive of *eo* (*ire*) and *ama*; these two words being contracted to *amare*; and so is the perfect of the infinitive (*amavisse*) formed

from the same time of *eo* (that is, *ivisse*) and *ama*, these two words *ama ivisse* being also contracted to *amavisse*; that is, just as *ama* and *ire* are contracted to *amare*, there being in both cases only the letter *i* suppressed.

After the same manner we may account for *monuisse*, *legisse*, and *audivisse*; the observations already made respecting *monui* and *legi* being also applicable here.

The future of the infinitive of the four conjugations; that is, *amaturum esse*, *moniturum esse*, *lecturum esse*, and *auditurum esse*, are also formed by means of the same time of *eo*, namely, *iturum esse*; as,

ama-iturum esse.
mone-iturum esse.
lege*-iturum esse.
audi-iturum esse.

The gerunds, *amandi*, *monendi*, *legendi*, *audiendi*, and *amando*, *monendo*, *legendo*, *audiendo*, as well as *amandum*, *monendum*, *legendum*, *audiendum*, are all formed by means of the corresponding gerunds of *eo*, that is, *eundi*, *eundo*, *eundum*; as,

ama[eu]ndi.	ama[eu]ndo.	ama[eu]ndum.
mone[eu]ndi.	mone[eu]ndo.	mone[eu]ndum.
lege[eu]ndi.	lege[eu]ndo.	lege[eu]ndum.
audi[eu]ndi.	audi[eu]ndo.	audi[eu]ndum.

In like manner, the supines *amatum*, *monitum*,

* *Lege* has become *lec*, from the similarity of sound between *eg* and *ec*.

lectum, *auditum*, are thus formed by means of the supine of *eo*, namely *itum*, as,—

ama-*itum* — amatum.

mone-*itum* — monitum.

lege-*itum* — lectum.

audi-*itum* — auditum.

And the participles *amans*, *monens*, *legens*, *audiens*; and *amaturus*, *moniturus*, *lecturus*, and *auditurus*, are also formed by the corresponding participles of *eo*, that is, *iens* and *iturus*. Thus :—

ama-*iens* — amens.

ama-*iturus*—amaturus.

mone-*iens* — monens.

mone-*iturus*—moniturus.

lege-*iens* — legens.

lege-*iturus*—lecturus.

audi-*iens* — audiens.

audi-*iturus*—auditurus.

Thus *eo*, or rather, *io* — for the latter was the more ancient form — filled in the beginning of time the place of the verb to be, and not only in the Latin tongue, but in all others; by which I mean, not this particular word *eo* or *io*, but one of equal or similar import; that is to say, a word implying motion, such as *moving*, *walking*, &c.; for, as I have already observed, men could not in the beginning have indicated existence otherwise. Then in those primitive times, when a man said as we do now, “I love,” his meaning was, “I go love,” or “I walk love,” or “I move love.” And if he said, “I am a Roman,” his meaning was, “I go a Roman,” or “I move a Roman,” or “I walk a Roman.” And if, referring to a past time, he said, “I was a warrior in my youth,” his words meant,

"I went a warrior in my youth," "I moved a warrior in my youth," or "I walked a warrior in my youth." And if he were to translate our hitherto unintelligible form, "I have loved," he would do so by "I have gone love," a locution similar to one which we still hear when persons, referring to the time of the day, say, "it is gone noon," or "it is gone one o'clock."

Now such a present time as "I move or go love," or "I move or go a Roman," is such language as also our best poets employ when they are inspired. Then when Virgil makes Juno say that she *walks* the queen of the gods*, and not that she *is* the queen of the gods, the mind is struck with the fine image, so full of life, brought before it, and we admire the poet's imagination. But if such language be taken as a proof that he who employs it must be a poet, all men in the beginning of time, or when languages were in their infancy, must have been poets; for it was in a manner similar to this that all men *ever* then expressed themselves; and the reason why they did so was, that they could not do otherwise, as their language had no other kind of forms. Now this goes to prove that poetry was the first language ever spoken, and that it is consequently still *the most natural* †; and that, in order to write it well, we must imagine ourselves in those remote times when men knew the

* Ast ego, quæ Divum incedo regina, &c.

† This is a remark which is also to be found somewhere in M. Villemain, the present French minister.

meaning of their words, and when almost every word was a picture. This also explains why ancient writers have so far surpassed all who have come after them, in strength and beauty of style ; as also why men in the beginning of the world had, compared to us, such noble and generous sentiments ; for, as fine poetry now exalts the mind, so must the words of ordinary life have anciently done, since they too were poetry.

The learned, from their having never known the literal meaning of the different times of a verb, have not only ever lost the beauty of the images presented to the mind by such figurative language as I have just given some instances of, but they have been often strangely puzzled to account for the apparently contradictory meaning of such language. Of this I am now going to give a forcible instance ; but, that the reader may the more easily understand it, I beg him to bear well in mind, that the perfect tense *amavi* means, *I have gone love*, and that the verb *to be* of the same time — just like the verb *to go* — means (as in the first person singular) “ I have gone.” As I have not yet given a particular account of any other verb *to be* than *eo* (and even of this word I mean to account more particularly hereafter), I consider it necessary to remark here, that *esse* is, until I come to examine it, to be understood as having precisely the same meaning as *ire*. This is the instance to which I allude : it is from him, whom, as we have seen, the learned Bishop Lowth seems to consider as the

most acute and profound grammarian that has appeared since Aristotle's time:—

“The Latins used their *præteritum perfectum*, in some instances, in a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification. Thus *vixit* signified *is dead*; *fuit* signified *now is not, is no more*. It was in this sense that Cicero addressed the people of Rome, when he had put to death the leaders in the Catalinarian conspiracy. He appeared in the forum, and cried out with a loud voice, *VIXERUNT*.”*

It is now a good many years since Cicero uttered this memorable word, and it has since then been echoed by thousands over the civilised world; yet, of the multitudes who must have dwelt upon it, not even *one* can be said to have had a clear idea of its meaning, since nobody could say that it literally implied any more than this, “they have lived.” Now if we were to translate these words into a language yet in a primitive state, and say to the persons speaking such a language, that the proposition “they have lived” was intended to signify, “they are dead,” how very extraordinary those persons would find this meaning! Is it not natural to suppose, that they would join with Harris in declaring the Latin tense here alluded to, to have in this instance the very reverse of its natural signification? And what a poor opinion this would give of one of the finest languages in the world; and how highly, compared to it, this people

* Hermes, p. 131.

would think of their own rude tongue, in which the worst of their orators could not, on such an occasion, express himself otherwise than "they have gone life," "they have moved from life," "they have fled life," "they have departed life," or in some such way equally figurative, clear, and strong! Compared to such forms, how poor and insignificant is "they have lived!" not because these words want meaning, but because we have not, as we shall see by-and-by, known how to find their meaning, from our not having the science that could guide us in such a research.

When Harris says, in the above passage, that "the Latins used their *præteritum perfectum* IN SOME INSTANCES after a very peculiar manner, so as to imply the *very reverse of the verb in its natural signification*," this implies that it is only by exception the *præteritum perfectum* has here the signification assigned it; but this is a mistake, since this time has ever the meaning here given it by Cicero, and no other. As in *vixerunt* there is no particular part of life alluded to, all life is considered; and hence the word is, in this instance, synonymous with death, since it implies a departure from all life. But when the word life is in this time limited by some other word or words, which allow us to see that only a part is referred to, then this time is not synonymous with death. Thus if Cicero said, "they have lived *in Rome*," the words *in Rome* would show that he alluded only to the life they had passed in Rome. Then what does the

perfect tense in this instance mean? The same as before—"they have gone life," but only the life they had in Rome; so that such persons may be, or may not be, still living. Thus if we say in English, "the man has lived," and do not say any more, our words imply the man is dead; though such language, except in poetry, can now be scarcely understood, so greatly have we lost the meaning of our words; but if we say, "the man has lived in this house," our words do not imply that the man is dead, since this may be said of him during his life. Then "the man has lived" means "the man has gone *all* life," since there is no part specified. "The man has lived in this house," means also, "the man has gone life," or ceased life, but not all of it; it is only that part which he has passed in a certain place, namely, "this house."

From Cicero's employing the *præteritum perfectum* as he has here done, and on so grave an occasion, we are to infer that some vestige of its primitive meaning, even as late as his time, remained; but this could after all be very faint, though, as eighteen hundred years have since then passed over the world, men had, of course, from their living so much nearer those times when the exact meaning of every word was known, a far clearer notion of what they said than we have now. Harris quotes other instances of this singular use, as he believes it to be, of the *præteritum perfectum*, but I leave them unnoticed for the present, as I now enter upon something connected with the verb

to be, which will render the observations I have to make respecting those instances, as well as many points already considered, much more intelligible and evident than they may without them appear.

I have already said that *amare* (that is, *ama ire*) means “the thing love,” from which we are to consider *ire* as meaning *the thing*, just as we may consider *être*, in *connaître*, *paraître*, &c., as also meaning *the thing*; for between *ire* and *être* there is not, in this case, the least difference. Now, as we admit that *eo*, *is*, *it*, &c., are other forms of *ire*, are we not obliged to say that each of these words means also the thing; and hence that *amo* (for *ama eo*) means not only “I go love,” but also “the thing love;” and that *amas* (for *ama is*) means “the thing love;” and *amat* (for *ama it*) means, in like manner, “the thing love?” Now though each of these three words (*eo*, *is*, *it*) means, separately considered, *the thing*, still every body perceives that these words do, in another respect, differ from each other; and in what respect? In this: *eo* is for the first person; *is* for the second; and *it* for the third. Hence, *eo* means the thing called the first person, in other words, it means *I*; *is* means the thing called the second person, in other words, *thou*; and *it* means the thing called the third person, in other words, *he*, *she*, or *it*. Then what is the verb *to be*? We have seen it; it is a word implying motion or existence, such as the verb *to go*. And what is a pronoun? We have also seen it; it is the verb *to be*, in other

words, the verb *to go*. Then, if *eo*, *is*, *it*, be three pronouns, in what do they differ from *ego*, *tu*, *ille*? They differ from them only in form, and this difference is occasioned by the different situations which these words are made to occupy. Thus, instead of saying *amego*, we say *ama eo* (contracted to *amo*), and instead of saying *ille eo qui quondam*, &c., we say, *ille ego qui quondam*, &c. If the Latin were not so rich in words as it is, it might very well have the same pronoun in both these situations (since they do not differ as to meaning), and in the beginning it was so; but as words increased, they were made to vary in form, not only on account of their different meanings, but even on account of their different situations. Thus, in very remote times, the Latins must have said —

Eo ama	I love.
Is ama	Thou lovest.
It ama	He loves.

And after this, from *eo*, *is*, *it*, falling behind *ama*, were made *amo*, *amas*, *amat*. And this explains why the Latin language does not take pronouns before the verb. This also explains why, in English and French, the endings of verbs have not been formed, as in Latin, from the verb *to be*. For as the verb *to be* (in other words the pronoun) precedes verbs in both English and French, we should have it twice in the same instance were it also made to follow them. Now, as the terminations *mus*, *tis*, and *ant*, in *amamus*, *amatis*, *amant*, are, as I have already proved them to be, contrac-

tions of the same persons of the verb *ire*, that is, *imus*, *itis*, *eunt*, it follows, since their singular forms are pronouns, that these endings must be pronouns also, and that they are other forms for *nos*, *vos*, and *ii*, or *ei*, &c. Hence we may perceive that these words (the three plurals) are much longer than the three singulars *eo*, *is*, *it*.

In *imus*, we see evidently two words, *im* and *us*; then we are to consider each of these words as a singular, which will lead us to suppose that men first made a plural number by the addition of two singulars. In the second person (*itis*) we also find something worthy of attention, namely, that it is composed of the second and third persons singular added together, that is, of *it* and *is*. And in the third person plural, we have also several pronouns in the singular number. The whole word is *eunt*; but when we take away *eu*, we shall be obliged to put vowels before the *n* and the *t*, in order to give them a sound, hence *n* becomes *en*, and *t* becomes *it*, and we have from *eunt* these three words, *eu en* *it*, of which we may presume that *eunt* is the contracted form. Now, as the slightest indication in making a discovery is of great importance, we should mark well these two circumstances just noticed; namely, that two or more singulars go to make a plural number, and that when a consonant has not a vowel before it, the vowel must have been suppressed; we have also seen that the second and third persons singular go, when added together, to make a plural number for the second.

Now, when we examine the verb *sum*, we remark that the first person plural is *sumus*, in which we see also two singulars, *sum* and *us*, and this *sum* (*I am*) is already the first person singular; as to the pronoun *us*, we have it here as in *im-us*. Now the second and third persons singular of *sum* are *es*, *est*; and here, as in the instance already given, these two words are added together to form the second person plural, which is *estis*. In the third person plural, which is *sunt*, we may also discover several pronouns — there are no less than four — *is*, *eu*, *en*, *it*; then *sunt* is a contraction of these four words; but when the word *sunt* was made, perhaps only two words went to compose it, as two of these words might have already been converted into one. When, after this manner, we examine the single word *sum*, we find, though it now makes but one word, and that this is a singular, it is, however, a compound of three words; namely, *is*, *eo*, *im*, which have been contracted to *sum*. This contraction has most probably been formed thus: men first said *eo im*, which corresponded with our *I am*; then these two words became one word, thus, *eom*; and in this form we find it, in fact, in the Saxon tongue, in which it stands for *I am*; and this is also an indication, and one of great importance, as it goes to show — with innumerable other instances which follow — what the Saxon and Latin tongues were in their infancy, and how they have been formed.

Then why did not *eom* stop with this form; that

is, why did it become *sum* by taking *is* before it thus, *is eom*? Because this *is* (which was perhaps *es*, as these two letters *i* and *e* must have been frequently confounded) was what a grammarian would call the *régime* or accusative of *eom*, and the two words had this meaning, "it I am," "I am it," "I go it." And when we bear in mind that *am* is the same as *go*, we shall find no more difference between *sum* and *eo* than that one has an object expressed in itself, and the other has not. But what difference, it will be asked, was there as to meaning between *eo im* and *is eom*? None whatever. It was from the *eo im* having coalesced, and from its having been forgotten, that *eo* had already in itself (when *eoim*) an object (*im*) that another object (*is*) was added? And why, it may be asked, did not the *is* follow and not precede *eom*, since *im* did not precede *eo* in *eo im*? The reason is this: the *is* did follow *eom*, and men said *eom is*, ("I am it," or "I go it,") but this form existed so long, that *eom* fell behind, so that the words stood *is eom*; and they must not have been long in this situation before the *i* in *is* was, on account of its short sound, dropped, when the *s* immediately joined *eom*, making *sum* by contraction. Hence this verb *sum* was at this time equivalent to our word *follow*. The second person singular *es* is not a compound; but the third person singular *est* is composed of two words, *es it*, which have been contracted to *est*; hence the literal meaning of this word is not *is* but *it is*, or more literally, as to meaning, "it goes," "it fol-

lows," &c. Now all this is very simple, yet it leads us to discover that in the beginning no word had more than two letters, and that no two consonants went together. We shall have numerous instances, as we advance, of verifying those remarks, whilst making very important discoveries by the application of the method they require.

We have already seen that the endings of a Latin verb are formed by the addition of the verb *to go* (*eo* or *ire*) to another word. Thus to form the imperfect of *amo* (*amabam*) *ibam*, the imperfect of *eo* is added to *ama*, as *amaibam* contracted to *amabam*, so that this means "I went love." But I have not shown by what artifice this past time (*ibam*) of *eo* is formed. It is, we may see, composed of two words, *ib* and *am*; yet the latter word *am* has all the appearance of a present time or a future; as we may see it in *cam*, *legam*, and *audiam*. Then it is evidently to the word *ib* we are indebted for this word *ibam* having a past signification; and as there is now no such Latin word, we are led to believe that *ib* must be a contraction, and this at once leads us upon *ibi*, which means *then*, or, *at that time*. Hence, *ibam* is a contraction of *ibi am*, there being only the letter *i* omitted. Now, as *am* is evidently a present time, and the same *am* we have in English, it means "I existence;" so that when *ibi* is added to it, both words mean "I existence then," or "at that time;" and it is in this manner that men, in the beginning, made a past time. If we now turn to the past time of *sum* (*eram*, *eras*, *erat*, &c.), we shall find that the

same method has been adhered to. The *am* here is the *am* in *ibam*; and now we have to look to the word *er* by which it is preceded, in order to find its past signification. This brings us to *era*, or as it is now written in Latin, *æra*; which, like *ibi*, refers also to a past time, meaning *that epoch*. Then *eram*, which might as well be written *æram*, is a contraction of *æraam*, there being, as before, but a single letter omitted (the *a*), and the meaning is as before, "I existence *then*, or *at that epoch*." We shall see, farther on, that there was not in the beginning even an omission of the letter *a*, since *æra* must have been (before having this form) *ær*. Thus we see that even the verb *sum* is formed by means of the verb *eo*, since *am* belongs to *eo*.

I have also shown that the preterite perfect time is formed in Latin by adding the same time of *eo* to another word, as, for instance, *ivi* to *ama*, both words making by contraction *amavi*; that is, "I have gone love." But I did not then show how *ivi* itself came to have this past signification, not wishing to run the risk of perplexing the reader's attention with too many things at a time. We know that *ivi* was anciently written and pronounced. *iuvi*; that is, the *u* instead of *v*. Now in this word *iuvi*, it is the final *i* which is the pronoun, and it is precisely the same as our *I*, but this letter must have been in the beginning followed by *o*, so that the word was *iuio*, which is the same as *iu eo*. Then *i* or *io* being here the pronoun, and not being in the past any more than *am*, to which it is also equal in

meaning, we have to look to *iu* alone for the past time here signified. As this word is the same as *iv*, and as the *i* by which the *v* is here preceded, has no sound separate from the *v*, hence it is only put here that the *v* may be sounded, and we are not to consider it when accounting for the *v*. We have already seen that the word called the verb has, when in the imperative mood, its radical form, and that *ire*, for this reason, becomes the single letter *i*, which then means *go*. In this opinion we may be the more confirmed, by remarking that the *re*, by which the *i* in *ire* is followed, can be no other than the ancient Latin word for *thing*—that is, *re* instead of *res*—which first went before the *i* just as *esse* and *ire*, as we have already seen, must have preceded *sage* in *sagesse* and *sagire*; or just as the word *être*, by which such verbs as *connaître*, *paraître*, &c. are ended, must in the beginning have gone first. Then *ire* (that is, *i-re*) means *the thing go*. Now what part of *i* is there in *u* or *v*, as this is the root of *ivi* or *ivi*? This question will lead us to discover that the *u* is composed of *i* and *i* joined together, so that *u* ought to mean, literally, *go, go*; then, though *amavi* means, as we have already seen, “I have gone love,” yet its most literal signification is, “I have go, go love.” Thus, *i, i* (*go, go*), from its implying despatch or haste, was made to signify *gone* (*iu* or *iv*), the two words *i, i*, which are both in the present, being wisely shortened for this purpose to the one sound *u*, written *iu* or *iv*. Thus is it also in English, for *gone* is a contraction

of *go on*, which two words do also imply haste or despatch, being equal to *go, go*, when thus used, and hence they have been happily shortened to one sound (*gone*), in order to signify more forcibly that which is fled or past. I beg here to observe, for the curious reader—though I should not do so yet—that as this past time in Latin is signified by two words (*i, i*), each meaning *one*, so in English is the same time signified by two words, each meaning *one*; for we shall see more evidently, farther on, when accounting for the meaning which words carry in themselves, that the word *go* means, when analysed, THE ONE, and that the word *on* is the same as ONE. But even here this may be easily conceived, at least with regard to the word *go*; for since it is not difficult to suppose that the first person singular of English pronouns (*I*) is another word for *one*, it cannot be more difficult to suppose this word to be the same as *go*, since, when languages were in their infancy, not only the verb *to be*, but pronouns also were the same as the verb *to go*. The reader may also *here*—that is, before I shall endeavour to show more fully how words do carry in themselves their own definitions—remark that there is a great similarity, as to form, between *go* and *ego*. Indeed, when we put before the *g* in *go*, *e* or *i*—without which it cannot be supposed to have a sound of its own—*go* must become *ego* or *igo*, of which the literal meaning is, as we shall clearly see hereafter, *the great one* or *the chief one*; and this meaning may be

also rendered by *the* FIRST *one*; that is, *the first person*, which is the meaning we attach to *I* or *ego*.

Now as *amavi* must literally mean, *love gone I*; that is, *I love gone*; and as *ama* is here for *love*, *v* for *gone*, and *i* for *I*, it follows, since *fui* means, in like manner, *being or existence gone I*, that it is the letter *f* that is for being or existence, since the *u*, which is the same as *v*, is for *gone*, and *i* for *I*. We shall hereafter see that one of the first words ever formed by man for naming the substance *life* was a single *f*, or a *v*, which two letters are, as every body knows, frequently confounded: then *fui* might as well be *vui*; that is, *v-u-i*; in which case, if we give to *v* the name it has in the English alphabet (*vee*), we shall have in sound the French word for *life*—that is, *vie*; and this, we shall also see, had long existed in Latin before *vita*, the latter having first been *ita vi*—that is, *the life*; *ita* being here one of those words called articles, until it fell behind *vi*, and both words became one.

Thus has it also been with regard to the Greek word for life βίος. It must have been first *ος βι*; that is, *the being*; *ος* being also here what *ita* was in *ita vi*.

Here it may be also remarked, that the letter *b* is frequently used instead of an *f* or a *v*. Thus *liber* is no other than *liver* or *livre*; and the German word for *wife*, which is *weib*, can be no other than *weif* (*wife*). Then, this being admitted, what difference is there between *be* and *vie*? When we

here allow the letter *b* to stand for *v*, as it does in *liber*, and the *e* by which it is followed to keep the sound it has in this instance, which is equal to that of *ie* in the French word *vie*, does not the English word for existence — that is, *be* — become *vie*? And, in like manner, what does β in $\beta\iota\omicron\varsigma$ become but *vie* or *be*? so that $\beta\iota\omicron\varsigma$, *vita*, *be*, and *vie*, are really the same word, and of this we shall be more convinced as we advance in this discovery. Now as verbs are all names in the fourth degree, and as the two first words in *fui* — that is, *f-u* (*life gone* or *being gone*) — have been shortened to one word, namely, *fu*, we have to find out by what single significant word this idea has been named. By adhering to our system it is not difficult to discover that *fu* must be here synonymous with *flight*, and that *fui* may consequently be rendered by “I flight,” — that is, “I of the thing flight,” “I of that which is flown, — *which is past*,” and this will be found to correspond with the meaning already assigned this word, namely, “I have gone or fled.”

By this account of *fui* we may discover the critical meaning of the present Latin word for flight (*fuga*), and consequently that of every other language. The final syllable of this word (*ga*) must have first been *ge ea*, and these two words must have first stood thus, *ea ge*, which literally means *the go*. But as *go* is another word for *existence* or *being*, hence *ea ge* is here the same as *esse* or *être*, or the English word *being*; so that when *ea ge* became one word, it must have gone before *fu*, thus, *ga fu*; that

is, *the thing flight, the being flight*. Thus the Greek word for flight (φύγη) is the same as *fuga*, with this difference, that it has not in its composition the article *ea*; hence it is equal to *fu-ge*, that is, *flight be*. And this word must have first been *ge-fu*; that is, *be flight, thing flight*. In like manner, *fuisse* is no other than *fu-esse*; but it should not be written *fuesse*, but as it is written *fuisse*; and so for this reason should the infinitive *esse* be written *isse*, as we shall see when accounting for the origin of letters. The English word *flight* cannot yet be thoroughly explained, as it will be first necessary to become acquainted with the Greek alphabet. It may, however, be here observed, that this word ought to be written *fliht*, or *flyht*, or *fleght*. The three letters *ght* literally mean *the life* (*ig-vit**), and hence this meaning is precisely equal to that belonging to *be*, *esse*, or *être*. Hence when these three letters formed the two words *ge vit* (*the life* or *the thing*), they must have preceded, like an article, *flii* or *fly*, or *flee*; so that the whole word *flight* means *the thing flee* or *fly*, that is, *THE flee* or *THE fly*; for though in *ght* there are two words, they had, when made to precede another word, but the force of the single word *the*. The French word for *flight*, which is *fuite*, must—there can be no doubt of it—have at first been *it fu, the flight*; and so the word called the article (*it*) fell behind *fu*, and made this word *fuit*, which is now written *fuite*. Then though the *fut* in *il fut* may be also said to mean

* How the three letters *ght* make *ig-vit* cannot yet be shown.

flight, and to be also composed of *it fu*, still there is this difference between the *it* in both words : the *it* in *fuite* referred, before it fell behind *fu*, solely to this word ; whereas the *it* in *fut* did not, before it fell behind *fu*, refer to this word, for it was another word for *il*, since *il-it-fu* means *he-the being-flight*, that is, *he being flight*.

But it may now raise doubts in the reader, to tell him that such words as articles, do thus fall behind the nouns they precede, and coalesce with them ; but I shall give numerous instances of this apparent singularity as I advance in this discovery. Even here I may ask, what in English is the word *growth* except *the grow* ; or *stealth* except *the steal* ? or *fourth* or *fifth*, &c. except *the four*, *the five*, &c. ; or what was the present pretended English word *fool*, but *il fou*, which became *foul*, and is now unfortunately written *fool*, from our having known nothing of its original state. But articles may coalesce with the words to which they belong without falling behind them. Thus, *thither* is *thi-ther* ; that is, *the there* or *that place*. And *elbow* is *el-bow* ; that is, *the bow* or bend in the arm : and it does not come from the Saxon word *elboga*, as the learned have supposed, for it is a much older word, since it wants the article *ga*, for which I have accounted above (see *fuga*). But when we take away this *ga* from *elboga*, what have we but *el-bo* ? which is no other than *elbow*. Hence, when the Saxons put *ga* before *elbo*, they had already forgotten the literal meaning of this word, which has the article *el* in it. Thus we

also, from having forgotten that there is already an article in the words *growth*, *fourth*, &c. say *the growth*, *the fourth*, &c. Nor have the Latins, though they appear to have no articles in their language, avoided this error, as we shall have often occasion to see in the course of this work.

We may, from this critical knowledge of the perfect tense in Latin, correct the erroneous opinion entertained respecting the original of the same tense in French for the verb *to be*. Thus *fus* and *fut* in *je fus*, *tu fus*, *il fut*, do not come from *fui*, *fuisti*, *fuit*; for they are as ancient as these words. As to meaning, this tense is to be thus accounted for:—*Fus* is a contraction of *fu-is*, and *fut* of *fu-it*, the *is* and the *it* being here two pronouns which first went before *fu*, thus, *is fu*, *it fu*, and then fell behind *fu*, and made, from their coalescing with it, the two words *fus* and *fut*. Then *je fus* means *I the being flight*; that is, *the being belonging to flight*, or *to the past*. In the same manner are *tu fus* and *il fut* to be explained; that is, by thou *the being to flight*, &c.; he *the being to flight*, &c. The three persons plural, *fumes*, *futes*, *furent*, are to be accounted for in the same manner. Thus, *fumes* is for *fu-imes*, that is, *imes fu*, the beings to flight, &c., and the second person *futes* is for *fu-ites*, that is, *ites fu*, the beings to flight, &c.; and *furent* is for *fu-erent*, that is, *erent fu*, the beings to flight, &c.; in which cases *imes*, *ites*, and *irent*, are three pronouns.

But though such is the real literal meaning of this tense, we are not to forget that it has been formed from the same time of *avoir*, that is, from *j'eus, tu eus, il eut, &c.*; and this can be here clearly conceived, when we bear in mind that *f* or *v* was one of the first names, as we have already seen, that was anciently for *life*. Then *je fus* becomes, when thus considered, *je f-eus*, in other words, *je vie eus* (the *f* and *vie* being equal); that is, in English, *I life had*. And so by still remembering that *f* is for life, may the other persons of this tense be accounted for in a similar manner; *tu fus* and *il fut* being for *tu vie eus, il vie eut*, and the three persons plural, *nous fumes, vous futes, ils furent*, being for *nous vie eumes, vous vie eutes, ils vie eurent*.

Here the words *life had*, throughout the three persons singular and plural, in both French and English, are precisely equal to *life gone*, as we shall see when we know what *had* means in both French and English. And this much being for the present granted, it can be easily conceived that *life had*, or *being had*, must be synonymous with *flight*; since *life gone*, or *being gone*, either of which may be also fairly and literally rendered by *the gone*, that is, *the thing gone*, can be easily conceived to have such a meaning.

Then according to this account of the French *prétérit défini* of *être*, it is clear that the same tense of *avoir* must be rendered in the singular thus :—

J'eus	} that is	Je eu is	} meaning	I	{ gone
Tu eus		Tu eu is		Thou	
Il eut		Il eu it		He	
					{ or past being.

And thus in the plural:—

Nous eumes	} that is	Nous eu im-es	} meaning	We	{ gone
Vous eutes		Vous eu it-es		You	
Ils eurent		Ils eu ir-en-it		They	
					{ or past beings.

Thus we begin already to perceive, that this tense of *avoir* does not at all imply possession. It may not, however, as yet, be easily imagined how this tense of *avoir* can have the meaning here assigned it, when possession is clearly meant by it, as when we say, for instance, *j'eus un livre*. But there are other circumstances connected with this tense which must have struck the attentive reader, and surprised him much more than its not meaning possession, though it seems so clearly to do so. Thus he must have observed, from the view that has been taken of it, that it is made to do the office of a pronoun, of the verb *to be*, the verb *to go*, and to signify *time*. But as a pronoun, and the verb *to be*, and the verb *to go*, and *time*, have, when analysed, exactly the same meaning, it follows that if it be equal to any one of the four, it must be equal to the other three.*

* I regret that these words belong to those of which I may not yet show the analysis; but I may here give a general idea of their meaning. The English word *TIME* literally means *the life*; but it will mean *divine life*, if we give to one of the two words of which it is composed the meaning it had at its birth. The literal meaning of the same word in both Latin and French is the same, and that is *the divine life above*; and in Greek it means that which is ever *one*, and as the word *one*

We have seen, in the passage quoted from Harris, that *fuit* in Latin, in what he calls "the very peculiar" use of the tense to which this word belongs, is made to signify *now is not, is no more*; but from what we have just seen, how easy it is to perceive that *fuit* in Latin, and *fuite* in French, make but one word. And how strongly this opinion is still borne out from an inspection of these other passages quoted also by Harris, whilst considering this apparent singularity:—

" *Fuimus* Troes ; *fuit* Ilium, et ingens
Gloria Teucrorum." Æn. ii.

And again,—

" Locus Ardea quondam
Dictus avis ; et nunc magnum manet Ardea nomen ;
Sed fortuna *fuit*." Æn. vii.

How easy it is to perceive, that in *fuimus Troes*, we have three words, of which each one, separately considered, is equal to the other two : *imus fu Troes*,

means when analysed the *sun*, hence *TIME* in Greek is synonymous with the *SUN*, but the word *one*, when otherwise considered, means *the great life*. The words for *go* in Greek, Latin, French and English, have all, when closely examined, the same meaning, which is, the *SUN*. Pronouns generally mean life or being, that is, when we do not allow them to have the great meanings they had at their birth ; for in this case they often mean *divine life* or *the sun*. What I am now going to state must in this place appear incredible ; it is, that the words *io*, *be*, and *is*, which are apparently very different from one another in both form and meaning, do not, however, in these respects, differ from one another in the slightest degree. Thus each one takes, when analysed, the form and meaning of the other two. Hence they were in the beginning but one word, of which the meaning was the *SUN*. This circumstance must in this place appear very extraordinary, yet I am so convinced of its being critically true, that I can here fearlessly state, I have hitherto made no discovery more evident.

or *imus Troes fu*, that is, "we gone Trojans," or "we Trojans gone;" in other words, "we have gone from being Trojans," "we have fled from being Trojans," "we are," while thus considered, "as flight itself." And can any translation of *fruit Ilium* be more true and clear than *Ilium has fled* or departed? And how are we to translate *fortuna fruit*, but by *fortune has fled*? How insignificant, compared to this translation, is *fortune has been*! And why so? Because we know not the meaning of this word *been*: we are here as ignorant of it as Harris has been of *fruit*; but we shall see, when we know our letters, that between *fruit* and *been* there is not, as to meaning, the least difference. Hence *I have been*, literally means *I have gone*; and this explains why we so naturally say, *I have been to see you*, for *I have gone to you*. I may here state, with regard to the termination *en*, that in the past participles of verbs, as in *spoken*, *taken*, &c., it ever means *gone*, or *flight*, as we shall see hereafter. In other situations this word is equal to the word *the*, or to the word *thing*; but critically speaking, these three words *en*, *the*, and *thing*, have always the same meaning.* Here the reader may ask with surprise if the words *the* and *thing* ever meant motion; yet he will see that the word *the*, when analysed, makes the French word *vite*, and that *vite* is no other than *it vie* (the life), or *be alive*;

* The reader may remind me that I have already accounted for the article *the*, as being the positive of *they* and *them*. This now apparent contradiction will be explained hereafter.

and the word *thing* is, when analysed, *the being go* (*the-vie-ge*), in other words, *the thing going*, or *motion*.

It is also worthy of remark that as *u* (in *fui*), which means *gone*, is composed of two words (*i, i*), each implying existence, from their being equal to *go, go*; so do the two words of which the word *been*, that is, *gone*, is composed, mean each existence, and are equal to *live, live*, or *go, go*. Hence it does not in the least matter, whether we consider *gone* as being a contraction of *go on*, or of *goen*; since, from either view of it, its meaning will be the same, and the one is as correct as the other, for the words *en* and *on*, as we shall often have occasion to see, have been indifferently used. Nor is this latter circumstance to be wondered at, when we discover by the analysis of them, that they have a similar meaning.

We may now — that is, as far as our yet limited knowledge of the alphabet will allow us — inquire into the nature of the imperfect tense of the verb *to be* in both English and French.

The word *was* means, when analysed, THE ONE (*vie-as*); that is, the one BEING OR LIFE, the one GOING, or the one TIME; for, as I have already remarked, these different names have all, when analysed, a similar meaning, — as we shall see in the proper place.

From the word *was* thus meaning *life* or *time*, it has been made to mean both; that is, not the one *or* the other, but the one *and* the other. Then

I was not only implies, *I once*, or *I one being*, but *I one being once*; that is, *I being once*.

The word *wast* does not differ from *was*, but by its expressing the same idea more fully. Thus it literally is THE ONE LIFE OR TIME (*vie as it*), instead of THE ONE. The word *were* (*vie-ere*) means also, when analysed, *the once*, *the formerly*; that is, *the being once* or *formerly*.

It may now seem strange, from an inspection of the analysed meaning of *was* and *were* (*vie-as*, and *vie-ere*), that the word *vie* (*life*) should represent the word *the*; but the reader will please to remember, that the analysis of this article *the* is *it vie* (*the life*), as I have already stated, though I have not shown how this is made out, nor may I do so yet. We shall hereafter, also see that between *the* and Θεός (God) there was not, in the beginning, the least difference, either as to meaning or form. And what more appropriate name can there be for the Divinity than THE LIVE?

Now if we analyse the word *once* (*one-is*) we shall not find the least difference between it and the word *was*, for both words mean the *one being* or the *one time*. Hence *I was* is equal to *I once*; that is, *I one time*, *I formerly*.

There is something very curious connected with this word *was*. When traced up to its very birth, though it had not then a letter more or less than it has now, there is not the least difference between it and the French word *fois*, either as to meaning or the *number of its letters*. As the word *was* has now

to all appearance but three letters, every body will naturally suppose, until assured of the contrary, that I must consider the *w* as representing two characters, in order to make this word have as many letters as there are in the word *fois*. It may be also remarked, that when we sound all the letters in *fois* — that is, pronouncing it as if it were written *foise* — and that we consider the *w* as partaking of the nature of the *v*, and that we sound it accordingly — which all other people seem to do except the English — the difference between *was* and *fois* will become, for the nicest ear, almost imperceptible. When it is, moreover, observed, that the characters *f* and *w* are, in the Saxon tongue, nearly the same letter in form as in sound, they being made thus (f p), and that they are frequently used indifferently, there can be no doubt but that these two words were at one time in every respect the same, and that they then made but one word.

The observation with regard to *was* and *fois* having each the same number of letters, though the *w* is not counted for two, may, in this place, lead the curious reader to the discovery of the formation of a certain letter, and consequently to others.

The imperfect tense of *être* is in the two first persons singular *étois*; but it might as well be written *itois* or *estois*; and probably in very remote times it was thus differently written. No matter which of these three different forms we analyse, the meaning of this word is the same; and this is — *the one being*, or *the one time*, or both together.

It takes, when analysed, these three forms : IT-O-IS —IT-O-BE—IT-O-IO. Hence this word does not differ in the slightest degree from *was*. And why is it so? because these two words *étois* and *was* were in the beginning the same word. Thus the *ois* in *étois* is the same *ois* we have in *fois*, and hence *et-ois* and *f-ois* do not differ but by their having different articles; so that, if we deprive them of their articles, both words will become *ois*, and if we pronounce these three letters as they are pronounced in the French word *oiseau*, there will not be the least difference whatever in sound between them and *was*. Hence, if we adopt the form *itois* instead of *étois*, and give to the three letters *ois* the sound they have in *oiseau*, and which is undoubtedly their primitive sound, we shall make *it-ois* become *it was*. Thus we not only discover the exact meaning of *was* and *étois*, but that these two words were in the beginning the same word.

Now to what does this discovery lead? to the exact meaning of all those words in French, no matter whether they be nouns or verbs, that end with *ois*. Of this common termination nobody has hitherto had the most distant notion, either as to etymology or meaning. Though the reader cannot yet conceive how I find, by an analysis of the words *was*, *fois*, and *étois*, that they all mean *one time* or *one being*, yet, since this analysis has led to the discovery of the real nature of the termination *ois* (and of which sufficient proof is here given

by my having shown something too palpable for any body to deny, namely, that *et-ois*, is no other than *it-was*), he must begin to feel tolerably convinced that I cannot be mistaken in the meaning I have given of these words.

When *ois* belongs to the words called substantives (adjectives in the fourth degree), it is to be considered as meaning BEING only; hence *François*, which must have first been *ois France**, means *one* (to) *France*, or *one* (of) *France*; that is, *one person*, *one being*, or *one thing*, but not *one time*.

The third person singular, *étoit*, does not differ in meaning from *étois*; since it also gives, when analysed, *the one life* (it-o-it), or *the one time*, or both together. But it is not so with the three persons plural: *etions* (it-i-on-is) literally means *the one one being*, and—but not in different words—*the one one time*. By *one one being* is meant *beings*; hence *one one being* is a plural number. But by *one one time*, is simply meant *the past*, and hence it is equal to *go go*,—that is, *gone* or *flight*. The reader may

* It can be easily conceived that *ois* must have first preceded the substantives to which it belongs, if we remark how we express ourselves when we name the same idea otherwise. Thus instead of *he is of France*, we do not say *France he is of*; nor instead of *it is black*, do we say *black it is*. The word called the pronoun ever precedes on those occasions the noun, and this is very proper, since when thus employed we mean to show that the substance it determines is only a part of the substance named by the noun. Thus “*he is of France*” means, “*he is a person of France*,” a part, as it were, of France. By dwelling on these remarks, any body may now discover—that is, before he comes to where it is shown in this work—the origin of the English terminations *ish* and *ch*, as in *blackish*, *French*, &c.; and this, too, is a very important discovery, as nobody can imagine what these terminations mean, or how they have been formed.

remember that the radical part of *fui* is *u* (gone or flight), and that this *u* is a compound of *i, i*, which is also equal to *go, go*. Yet it may be remarked, that if *one one being* be a plural number, it follows that *one one time* should be a plural number also, and be rendered by *times*, and not by *the past*, or *time gone*. There is, however, notwithstanding the propriety of this observation, something very natural in representing a past time by the repetition of a present; and hence we say, when wishing a person to be gone, *go, go!* which two words are really synonymous with *be GONE!* Besides, we may observe, that as a past time is never named without our recurring to the present, there are really two times referred to whenever it is employed—the time we have, and the one we have not. The second person plural, *étiez*, which makes, when analysed, *it-i-i-is*, does not differ in meaning from *étions*, and it is to be accounted for in precisely the same manner. The third person plural, *étoient*, is a very curious word: it literally means *the great lives*—and there is for this a very wise reason. When this word first received this name, persons were not referred to, but the winds of heaven; and hence the propriety of the name *great lives* or *great beings*; and also of making this name signify afterwards *persons* or *beings gone*, since nothing can, to all appearance, be more gone than the winds that have passed by. When *oient* means *the great lives*, it is to be thus analysed: *oi-iv-it*; or thus, *ii-iv-it*; or thus, *iv-iv-it*. But when considered as meaning but a single

idea, it may be indifferently written *went* or *ivent*. It is easy to perceive that *ivent* is no other than *vent*, the French of wind, the *i* having been dropped. Thus we discover the origin of the English word *went*: we see that it is the same as *vent* or *wind*. Nor does this latter word differ in the least from *vent*, when analysed. I ought here to observe that the three ideas *God*, *goodness*, and *greatness* had, in the beginning, but one name; hence, though I say that *oi-ent*, or the name for the *wind*, literally means *the great lives*, I might as well say *the divine lives*, or even *the high lives*; for the idea of *highness* was, I find, named in the same manner. When we remark that *oi* is equal to *vv*, that is, to *w*, how easy it is to perceive that the whole word *oient* is, literally, *went*. Now, too, we perceive that the English verb *to wind*—as, *to wind one's way*—is the same word as that which names air; and the old verb *to wend* must be also, it is clear, the same word, the *i* and the *e* being frequently confounded. The Latin word for wind (*ventus*) does not differ from either *vent* or *wind* but by its having an article more (*us*), which must have first gone before it—thus, *us vent* (the wind). This article *us*, when analysed, means also, like *the*, the divinity or *the sun*, as we shall see presently.

The idea of motion named by the Latin and French verbs *venire* and *venir*, was also borrowed from the *wind*; since *ire ven* and *ir ven* are their analysed forms, and these mean *the wind*.

* Hence came the idea we name by the word *event*.

When we examine the English word *wind* after the same manner, we have *id win*, which is the same as *it ven*; but *vin* or *win* is more correct than *ven*. It may, however, be thought otherwise, as *vin* and *win* are for *wine*; but *vin* and *win* had not in the beginning, when meaning *wine*, their present forms, since they were then written thus: *in iv*, and *in iv iv*, the former meaning *the grape*, and the latter *the grapes*.

This account of *oient* confirms what has been already stated with regard to a past time being indicated by extreme motion; since the name given to the wind has been chosen in the present instance.

As the French word *souvent* means, when analysed, *all the wind* (*is-oi-vent*), it would appear that men in the beginning of time received also the idea of frequency from the winds. But in a country rarely visited by them, this idea must have been borrowed from some other natural object. Thus the Latin word for *often* (*sæpè*) takes, when analysed, this form, *is-æ-ip-è*, which literally means, *is the bees*. Here the word *bees* is represented by *ip-è*, of which the meaning is *bee, bee*; but to avoid the repetition of the second *bee*, a pronoun, that is *è*, and which means life or being, has been put in its place. When it is remarked that this pronoun might as well be *is* or *es* as what it is, it will be admitted that *sæpè* might as well be written *sæpes*. I make this remark to show how slight the difference between *apes*, the Latin of *bees*, and *apè* in *is-apè*, which means also the *bees*. Now the

English word *often* becomes, when analysed, *en-ov-it*, of which the literal meaning is *the sheep*.* *sheep*; the pronoun *it* serving here as in the last instance, and for the same reason, as a substitute for the second word *sheep*; but this *it* might as well be *es* or *is*. In Latin the word for *sheep* is *ov is*, which must have first been *is ov*; that is, *the sheep*: but when the *is* fell behind, it became *ovis*, and it has no other meaning than *the one life* (*is-o-vie*). Thus we perceive that *the winds*, *bees*, and *sheep*, have, in three different countries, given birth to the same idea. The two Greek words for *often* (*πολλακις* and *πλεονακις*) are composed of several words, of which the primitive meanings must have been lost long before Greek names of such length had been formed by their juncture. Hence it was no object in nature that gave the Greeks the idea of *often*, expressed in these two words, which are too modern to have been the first they ever had for this purpose. *Πολλακις*, when analysed, stands thus, *πολ-εα-εκ-ις*, of which the meaning is *all this and that*:

* This is for *she-bay*; that is, *the female-bay*, this animal being so called from its crying *bay*. Hence it would appear that the word *sheep* (*she-bay*) did not in the beginning apply equally to both genders, but that it was only in the feminine. When we recollect that the *b* and the *p* are frequently confounded, it can be easily admitted that with our great love for contraction *sheep* should be used instead of *sheeb*. An analysis of the French word for *sheep* (*brebis*) confirms what I have here stated with regard to this animal's being called after its bleat. When analysed it is *is-bre-be*; of which the literal meaning is, *the bray bay*, that is, *the cry bay* or *the breath bay*, for the word *breath* (*bray the*) is no other than *the bray* which became *breath* from the article *the* falling behind *bray*. And this again is confirmed by an analysis of the word *bleat*, which makes *it-be-il-ea*, or *it bay il é*, and means, *the bay it is*; that is, it is the cry of the sheep.

in which there is no allusion made to any object in nature; and hence it is a word of modern date compared to *souvent*, *sæpè*, and *often*. The other word, *πλεονακίς*, is still more modern, since it is composed of *πλεον* (full), and *εα-εκ-ίς*, so that the meaning is *full this and that*, which is precisely equal to *all this and that*. Since the word *full* means, when analysed, *the all (vie-ol)*, that is, the whole.

These various observations, which rise out of the account given of the imperfect tense of the verb *to be* in English and French, will serve to confirm the truth of the discoveries that have on this occasion been made. I have forgotten to allude to the modern orthography introduced by Voltaire, that of writing *ais* instead of *ois*. This innovation has long divided public opinion; but now, as we know what *ois* means, it should henceforth be regarded as a mark of ignorance or stupidity to prefer *ais*.

I need say nothing of the advantages to be derived for both native and foreigner from this important discovery of the real nature of the imperfect tense *to be*. Though Englishmen never knew the meaning of the word *was*, any more than Frenchmen knew that of *étois*, it would, however, have rendered these words very intelligible to both parties, had they known that the one was not a translation of the other, but that they were one and the same word. How easily this can be perceived when we remark that *ois* in *étois* is to be considered as the *ois* in *ois-eau*! since this will

not leave a shade of difference in sound between *ois* and *was*. And how much more intelligible it will make both these words to know that they mean *once*! How distinct and lasting the impression must, for the future, be of the multitude of words to which this termination belongs! Let an Englishman, for instance ask himself what idea he has hitherto had of *je dançois*, *j'aimois*, &c., compared to *I dance was* or *once*, *I love was* or *once*. When I question my own mind on this point, and endeavour to recollect what idea I had of this termination a few months ago, I cannot by any means recover it. And why so? Because I must in this instance have had no idea at all, or at best a very confused one.

We are not to forget that the verb *avoir* is to be ever understood as being connected with this termination *ois*, when it belongs to verbs. *Je dançois* literally means, *I was have dance*, *I once have of dance*. This we can conceive still more easily, when we remark that *avois* itself, is for *ois av* (was have), the *ois* having thus in the beginning preceded *av*. Hence *j'avois* means, when we thus give to each word its primitive situation, *I was have*, that is, *I was of possession*, a part, as it were, of possession; in other words, *I was a possessor*.

Let us now show the nature of a past participle in English and French, of which not even the meaning has been hitherto known, as I have clearly proved by an investigation of the familiar proposition, "I have had a book."

I have already shown how the participle past is

for the most part formed in English ; that this is done by the addition of the word *had*, to that form of the verb called the infinitive. Thus *loved*, *walked*, &c. are composed of *love had* and *walk had*, contracted to one word. We have also seen how the imperfect tense of the indicative is formed in a similar manner. But I have not yet shown the meaning of the word *had*, though I have shown that it does not mean possession ; for that if it had such a meaning, we should have double possession in such a sentence as, “ I have had a book,” that is, possession *now* and possession in a time gone by ; for if the word *had* implies possession past, *have* must surely imply present possession. Yet we do not mean to say, by “ I have had a book,” that we have still the book referred to. Then what, it will be asked, is the meaning of the word *had* in this instance ? Why it has precisely the same meaning which the ending of a Latin verb has in the perfect tense, that is, it means *gone* or *went*, and it has not a particle of the word *have* in it. Then the words imply, “ I went the possession of a book.” Thus, “ I have (I possession) had (went) a book,” just as *amaivi* means, *love went I*. But the reader will say that *had* has never been employed for *went* ; and this is very true, that is, very true in one sense, since we never say, nor have we ever said, *I had* for *I went* ; and yet it is otherwise a mistake, for we do never say, “ I have had,” or “ I have loved,” that our meaning is not “ I possession went,” and “ I possession love went.” And it

happens in this way: the Saxon word for *went* is *eðde*, as we may perceive from the following passage, of which I give the literal translation opposite, that is, as I find it already given, for the satisfaction of those readers who know as little of the Saxon language as I do myself:—

“Dha gelamp hit æt sumum sæle,
swa swagyt for oft dedh, that
Englisse cydhmen brohton heora
wara to Romana-byrig, and Gre-
gorius *eode* be hære stræt to
tham Engliscum,” &c.

“Then happened it at some sale,
so as yet for oft doth that
English chapmen brought their
wares to Rome-borough; and Gre-
gory *went* by there street to
the Englishmen.” *

From the following passage I also learn that the termination *ed* was anciently written *ode*: — “*Ed*, as was shown before, is purely Hebrew, and signifies witness or testimony; and in this sense it is used when added to a verb, to imply something already done, and of which it still bears witness. The Saxons variably wrote *ed*, *ede*, *od*, *ode*, *ad*, *id*, *ul*, *yd*, and *de*, which are immaterial with regard to variation, and tend to confirm the idea that the sense of a word exists in its consonants.” †

Now between *ode* and *eode* the difference is very slight, it being only the dropping of the *e* before the *o*; hence *lovode*, which was anciently written instead of *loved*, is evidently *love went*, just as in Latin; and *loved* has been written instead of *lovode*, because, as to pronunciation, there is no difference between *ed* and *ode* at the end of a word, when the accent does not fall upon these terminations.

* Ælfric's Homily, &c. on the birth-day of St. Gregory; from Bosworth, p. 265.

† Martin's Philological Grammar, p. 393.

There is no mistake in saying that *ed* was anciently written *ode*; for on looking into the old Saxon translation of the Gospels quoted by Dr. Johnson, I find numerous instances of this orthography. Then *had*, it will be said, is for *have eode*, *possession gone*: but it is not so; *had* is for *eode* itself. It must have first become *ad*, and then this *ad*, from the belief that it belonged to *have*, took *h* before it. Then every time we say "I have had," it is for *I have eode* ("I possession gone"); and when we say "I had," the *have* is only suppressed, and we are still to consider ourselves as saying "I have eode." But where, it will be asked, is the harm in allowing *had* to be a contraction of *have eode*? There is this harm in it, that it is not true; besides that *had* cannot, if this be allowed, bear investigation. Thus, if *had* were to be for *have eode*, we should have the word *have* twice in "I have had," as these words would then be, "I have have eode." Hence *had* is no other than a corruption of *eode* (*gone* or *went*), and does not on any account imply possession; but the word which does imply possession is *have*, and this word, when it is not already expressed before *had*, is ever understood, *I had* being only a contraction of *I have had*. Then it may be remarked that I have been mistaken in supposing that *loved*, *walked*, &c. are contractions of *love had*, *walk had*; and that they are contractions of *love eode*, *walk eode*: this remark would be very true if I made any difference between *had* and *eode*; but I make none, since I say that *had* is for

eode, and that it was formerly written *eode*. But how has this word *eode* been made to imply *went* or *gone*? In the following manner: *eo* is from *ire* (*to go*), and is in the present time, and the *de* by which it is followed means *then*, it being the same as *dha* (the first word of the Saxon passage already given); but it is not, as may be supposed, a contraction of *dha*, for *dha* could not have been the first word the Saxons had for *then*; but it must have been *id* or *ed*, as we shall see when I show how words may be traced not only up to a single letter, but often to the half of a letter. Then the first manner that ever man employed for signifying a past time was to add the past time of *to go* to the word to which they assigned a past signification; and this past time of the word *go* itself was formed by its present time being added to a word implying *then*. But it will be remembered and remarked that I have shown how the verb *go* is the same as a pronoun; and hence it will be inferred that the past of *go* must be also a pronoun, having a past signification. Such an inference will be correctly drawn; for *eode* is as well as *eo* a pronoun, and these two words differ from one another in precisely the same manner the words *that* and *this* do. And when time is considered, *this* and *that* mark a present and a past time as clearly as the words *now* and *then*, or as the words *present* and *past* do; as “*this* year is more rainy than *that* year was;” that is, the *present* year, or the one we have *now*, is more rainy than the year *past* referred to. Then

it follows that pronouns as well as those words called verbs, have also their times: thus the word *this* is composed of *the is* (a present time), and *that* of *the at* (a past time); and both words differ from each other as the words *has* and *had* do, *is* being for a thing near, and *at* for a thing distant. We shall see hereafter how it happens that some letters indicate a past, and others a present time; but here I cannot be more particular. Thus respecting *had* I conclude, that it is a past time of *eo* or *go*, and that it is consequently the same as a pronoun, or as the verb to be, since the verb *to go*, and the verb *to be*, and the pronoun, are in all languages the same word.

We have just seen how pronouns, as well as verbs, have a present and a past signification; and it will be necessary to bear this well in mind, in order to understand a French participle past, it being no other than a pronoun to which is attached this signification of a past time. The reader who has followed me thus far with attention needs not now be told that in the Latin word *teneo*, the *eo* at the end of this word is a pronoun, or, which is the same thing, the present tense first person singular of the verb *to be*, or the verb *to go*, and that men must have first said *eo ten* (*I hold*), till the *eo* fell behind, making *teneo*. Then I make this remark for such readers as have not read thus far attentively, or for those who may have read only a few odd passages in this work, and be inclined to believe that they understand the rest, or at least

the parts they have read. But in both suppositions such readers are mistaken, for no single part of this work can be properly understood without a perfect knowledge of the whole. It will be also remembered by the attentive reader, that *tenui* is for *teniui*, this *uii* being the same as *ivi*, the perfect tense of *eo*, as the *u* and the *v* were anciently the same. Then in *tenui* there is a word more than in *teneo*. The *i* at the end of *uii* is a contraction of *eo*, and such, too, is the pronoun I in English; and *iu* in *ivi* is another form for *eo*, that which shows this word *eo* to belong to a past time. Then *ivi* means "I gone," that is, it is two pronouns, the one (*i*) merely indicating existence, and the other also existence, but that which is *gone*. This *iu* has been contracted to *eu*, and thus it is in the French language; *tenu*, *reçu*, and all such words being contractions of *teneu*, *reçeu*, and so they have, till a very late period been written, and so should they be written at the present hour. Then *tenu* or *teneu* in French, is for *eu ten*; just as it is in Latin. And between the *eu* in *j'ai eu*, and this *eu* at the end of *teneu*, and the *iu* (contracted to *u*) in *habui* in Latin (that is, *habiui*), there is not the least difference. And what difference is there between *eu* in the French pronoun *eux*, and this *eu* in *teneu*? none whatever. Just as *eo* is in Latin classed among the pronouns, so is this *eu* in French classed among the French pronouns. But it may be observed, that *eu* and *eux* are written differently; and this is very true, but this difference arises

from *eu* being a singular, and *eux* a plural number. And here it may not be amiss to show how this plural is made, as I may forget doing so hereafter, this word being one of little importance, compared to what is to follow. *Eux* is composed of three pronouns, each in the singular number, and they have been thus added together in order to make a plural. These pronouns are *eu*, *ic*, *is*, which, from having fallen together, became one word; but when this coalition took place *ic* and *is* might have been written *ec*, *es*. And what, the reader will ask, is the meaning of *eu*, *ic*, *is*? nothing but this, *it*, *it*, *it*, or *that*, *that*, *that*, which, added together, make *them*, in French, *eux*. Then the reader will say, that if this be true, the word *them* in English must be also a compound word. And so it is, and is composed of *it*, *he*, *him*, as we shall see. And what is the French word *du*? it is no other than *ed eu*, contracted to one word, (it not being formed, as it has been thought, from *de le*,) and it means *of that*; for this word *ed* is the original of the Latin and French *de*, and it is a very curious word, as I shall show in the proper place.

This participle *eu* varies in French on account of gender and number. When in the feminine, it is written *eue*, which is a contraction of *eu ea*, both words having coalesced, and the *a* having been dropped. Then *eu ea* meant *that feminine*; and when *eu* was put in the plural, this was done by the addition of another word in the singular number of equal import, which was *es* or *is*, of which the vowel pre-

ceding the *s* was also dropped; so that *eu es*, or as it was also written, *eu is*, became *eus*; and the feminine, instead of being *eue es*, became *eues*. As to *j'eus*, *tu eus*, &c., the word signifying *have* is not expressed, but understood; and anciently this tense must have been *j'ai eus*, *tu as eus*, &c., the *eus* being here a contraction of *eu is*, which must have been first *is eu*, these two words meaning *this that*, in French *ce la*. Then *j'ai eus* would mean, if now said, "I possession that," or which is the same, "I possession *gone*," or "I possession *then*," or, "at that time." But as *j'ai eus* is no longer said, the literal meaning of this *j'eus* is, "I that," *je cela*, *moi cela*. In like manner the third person singular (*il eut*) is accounted for, *eut* being at first *it eu* (*ce la*), and then *eut* from the *it* falling behind, and coalescing with *eu*. The three persons *eûmes*, *eûtes*, *eurent*, are also composed of *eu*, to which several other ancient pronouns are added, each in the singular; thus *eûmes* is composed of *eu*, *is*, *im*, *es*, of which the *is* has been wholly omitted; then *is*, *im*, *es*, means *them*, and the *eu* by which they are preceded shows that these words have a past signification. *Eûtes* and *eurent* have, besides *eu*, several singular pronouns; thus the former is composed of *eu*, *es*, *it*, *es*, and *eurent* of *eu*, *er*, *en*, *it*; each one of all these pronouns meaning, when separately considered, *it*, so that three of them mean *it*, *it*, *it*, by the addition of which a plural number has been formed. But why, it will be asked, did not men, in the beginning, do as they do now, that

is, add an *s* to their words as a sign of the plural? simply because a plural number has never, in any language in the world, been formed after so nonsensical a manner. But it was wise that they should join together several singulars, in order to make a plural, and so have they done. Thus *er* meant one thing, and *es* meant another; so that *er* and *es* added together made *eres*, which has been contracted to *res*, the Latin word for *thing*, but which in the beginning meant things.

Then *eu*, in *j'ai eu*, does not, any more than *had* in *I have had*, imply possession, for if this were so, we should have both present and past possession in *j'ai eu*, since it must be admitted that the word *ai* does already imply possession; so that by allowing *ai* to be for present possession, and *eu* for past possession, *j'ai eu* would have the ridiculous meaning of *I possession present, I possession past*. And this appears doubly absurd when we remark, that in *j'ai eu* past possession alone is understood, since if we say, *j'ai eu un livre*, nobody understands that the book is still possessed.

But how, it will be asked, does it happen, that *eu* varies in French on account of gender and number, and *had* never does? This apparent singularity is thus accounted for: *had* is a compound of two words, of a pronoun and a word of time, meaning *then*; that is, it is composed of *eo* and *id*; or, if the reader prefers the more modern *dha*, we may say, it is composed of *eo* and *dha*. Now as those words of time, called adverbs of time,

never do vary on account of gender or number, hence the *id* or *dha* at the end of *eo* undergoes no variation. But in French we have no adverb of time attached to the pronoun *eu*, and hence this pronoun, like other pronouns, does vary; since its power of having gender and number is not taken from it by the addition of another word, such as *dha*, which has neither gender nor number. But in Latin, it will be remarked, that though this pronoun has no word of time added to it, still it does not vary. But this is a mistake. In Latin there is, I allow, no word of time added to *eu* or *iu*, but there are pronouns added to it; and those pronouns vary as to number and person, though not as to gender, just as the pronouns in French and English do vary on account of number and person. Thus the endings *i*, *isti*, *it*, *imus*, *istis*, *erunt*, are pronouns as evidently as any other pronouns are. And if they are deprived of gender, though they have number and person, this is a privation which we have in English, though not in French, in the three persons, *they*, *theirs*, *them*, which are alike in the three genders.

Now how does it happen that the participle does not vary on account of gender or number when we say, *j'ai eu une plume*, and that it does when we say, *la plume que j'ai eue*, which in the plural number would be also *les plumes que j'ai eues*; whilst, in the former instance, the *eu* does not vary, if we say, *j'ai eu des plumes*? Every body will say that this happens from the participle past being in the former

situation followed by its *régime* or accusative, and from its *régime* or accusative preceding it in the latter. But why has the *régime* this effect upon the participle when preceding it, any more than when following it? I have already observed that a man very ignorant of astronomy can tell whereabouts the sun appears to rise and to set, simply from his having often observed its situation at the beginning and the close of day. Thus, too, has it hitherto been with grammarians. Du Marsais has, however, endeavoured to go a little farther; and Condillac, who was a very close observer, has approved of Du Marsais's view of the participle, as I have already shown. According to these two eminent authorities, the participle past is in one situation (such as *j'ai eu une plume*) a substantive, and in the other (such as *la plume que j'ai eue*) an adjective. And this view (although an erroneous one) is by far the best that has been ever taken of the participle past.

Now the participle past being one of those words called pronouns, it is as easy to account for its gender and number, as it is to account for the gender and number of a pronoun. Thus, as every body knows the difference between *le* and *la*, *il* and *elle*, *celui* and *celle*, both as to gender and number; and as no native can ever confound these words with one another; in like manner, the participle past may henceforth, since it belongs to this class of words, be as clearly understood by all, and as properly employed. When I say, *j'ai eu une plume*, the word *eu* belongs only to *ai*, which we know is an-

other word implying possession. Then in the beginning men said, *j'en ai une plume*, which meant "I *that* possession a pen," *moi cela possession* * *une plume*; that is, "I *that* possession (namely) a pen;" by which we may see that the word *eu* showed the thing (that is, the possession) to be *distant*, the words *cela* and *that* having in French and English such a meaning, whether they refer to time or place. But it may be asked, why does not *eu* vary on account of the various forms of *avoir*? It is for this reason: *avoir* could not in the beginning have more than one form, and it was then that *eu* went before it. When *eu* fell afterwards behind *avoir*, the latter took various forms, according to the different persons to which it belonged, having received those various forms from its coalition with those different persons. I shall, when the proper time for doing so is come, show how this verb *avoir* was in the beginning formed; but here, in order to explain what I have just said with regard to this verb having taken its different forms from its coalition with the different persons by which it was preceded, I beg to remark that *habeo* in Latin was once merely *hab*, and that it has only become *habeo* from the pronoun *eo*, or rather *io*, by which it was preceded, having fallen behind; and in a similar manner are all its other forms to be accounted for.

Now as the word for possession has in itself but one form, notwithstanding the various forms in which we see it appear, so the word *eu* whenever it

* This word had then no gender.

belongs to this general word for possession, can have but one form. Hence it is that in French *eu* does not vary when merely relating to *avoir*; and though we do not now say, *j'eu ai*, but *j'ai eu*, still we may discover the sense by giving to *eu* the same meaning in the latter situation which we give it in the former: thus, "I *that* possession" may be understood as well as "I possession *that*," since it is similar to another transposition which frequently happens in French, such as *homme excellent*, instead of *excellent homme*.

Now when I say, *la plume que j'ai eue*, the word *eue* does not at all refer to *ai*, that is, to the verb *avoir*, but to the *plume*; for in the beginning these words stood thus: *la plume eue que j'ai*, that is, *la plume celle là que j'ai*; for *eu* and *eue* were then what *celui là* and *celle là* are at present. But the *là* in both these instances refers to time, that is, to a time wholly past; so that when I say, *la plume celle là que j'ai*, the meaning is, *la plume celle (à ce tems) là que j'ai*, that is, *celle à ce tems là moi possesseur*; for we must not forget that *ai* is here another word for a part of all possession, so that it may be very properly rendered by *possessor*; and it is easy to perceive that *ce tems là* refers to a time wholly past. But when *eu* and *eue*, as well as their plurals *eus* and *eues*, had for a long time thus preceded the verb *avoir*, they afterwards fell behind it, and men, instead of saying *la plume eue que j'ai*, said, *la plume que j'ai eue*. Such is the participle past in French, about which so much has been written and

said. Nothing can be more simple; and had it always preserved its primitive place, grammarians would have never written a rule respecting it, no more than they have done respecting the words *il* and *elle*, which are never confounded by any body. The truth is, had this word, called the participle past, never lost its place, we had never heard so much of it as its name, since there is in reality no such word in any language in the world, the word so called being no other than one of those words termed pronouns or articles.

But the reader may here interpose by reminding me that there are other participles past than *eu*; that there are those ending *e*, such as *aimé*; and those ending *i*, such as *puni*. And he may also observe, that I have not alluded to certain doubts entertained by eminent grammarians — though not by inferior ones, for the latter find nothing difficult — respecting the use of the participle past. Thus Condillac says, “On a demandé s’il faut dire la justice que vous ont *rendu* ou *rendue* vos juges. Pendant *long-temps* les grammairiens se sont déclarés pour *rendu*, parceque, disaient-ils, ce participe est suivi du sujet de la proposition. Comme cette raison est sans fondement, je crois, avec Duclos, qu’il faut dire *rendue*.”*

I admit that there is nothing here like certainty; for Condillac, though he disapproves of the form which had for a long time, as he observes, been adopted by grammarians, assigns no reason for his agreeing with Duclos. His meaning, in English, is,

* Condillac, Gram. chap. xxii. seconde partie.

Grammarians had for a long time decided in favour of a certain form being given to the participle past, and they did so for a certain reason ; but this reason is supposed to be without foundation, and Condillac, *simply on this account*, BELIEVES with Duclos that the contrary form ought to be adopted. Now every body who has understood my observations on the participle past, will have no doubt as to whether we ought to say, *la justice que vous ont RENDU vos juges* ; or, *la justice que vous ont RENDUE vos juges*.

To solve this difficulty—that is, to know if *rendu* ought to vary on account of gender—we have only to ask to what does the pronoun *eu* or *eue* at the end of *rendu* or *rendue* refer. If it refers to the verb *rendre*, we know it can have no gender, as verbs or nouns in this situation have no gender ; but if it refers to the noun *justice*, we know that *eu* must have gender, because nouns, that is, the words so called, have gender. Now, when we take away *eu* or *eue* from *rendu* or *rendue*, we know that what remains of *rendu* or *rendue* must be equal in meaning to the French word *reddition*, though such a word as *rend*, standing thus for *reddition*, is no longer in use. But why do we know that *rend* must be equal to *reddition* ? Because every verb, no matter in what situation, is equal to a substantive ; and hence *rendre* or *rend* must be equal to *reddition*. Then this being admitted, is it not easy to perceive that the *que*, after the word *justice* refers to this word *justice*, in *la justice que*, &c. ? and this too being admitted, is it not equally easy to perceive

that this means *la justice, celle là que, &c.*; and whence comes this *celle là*? Why, it is no other than the *eue* at the end of *rendue*; and as we cannot say *la justice celui là que, &c.*, we must not for the same reason say *rendu* but *rendue*, or, as it ought to be written, *rendeue*. Hence Duclos and Condillac have adopted the proper form for the participle in such a situation; but they have been guided in their choice more by instinct than by reason. Such readers as do not yet clearly understand how a verb and a substantive make but one word, will ask what is the meaning of *la justice celle là que vous ont reddition vos juges*. To which the more intelligent or attentive reader will reply, that as *j'ai* implies "I possessor," that is, "I am possessor;" and as *j'aime* implies, "I lover," that is, "I am a lover;" since in the first instance by *ai* is meant a part of all possession, and in the second is meant by *aime* a single part of all love; both of which parts stand as clearly in apposition to *I* as the name Paul stands in apposition to apostle in "Paul the apostle" — then, for the same reason, *vos juges ont* means *vos juges possesseurs*; and the word *reddition*, which stands also in apposition to *ont*, shows of what the *juges* are possessors: we see that it is of *reddition*, to which *juges*, as well as *ont*, stand in apposition. Hence we have to find a single word, in order to render our meaning more clear, that will imply *ont reddition*, and stand in apposition to *juges*. This word is *rendeurs*; for such a word means *possesseurs de reddition*. Hence, if instead of

la justice celle là que vous ont reddition vos juges, we set down this meaning of it, we shall have *la justice celle là que vous rendez vos juges*; that is, *la justice celle (de ce tems) là, QUE, (that is, pour QUE, pour LA QUELLE,) vos juges (étaient) rendez (à) vous*; that is, *vos juges étaient rendez appartenant à vous*. In order to understand this arrangement still more easily, we must not forget that as there are no such words as verbs, there are consequently no such words as active verbs, and that all those words which appear to be followed directly by other words upon which we are told they act, are not followed *directly* by those other words, since they have ever between them and those other words, one of those words called prepositions understood. Thus “I love John,” is, “I have love belonging to John;” and “John whom I love,” is, “John for whom I have love,” or “John to whom I have love;” that is, belonging to whom is the love I possess. Hence we see that *que* in the instance *la justice que*, &c. is not governed (as grammarians have ever supposed it to be, when in such a situation) by *ont rendue*, since it has *pour* understood before it. And if Frenchmen do no longer say *pour que* instead of *pour lequel* and *pour laquelle*, it is because *lequel* and *laquelle* have usurped its place; these two words being composed of *que* and the two pronouns *il* and *elle*, and which happened in the following manner:—Men formerly said *el que* and *elle que*; but the *el* with time fell behind *que*, and *que el* became contracted to *quel*; in like manner *elle* fell

behind *que*, and *que elle* became also contracted to *quelle*; and this being the case, and men having forgotten that the words *quel* and *quelle* had already in them the pronouns *el* and *elle*, put again other pronouns (the modern forms *le* and *la*) before these words *quel* and *quelle*; and hence come *lequel* and *laquelle*.

How, also, it may be asked, are we to understand the past participle in the situation to which Condillac refers, when he says: “ Mais la grande question est de savoir si le participe est variable dans sa terminaison, lorsqu’il est suivi d’un verbe ou d’un adjectif; par exemple faut il dire, ‘ elle s’est laissée mourir,’ ou, ‘ elle s’est laissé mourir,’ ou, ‘ elle s’est rendue catholique,’ ou, ‘ elle s’est rendu catholique?’ ” As in these and all similar instances, the participle and the word by which it is followed, make but one compound word, and as it is at the end of this compound word the sign of agreement ought *to be*, if allowed *to be*; thus, for instance, as in *laissé mourir*, which as to meaning might be written *laissé-mourir*, it is at the end of *mourir*, and not at the end of *laissé*, the sign of gender and number ought *to be*, if allowed *to be*, hence it is that in such cases the participle should not be made to vary in gender or number; but when that is possible, it is the word by which the participle is followed that should in these respects be made to agree. Thus, in English, if we compose a word of two words, if we make, for instance, of the two words *room* and *door* the single word *room-door*,

and that we wish to put this word in the plural number, we cannot do so by saying *rooms-door*, but we are obliged to say, *room-doors*. Now, as in French, those words called infinitives have neither gender nor number, hence the pronoun, that word hitherto called the participle, cannot be attached to them; and as the gender and number of those words called adjectives do already accompany them, hence there is no necessity for putting again after them other signs of gender and number; that is, when adjectives accompany participles, so as not to make separate words, as to meaning, from the participles by which they are so accompanied. But in those and all similar instances the participle or pronoun exists. Thus of *elle s'est laissé mourir*, the literal meaning is, *elle à elle même est CETTE CHOSE, de ce tems là, le laissé mourir*: this we may understand more easily, if we give to *est* its substantive meaning; that is, if we put in its place *être* or *cette chose*; and if we remark that by the words *cette chose de ce tems là*, we design the participle past, which might be also rendered by *celui-là*. We are also to remark that *le laissé mourir* is considered as a compound word, just as *le laissé-aller* is considered when used instead of *abandon* or *mouvement libre*: *elle à elle*, that is, *elle étant à elle même, cette chose, celle du passé, nommée laissé-mourir*. And of *elle s'est rendu catholique*, the literal meaning is, *elle à elle même*, that is, *elle étant à elle même cette chose, la chose passée, nommée rendu catholique*. And were we in both these instances to take from *laissé*

the *é*, and from *rendu* the *eu*, and instead of *laissé mourir*, and *rendu catholique*, to say, *laiss-mourir* and *rend-catholique*, we should be still more literal and correct. In like manner are to be explained *elle s'est crevé les yeux*, *elle s'est fait peindre*, &c. ; in which situations the participle, for the reason given above, must never vary on account of gender or number, since the participle and the word to which it is added, are to be ever considered in such cases as making but one compound word similar to the two French words *laissé-aller* or *laisser-aller*, and the two English words, *room-door*. Then *crevé les yeux* may be rendered by *le crevement des yeux*, and *fait peindre* by the single word *portrait*.

But I have passed over the use of the participle in such a situation as *l'homme est tenu*, *la femme est tenue*, when it must ever vary in gender and number, according to the object to which it refers ; and this is the reason why : *l'homme tenu* is for *l'homme eu ten* ; that is, *l'homme celui-là, celui de ce tems là, ten* ; and *la femme tenue* is for *la femme eue ten, la femme celle là ten, celle de ce tems là ten* ; and thus must it have anciently been before *eu* and *eue* fell behind *ten*.

Here the reader will again, no doubt, wish to remind me that there are besides the participles in *eu* those in *e*, *i*, such as *aimé*, and *puni* ; and that there are others ending in *nt* and *rt*, such as *peint*, *couvert*, &c. : of this I am aware, and my answer is, that all participles are to be accounted for just as I have accounted for those in *eu*. Thus *aimé* has

precisely the same meaning that it would have, if written *aimeu* instead of *aimé*, just as *ténu* would have the same meaning which it has were it written like other participles of verbs in *ir*, that is, *teni*, instead of *ténu*.

But when we reflect upon what a participle is, that is to say, when we reflect that it is the same as those words called pronouns or articles, we shall discover a great many other participles besides those here alluded to; indeed we shall find as many of them as there are articles and pronouns, and not only when we consider the articles and pronouns still existing, but all those which did in past times exist, and that have since many ages been wholly forgotten. Hence *er*, *ir*, *re*, and *tre*, in such words as *aimer*, *punir*, *rendre*, and *connaître*, are all participles as much as *i*, *e*, and *eu* are in *puni*, *aimé*, and *ténu*.

Now it was from this intimate acquaintance with what a participle in French is, that I have been led to a very precious discovery, namely, to all the endings of not only Latin nouns, pronouns, adjectives, participles, &c., but also to those of every other language in the world. And by taking away those endings from words, and making them precede instead of to follow them, we shall see the language in which we do so, such as it must have been in very remote times. In order to be clearly understood, let me here set down a few Latin words out of a thousand which it were not difficult to

find, and thus show what forms these words bore ages before old Ennius had written a line.

Deus — us di (the day) (the i was changed to e).	argentum — um argent.
homo — eo hom.	manus — us man.
terra — ea terre.	liber — er lib (er liv).
dies — es di.	bonus — us bon.
templum* — um temple.	solus — us sol.
vinum — um vin.	luna — ea lune.
panis — is pan.	Christus — us Christ.
aurum — um aur.	finis — is fin.
	pinus — us pin.

Thus we perceive that the endings *us, o, a, es, er, um, &c.*, do all belong to that class of words called pronouns or articles, and that they did anciently precede nouns in Latin, just as articles do at present in French and English; and that from preceding words they fell behind them, and then, from coalescing with them, each two words became one; that is, the two words which grammarians call articles and nouns became one word, called a noun. From these few instances, which any body, even a person wholly ignorant of Latin, may increase to thousands by merely opening a Latin book and doing as I have just done, we perceive the great antiquity of the French language. Thus *bon* in French is not taken from *bonus*, as it has been ever supposed, but it is the far more ancient Latin word itself (*bon*), compared to which *bonus* is a modern word: and the same observation will

* Um is for eu im: it is the same which we see in the pronouns written *eum*.

apply to *homme, terre, temple, vin, pain, or, argent* and *main*, &c.; all these being the more ancient Latin words for *homo, terra, templum*, &c.; for as to the difference in form between *main* and *man*, *pain* and *pan*, *or* and *aur*, they are too trivial to deserve notice. And when we recollect that the *b* and the *v* are kindred letters, it is easy to perceive that *liber* and *livre* make but one word, just as the ancient English word *lief* was the same as the German *lieb*. How it happens that these four letters *b, f, u,* and *v*, as also *w*, have been frequently confounded with one another, we shall see hereafter. From these instances we also perceive that the words for *God* and for *day* were anciently the same; and that they could only be distinguished from one another by the different articles which preceded them. Thus *us di* referred to the Divinity, and *es di* to the day. Nor are we now to suppose that the French word *Dieu* is from *Deus*; since it is the ancient word *di* itself which was preceded by another article (*eu*), and so became *Dieu*, from this article falling behind it; and hence the familiar little oath *pardi*, is not a corruption, as it has been ever thought, of *pardieu*, but it is the ancient form of *pardieu* itself; and such also is the old English oath *perdie*.

Here, too, we discover the original of *solus*. Hitherto the learned have supposed that *sol* came from *solus*, as the sun is alone, or without an equal in the heavens: but the reverse of this is the truth, since it is *solus* that has been formed from *sol*; and

hence *sol* meant, in the beginning, not only the *sun*, but also *alone*; and it had this double meaning from its being single. From this observation I discover the original of the French word *soleil*. It is not, as the learned have supposed, derived from *sol* in Latin, but it is the word *sol* itself. It was thus written, *sole*, and then it took the pronoun or article *il* before it—thus, *il sole*; and then this pronoun *il* fell behind *sole*,—just as *us* did in order to form *solus*,—and *sole* and *il*, having coalesced, made *soleil*. And when men said *il sole*, *sole* meant also *alone*; for the difference between it and *seul* is too slight to allow a doubt on this point. And is the French word *lune* from *luna*? By no means: for before the Latins had *luna* they must have had *ea lun*, and from *ea* falling behind, and coalescing with *lun*, the word *luna* was formed; so that the present word for *lune* in French is, probably, by many centuries, older than *luna*, since it is the same word which the Latins had for the moon before they had *luna*. As to the *e* by which *lune* in French ends, it is nothing at all—that is, when we go back to those ancient times. Thus we may also discover, at a glance, multitudes of English words, as they were in former times, by only referring to articles: such as—

trepan — an trap.
 mountain — ain mount.
 fountain — ain fount.
 organ — an orgue.
 truth — the true.
 fourth — the four.
 fifthe — the five or fife.

sixth — the six.
 &c. &c.
 warmth — the warm.
 path — the pa.
 faith — the fai.
 oath — the o! a!

It is useless to continue; any body may do so. The reader is probably aware that anciently the indefinite article *a* or *an* was written *ein*, *ain*, *an*, &c.; hence *mountain* is the same as *a mount*, and *fountain* the same as *a fount*. Before we had *organ*, we used, it is clear, to say *an orgue*, just as the French do at present. Such words as *true*, *warm*, &c., which are now only used as adjectives, were, it appears, anciently nouns, just as *bon* was in Latin, when preceded by *us*, as we have already seen. As to *the* in *fourth*, *fifth*, &c., it may be thus continued throughout all the other numbers; and as to those in *ce*—that is, *once*, *twice*, and *thrice*—it is easy to perceive that they must have been formed after a similar manner; namely, by an article at first preceding *one*, *two*, and *three*, and then falling behind these numbers: this article was *is*—the same which we see in *is*, *ea*, *id*. Hence *is one*, *is two*, *is three*, became *one is*, *two is*, *three is*, which have been contracted to *ons*, *twis*, *thris*, written *once*, *twice*, *thrice*. As to the *ce* in French, it is the same as *is* in Latin.

Path, *the pa*, *is*, we perceive, the same as the French word *pas*, as is also *pace*; that is, *ce pa*, or, as it ought to be written, *is pa*; for whence comes the French word *pas*? why, from *is pa*, to be sure; after which the *is* fell behind, and became contracted with *pa* to *pas*. And whence came *pa*? why from *ea pi* (the foot); after which the *ea* fell behind *pi*, and both words became *pa* by contraction. And whence comes *pes* in Latin? why, also

from *pi* and the article *es*, by which it was preceded, thus, *es pi* (the foot), till *es* fell, as usual, behind, and made, with *pi*, by contraction, *pes*. And whence came *pi*? from *i ip*, this *ip* being the first word of all for a foot; and it implied *up*, and also *a foot*, which meaning, as well as that of *over*, *in*, *on*, &c. it has still in Greek. Then how does it happen that the French have now *piel* for *foot*, if they had once simply *pi*? why, when they had *pi*, they put for article before it *id*, and so said *id pi*, the foot; after which the *id* fell behind, and made *piel*, instead of *piid*. Thus, while languages were yet forming, the same people might have several words for the same thing. In one province, for instance, the word for foot might be *pas*, in another *pes*, and in another *ped*, merely from different articles being placed before the same word *pi*, and from their coalescing with it.

Fai in *faith* is the ancient form of this word, such as we find it in Spenser and other old writers. It means when analysed *the Great Being*, that is, *God*; and as I perceive that its primitive form was *foi*, it is evident that between *faith* in English and in French, there is no difference. An *oath* in former times was, it would appear, an $\text{o} \Delta$, which is also another name for the Divinity, as we shall see hereafter. The word *law* had also in the beginning a similar meaning, nor does this word differ from the French word *loi*, or from the Saxon word *lah*, they being all three the same word.

It may not be amiss again to remind the reader

that the verb *to be* and the pronoun (by which I mean also the article) are but one word. Hence *the* may be often better, or at least as well, understood, if we translate it by *is*, when we find it at the end of words. Thus *strength* may be as well understood by rendering it *strong is*, as by *the strong*. And so may we explain

width — wide is.

wealth — weal is.

length — long is.

sabbatth — sabbat is.

health — heal is.

breath — brea is.

stealth — steal is.

&c. &c.

Though I have not yet shown how words may be traced up to their very birth, yet the reader may have seen enough, to put him in the way of making important philological discoveries. Thus, has he the word *earth* to account for, he may discover that when he takes from this word *the*, there remains *ear*, which was the word for *earth* prior to the word *earth* itself. But he may remark that this word *ear* ends with an *r*, which must have been *er*, and that it did at one time precede *ea*, so that the first word for *earth* must have been *ea*; then men said *er ea*, just as we now say *the earth*. Now the Latin word for *earth* had a similar origin. It was at first *er ea*, this became *ear*, but was shortened to *er*; then *er* took before it the article *it*, as *it er*, and these two became *ter*, by coalition and contraction; and then this word *ter* took before it the article *er*, which again fell behind, making *terr*; and this took before it *ea*, as *ea terr*, which also fell behind, and made *terra*. But before *ear* had become *er* by contrac-

tion, it left in the language *ar*; for *aro*, the verb, is no other than *eo ar*, “I go the earth;” that is, “I labour it;” and *arare* is *ea ar ire*, *the earth to go*; that is, to labour the earth. The *ea* first fell behind *ar*, and made *ara*; and then came *ire* behind *ara*, and so the three words were contracted to *arare*. But before *area* had become *ara*, it was itself employed in another sense; that is, as a public place, &c., and so it has remained in Latin. By this means we also discover the exact etymology of *arabilis*: *bilis* is composed of *ib*, *il*, *is*, of which the literal meaning is, *being it is*, or *it is being*, so that the meaning of the whole word *arabilis* is this, *it is being the earth*; that is to say, it is being as the earth, that which can be laboured as the earth. The Greek word *era* (earth) has also had the same origin: it began with *ea* just as the English word earth did; then it took the article *er* before it, making *er ea*; and here the article instead of falling behind *ea*, happened to join with it, and in this manner *erea* became by contraction *era*.

Thus we are not, when seeking the etymology of words, to suppose that no words are articles or pronouns but those which grammarians tell us are such. It is easy to perceive, after the analysis thus made of those several words, that in the beginning no word had more than two letters; and from knowing this, we may, by the assistance of our other newly-acquired knowledge, and with more that is to follow, trace perhaps all the words in the world to their very birth. All the observations I have

still to make shall mainly tend to this point; for I know it is a great one, as no other knowledge can show us more clearly the history of the human mind from its rudest to its most civilised state; that is, as to its powers of reasoning and defining. Besides the discovery which I have made with regard to no word in the beginning having more than two letters, I also discover that no two consonants ever went together. Hence we are not now, when tracing words up to a single letter, or at most to two, to allow a consonant to stand without a vowel. But when we do not trace words up to a single letter, or to two at most; and that we do show of how many words another word is composed, then it will not be necessary to trace a word letter by letter, or by two letters at a time; for if we always follow this system, we shall not, when a word is composed of several other significant words, be able to discover its meaning. An instance or two will make this clear: if we separate the English word *friend* as it ought to be separated, if merely composed of several pronouns, it would stand thus: *if-ir-iē-ēn-id*, which offers no meaning. Now, as such an important word must have, like every other word, a meaning in itself, we are, in order to discover that meaning, to suppose it to be composed of several significant words; that is, words not merely articles, but such as offer to the mind an image of something. But when the word we want to explain is one of old standing, we cannot suppose it to be made of modern words.

Now we see that the word *friend*, when pronounced slowly, seems to be composed of three words, *fri en ed*; and in order to find what *fri* must have anciently meant, we are to look for it in some other word, and analyse that word when we have found it; that is, divide it into parts. This leads us to the word *friar*, or as it is sometimes written, and ought always to be written, *frier*. Every body knows that *frier* and *brother* were anciently the same word, and that still in French *brother* and *frier* are *frère*; but we see at a glance, that before this word was *frier* it must have been *er fri* (the brother); and hence we discover that *fri* meant formerly *brother*. This first part of *friend* being known, the rest presents little or no difficulty, as we may, after a moment's reflection, discover that the three words *fri-en-ed* are for *fri-in-need* (a brother in need), which is a happy and beautiful definition of *friend*. Here we may remark, that from the letter *i* being already before *en*, this latter word could not be so well written *in*, as by doing so we should have the letter *i* twice — *friind*. This orthography has, however, been adopted by the Germans, who write this word *freund*, in which the *u* is no other than the double *i*, for when we put two *i*'s together, we make the letter *u*; and it was, I have discovered, as we shall see hereafter, in this manner that the first *u* was ever made. The *n* in need could not be preserved in *friend* with propriety, or to any advantage, since it would be then written *friennd*, which would make no difference in

the sound. As to the *eed* which remains when the *n* is omitted, it was not anciently so long ; it could have been only *ed*, since in Saxon *need* is *nedes*, which must have first been *es ned* (the need). Hence of the three words *fri in ned*, of which friend is composed, there are only two letters omitted, an *n* and an *e*, and their omission is easily accounted for.

But the reader will ask how are we to know that *d* is here a contraction of *need*, any more than *heed* or *head*, or some such word? Indeed this cannot be known but by the sense. Thus were we here to adopt *heed* or *head*, or any other one of a similar ending, it would, conjointly with the other two words, have no meaning. But let us choose another word ending with *d*, in order to show that we may always easily know when we have found the true one. *Blind* is a very interesting word. Here we must remark that *i* has its fullest sound, so that *in* in *blind* can scarcely be the same as *in* in *fri-in* ; then *in* is here sounded as if written *eyne*, anciently the plural of *eye*. And when we put vowels before *b* and *l*, as *ib il*, and make these two words precede *eyne*, we shall have *ib il eyne*, that is, *be the eyes*, for *ib* was the first word for *be*, and *il* is an ancient article or pronoun implying *the*. Having thus found those three words in *blind*, we have only to account for *d*, and discover of what word it is a contraction ; and this is not difficult to find, as the other three words lead us to it : this word is *hid* ; so that *blind* is a con-

traction of the four words *be il eyne hid*, “be the eyes hid,” in modern words: *it is the eyes hid*, that is, “it is to have the eyes hid;” which is also a very true and happy definition of the word *blind*. Here too we may perceive that the contraction is very slight; and when we pronounce rapidly together the four words *be il eyne hid*, it is impossible not to produce the sound we hear in *blind*. Thus we see that *be il* became *bl*, *eyne* became *in*, and *hid* became a single *d*. After thus seeing how *friend* and *blind* are accounted for, the word *mind*, about the meaning of which learned philosophers have written so much, offers no difficulty, it being a contraction of *im-eye-in-head* (it is the eye in the head), than which no definition can be more happy. From this ancient article *im* (the original of the English word *him*), the *i* has been dropt, which happens very frequently with this letter when it begins a word; and the *m*, from joining with *eye*, has produced *mi*. Then the *i* in the word following (*in*), was wholly lost in this full sound of *mi*, so that the three words became one syllable, and this one syllable, from its closely and rapidly joining with *head*, made still, with this word *head*, but one syllable; yet when we pronounce the word slowly, we see distinctly every one of the four words of which it is composed: *m-i-n-d* (*the-eye-in-head*) *im-eye-in-head*.

Thus we see that the three words *friend*, *blind*, and *mind*, make altogether, in their contracted state, but three syllables — a syllable for each word — though in their original state they make eleven syl-

lables, each syllable a word. We may also perceive that when we consider these three words as they have been hitherto considered, namely, as three sounds that are in themselves wholly void of meaning, no reason can be assigned why they might not be made to change places with one another. Thus—not to instance but one of them—there is no reason why a person dear to us, might not be called a *blind* or a *mind*, as well as a *friend*, since these three words are, in themselves, utterly void of meaning; that is, when we consider them as they have been hitherto considered. But from the view I have just taken of them, nobody can say they might, with any propriety, be made to change places, since the meaning of each of these three words (for now each word has its meaning) is (separately considered) very different from that of either of the other two. Then when we compare their present state to that in which they have lain for so many ages, they are as three dead bodies restored to life. My whole design shall henceforth be, as I have already said, to put every body in the way of thus discovering the meaning of words, though until the alphabet be known, the various meanings which the same word may with great propriety have, cannot be fully shown. Thus the word *mind* makes not only *in eye in head*, but also *wid*, and this word, when analysed, becomes *wit*. *Mind* will be also found to mean God and eternal life, which agrees with Plato's idea of it.

But an analysis of the Latin word *spiritus* and the French word *esprit*, will give a clearer notion of what is meant by the same word having with great propriety very different meanings. *Spiritus*, when thus analysed, *us-is-ip-ir-it*, means, *that is in the head*; for the first word for *head* was a single *t* or *d*; and this letter meant *life*, or the *divinity* as well as *head*. Thus *head* becomes *vie-a-d*, the life to God; that is, belonging to God; or if written thus, *hed*, it means *the life d*, or the being God. Hence *teste*, now written *tête*, makes also *it-is-te* (*it is the t*), and this may mean *it is the life*, or *it is God*; which will become more intelligible when *teste* is thus analysed, *it-est*, that is, *the being*, or existence. But the Latin for head, *caput*, literally means *the first in life* (*ic ea ip vit*). In like manner *esprit* may be variously accounted for. When analysed thus, *es ip ir it*, its literal meaning is, *it in the head*, which may as well mean, *that in the life* or *the Divinity*. When thus analysed, *es-père-it*, it means *it is the Father*, for father is, I find, also synonymous with *God*, or *eternal life*. *Esprit* is also the same as *pretre* and *priest*. Thus *pretre* must have first been *être père* when *être* fell behind *père*, and both words were shortened to *pretre*. It was anciently written *prestre* (*père-estre*), but this cannot in any way affect the account I have given of it. The word *priest* is also for *père est* (father is), and it ought to be written *preest*, which would cause no change in the pronunciation. The word *esprit* is also the same as

prayer and *prière*, for both these words mean, when analysed, *the being father*, or, more correctly, the *eternal Father*; for the word implying existence is here expressed twice, and it hence implies *all existence*. Thus *prayer* makes *père-AY-ER*, and *prière* becomes *père-I-ERE*. The words for *prayer* must have been thus made, from our addressing in our prayers the Almighty by the name of Father. Indeed, the Latin word *pater* is become synonymous with *prayer*, as when we say a *Pater* or a *Pater Noster*. In like manner, do we not hear a priest called a father in both English and French, which will account for *pretre* being for *père être*, and for *priest* being for *père est*. The word *esprit* becomes also, when thus analysed, *es ip ir it*, the same as the English word *spirit*; and hence the latter is only a contraction of the former, as we may plainly see by analysing this word *spirit*, since it also makes *es ip ir it*, or *is ep ir it*. The words *esprit* and *spirit* mean also (when thus analysed, *it is ip ir*) *it is in the air*; that is, it is a being in the air.

Many other observations might be still made on the above words; but these few will suffice to put every body in the way of supplying what I have here omitted. Hence, too, we may perceive how several words, which are apparently very different, make, after all, but one; and this will account for the growth of languages, and show how the words of men first became confounded.

We have seen how those endings of words common to Greek, Latin, French, &c., are only articles

or pronouns that have fallen behind these words; nor are we to consider them as belonging to one language more than to another, though they may prevail in one language more than they do in another. Thus we see how the nominatives singular of the five declensions of Latin nouns, as *rosa* for the first; *magister*, *dominus*, &c., for the second; *soror*, *corpus*, *avis*, &c., for the third; *manus* for the fourth, and *dies* for the fifth, are to be accounted for; and in order to discover the original of the other five cases, both singular and plural, we are to have recourse to the means by which the nominative singular is known. Thus, if *rosa* be no other than *ea ros*, its genitive *rosæ* can be no other than *æ ros*; and if it be remarked that the pronoun *ea* has *now* for its genitive *ejus*, and not *æ*, this remark avails nothing, since it is evident that *æ* must have also existed; for how does it happen, that in the accusative and ablative singular, as well as in all the cases of the plural, we have the different variations of *ea*? And as to the dative of *ea* (*ei*), it must in the beginning have been the same as *æ*, both in sound and meaning. This observation respecting nouns of the first declension will apply to the whole five; we have in the endings of their different cases ancient pronouns.

Thus, instead of the pronouns *is*, *ea*, *id*, with all their variations, we may set down (which did anciently exist) —

Nom. *us, ea, um*.*Acc. *um, am †, um*.Gen. *i, æ, i*.Voc. *e, ea, um*.Dat. *eo, æ, eo*.Abl. *eo, ea ‡, eo*.

And so might we follow the same system through the five cases plural: these terminations do as evidently belong to those words called by grammarians articles and pronouns, as that two and two make four. But how are those terminations made to have the meaning assigned them? How is it that *ea* (contracted to *a* in *rosa*) means *the*, and that *æ* means *of the* or *to the*? That *ea*, which is only one word, should mean *the*, which is only one word, can be easily conceived; but that *æ*, which is only one word, should mean two words, (*of the* or *to the*, genitive and dative,) is not so easy to conceive. The truth is, that *æ* can be no other than a contraction of two words, and these in the beginning must have been *ea i*. And what, the reader will ask, is the meaning of *ea i*? The grammarian will answer, by saying that it means *of the*; and so may these two words be rendered, as to meaning, by *of the*. But what, the close inquirer may ask, is the meaning of this word *of*? By what means did man in the beginning form this word? Various conjectures have been made by the learned respecting it; but

* Both *us* and *um* are compound words. *Us*, as we shall see hereafter, is composed of *o is*, and *um* of *eu im*, so that *um* might be also written *eum*.

† This is a contraction of *ea im*.

‡ *â* in the abl. of the first declension is only a contraction of *ea*.

the best philologist of our own days, has rejected them all, by supposing this word to be a fragment "of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon *afara* (*posteritas*) *et afora* (*proles*), and that it is a noun-substantive, and means always consequence, offspring, successor, follower*," &c. This etymology is very far from being the true one, as we shall see when explaining the Greek characters, but not sooner. I may, however, here show by what artifice men first made a genitive case in Latin. *ea i* means *the* and *one*, it is a plural number; it is the same as, *one, one*; with this difference, that the first one has a definite meaning, and the second has not; then it is as if we were to say *the one*, and besides this, *one more*; so that put together both words make *the one, one*. We must not forget that, in English, *the* is a compound word, *it he*, which means a particular one, or *the one*, or *the thing*; and when to these two words was added another word (the letter *i*), by which means was formed the word *thei* or *they*, the three words meant *the the the*; the *it he* and *i* having fallen together thus (*i*)*thei*; and though *the* must have existed before *thei* or *they*, still the latter, when formed, prevailed, so that *the* was forgotten, until it afterwards withdrew itself from *they*. But it never lost entirely its plural signification, which explains, as I have already shown, its meaning before adjectives. *Them*, in like manner, means *the the the*, it being composed of *it he im*, which

* Horne Tooke, p. 199.

have also fallen together ; and hence is derived *the*, that is, when it has its objective or accusative signification.

Thus, too, is it in Latin, with regard to *ea i*. *Rosa* means the rose, *rosæ* means also the rose, and besides this, it means *one thing* with regard to the rose ; hence when we say *the rose* and *one thing*, it is to the rose we are to look for the *one thing* ; then we are to consider it as being *of the rose*, that is, one part of it, though it may as well mean *the rose* and *a rose*, since there is nothing in this word as it is now written to show that the *one thing* is a part of the other, and not a whole thing independent of the other. Hence it is that for the want of this distinction, there is no difference between the genitive singular and the nominative plural, for both these cases are equally in the plural number.

I am glad to have till now forgotten, that the ancient genitive of nouns in the first declension was *ai* ; which confirms my opinion that *æ* must be for *eai*.

This simple manner of naming the same thing twice, is undoubtedly the most ancient plural form. As a further confirmation of what I have thus stated respecting the genitive singular and nominative plural being both in the same number, I may remark, that the other declensions do in the same cases go to prove the truth of this statement. The genitive singular and nominative plural have throughout, without a single exception, when the noun is declined regularly, the same number of

syllables ; so that the one is not more singular or plural than the other. Then they are to be considered as differing from one another only in the following respect : the second *one thing* referred to in the genitive singular belongs to the first. Thus *i* in *ros ea i* (the original of *rosæ*) means one thing, but one thing belonging to *rosea* ; whereas *i* in the nominative plural means one thing wholly separate from *rosea*, that is, it is a *rose*, and not one thing belonging to a rose.

When I say that the genitive singular and nominative plural of the other declensions, correspond with this view I have taken of the first declension, I may be told that this agreement does not always exist in the form of the word, though it does in its length. But I can answer, that the genitive singular and nominative plural agree in another respect, and that is in meaning. For what difference is there between *is* in *sororis*, the genitive singular, and *es* in *sorores*, the nominative plural? They are both singular pronouns, and like *i* mean *one thing*, or *the one thing*. This observation will also apply to *corporis*, genitive singular, and *corpora*, nominative plural ; the *a* in the latter word being for *ea*, which is the same *ea* we have already seen in *rosa*. That the reader may the more easily conceive how this happens, it may not be amiss again to remind him that between the verb *to go* and the verb *to be*, and all those words called pronouns, there is not, as to meaning, the least difference ; so that each of these words, when single, can

mean but one thing. Hence did such forms exist as *corporit* and *corporim*, instead of *corporis* and *corpora*, they would be as much in the plural as the two latter words, since each of the four words, *it*, *im*, *is*, and *ea*, refers but to a single thing. Here the reader may ask me if I mean to assert that there is no difference in English between the two words *it* and *is*, in such an instance as, "*it is* a fine day?" I do. Here *it* is not more a pronoun than *is*, nor the word *is* more a verb than *it*; and to prove this to be true, we need only examine the word *est*, which is composed of *is* *it*, or of *es* *it*, that is, of the two English words we have just seen, in "*it is* a fine day;" from which we may see (as *est* means *it is*) that these two words *it is* did not always occupy the same place with regard to each other which they now do; and that *is* was the pronoun and *it* the verb. The truth of this observation becomes palpably evident when we remark, that the third person singular of *eo* (which nobody can any longer doubt to be the same as the verb *to be*) makes *it* and not *is*.

Now the genitive plural has, throughout the five declensions, more pronouns in its composition than the genitive singular, or the nominative plural; and it ought to be so, since the meaning is, "some part of several things." Hence it is necessary that this case should mean as much as the nominative plural means, that is, that it should mean several things, and have, moreover, in itself the meaning of *some*. Hence *rosarum* is composed of the follow-

ing pronouns besides the word for *rose*:—*ea-er-um*. We may add that *um* is a compound, that is, *eo im*; and as *dominus* was first *us domin* (the Lord), hence *dominus* has also in its genitive plural, besides *domin*, the pronouns *eo, er, um*; for *dominorum* is a contraction of *domineoerum*; that is, without considering *domin*. And as *corpus* is the same as *us corp* (the body), *corporum* is also for *corp-eo-er-um*; in which we still see that the genitive plural is more than the nominative plural, since the latter is only *corpora*, that is, *corp-eo-er-ea*; for the *um* we must not forget is equal to *eu im*.

Manus and *manuum*, *dies* and *dierum*, offer also a difference in favour of the genitive plural, since *manus* (for *us man*) contains in the nominative plural but *man-eu-is*; whilst in the genitive, it has *man-eu-eu-im*.

And *dies* (*es di*) is in the nominative plural but *di-es*, whilst in the genitive it is, when we count the *um* in full, *di-er-eu-im* (*dierum*).

Now our word *some* is no other than *um* in Latin, since when analysed it makes *is eo im*; and as for the sound it might as well be written *sum*; but it is more correct to write it as we do, except that the *m* should not be followed by an *e*. Hence the word *some*, which is composed of three pronouns each implying one thing, or, the *one, one, one*, means several things, or several parts of several things; or, in its collective sense, but one single part of one thing, or of several things.

But the termination *um* in the accusative sin-

gular of nouns of the second and fourth declension is to be considered in its singular collective sense only; thus *Dominum* means *the Lord*, and *manum*, *the hand*. Nor is the accusative to be considered throughout the five declensions as differing in number from its nominative, either in the singular or the plural. The same may be said of the vocative; but it is not so with regard to the dative and ablative in both numbers. These two cases have ever in them, as to meaning, a pronoun more than their nominatives; and if they have not always this additional pronoun in their form, this arises from its having been such a pronoun as could from its feeble sound be easily dropt. The first form the dative ever had in Latin must, I have not the least doubt, have been similar in form to the translation given of it in modern languages. Thus, instead of *rosæ* men said *ea i ros* (that the rose), and *ea i* then coalesced and fell behind, making *rosæ*. Thus also have datives been formed in French. The word *canaille*, for instance, is composed of a dative and a noun added together, which must have happened in the following manner:—Men first said *à il can* (*à le chien*, *au chien*), then *à il* became *ail*, and *ail*, from its having preceded *can*, fell behind it, making *canail*, which is the same in sound as *canaille*. But this word has not, however, a word more than it ought to have. The *le* which it has more than *canail* is the article *le* which went before *canail*, thus, *le canail*, and then fell behind it, and so *canail-le* became *canaille*; and hence it is now, on

account of its feminine form, classed with feminine nouns, though it must in the beginning have been masculine.

I have not remarked to the reader that the Latins must have said *is can* before they said *canis*, just as they must have said *is pan* before *panis*; and that, consequently, *can* must have been “for dog.” And why have I not made this remark? Because I have already put every body in the way of satisfying himself that all such terminations can be no other than these words called by grammarians articles and pronouns, and that we may thus see the Latin language while it was yet in a very rude state; since any body may now, by adhering to the method I have thus far shown, set down, in the short space of an hour, a multitude of such old Latin words as *is pan*, *is can*, *is mon*, *us Christ*, *er lib*, &c. And such was the language of Virgil and Horace before these words became *panis*, *canis*, *mons**, *Christus*, and *liber*.

* This is the original of *monster* in English, of *monstre* in French, and *monstrum* in Latin. Then the literal meaning of these words is: *monster*, *it is to be a mountain*; *est er* literally means “it is the thing,” and of course these two words first preceded *mon*, thus, *est er mon* (it is the thing mountain). *Monstre* is for *mon estre*, this *estre* being the infinitive *être*, and the same as *est re* (it is the thing). *Monstrum* is more modern in its form than either the English word *monster*, or the French word *monstre*, since it has in its composition the pronoun *um*, besides what these two words have. Then the Latins had *monstre* or *monster* before they had *monstrum*; and they must have said *um monstre* or *um monster* just as the French say now *le monstre*. And when *um* fell behind *monstre*, and they forgot that such a word had ever preceded it, they would have still put another article before it; and when that fell behind, put still another, and so continue until this single word might cover a page, had not men most fortunately

Thus we may discover all the French words formed from datives. The *a* or the *ea*, from their preceding *il* or *le* or *là*, coalesced with them, so as to make *ail* or *al*. Thus, *central* is from *al centre*; *royal*, from *al roy*; *loyal*, from *al loy*; *moral*, from *al mor**; *machinal*, from *al machin*; *nasal*, from *al nas* (*us nas* must have preceded *nas us*); *papal*, from *al pape*; *oriental*, from *al orient*; *principal*, from *al principe*; and *alors*, from *al or is* (*à l'heure*). *Oris* is for *heure* or for *hora* in Latin. This word *alors* is erroneously supposed to be derived from *illam horam*, whence, it is said, the Italians have also taken *allora*. But here is the manner in which

begun to write, by which means a stop was put to this power of lengthening words, since the language then became settled. From this we learn that it was a *mountain* which first gave men the idea of a *monster*; but when we see in dictionaries that *monster* is derived from *monstrum* in Latin, or from *monstre* in French, what are we the wiser for such information? that is, what clearer idea have we of the word *monster* than we had before? All we learn by such information is this: that in other languages besides English, there is a word for *monster*. It may be observed that we are told what this word in those other languages is; but this adds nothing to our idea of the word *monster*, since in those other languages the meaning which this word carries in itself, as its own definition, is not shown any more than in English.

* *Mores* must, the reader is now aware, be no other than *es mor* (les moers), and we thus perceive that *moralis* and *centrales*, which literally mean "the moral," the central or moral is, "central is," have been formed as French datives, but their form is more modern, since they have the article *is* more than the French words. And by this we also learn, that, when *moral* and *central* were formed, the article *es* had not yet fallen behind *mor*, nor the *um* in *centrum* behind *centre*; hence *moral* and *central* must be words of great antiquity; and these French words are not as it is believed derived from *moralis* and *centrales*, but they are the same words which the Latins must have had previous to their having either *mores* or *centrum*, as these two words do now appear; that is, *mores* and *centrum* instead of *es mor* and *um centre*.

I account for *alors*, *allora*, and *hora*, as well as for the Greek word *ώρα*. The first word for an hour was an O. This *o* took *er* before it thus, *er o* (the hour); then *er* fell behind *o*, and thus was formed *or* by contraction. Then this *or* took *is* before it thus: *is or* (the hour), and *is* fell behind and made *or is*, which became contracted to *ors*. And when the word for *hour* had this form, it took *al* before it; and from these two words having fallen together, was formed the French word *alors*, meaning *à l'heure*. The Latins formed the word for *hour* in the same manner, having first *o*, and then *or*. But when they had *or*, they put *ea* before it, instead of *is*; and from *ea* falling behind *or* and losing the *e*, *ora* was formed, which was also the Greek and Italian form. But the Latins did not stop here: they put *i* before *ora*, which made *i ora* (the hour), for *i* is also an old article. But *i* went over to *ora* and made *iora*; and *iora* took again another *i* before it, *i iora* (the hour); so that the word for *hour* became *iiora*, from this second *i* approaching the first; and now that these two *i*'s might be taken but for one word, men drew a bar between them, thus, *i-i*; and in this manner was formed the first H ever made. Then as the two letters *i i* are here for one word (an article), it follows that H has a similar meaning. Here too the *attentive* reader may discover—that is, before coming to the Greek alphabet—that, as another letter has been formed from the juncture of *i i*, it must follow that H is the same as that other letter.

We shall see, when I show the first name the sun had, what led men to call an *hour* an *O*.

Thus we see how greatly philologists have been in error by supposing that *alors* and *allora* are derived from *illam horam*. How is it possible that such a word as *alors* could be derived from *illam horam*? In the latter form we have two *m*'s, though not even a single *m* in *alors*; and what is there in *illam horam* that could have led to the *s* in *alors*? Here the reader may ask how it happens that the French have not now *ors* or *oris* for *hour* instead of *heure*? I have already told why, when I observed that the same thing might have several names, even in the same country; since in one province men might put one article before a word which, in another province, might receive a very different article; thus we have seen that *is or*, and *ea or*, have been employed to name "the hour." The French word for *hour*, now in use, began as the other words for *hour* did, which we have just seen. But *or* took before it the article *eu*, so that the word became *euor*, and this by contraction *eur*, which took afterwards the article *i* twice, so that a *h* was formed as above.

A few more instances of such terminations as have been made from datives having fallen behind the words they went before, will suffice to remove all doubt on this matter. Thus *bestial*, *legal*, and *regal*, must have first been *al beste*, *al leg*, *al reg*; and afterwards from the *al* having fallen behind, they became *besti-al*, *leg-al*, *reg-al*; and then from

both words having coalesced, the present forms, *bestial*, *legal*, and *regal*, came into being.

The two words *legal* and *regal* seem to offer some difficulty; but, in order to account for them, we have only, by adhering to our system, to show the forms which must have preceded those of *lex* and *rex*; and from the conviction that these words must end with an article, it is not difficult to discover that *lex* and *rex* are contractions of *leg is* and *reg is*. Then men said *is leg* and *is reg*, before they said *lex* and *rex*. Hence the genitives of *lex* and *rex* (*legis* and *regis*) are more conformable to their nominatives than they appear to be; and *regina* is, we now perceive, no other than *ina reg* (*una reg*), that is, *a female king*; and the French word *reine* (anciently *roine*) is, we also discover, the contraction of *roi une* (the *u* alone being omitted). It was, of course, at first *une roi*, until the *une* fell behind *roi*.

Any body may now trace all the words in French formed from datives; but I must not forget to give a few instances of those ending in *au*. This word must have first been *ea eu*, or *à eu* (*a* being the contraction of *ea*). I need scarcely remind the reader that this *eu* (the pretended participle past of *avoir*) has been already fully explained, and proof has been given that it is one of those words called pronouns. Then *ea eu* means *to that*, just as *à il* or *à le* does.

Lionceau (*lion ce au*), that is, *ce au lion*, "this to the lion;" *louveteau* (*louve it au*), that is, *it au*

louve; the word *it* is the same as *ce* or *il*; *drapeau* (*drap eau, au drap*); *renardeau* (*au renard*), that is, “belonging to the fox.” *Flambeau* (*flame-be-au*) *be au flame* (*être à la flame*). *Perdreau* (*au per dri, for à la perdrix*).

But care must be taken not to confound all words in *au* or *eau* with datives. Thus *crapaud*, which is for *cra-ip-eau-id*, and *bourreau*, which is for *be-òu-reo*, cannot be said to belong to the above class. But what, the reader will inquire, is the meaning of *cra-ip-eau-id* and *be-òu-reo*? The former means the *croak in the water*, and the latter *be where criminal*; or, when we recollect that *u* and *v*, and consequently *f*, are often used indifferently, it may also be (but this will cause no change in the sense), *be of criminal*, that is, *the being belonging to the criminal*. We shall see, when we know how the letter *a* has been formed, that *cra* in *cra ip eau* must have first been *cro i*, which means *the croak*. If the present orthography of the English word *croak* be correct, this word must have first been *ea cro*, which, from the *ea* having fallen behind, became *croa*. Then this form must have taken *ic* before it; thus, *ic croa*, and in consequence of *ic* having also fallen behind *cro-a-ic*, written *croak*, has been formed. *Croasser* in French, *crocitus* in Latin, and *κρωγμος* in Greek, may, by an analysis of them, be all traced to the same sound. The *id* at the end of *crapaud* must have first gone before *cra-pau*, thus *id cra ip eau*, — *the croak in the water*. The single *p* in this word is for *ip*, which means *in*,

up, on, over, &c. This *ip* is supposed to be solely Greek, but it does not belong more to this language than it does to Latin, French, and English.

The ablative is to be accounted for after the same manner I have accounted for the dative; for these two make in reality but one case. Let us now see what light this knowledge of Latin cases will throw upon the two classes of pronouns, *mine, thine, ours, yours, theirs, &c.*, and *my, thy, our, your, their, &c. &c.*; but, above all, let us hence endeavour to discover how the plural number in English and several other languages has been formed by an *s*.

The reader may remember that I have already fully accounted for the meaning of the class of pronouns *mine, thine, ours, &c.*, which had been wholly unknown; but there is another great difficulty connected with them, for which I did not then account—I allude to their endings. Thus nobody has been ever able to tell us why *ours, yours, theirs*, and *hers* end as they do; that is, with an *rs*; whilst the other pronouns, *our, your, their*, and *her*, do not end so. For a long time the learned were of opinion that the former class should have an apostrophe before the *s*, thus (*our's*); but this Dr. Johnson has suppressed, and we now very seldom see these words written so. As the class *our, your, &c.*, have always the name of the thing to which they refer following them, as *our book, your book, &c.*, we can, by means of our newly-acquired knowledge, at once perceive that the final *r* is for *er*, and that

“ your book ” means “ you the book ” (you er book) ; that is, “ to you the book,” *er* being a pronoun or article, like *the* ; and in “ the book is yours,” the *rs* is, of course, a contraction of *er es*, or *er is* : and what do these two words mean? why *the thing*, *the thing*, or in one word, the *things* ; for *er is*, or as it may be written, *er es*, becomes, when contracted, *res* ; that is, the *thing*, the *thing*. Then “ yours ” is for *you res* ; that is, *you the things*, or *you the thing*, *the thing*. Hence in “ your books ” we have also *er es*, but they are separated from each other by the word *book*, thus, *you er* (book) *es* (your books). Now this is uncommonly curious, because it has been hitherto utterly unknown how it was that men did, in the beginning, form a plural by means of an *s*. But I should not allude thus to this plural sign more than to any other, since hitherto nobody could discover how the idea of plurality was first named, no matter in what language. We see that the *es* in “ *you er book es* ” occupies the place of the word *book* ; for it is one of those words called pronouns, and if we had it not in this instance, nor any other pronoun as a substitute for it, we should, in order to have a plural, be obliged to name the book twice, and to say, “ *youer book book*,” that is, *you the book book*, meaning “ to you the book book,” instead of *you er book es*, which has been contracted to *your books*. How natural and simple all this appears ! If there be a reader who cannot clearly understand all my remarks that refer to the

manner in which a plural number has been made in Latin, he will surely understand this; for it falls within the reach of every capacity, and it must serve to show how the plural number was first formed in all the languages in the world. Men must have either repeated the noun several times, or only once, and then (to avoid its repetition) a pronoun with it. Thus, for instance, instead of saying *books*, they must have said *book book*, or *book es*; and when it was of a pronoun they had to indicate the plural, they either repeated the same pronoun several times, or, in order to avoid its repetition, they repeated with it either another pronoun, or other pronouns of similar meaning. Thus the word *ye* in English I believe to have been in the beginning *i i i*, that is, the *i* thrice repeated, in order to distinguish it from a dual number, which must have been *you*. This we can the more easily conceive, when we recollect that *y* is for a long *i*, or a double *i*, to which, if we add *i*, we shall have *yi* now written *ye*. The truth of this observation will become more evident when I show how letters were first formed. In the Latin pronoun *is* we have but one pronoun, because it is a singular, but in its plural we have *ii*, that is, *one, one*. And hence we may be sure that whenever we see a plural indicated by a single letter (such as *i*) without its being added to another singular pronoun, it could not have been so in the beginning; and we are to conclude that there were then two *i*'s, of which one has been lost. And

this, too, we can easily conceive, when we remark, that of all letters the *i* is, on account of its short sound, the most easily omitted.

It may be now asked if the apostrophe ought to be preserved before the letter *s* in the pronouns *ours*, *yours*, *theirs*, &c.; my answer is, that it ought (were we consistent with ourselves) ever to precede *s*, in not only these pronouns, but every place where the *s* indicates a plural number, provided the plural number be not expressed by the pronoun *es* in full; that is, as we see it in such terminations as *ch*, *sh*, *x*, *o*, *ss* (*churches*, *fishes*, *boxes*, *cargoes*, *witnesses**). For as, on other occasions, we ever put an apostrophe before *s* when a vowel is omitted (that is, when we are aware of the omission), why should we not do so on this occasion? Thus, as nobody writes *hes* for *he's* (that is, *he is*), why should we write *yours* instead of *your's*, since the latter is for *youres*, just as *'s* is for *is* in *he's*? And since the word *books* is for *bookes*, why should we, if we were consistent with ourselves, write it otherwise than *book's*? But as we are now gone too far in our ignorance to write plural nouns thus with an apostrophe, we should not write the pronouns *ours*, *yours*, &c. otherwise than Dr. Johnson has done; for no reason can be shown, why

* It will appear the more extraordinary that the etymology of the plural sign (when an *s*) has not been hitherto known, if we remark that in all such instances as these we have in the most visible manner the pronoun *es*; that is, without any contraction or disguise whatever.

they should, any more than other words in the language, be allowed this distinction.

It is now by no means difficult to account for the formation of the other pronouns ending with *rs*. Thus as I have done with *yours*, we may do with *ours*, that is, take away the *rs* and this leaves *ou*, an ancient dative implying "to us." *Ou*, when bearing this meaning, is to be analysed thus, *oi-i*, which, when we recollect that *oi* is equal to *v v* or *w*, will, we may perceive, make *wi* or *we*. Indeed *us* itself becomes, when analysed, *vi-is*, which must have first been *is vi*, in which we have also two singulars, each meaning existence.

When in like manner we take *rs* from *hers*, we shall have only *he*; by which we see that this word *hers*, though now feminine, is formed by means of a masculine word; hence the word *she* must be a modern word compared to *hers*, since, had it existed when this latter word was formed, the possessive case would have been made from it.

Then how, it will be asked, did men at the distant epoch to which the formation of this word *hers* belongs, mark the feminine gender if they had no word for *she*? They did this very easily. The word *he*, when it referred to a woman, must have been always preceded by a certain pronoun, by which means no mistake could happen; and this pronoun must have been *is* or *es*. Then *is he* meant *the he*, but the *female he*; and how, it will be asked, do I know that *he* was preceded by *is* more than by any other pronoun? From my remarking that no two

words except *is he* could lead to the formation of the word *she*, in which we have the two words *is he* with the exception of the *i* before *s*, which, on account of its trivial sound in this place, has been dropt. And how was the masculine possessive (*his*) formed; and why does it not end with *rs* like *hers*, *ours*, &c.? It was formed in precisely the same manner as the other pronouns, by the addition of a compound word, such as *eis* (*es is*), which is equal in meaning to *res* (*er es*) to *he*, thus, *he eis*, which two words have been contracted to *his*. The pronoun possessive *theirs* is also formed after the same manner. To *thei* (for *they*) was added *res*, and then contracted, as above, to *rs*.

And whence come *mine* and *thine*? From *my ein* and *thy ein*. *Ein* is an ancient form for *one*, and it still means *one**; and yet *my ein*, &c. does not mean (as we understand these words) *my one*, but *me one one*; that is, *to me one one*; which is equal to *to me all*, that is, *all to me*, *all which I have*, *my whole property*. This happens from *my* being already a contraction of *me i*, that is, *one to me*, or, more literally, *me one*; and, from *me* and *i* having approached each other, *mei* has been formed, which might be written so, such being its exact original

* If we analyse *ein* thus *ei-in* (*one one*) we shall give it its primitive meaning, and this will be *all things* or *own*, this latter word making also when analysed *oi-in* (*one one*). But when *ein* means only *one* we give to one of its parts the meaning of *the*, which names with the other part but a single idea. This accounts for *ain* or *ein* being still used in old language for *own*.

form; but from *me* having been written *mi* (and such is its genuine orthography), and from the other *i* being added to this first *i*, both have been written as a long *i*, or as double *i*, that is, as a *y*; and hence we have *my* instead of *mei*. Then what difference is there between *my* in English and *mei* in Latin? None whatever; they have been made in precisely the same manner, and have precisely the same meaning. But how does it happen that when the word *one* was added to *my*, both words meant *my all*, or *all belonging to me*, instead of *my one*? because *mei* or *my* means already *my one*, or *one to me*; so that when to this, *one* was again added, it was done for the purpose of raising the first *one* to the highest degree; hence *me one one* is similar to the word *yours*, which also means *you one one* (*you er es*, or, *you the one one*.) The *one one* in *mine*, is as much a plural as the *er es* in the word *yours*, since there are in both words two singulars. The reader will say that I make no difference as to meaning between *one one* and *the thing the thing*, and this is very true; for *one one* means “one thing one thing;” and *er es* cannot mean any more. As to *one* being indefinite, and *the one* definite, this has nothing to do with the quantity indicated by the repetition of a singular, which, as we have now clearly seen, was the first method ever practised for composing a plural number.

Such are the words called possessive pronouns: they have, in all languages, both as to form and exact meaning, been hitherto utterly unknown;

but in these respects they have not differed from other words. Though I have said enough about them to put every body in the way of explaining them in other languages, still I cannot forbear alluding to them in French; and for this reason, that Frenchmen, who are certainly the best grammarians in the world, believe that they do thoroughly understand their possessive pronouns. But as I have taken the liberty of differing from them with regard to their *pretended participle past*, and several other interesting points, I must take the liberty of differing from them also with regard to the formation of their pronouns *mon, ton, son; le mien, le tien, le sien; notre, votre, &c.*

ON means one; and it is not, as the learned believe, a contraction of *homme*, no more than it is a contraction of *cheval*. It was first a single *o*, which took before it the pronoun *en*, thus (*en o*), and this meant *the one*; *en* afterwards fell behind *o*, thus, *oen*, and these two words became by contraction *on* instead of *oen*. The supposed preposition *on* is the same word, it being a contraction of *upon*. The latter word was thus formed: it was first *ip*, just as it is still in Greek; and then it meant the *top* as well as *up*; hence it took the article *i* before it, thus, *i ip*, the *top* or the *above*, and by the two words falling together thus, *iip*, the word *up* was formed. Then this *up*, which still meant the *top*, or the *above*, took *on* (*the one*, or *a one*) before it, thus, *on up*, that is, the *top* or the *above*. Then *on* fell behind *up*, and from its joining with it, the

word *upon* was formed, it being now frequently contracted to *on*.

The word *on*, meaning *one*, or *the one*, which is to be found in *all the languages in the world*, either standing apart by itself, or making a part of other words, has been thus formed, as I have shown. But how could such a wonderful coincidence happen? From two objects, the sun and the moon, which are known to all people, having contributed to its formation. Thus, *sol*, *luna*, *soleil*, *lune*, *sun*, and *moon*, give me, when analysed, the same meaning, which is, *the one*.

But how, it will be asked, could different nations have the same word for meaning *one*? This arises from the exclamation *O!* being common to all people, just as the cry of an animal, and the note of a bird, are common to all animals and to all birds of the same kind. While a child is still in its mother's arms, the first name that it gives to the *sun* or the *moon* is *O!* and thus it has been over the whole world; so that, with every people whose language has preserved the first names given to the *sun* and the *moon*, it will be found, on analysing them, that they all began with *O!* And if they have not an *n* joined to this *O!* it arises from another article than *en* having preceded *o*. *Sol* has been thus formed: *il o* (the *o*), meaning *the sun*, or *the one*; then *il* fell behind *o*, thus, *oil*, and both words were contracted to *ol*, and still meant *the sun*, or *the one*. After this *ol* took the article *is* before it, thus, *is ol* (the sun, or the one),

and from these two words coming together, and from the *i* in *is* being dropt, the word *sol* was formed, and it still meant the *sun*, or the *one*. It was from *sol*, thus meaning *one*, that it must have also meant *alone*, and not only whilst bearing this latter form, but also whilst it was *o* and *ol*; and this observation will apply to the *sun* and the *moon* of all languages throughout their different forms; and in this manner *sole* and *solitude*, &c. in English, as well as the corresponding words of other languages, have been formed. The only difference between *sol* and *sun* is that the latter (which ought to be written *son*) began by taking the article *en* before it instead of *il*, as *en o* (the *o*); then *en* fell behind *o* and made *oen*, which is the original of *one*. Then *oen* became contracted to *on*, and, whilst in this state, it took the article *is* before it, thus: *is on* (the *sun* or the *one*), and from both these words coming together, *son* (now written *sun*) has been formed; the *i* in *is* having been lost on account of its short sound. *Moon* began in a similar manner: *en o* (the *o*, the *one*); then it became *oen*, and afterwards, from its taking the article *im* before it, as *im oen* (the *moon*, the *one*), and from this article approaching *oen* and losing the *i*, *moen* (or *moon*, as it is now erroneously written) has been formed. It is scarcely necessary to analyse *luna*, and *lune*; they are both for *el una* and *el une* (in modern French, *l'une*); and they began also with an *o*, thus, *en o*, which, after the manner already shown, became *oen* (written *un*);

then *un* took *ea* before it, as *ea un*; which, from *ea* falling behind, made *una*, *the moon*, the *one goddess*; for *ea* was also the first word for *goddess*, as I find on analysing *dea* (*id ea*). The only difference between *luna* and *lune* is, that the latter has either dropt the *a*, or, that when it bore the form of *un*, it took the article *el* before it, and that it has been written *lune* instead of *lun*, in order to give it the feminine gender. When the French word for *sun* (*soleil*) was formed as far as *sol*, which happened just as it did in Latin, it was written *sole* instead of *sol*, and it then took the article *il* before it, thus, *il sole* (as it is in Italian), and then from *il* falling behind *sole*, *soleil* was formed.

The first word for *sun* in Greek was also an *O*, though it be now written *ηλιος*. This *o* took the article *is* before it, as *is o* (*the o*); then *is* fell behind *o*, and both words became *os* (*the sun, the one, &c.*). The article *i* went then before *os*, making, by its joining with it, *ios*; and this again took the article *el* (*ηλ*) before it, thus: *el ios*, from both of which falling together, *ηλιος* has been formed. Though the two names now used in Greek for the moon (*σεληνη* and *μηνη*) have not an *o* in them, still they have its meaning: thus *σεληνη* literally implies, in the old tongue in which it was first named, *is the one being*, that is, *it is the one being*, or *it the one being*; and *μηνη* means *it one being*. Even the long Siberian word for *sun*, *solontze*, began with a single *o*, as we may perceive from

its two first syllables, *sol-on*, which mean the *sole one*, or the *lone one*; and if we add to these the meaning of *tze*, (*it-ize*, that is, *it is*,) we shall have for the whole word, *the lone one it is*, or *the sole one it is*. All these detailed accounts of the sun and the moon, show clearly whence we have taken the word *on*; they confirm also what I have already said, namely, that men did not name the sun *sol* after the word *solus*, but that the word *solus* must have been formed from *sol*, and the article *us*; as, *us sol*, *solus*.

There is, however, another object, as I have observed, by which man must in the beginning have also named ONE, and that is, one of his fingers; and hence must have come both the letter *i* in the alphabet and the figure one (1). Then men must have also said *en i* (the one), as well as *en o*; and as from the *en* falling behind *o*, the word *on* in French has been formed, in like manner from the word *en* falling behind *i*, when men said *en i*, (that is, *the one*,) the word *ien* was formed, and *ien* must have also meant *one*, just as *on* did. Then *mon* is *me on*, (*moi un*), that is, *one to me*; *ton* is *te on* (*toi un*), that is, *one to thee*; and *son* is *se on*, (*soi un*, *un à soi*), that is, *one to one's self*; and *mien* is *me ien* (*moi un*), that is, *one to me*; *tien*, *te ien* (*toi un*), that is, *one to thee*; and *sien*, *se ien*, (*soi un*, *un à soi*,) that is, *one to one's self*. But Frenchmen will say that they have no such words in their language as *on* and *ien* implying *one*, but I beg their pardon; they have still both these words,

and they do, though it is unknown to themselves I allow, use them very frequently, just as the Latins did, unknown to themselves and every body else, make use of articles all their lives. I beg to set down here a few instances of those ancient French articles. I shall show them in such words as do still exist, or may be easily supposed to have existed at no very distant period, to the end that no doubt may remain on any body's mind as to the words *on* and *ien* being genuine articles or pronouns (allowing as I do, for the sake of being understood, that these two classes of words exist). *On* and *ien* refer to persons as well as to things, and are both definite and indefinite.

As the epoch when these words were in use is very distant, they will of course be seldom found to correspond in gender with their present forms.

garçon — <i>on</i> gars.	patron — <i>on</i> patre.*
limaçon — <i>on</i> limace.	glaçon — <i>on</i> glace.
nourrisson — <i>on</i> nourris (<i>un</i> nourri, <i>un</i> enfant nourri).	chaton — <i>on</i> chat.
jupon — <i>on</i> jupe (<i>une</i> jupe).	caisson — <i>on</i> caisse.
boisson — <i>on</i> bois (<i>une</i> boisson).	jeton — <i>on</i> jet.
crouton — <i>on</i> croute (<i>une</i> croute).	peloton — <i>on</i> pelot.
marmiton — <i>on</i> marmite (<i>une</i> personne à la marmite).	pieton — <i>on</i> piet (<i>un</i> à pie).
	baron — <i>on</i> bar.†
	forgeron — <i>on</i> forger (a forger, a smith).
	carton — <i>on</i> cart.

* *Patre* is for *pa-etre* that is, *papa être*; for *pa* is in *pater* the word for father, the *ter* being a compound pronoun (*it er*) equal in meaning to *être* in French. Hence *patron* means one that is a father.

† Here *b* is for *v* or *w*; and *on bar* is consequently for *on var* or *on*

saucisson — <i>on</i> saucisse.	sablon — <i>on</i> sable.
chauson — <i>on</i> chaus.	dicton — <i>on</i> dict.
melon — <i>on</i> mel* (<i>une</i> pomme).	moucheron — <i>on</i> mouche.
papillon — <i>on</i> papille.	pinçon — <i>on</i> pince.
tourbillon — <i>on</i> tourbelle.	medaillon — <i>on</i> medaille.
poelon — <i>on</i> poel (<i>une</i> poele).	pilon — <i>on</i> pile (<i>une</i> pile).
bouillon — <i>on</i> bouille.	

Nor does the article *on* want the feminine form, as we may perceive from such nouns as *baronne*, *friponne*, *patronne*, &c. &c. The following are instances of nouns in *ien* :—

epicurien — <i>ien</i> epicure.	magicien — <i>ien</i> magic.
gardien — <i>ien</i> garde.	musicien — <i>ien</i> music.
grammairien — <i>ien</i> grainmair.	Parisien — <i>ien</i> Paris.
Indien — <i>ien</i> Ind.	paroissien — <i>ien</i> paroisse.
logicien — <i>ien</i> logic.	rien † — <i>ien</i> re (<i>une</i> chose).
Lutherien — <i>ien</i> Luthere.	chien ‡ — <i>ien</i> ic.

war; that is, "one to the war," "belonging to the war;" and hence *baron* is another word for warrior; and such was this degree of nobility in ancient times. Barbacan (a watch-tower) is also for war-beacon; and barrack means, when analysed, *a war-house*, but which cannot be yet shown, as the observations to which the analysis of this word must give rise are too many and important to find room here.

* *Mel* must have been an ancient word for apple, since in Greek it is *μηλον*, which must have been *ον μηλ*.

† Hence this word was not in the beginning negative; and this much I perceive is known to the learned, since they find it in ancient French writers used affirmatively. But their knowledge respecting this word goes no farther. As to its etymology they know nothing, though they assert with great confidence that its original is *rem*. The accusative case of *res* has been chosen from the similarity between the letters *n* and *m*. But *rem* must have strangely changed to become

‡ (For note, see next page.)

Now what difference is there between the participle present of *ire* (*iens*) and this article *ien*? None whatever as to meaning; and as to form,

rien. Now if the learned had not found this word in ancient writers used affirmatively, could they have ever supposed that it had not always a negative signification? Never. And they would no doubt, notwithstanding the purity of the system by which I am guided, and the multitude of palpable proofs I have brought forward in its favour, boldly assert that a word now so evidently negative as *rien*, could have never been affirmative.

‡ The word *chien* becomes when analysed (and the explanation of the alphabet will show how this happens) *ic iv ien*; or, as *ien* can be reduced to *iv*, we may say it is equal to *ic-iv-iv*. No matter which of these two forms we adopt, the analysis of *chien* will be still the same, since both are expressive of haste. *ic iv ien* means *the thing come* or *go*, or, *life life*. Thus if we contract *iv ien* to one word, we have *vien*, so that *ic vien* will mean *the come*; and this word is we know expressive of haste, since *venir*, as we have seen in the account given of *oient*, means the wind (*ir ven*). In like manner *ic iv iv* may mean *the life life*, which we know from the repetition of *life* must imply quickness. And hence it is that *iv iv* become when contracted, *vive*, that is, *be alive*. Now when we contract *iv-ien* to *vien*, if we give to *ic* its primitive meaning, which is that of *here*, we shall, by allowing that *vien* in the beginning went before *ic*, have for the meaning of both words, *come here* (*vien ic*). Hence it is we still hear a dog called upon in English by *Here! here!* and in French by the word *Ici* with the dog's name attached to it. The English word *dog* is also, when analysed, expressive of haste, since it makes *id eo ge* or *id-o-ge*, which implies *the thing go* or *the go, go*. When we recollect that *canis*, the Latin for *dog*, must have first been *is can* (*the dog*) we may also discover by the analysis of *can* (*ic an*) that this word is also, like *chien* and *dog*, expressive of haste. For we know that *an* is equal to *one*, and consequently to *life* or *haste*. Hence in English we say *on on*, for *go go*; yet *on on* is no other than *one one*. Besides, *an* was in the beginning *o in* or *o en*, which is also equal to *o iv*, or *life life*, or the *sun*, as we have already partly seen, and as we shall see still more fully hereafter. The Greek names for *dog* (*κυων* and *κυνος*, no matter which we take) have also a similar meaning. *κυων* is for *ik-iv-on*, from which word *κυνος* does not differ, but by its having an article (*oc*) more, which neither adds to, nor takes from its meaning, this being as in Latin, French, and English, *the life life, ik-iv-en-os*, which was first *os-ik-iv-en*. Now when we divide the word *chien* thus, *ch-ien*,

there is only the last letter in *iens*, which is a contraction of *is*, another article that must have first preceded *ien*, and that afterwards fell behind it, making *iens* instead of *ienis*.

If it should be remarked, as rather singular, that men should at any time have made use of such a form as *ien grammaire*, *ien Inde*, (of which the literal meaning is, *une personne grammaire*, *une personne Inde*,) instead of *une personne à la grammaire*, *une personne à l'Inde*, we should observe from what we have already seen, that there is in this case a very slight ellipsis, and such as we find connected with the two words *your book*, of which the literal meaning also is, *you the book* (you-er-book), the word *to* being understood before *you*, thus, *to you the book*, that is, “belonging to you the book.” Hence *une personne grammaire*, and *une personne Inde*, are for *une personne à la grammaire*, *une personne à l'Inde*; that is, a person belonging to grammar, a person belonging to the Indies, or, of the Indies. An analysis of such words as *English*, *Irish*, *Scotish*, *Welsh*, *blackish*, *whitish*, &c. contains similar instances of such an ellipsis. Thus:—

and analyse these two parts thus, *ic iv*—*i iv*, each part stands in opposition to the other; hence *ic iv* means *the life*, and so does *i iv*. Then *ien* in *chien* like *ien* in *rien*, must have also gone first; but when this happened we are to believe *ch* to have had its primitive form of *ic iv*. But what reason, it may be asked, have we to suppose that *ien* served once in this instance, as one of those words called articles? From our knowing that before words had received their present settled state, no two of them were ever thus situated, without the one falling behind the other.

English is for Engle (Angle) is he.

Irish ——— Ir is he.

Scotish ——— Scot is he.

Welsh ——— Wale is he.

blackish ——— black is he.

whitish ——— white is he.

In all these words the *is he* has been contracted to *ish**, and *of* is understood before the words preceding this termination; as “of Engl is he,” “of Ir is he,” “of Scot is he,” “of Wale is he,” “of black is he,” “of white is he.” But the primitive order of such a construction must have been, “he is of Engle,” “he is of Ir,” “he is of Scot,” &c. But when the two words *he is* fell behind the radical word, the *he* for the same reason fell behind *is*; and had not the *of* been wholly suppressed, it would in its turn have fallen behind *is he* or *ish*, and so have made English, Irish, &c. become *Englishof*, *Irishof*, &c. But three words were too many to be thus carried behind, and this accounts for the total suppression of the word *of*. Here we not only discover the origin of the termination *ish*, but also the radical part of the word to which this termination belongs. Thus we perceive that the name for England was *Engle*, which does not differ when analysed from *Angle*, since both mean an *Angle*. As to the people named the *Angles*, after whom England is said to be called, their name is only the plural of *Angle* (*Angle-es*,

* With the exception of Welsh, in which the *i* preceding the *s* has been dropt.

equal to *Angle Angle*). The first name for Ireland was *Ir*, to which may be assigned several opposite meanings; but from the same word being in *Erin* (for here *Er* might as well be *Ir*), and from this word *Erin* meaning, when analysed, *green*, (*Er-iv* or *Iv-er*, which is also the same as *ever*,) it is pretty clear, as *Ir* was the first name ever given to *green*, that it is in this sense we ought to consider it in the word *Ireland*, which is frequently called the *Green Isle*. This word *Ir*, it may be supposed, is of Irish origin, and that consequently it cannot be investigated as if it were of Greek or Latin, or of any of the modern languages; but all languages must have the same radical words; and the Irish tongue, notwithstanding the great antiquity and purity which learned men allow it to possess, cannot in this respect form an exception. Thus of the four words of which I find the single name *Dublin* to be composed, there are three that belong to three different languages, as we may thus perceive, *id-du-be-lin*, of which the literal meaning is, *it where be flax*; or, the analysis may be, *id-ov-be-lin*, which will mean, *it of the flax*, the former analysis being equal to *the town where there is flax*, and the latter to *the town of the flax*. According to our notions of languages, the three first words in *id-du-be-lin* are Latin, French, and English, and the fourth word is French; but the truth is, they belong as much to Hebrew or Irish as they do to Latin, French, and English, for in the whole world there is but one language. Thus, if in Irish the

word for *flax* be no longer *lin*, it must have had this form when Dublin received its present name. I regret that a total ignorance of my native language, and a privation of such assistance as one may receive from friends or books, do not, at the moment I write these words, leave it in my power to be positive on this point. But I find, by analysing the word for *flax* in Greek, Latin, French, and English, that, in all these languages, it had, at its birth, the same form and the same meaning. Thus the French word *lin* must have been, previous to its present form, *in li*, which meant *a tye*, or *the tye*; just as the French word *lier* (*to tye*) must have first been *er li* (*the tye*); and when the *in* (or the *en*, as it may also have been,) fell behind *li*, thus, *li-in*, both words were contracted to *lin*; and this was done the more readily to distinguish *li-in* or *li-en* (*flax*) from *lien* (*a link* or *a tye*). Hence between these three French words *lin*, *lien*, and *lier*, there is, as to their radical meaning, no difference. As the Latin word for *flax* (*linum*) must have first been *um lin* (*the flax*), it is to be accounted for in the same manner. And just so are we to consider the Greek word λινον, which must have first been *on lin*, and consequently it does not differ from *linum* but by its having a different article—*on* instead of *um*—which makes no difference in meaning. Hence we see that the word for *flax* in French, is more ancient than it is in either Greek or Latin. The same word in English appears to differ widely from all these, yet it was in the beginning the same word, and its

present form is to be thus accounted for. When it was only *li*, it took the article *ea* before it, thus: *ea li* (*the tye*); and these two words, from *ea* having fallen behind, became contracted to *la* (*the tye*), and in this state we find it still in the analysis of *flax*, which makes *if-la-ic-is*, of which the exact literal meaning is, *the tye it is*.* Hence we discover that the English word *link*, now meaning an iron chain, must in the beginning have been made of flax, since when analysed it becomes *ic lin* (*the flax*); and this word must also, when meaning a torch, have been so called for a similar reason. The word *li* itself becomes when analysed *il i*, which means *the one*, because to tye two or more things together, is to make them become *one*.

The word *Scot* becomes, when analysed, *is-ic-o-it*, which must have first been *ic-is-o-it*, of which the two words *o-it*, from their meaning *the high one*, became contracted to *ot*, which means *height*, and is the same as the French word *haut*. Hence the word *Scot*, from its primitive meaning being *it is the high one* or *high thing* (*ic-is-o-it*), and from this afterwards becoming *is the height* (*is-ic-ot*), we may say that this name is at present synonymous with *height*; so that the exact meaning of the word *Scotish* is, *of the height is he*. But like the French word *haut*, which may be put in both the positive and fourth degree, the word *Scot* may simply mean

* The analysis of the English word *lace* (a tye) proves that *la* must have been once used in this sense, since *lace* is for *la-ce*, or rather, for *la is*, which must have first been *is la* (*the tye*).

high. Thus, when we analyse the word Scotland, it is in this sense that we are to take it; for the analysis of this word is, *is ic ot land*, which means *it is the high land*. The *o* is, besides its other meanings, made to signify *high*, from its being the name of the sun. The word *Wale* becomes, when analysed, *iv-oi-l*, and this word becomes, when contracted, *foil*, *fal*, or *val*, which have all the same meaning. Between *foil* and *fal* there is not any difference, not even in form or the number of the letters, as the reader must perceive if he looks at both words attentively; and this hint, as well as the one already given respecting the French termination *ois*, must lead every close observer to the discovery of the formation of the *a*, before we come to the account to be given of it in the alphabet. Then to *foil* a person meant in the beginning to *fall him*; and as *val* is no other than *vale*, and as the *v* is here equal to *f*, (these two letters, as well as the *w*, having been frequently confounded,) it follows that *vale* is the same as *fall*; and hence we should say, indifferently, *the falls* or *the vales* of a country. Then, allowing Wales to be a plural number, it is synonymous with the *vales* or the *falls*. I have not now time to inquire how etymologists may have explained this word, but there are more than a hundred chances to one that they have not discovered its true meaning. They have most probably been led, by the western situation of this country, to suppose that it has received its name from this circumstance; and here there is a singular coin-

cidence with regard to the words *west* and *fall*: it is, that they have both the same meaning when analysed. Thus, *west* (*w-est*) means *gone is*, and *fall* (*iv-al*) *gone all*. This similarity in meaning must have arisen from the sun appearing to fall when in the west. Hence it might be asserted that Wales has been so called on account of its situation; but there is a circumstance—that of its being in the plural number—which must leave no doubt of its having received its name from its numerous vales or falls.

With regard to blackish, whitish, and all such words, it will be readily admitted that they are for, *of black is he*, *of white is he*, &c., when we remember that *he*, as Dr. Johnson informs us, was anciently used for things as well as for persons.

I beg here to subjoin, before attempting to account for *ma*, *ta*, *sa*, &c., and *notre* and *votre*, a few instances of the French termination *in* being also used as one of the words called articles or pronouns. I shall take them, as I have done with the terminations just explained, from words still in use, or which we can suppose to have existed not long since. I need not remind the reader that the same disagreement as to gender which we have witnessed in the instances of *on* and *ien*, will be also found in the use of the article *in*.

divin — *in div*.*

festin — *in feste* (une fête).

* That is, *un dieu*; when we recollect that *v* is for *u*, it is not difficult to see that *div* must be for *dieu*, since there is only the *e* before *u* omitted. This is also the original of the Persian demons called *dives*.

<i>enfantin</i> — <i>in</i> enfant.	<i>maroquin</i> — <i>in</i> maroque.
<i>fagotin</i> — <i>in</i> fagot.	<i>voisin</i> — <i>in</i> vois (vo-is-in). †
<i>galopin</i> — <i>in</i> galope.	<i>gradin</i> — <i>in</i> grade.
<i>gamin</i> — <i>in</i> game (a game).*	<i>sibyllin</i> — <i>in</i> sibyll.
<i>traversin</i> — <i>in</i> traverse.	<i>tambourin</i> — <i>in</i> tambour.
<i>jacobin</i> — <i>in</i> jacob.	<i>serpentin</i> — <i>in</i> serpent.
<i>malin</i> — <i>in</i> mal.	<i>purpurin</i> — <i>in</i> purpur.
<i>moulin</i> — <i>in</i> mouli.	<i>muscadin</i> — <i>in</i> muscade.
<i>seraphin</i> — <i>in</i> seraph.	&c. &c.

Any body may thus set down all the words in French similar to those here given, and thus discover the real meaning (hitherto unknown) of a great many familiar words. It is extraordinary that a word so frequently used as *gamin*, and of which the etymology is so clear, has not till now been known. It is a name given to the merry little boys of Paris; that is, to those who are fond of *game*; and hence they have been very happily called *gamins*. The word *game* is now wholly unknown to Frenchmen, yet at the time they called a little boy a *game* (*in game*) this word must have been in very frequent use.

And what are we the wiser for knowing that *divin* is from *divinus*; which is all that has been hitherto known of the word *divin*. But this etymology, we see, by examining *divinus* itself, cannot be correct, since this latter word must have been *us divin* before it took its present form. Then it is as true to say that the French word *divin* is derived from

* That is, a play, a pastime (*un jeu*).

† That is, one within calling (voice-it-one; one it to the voice).

divinus, as it were to assert that a father may be the offspring of his own child. If I could believe, which I cannot, that there is a day's difference as to age between Latin and French, I should allow that difference to be in favour of the latter; for it is, generally speaking, far more ancient in the structure of its words than the former. Then *Divinus* literally means, *it one God* (us in Dieu); that is, "it one (to) God."

The word *voisin* is still less known to the learned than *divin* or *divinus*. They derive it from *vicinus*, from having remarked that the latter word is employed in a similar manner; but if they had any suspicion of the meaning which the words *voisin* and *vicinus* carry in themselves, as their own definitions, they would be very far from allowing *voisin* to have such an etymology. This word means, as I have said, a person living within call; but *vicinus* means literally *the here in it* (*iv ic in us*), of which the meaning will be equally literal, but more intelligible, by rendering it thus: *it here in is*; that is, "it is here in," "it is close by." But as the *v* in *vicinus* is, as we shall see, equal to *h*, this word may be also analysed thus: *hîc-in us*, which, when we make the *us* occupy the place it must have held before it fell behind, will literally mean *the here in*; that is, "the close by," *hîc* being the Latin for *here*.

The word which the Latins had for *voice*, previous to their having *vox*, must have been *vo*, since *vox* makes, when analysed, *vo ic is*; that is, *it is*

the voice. The French also had this *vo* for *voice*, and they must have put the same articles before it that it took in Latin, namely, *ic* and *is*. Hence it must have been with them *voic*; this having happened from the *ic* having fallen behind *vø*. When this word had been so far made, the word *voisin* (which ought to be written *voicin*) received its present form. This must have happened in the same manner as the French termination *ois* and the English termination *ish*, both of which have been already accounted for, have been made; that is, men must have used such a form as *one to the voice* (*in a voic*); so that the word for *one* (*in*) having fallen behind *voic*, the latter became *voicin*, which, from neither its meaning nor its etymology being known, is now written *voisin*.

The word *vo* itself becomes, when analysed, *iv o* (*the thing o*), that is, *the sound o*; which implies that this exclamation is characteristic of man, just as any certain cry or note may be said to belong to some particular animal or bird.

I have said enough of those French endings (*on*, *ien*, and *in**) to satisfy every body that they be-

* This *in*, no matter how we consider it, is ever the same word. Thus in the English word *stain*, which is no other than *stay in*—because a stain is that which does in reality *stay in*, and cannot be got out—the word *in* may be very well explained by *the* or *a*, since when thus understood whilst placed before *stay*, as *in stay* (*the stay* or *a stay*), the meaning will be still the same. This too is confirmed by an analysis of the English word *begin*, which makes *be-ge-in*, and literally means, *the go in*; the word *be* being here equal to *the*, and *ge*, to *go*. But if we make *in* precede the two words *be ge*, thus, *in be ge*, the meaning will be *the thing go*, which is also equal to *begin*. An analysis of the word synonymous with *begin*, which is *commence*, is equally


long to the class of words called by grammarians articles or pronouns, and to put others in the way of explaining them all. I have entered into a particular account of only a few of the words to which those endings are attached; but I mean, farther on, to explain several of them which I have left unnoticed.

convincing on this point. Thus this word *commence* makes, when analysed, *come in is*, of which we have the exact meaning when we assign to the word *is* its primitive place and power, thus, *is come in*, that is, *the come in*. But when we put the word *in* first, as, *in is come*, that is, *the thing come*, it is just as with the word *begin* when the *in* of the latter word is also put first. Indeed, the sole difference between *in* when thus differently situated is a difference in degree, and thus it is with all words. From this critical account of *begin* and *commence*, we discover what could not be otherwise known, the precise difference between them. We see that as *begin* (*be-ge-in*) means *the go in*, and *commence* (*is come in*) *the come in*, there is exactly the same difference between them we may perceive between the words *go* and *come*, but not any more.

I forgot, when accounting above for the word *stain*, to allude to its meaning in other languages. The French word *tache* (*tac vie* or *vie tac*) means *the take*, that is, what takes and cannot be got out. This might have been discovered had men only given to the *ch* in this word its primitive sound, namely, that of *h*, since this would have shown them that it was equal to the English word *take*. The Latin for *stain*, *macula*, makes *eu-mac-ivil*, of which the literal meaning is, *the make evil* or *harm*. Though the Greek word is different from this in form, its meaning is similar: *σπιλος* which when analysed becomes *ος-ισ-πι-ιλ*, meaning, *it is in ill*; that is, it is wrong, it is evil, it is harm.

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CLASSIFIED INDEX.

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CLASSIFIED INDEX TO CATALOGUE OF NEW WORKS.

MEDICINE.

Bull's Hints to Mothers -	5
" Management of Children -	6
Elliott's Dictionary of Medicine -	7
Crofton's Human Physiology -	8
Franklin on Enlarged Abdomen -	9
Holland's Medical Notes -	11
Morison on Rheumatism -	18
Marx and Willis (Drs.) on Disease -	20
Pereira on Food and Diet -	23
Rice's Medical Guide -	25
Sandby on Mesmerism -	25

Beale's (Miss) Vale of the Towey -	4
Black's Treatise on Brewing -	5
Bray's Philosophy of Necessity -	6
Claver's Forest Life -	7
Colton's Larcen -	7
De Morgan on Probabilities -	8
Good's Book of Nature -	9
" Help-to-English Grammar -	9
Guest's Mabington -	10
Hand-book of Taste -	11
Hobbes (Thos.), English Works of -	11
Holland's Progressive Education -	11
Howitt's Rural Life of England -	12
Voyage to Roundhead Place -	13
" Student-Life of Germany -	13
" Rural and Domestic Life	
of Germany -	13
" Colonisation and Chris-	
tianity -	13
" German Experiences -	12
Humphreys' Illuminated Books -	14
Jeffrey's (Francis) Contributions to	
The Edinburgh Review -	14
Living's (S. Junc.) on National	
Industries (Pict. Essay) -	15
Letters on American Debts -	27
Life of a Travelling Physician -	16
Louden's (Mrs.) Lady's Country	
Companion -	17
Macaulay's Critical and Historical	
Essays -	18
Macintosh's Miscellaneous Works	
Marx and Willis (Drs.) on Decrease	
of Disease -	20
Muller's Mythology -	15
Peter Plymley's Letters -	27
Sandby on Mesmerism -	25
Seaward's Narrative of Shipwreck -	26
Smith's (Rev. Sydney) Works -	27
Sumner's (Mrs. Felix) Mother's	
Primer -	28
Taylor's Statesman -	29
Walker's Chess Studies -	31
Widoughy's (Lady) Diary -	32

NATURAL HISTORY.	
Catlow's Popular Zoölogy -	6
Gray's Figures of Molluscous Animals	
" and Mitchell's Ornithology -	10
Kirby and Spence's Entomology -	10
Lee's Taxidermy -	10
" Elements of Natural History	
Proceedings of Zoological Society -	24
Stephens's British Coleoptera -	28
Swainson on Study of Natural Hist.	
" Animals -	28
" Quadrupeds -	28
" Birds -	28
" Animals in Menageries -	28
" Fish, Amphibians, and	
Reptiles -	28
" Insecta -	28
" Malacology -	28
" Habits and Instincts of	
Animals -	28
Turton's Shells of the British Islands	
Waterson's Essays on Natural Hist.	
Westwood's Classification of Insects	

NOVELS AND WORKS OF FICTION.	
Carlen's Rose of Tistelon -	6
Doctor (the) -	8
Howitt's (Mary) Neighbours -	12
" Home -	12
" President's Daughters	
" Diary, &c. -	12
" The H. - Family, &c. -	12
Marryat's Masterman Ready -	
Settlers in Canada -	30
Rambles of the Emperor Ching Th	
Trollope's (Mrs.) The Launtings -	30

ONE-VOL. CYCLOPEDIAS AND DICTIONARIES.	
Blaine's Encyclopedia of Rural Science -	15
Brand's Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art -	5

Copland's Dictionary of Medicine -	7
Gwilt's Encyclop. of Architecture -	10
Johnson's Farmer's Encyclopedia -	14
Loudon's Encyclopedia -	17
Trees and Shrubs -	17
Gardening -	17
Agriculture -	17
Plants -	17
McCulloch's Geographical Dictionary -	18
" Dictionary of Commerce -	19
Murray's Encyclop. of Geography -	22
Savage's Dictionary of Printing -	26
Use's Dictionary of Arts, Manufac-	
tures, and Mines -	31
Weber and Parker's Domestic	
Economy -	32

POETRY AND THE DRAMA.	
Aikin's (Dr.) British Poets -	26
Bailie's New Dramas -	3
" Plays of the Passions -	3
Bowdler's Family Shakespeare -	26
Chalmers' Walter Gray -	6
" Poetical Remains -	6
Goldsmith's Poems -	19
J. L. L.'s Poetical Works -	26
Macaulay's Lays of Ancient Rome -	18
Montgomery's Poetical Works -	21
Moore's Poetical Works -	21
Lalla Rookh, an Hum. seq. -	21
" " Ep. seq. -	21
" Irish Melodies -	21
" Do. illustrated by MacIse -	21
Moral of Flowers -	21
Southey's Poetical Works -	27
" British Poets -	26
Spirit of the Woods -	27
Thomson's Seasons -	29

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND STATISTICS.	
McCulloch's Geographical, Statisti-	
cal, and Historical Dictionary -	18
" Political Economy -	19
Kane's (Dr.) Industrial Resources	
of Ireland -	14
Smith's Wealth of Nations	
Spelman's Style of Art Tables -	27
Tooke's History of Prices -	30

RELIGIOUS & MORAL WORKS.	
Amy Herbert -	3
Bailey's Essays on Pursuit of Truth -	3
Bloodfield's Greek Testament -	5
" Colledge and Wood do.	
" Greek & English Testa-	
ment to New Testament -	5
Barter's Oriental Customs -	5
Burns's Christian Philosophy -	6
Calder's Scripture Herbal -	6
Dillon's Sunday Library -	28
Dodridge's Family Expositor -	8
Engelmann-Alte & Alde-Concord -	8
Forster's New Devout Communicant -	9
Hardy's Lit. & Radical Criticism -	12
Kippis's Collection of Hymns, &c. -	15
Marriage Gut -	20
Parker's Domestic Duties -	22
Pearson's Prayers for Families -	23
Riddle's Letters from a Godfather -	24
Robinson's Greek & English Lexicon	
to the New Testament -	25
" On Woman -	25
Spalding's Philosophy of Christian	
Moris -	27
Tate's History of St. Paul -	29
Taylor's Dora Melder -	29
" Margaret, or, the Pearl	
in Normans -	29
Turner's Sacred History -	31
Wardlaw's Socinian Controversy -	31

RURAL SPORTS.	
Blaine's Dictionary of Sports -	4
Hassard's Fishing in Wales -	11
Hawker's Instructions to Sportsmen	
Louden's (Mrs.) Lady's Country	
Companion -	17
Ronald's Fly-Fisher's Entomology	
Thacker's Couriers' Remembrancer	
" Coursing Rules -	22

THE SCIENCES IN GENERAL AND MATHEMATICS.	
Bakewell's Introduction to Geology	
Balmain's Lessons on Chemistry -	3
Brauer's Chemical Science, Literature, and Art -	5
Brewster's Optics -	5

Conversations on Mineralogy -	7
De la Beche on the Geology of Cornwall, &c. -	7
Donovan's Chemistry -	7
Ferry on the Steam Engine -	8
Footbroke On the Arts, Manners, Manes, and Institutions of the Greek & Romans -	9
Greener's Science of Gunnery -	10
" On the Gun -	10
Herschel's Natural Philosophy -	11
" Astronomy -	11
Holland's Manufactures in Metal -	12
Harris's Lectures on Light -	12
Kane's Elements of Chemistry -	13
Kater and Lardner's Mechanics -	14
Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopaedia -	15
" Hydrostatics and Pneumatics -	16
" and Walker's Electricity -	15
" Geometry -	15
" Treatise on Heat -	16
Lectures on Polarised Light -	16
Lecrochier's Photography by Ecten -	8
Lloyd On Light and Vision -	16
Low's Simple Physics of Chemistry -	16
MacKenzie's Philosophy of Vision -	18
Marx's (Dr.) Conversations on the Sciences, &c. -	19
Mealy's Practical Mechanics -	22
" Lardner's Acoustics -	22
Napier's geometry -	25
" Astronomy and Geodesy -	25
Owens's Microscop Comp. Anatomy -	22
Parrell On Heat -	22
Pearson's Practical Astronomy -	23
Phillips's Palaeozoic Fossils of Cornwall, &c. -	23
" Guide to Geology -	23
" On the Geology of Cornwall, &c. -	23
" Introduction to Mineralogy -	23
of Londonberry -	23
Poole's Natural Philosophy -	23
Roberts's Dictionary of Geology -	23
Sanderson's Mathematical Case -	23
Scroderby's Magnetical Investigations -	26
Scott's Optics and Algebra -	26
Thompson's Grammar -	26
Wilkinson's Figures of War -	32
Wood On Railroads -	32

TOPOGRAPHY AND GUIDE BOOKS.	
Addison's History of the Temple Church -	3
" Guide to ditto -	3
Britton's Picture of London -	5
Howitt's German Experiences -	12

TRANSACTIONS OF SOCIETIES.	
Transactions of Societies -	
British Architects -	30
Civil Engineers -	30
Entomological -	30
Linnæan -	30
Zoological -	30
Proceedings of the Zoological Society	

TRAVELS.	
Allan's Mediterranean -	3
Beale's (Miss) Vale of the Towey -	4
China, Last Year -	6
Chorley's Manners and Manners in France and Germany -	7
De Custine's Russia -	7
Harris's Highlands of Ethiopia -	11
Howitt's Wanderings of a Journeyman Taylor -	13
Leing's Notes of a Traveller -	15
" Residence in Norway -	22
" Tour in Sweden -	22
Life of a Travelling Physician -	16
Postane's Observations on Sindh -	21
Seaward's Narrative -	21
Chorley's Manners and Manners in France and Germany -	7
Strong's Greece as a Kingdom -	28
Wilde's Voyage to Madeira, &c. -	32

VETERINARY MEDICINE AND AFFAIRS.	
Field's Veterinary Records -	9
Morton's Veterinary Medicine -	21
" Zoological Chart -	21
Percival's Hippopotography -	23
" Anatomy of the Horse -	23
Spooner On the Leg of the Horse -	23
Turner On the Foot of the Horse -	23
White's Veterinary Art -	23
" Cattle Medicine -	23

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